Naval order of 24 October 1918

The Naval Order of 24 October 1918 was a plan made by the German Admiralty at the end of World War I to provoke a decisive battle between the German High Seas Fleet and the British Grand Fleet in the southern North Sea. When the order to prepare for the sortie was issued on 29 October, mutiny broke out aboard the German ships. Despite the operation being cancelled, these in turn led to the more serious Kiel mutiny, which was the starting point of the November Revolution and the proclamation of the Weimar Republic.

Background
The origin of this operation was the exchange of diplomatic notes beginning on 5 October 1918 between the new German government under Prince Max of Baden and President Woodrow Wilson, in which Germany asked the President to mediate an armistice. One of Wilson's preconditions was the cessation of Germany's submarine war. Despite the objections of Admiral Scheer, the Chief of the German Admiralty Staff, the German Government made this concession on 20 October. The U-boats at sea were recalled on 21 October. In response, on 22 October Scheer ordered Admiral Hipper, commander of the High Seas Fleet, to prepare for an attack on the British Fleet, utilizing the main battle fleet, reinforced by the newly available U-boats. Hipper's order was promulgated on 24 October, and approved by Scheer on 27 October. The Fleet then began to concentrate at Schillig Roads off Wilhelmshaven to prepare for the battle.

State of the German fleet
The High Seas Fleet in October 1918 was built around the core of 18 battleships and 5 battlecruisers, most of which had been completed before the outbreak of war. Since the Battle of Jutland in May 1916, the obsolete pre-Dreadnoughts had been de-commissioned, two new battleships with 15-inch guns (SMS Baden and SMS Bayern) and the new battlecruiser SMS Hindenburg had joined the fleet, but one Dreadnought battleship SMS Rheinland had been damaged beyond repair by running aground in the Baltic. The fleet had undertaken only three sorties into the North Sea at full strength since June 1916: 18–19 August 1916, 18–19 October 1916, and 22–25 April 1918. This prolonged period of relative inactivity, at a time when all other branches of Germany's armed forces were very heavily engaged, did much to undermine the morale of the crews and the self-respect of the officers. Acts tantamount to mutiny took place on various occasions during 1917, the most noteworthy being the arrest of 200 men from the battleship SMS Prinzregent Luitpold in August, resulting in two executions.

Full text of the order
The order of 24 October for the High Seas Fleet's attack is as follows:

U-boat operations
The plan called for 25 U-boats to be deployed in six lines in the southern North Sea, in the hope of ambushing British ships sailing to counter-attack the German Fleet raiding forces. Other U-boats were to undertake special operations involving British Naval Bases. On 23 October seven U-boats at large in the North Sea (U-108, UB-86, UB-121, UB-125, UB-96, UC-58 and U-60) were diverted by wireless signals to take up positions off Rosyth, in order to give the alarm when the British Fleet sailed, and hopefully launch attacks. In addition,U-43, also at sea, was directed to take up a watching position near the Tyne. Starting on 24 October, the other U-boats began departing from Heligoland to their patrol areas.

Two of these U-boats were lost. The first, U-78 (Oblt. Johann Vollbrecht), sailed on 27 October from Heligoland for a minelaying mission off the Scottish East Coast, but she was torpedoed and sunk the same day by the British submarine G2 in the central North Sea, roughly 280 nautical miles east of the Firth of Forth. All 40 crewmen were lost.

The other submarine to be sunk was UB-116, which sailed from Heligoland on 25 October with special orders to attack the British fleet anchorage at Scapa Flow. She was commanded by the 26-year-old Oberleutnant zur See Hans Joachim Emsmann who, since first becoming a U-Boat captain in February 1918, had sunk a total of 26 ships. She attempted to enter Scapa Flow submerged by the southern passage, Hoxa Sound, on the evening of 28 October. Hydrophones mounted ashore at Stanger Head, Flotta, alerted the British defenses, and the sea-bed magnetometer loops, designed to detect the magnetic signatures of incoming vessels and thus trigger remote-controlled mines, were activated. Emsmann raised his periscope at 11:30 pm, presumably to check his position, and was spotted by look-outs on shore; the mines detonated shortly thereafter, leaving the submarine disabled on the sea bed. There are reports that at least some of the crew survived the initial mine detonation and that tapping could be heard from the disabled vessel. She was finished off by depth-charges from defense trawlers shortly thereafter; all 36 crew members were lost.

Two other submarines, UB-98 and UB-118 were damaged in collision with each other on 28 October, and had to return to port. Two others, UB-87 and UB-130 also aborted their missions due to breakdowns.

State of the Grand Fleet
In late October 1918 the British Grand Fleet, based at Rosyth in the Firth of Forth, had some 35 Dreadnought battleships and 11 battlecruisers (including two of the very lightly armored ). Twenty of these ships had been completed since the outbreak of war, and a third of them were armed with the highly effective 15-inch gun; the oldest capital ship in the fleet was Indomitable (commissioned in June 1908). Five of these ships were from the United States Navy and one from the Royal Australian Navy.

The materiel problems which beset the Grand Fleet at the Battle of Jutland and beyond, (i.e. poor flash-protection in ammunition handling, lack of deck armour over magazines, deficient armour-piercing shells, and too few destroyers) had all been remedied to various extents. In particular, the newly designed "Green Boy" shells for the fleet's heavy guns were thought to be such a great improvement in offensive power that they nullified the advantage of the heavier armour protection of German battleships. Moreover, the fleet possessed new weapons (such as ship-borne torpedo aircraft, and fast steam-driven submarines) for which the German fleet had no match. The morale in the British Fleet was high in anticipation of a re-match for Jutland, the personality and leadership of the Commander-on-Chief, Admiral Sir David Beatty, being an important reason for this.

Intelligence
In the First World War British Naval Intelligence in general, and code-breaking in particular, was highly efficient. It played a very important role in the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland, in the American entry into the war on the Allied side, and the defeat of the U-boats in 1917-18. By late 1917 improvements in German communications security had made intelligence gathering more difficult, at least as far as the High Seas Fleet was concerned. Between October 1917 and April 1918, the Germans were able to launch three surprise sorties into Norwegian waters against mercantile traffic, on the last occasion (22–25 April 1918) employing their whole fleet. Each time the British did not receive sufficiently timely warning to mount an effective counter-attack.

High-power wireless communications were essential for the control of U-boats at sea; but this also allowed efficient triangulation-based location of the U-boats by the Allies. In addition, U-boats employed a simpler cypher system than that used by the surface fleet, which Room 40, the British Admiralty's code-breaking section, could usually read with few difficulties. In October 1918 these methods allowed the Admiralty to track the U-boats sent to blockade Rosyth. As early as the afternoon of 23 October the Admiralty alerted Admiral Beatty that the situation was abnormal and that they would reinforce him by sending destroyers from the anti-submarine Flotillas based at Plymouth and Buncrana. By late on 28 October the situation was reaching a climax, and Vice Admiral Sydney Fremantle, the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff and Rear Admiral Reginald Hall, the Director of Naval Intelligence sent Beatty a full appreciation which read, in part:

"″Dispositions of enemy submarines combined with positions of their large minefield recently laid and now clear constitutes fairly decisive evidence of his desire to draw the Grand Fleet out ... No evidence of how he proposes to achieve this object but evidence that no move of his battlefleet can take place before ... tomorrow night. No objective of the enemy is apparent that will not involve great risk for him. Therefore he may confine himself to emerging from the Bight and returning after making us aware of his exit by W/T signals. Unlikely the enemy will risk fleet action until the Armistice negotiations are settled one way or another. Press reports of German submarines proceeding home via the Norwegian Coast probably emanate from Germany and are intended to conceal existence of submarine trap.″"

Throughout the following 48 hours, Fremantle was able to keep Beatty well informed of developments in a timely manner, correctly describing the concentration of the High Seas Fleet at Schillig Roads on the evening of the 29 October, and its intention to sail on the 30 October. Hipper's unexpected postponement of the operation on 30 October was initially ascribed to fog.

Comparison of forces
The detailed orders of battle are given in the Appendix, and are summarized in the table below. The disparity in forces was roughly 2-to-1 in favor of the British. Had the battle been joined, it would have involved some 69 capital ships (in comparison with 58 involved at Jutland).

A realistic plan or pointless sacrifice?
Writing postwar, Admiral Scheer asserted that this plan might have achieved a favorable result for Germany, with any German losses balanced by losses to the British, so that the Germans would retain sufficient surface forces to protect a renewed U-Boat offensive. The High Seas Fleet had undertaken similar diversionary attacks intended to draw British units into a submarine/mine ambush before: the Action of 19 August 1916 was the one occasion when this tactic came closest to succeeding. A surface engagement off Terschelling near dusk on the second day offered some tactical advantages for the Germans and, if surprise were achieved, the Germans would have had a reasonable chance of inflicting more losses than they received before retiring with the bulk of their force intact. On 27 October the German Government had agreed to the surrender the fleet as part of the armistice; thus in strictly material terms, the German Navy had nothing to lose.

Admiral Beatty's specific intentions are not recorded, but there seems no doubt that he would have sailed as soon as the Germans were reported to be at sea, and would have aggressively pursued battle. With the war as good as won, there was no need of the prudence which had characterized Grand Fleet operations until then. Given the distances involved, if the German sortie were reported promptly and the Grand Fleet sailed immediately on receipt of such a report, there was every possibility that they could have cut off the German line of retreat and forced a fight to the finish. Admiral Hipper seemed well aware of the risk in this plan, and expressed a sanguinary attitude about it: "a battle for the honour of the fleet in this war, even if it were a death battle, it would be the foundation for a new German fleet.".

Henry Newbolt, the official historian of the Royal Navy during the First World War, compared Hipper's planned operation with Michiel de Ruyter's Raid on the Medway in June 1667, when the Dutch Fleet launched a surprise attack on the English naval bases in the Thames estuary, inflicting a serious defeat and in consequence securing a more favorable peace treaty for the Netherlands at the end of the Second Anglo-Dutch War.

More recently, it has been argued that the plan was a deliberate act of counter-revolution by the German Naval High Command against Prince Max of Baden and the peace party: regardless of the outcome of the battle, the launching of the attack would have hopelessly compromised the armistice negotiations and the credibility of Prince Max's government.

Cancellation of the plan
The High Seas Fleet had assembled in Schillig Roads on the afternoon of 29 October in preparation for sailing the following day, 30 October. A ruse that operation was a training sortie was employed for security, as was usual practice. The raid on the Thames and the Flanders Coast were thus scheduled for dawn, 31 October, and the battle with the British Fleet in the afternoon and evening of the same day.

However the evening of 29 October was marked by unrest and serious acts of indiscipline in the German Fleet, as the men became convinced their commanders were intent on sacrificing them in a deliberate attempt to sabotage the Armistice negotiations. A large number of stokers from Derfflinger and Von der Tann failed to return from liberty ashore and were rounded up by the authorities; insubordination was rampant on board Thüringen, Kaiserin, Helgoland and Regensberg; and mutinous demonstrations took place in König, Kronprinz Wilhelm and Markgraf. Even in the fleet flagship Baden the mood of the crew was dangerous. The mutinous behavior was confined to the crews of the larger ships; the crews of torpedo-boats, submarines and minesweepers remained loyal

Bowing to the inevitable, Admiral Hipper cancelled the operation on 30 October and ordered the fleet dispersed in the hope of quelling the insurrection. However, the damage had been done: ships of the III. Battle Squadron, arrived at Kiel via the Kaiser Wilhelm Canal on 1 November, carrying with it the glowing ember of mutiny which would ignite with full force on 3 November.

Appendix: Orders of battle
Had this operation resulted in a battle between the British and German fleets, it would have been one of the largest Naval Battles in history. The following lists give details of the ships which would potentially have been involved.

[[Image:War Ensign of Germany 1903-1918.svg|60px|border|KLM Ensign]] German order of battle
The German fleet was to be organized into three groups, plus supporting submarines and airships, as follows

High Seas Fleet Commander-in-Chief, High Seas Fleet: Admiral Franz Ritter von Hipper in battleship Baden

Scouting forces
 * Commander, Scouting Forces: RAdm Ludwig von Reuter in battle cruiser Hindenburg
 * I. SG (RAdm Reuter) battlecruisers: SMS Hindenburg (F), SMS Derfflinger, SMS Moltke, SMS Von der Tann, SMS Seydlitz
 * II. SG (Cdre Viktor Harder) light cruisers: SMS Königsberg (1915) (F), SMS Karlsruhe (1916), SMS Pillau, SMS Nürnberg (1916), SMS Köln (1916), SMS Dresden (1916), SMS Graudenz
 * Deputy Leader of Torpedo-Boats FKpt Hans Quaet-Faslem in light cruiser: SMS Frankfurt
 * II. TBF destroyers: (3. hf) SMS G101, SMS G104, SMS V100, SMS G103, SMS G102; (4. hf) destroyers: SMS B97, SMS B111, SMS B109, SMS B110, SMS B112
 * I. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (2. hf) SMS V130, SMS S133, SMS S135, SMS S134, SMS S139
 * VII. TBF (detachment) torpedo boats: (13. hf) SMS S138, SMS V83, SMS S65, SMS V78, SMS S56

Main body (under Commander-in-Chief)
 * III. BS (VAdm Hugo Kraft), battleships: SMS König (F), SMS Bayern, SMS Grosser Kurfürst (1913), SMS Kronprinz Wilhelm, SMS Markgraf
 * Fleet Flagship battleship: SMS Baden (F, Adm Hipper)
 * I. BS (VAdm Friedrich Bödicker) battleships: SMS Ostfriesland (F), SMS Thüringen, SMS Posen, SMS Nassau, SMS Oldenburg, SMS Westfalen, SMS Helgoland
 * IV. BS (VAdm Hugo Meurer) battleships: SMS Friedrich der Grosse (1911) (F), SMS König Albert, SMS Kaiserin, SMS Prinzregent Luitpold, SMS Kaiser (1911)
 * Leader of Torpedo-Boats Cdre Paul Heinrich(GE) in light cruiser SMS Emden (1916)
 * I. TBF torpedo boats: (1. hf) SMS V129, SMS G39, SMS G86, SMS G40, SMS G38, SMS S32
 * V. TBF torpedo boats: (9. hf) SMS G11, SMS V6, SMS V3, SMS V2; (10. hf) SMS G8, SMS G10, SMS V5
 * VI. TBF torpedo boats: (11. hf) SMS V128, SMS V127, SMS S132, SMS S131, SMS V126, SMS V125; (12. hf) SMS V43, SMS V45, SMS V44, SMS S49, SMS S50, SMS V46
 * IX. TBF (17. hf) torpedo boats: SMS V80, SMS S52, SMS S51, SMS S60, SMS S36

Minelaying group
 * IV. SG (RAdm Johannes von Karpf(GE)) light cruisers: SMS Regensburg (F), SMS Bremse, SMS Brummer, SMS Strassburg, SMS Stralsund; attached minelayers: SMS Arcona, SMS Möwe
 * VIII. TBF torpedo boats: (15. hf) SMS T180, SMS T193, SMS T192, SMS T195, SMS T190, SMS T189; (16. hf) torpedo boats: SMS T178, SMS T179, SMS T176, SMS T186

Airships: L65, L64, L63, L52, L61, L56, SL22 Submarines: thirty U-boats were assigned to this operation, in six patrol lines: SMU U-43 (Germany), SMU U-52, SMU U-53, SMU U-60, SMU U-62, SMU U-78, SMU U-86, SMU U-91, SMU U-94, SMU U-96, SMU U-100, SMU U-107, SMU U-108, SMU U-113, SMU U-162, SMU UB-64, SMU UB-67, SMU UB-80, SMU UB-86, SMU UB-87, SMU UB-93, SMU UB-96, SMU UB-98, SMU UB-116, SMU UB-118, SMU UB-121, SMU UB-125, SMU UB-126, SMU UB-130, SMU UB-131, SMU UC-58.

[[Image:Naval Ensign of the United Kingdom.svg|60px|border|Royal Navy Ensign]] British order of battle
This is the administrative order of battle of the Grand Fleet and other important commands in Home Waters in late October 1918. We have excluded minesweepers, sloops and older vessels employed on patrol duties, confining ourselves only to forces likely to have been engaged had the German sortie gone ahead. Some of these ships may not in fact have been available to sail on 30 October due to breakdowns or routine maintenance. The Grand Fleet was based at Rosyth, with usually one Squadron detached to Scapa Flow for gunnery training.

Grand Fleet Commander-in Chief: Adm Sir David Beatty in battleship HMS Queen Elizabeth (1913) (attached light cruiser: HMS Blanche (1909), destroyer: HMS Oak (1912))
 * 1st BS (Adm Sir Charles Madden) battleships: HMS Revenge (06) (F), HMS Resolution (09), HMS Royal Sovereign (05), HMS Royal Oak (08), HMS Ramillies (07), HMS Emperor of India, HMS Benbow (1913), HMS Iron Duke (1912), HMS Marlborough (1912), HMS Canada (1913) (attached cruiser: HMS Bellona (1909))
 * 2nd BS (VAdm Sir John de Robeck) battleships: HMS King George V (1911) (F), HMS Ajax (1912), HMS Centurion (1911), HMS Erin, HMS Orion (1910), HMS Thunderer (1911), HMS Monarch (1911), HMS Conqueror (1911), HMS Agincourt (1913) (attached cruiser: HMS Boadicea (1908))
 * 4th BS (VAdm Sir Montague Browning) battleships: HMS Hercules (1910) (F), HMS Neptune (1909), HMS St. Vincent (1908), HMS Colossus (1910), HMS Bellerophon (1907), HMS Collingwood (1908) (attached cruiser: HMS Blonde (1910))
 * 5th BS (VAdm A C Leveson) battleships: HMS Barham (04) (F), Malaya, HMS Valiant (1914), Warspite
 * 6th BS (RAdm H Rodman) battleships: USS New York (BB-34)(USN) (F), USS Texas (BB-35)(USN), USS Arkansas (BB-33)(USN), USS Wyoming (BB-32)(USN), USS Florida (BB-30)(USN)

Cruisers (with main body)
 * 2nd CS (RAdm E F Bruen) armoured cruisers: HMS Minotaur (1906) (F), HMS Achilles (1905), HMS Cochrane (1905), HMS Shannon (1906)
 * 4th LCS (RAdm A F Everett) light cruisers: HMS Calliope (1914) (F), HMS Cambrian (1916), HMS Constance (1915), HMS Comus (1914), HMS Cordelia (1914), HMS Caroline (1914)''
 * 7th LCS (RAdm G H Borrett) light cruisers: HMS Carysfort (1914) (F), HMS Cleopatra (1915), HMS Penelope (1914), HMS Aurora (1913), HMS Undaunted (1914)
 * Flying Squadron (RAdm R F Phillimore) aircraft carriers: HMS Furious (47) (F), HMS Campania (1914), HMS Argus (I49), HMS Vindictive (1918), HMS Nairana (1917), HMS Pegasus (1917)

Battlecruiser force
 * Commander-in-Chief: VAdm Sir William Pakenham in battle cruiser HMS Lion (1910)
 * 1st BCS (RAdm Sir Henry Oliver) battle cruisers: HMS Repulse (1916) (F), HMS Renown (1916), HMS Princess Royal (1911), HMS Tiger (1913)
 * 2nd BCS (RAdm Sir Lionel Halsey) battle cruisers: HMAS Australia (1911)(RAN) (F), HMS New Zealand (1911), HMS Indomitable (1907), HMS Inflexible (1907)
 * 1st CS (VAdm T D W Napier) battle cruisers: HMS Courageous (50), HMS Glorious
 * 1st LCS (RAdm W H Cowan): HMS Caledon (D53) (F), HMS Inconstant (1914), HMS Galatea (1914), HMS Phaeton (1914), HMS Royalist (1915)
 * 2nd LCS (RAdm J A Fergusson): HMS Birmingham (1913) (F), HMS Dublin (1912), HMAS Melbourne (1912)(RAN), HMAS Sydney (1912)(RAN), HMS Yarmouth (1911)
 * 3rd LCS (RAdm A T Hunt): HMS Chatham (1911) (F), HMS Birkenhead (1915), HMS Chester (1915), HMS Southampton (1912)
 * 6th LCS (RAdm E S Alexander-Sinclair): HMS Cardiff (D58) (F), HMS Calypso (D61), HMS Caradoc (D60), HMS Cassandra (1916), HMS Ceres (D59)

Destroyer flotillas
 * Commodore (Destroyers): Cdre H J Tweedie in light cruiser: HMS Castor (1915)
 * 3rd DF leaders: HMS Nimrod (1915), HMS Talisman (1915); destroyers: HMS Maenad (1915), HMS Mameluke (1915), HMS Marvel (1915), HMS Menace (1915), HMS Michael (1915), HMS Munster (1915), HMS Napier (1915), HMS Noble (1915), HMS Nonsuch (1915), HMS Onslaught (1915), HMS Petard (1916)
 * 11th DF leaders: HMS Valorous (L00), HMS Seymour (1916), HMS Kempenfelt (1915); destroyers: HMS Romola (1916), HMS Sarpedon (1916), HMS Tenacious (1917), HMS Tormentor (1917), HMS Tancred (1917), HMS Vivacious (D36), HMS Vittoria (1917), HMS Vortigern (1917), HMS Watchman (D26), HMS Versatile (D32), HMS Walker (D27), HMS Vancouver (1917), HMS Viscount (1917), HMS Walrus (1917), HMS Vanessa (D29), HMS Vanity (D28), HMAS Voyager (D31)
 * 12th DF leaders: HMS Valhalla (1917), HMS Saumarez (1916); destroyers: HMS Simoom (1916), HMS Winchester (L55), HMS Wrestler (D35), HMS Scimitar (1918), HMS Torch (1918), HMS Vivien (1918), HMS Wolsey (1918), HMS Scotsman (1918), HMS Scout (1918), HMS Scythe (1918), HMS Tomahawk (1918), HMAS Waterhen (D22), HMS Sepoy (1918), HMS Speedy (1918), HMS Seabear (1918), HMS Sirdar (1918), HMS Trinidad (1918), HMS Tryphon (1918)
 * 13th DF light cruiser: HMS Champion (1915), leaders: HMS Valentine (1917), HMS Valkyrie (1917); destroyers: HMS Vimiera (1917), HMS Vega (1917), HMS Vectis (D51), HMS Violent (1917); HMAS Vendetta (D69), HMS Verulam (1917), HMS Wakeful (H88), HMS Westminster (L40); HMS Verdun (1917), HMS Viceroy (1917), HMS Vesper (D55), HMS Venetia (1917); HMS Wolfhound (L56), HMS Ursa (1917), HMS Ursula (1917), HMS Urchin (1917); HMS Umpire (1917), HMS Ulster (1917), HMS Tower (1917), HMS Tristram (1917); HMS Vidette (D48), HMS Winchelsea (D46), HMS Westcott (D47); HMS Windsor (D42), HMS Whitley (L23), HMS Woolston (1918), HMS Walpole (D41), HMS Wessex (D43), HMS Wryneck (D21)
 * 14th DF leaders: HMS Vampire (D68), HMAS Anzac (1917); destroyers: HMS Ophelia (1915), HMS Relentless (1916), HMS Medina (1916), HMS Nonpareil (1916), HMS Observer (1916), HMS Opportune (1915), HMS Orestes (1916), HMS Pellew (1916), HMS Peyton (1916), HMS Plover (1916), HMS Patriot (1916), HMS Offa (1916), HMS Peregrine (1916), HMS Plucky (1916), HMS Norman (1916), HMS Orford (1916), HMS Pylades (1916), HMS Warwick (D25), HMS Velox (1917), HMS Whirlwind (D30), HMS Paladin (1916), HMS Penn (1916), HMS Octavia (1916), HMCS Patrician, HMS Tyrant (1917), HMS Splendid (1918), HMS Tobago (1918), HMS Sabre (1918), HMS Seafire (1918), HMS Seraph (1918)
 * 15th DF leaders: HMS Parker (1916), HMS Grenville (1916); destroyers: HMS Rapid (1916), HMS Sabrina (1916), HMS Radstock (1916), HMS Rowena (1916), HMS Ready (1916), HMS Raider (1916), HMS Restless (1916), HMS Rocket (1916), HMS Rigorous (1916), HMS Sable (1916), HMS Rob Roy (1916), HMS Salmon (1916), HMS Sorceress (1916), HMS Rosalind (1916), HMS Trenchant (1916), HMS Undine (1917), HMS Tirade (1917)
 * 21st DF leaders: HMS Botha, HMS Douglas (D90), HMS Swift (1907); destroyers: HMS Miranda (1914), HMS Matchless (1914), HMS Milne (1914), HMS Morris (1914), HMS Murray (1914), HMS Mentor (1914), HMS Mansfield (1914), HMS Moorsom (1914)

Harwich Force
 * 5th LCS (RAdm Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt) light cruisers: HMS Curacoa (D41) (F), HMS Centaur (1916), HMS Concord (1916), HMS Conquest (1915), HMS Coventry (D43), HMS Curlew (D42), HMS Danae (D44), HMS Dragon (D46)
 * 10th DF leaders: HMS Montrose (D01), HMS Bruce (D81), HMS Shakespeare (1917), HMS Spenser (1917); destroyers: HMS Starfish (1916), HMS Sybille (1917), HMS Redgauntlet (1916), HMS Satyr (1916), HMS Skate (1917), HMS Stork (1916), HMS Sturgeon (1917), HMS Sylph (1916), HMS Radiant (1916), HMS Redoubt (1916), HMS Skilful (1917), HMS Tempest (1917), HMS Thruster (1917), HMS Retriever (1917), HMS Sharpshooter (1917), HMS Springbok (1917), HMS Truculent (1916), HMS Sceptre (1917), HMS Torrid (1917), HMS Taurus (1917), HMS Tetrarch (1917), HMS Thisbe (1917), HMS Teazer (1917), HMS Sparrowhawk (1918), HMS Swallow (1918), HMS Tactician (1918)

Minelaying destroyers
 * 20th DF (Immingham) leaders: HMS Abdiel (1915), HMS Gabriel (1915), destroyers: HMS Ferret (1911), HMS Sandfly (1911), HMS Lawford (1913), HMS Legion (1914), HMS Prince (1916), HMS Tarpon (1917), HMS Telemachus (1917), HMS Vanquisher (D54), HMS Vanoc (1917), HMS Venturous (1917)

Destroyer reinforcements The following are the modern vessels in Buncrana, Devonport and Dover flotillas in October 1918. These flotillas were ordered to provide reinforcements to the Grand Fleet after 23 October. There were 16 L-class/M-class destroyers temporarily attached to the Grand Fleet on 11 November 1918.
 * 2nd DF (Buncrana) destroyers: HMS Mandate (1915), HMS Marne (1915), HMS Martial (1915), HMS Michael (1915), HMS Milbrook (1915), HMS Minos (1914), HMS Moresby (1915), HMS Nicator (1916), HMS Ossory (1915), HMS Pelican (1916), HMS Pigeon (1916), HMS Magic (1915), HMS Manners (1915), HMS Medway (1916), HMS Mindful (1915), HMS Mons (1915), HMS Mounsey (1915), HMS Mystic (1915), HMS Musketeer (1914)
 * 4th DF (Devonport) leader: HMS Faulknor (1914); destroyers: ''HMS Nereus (1915), HMS Oberon (1916), HMS Onslow (1916), HMS Oracle (1915), HMS Oriole (1916), HMS Orpheus (1916), HMS Pasley (1916), HMS Laertes (1913), HMS Lance (1914), HMS Laurel (1913), HMS Laverock (1914), HMS Lennox (1914), HMS Leonidas (1913), HMS Liberty (1913), HMS Lochinvar (1915), HMS Loyal (1913), HMS Lysander (1913), HMS Lookout (1914), HMS Minion (1915), HMS Narwhal (1915), HMS Nepean (1915), HMS Nerissa (1916), HMS Morning Star (1915), HMS Nizam (1916), HMS Norseman (1916), HMS Obdurate (1916), HMS Obedient (1916), HMS Oriana (1916), HMS Osiris (1916), HMS Rival (1916)
 * 6th DF (Dover) leader: HMS Broke (1914); destroyers: HMS Afridi (1907), HMS Amazon (1908), HMS Cossack (1907), HMS Crusader (1909), HMS Saracen (1908), HMS Viking (1909), HMS Zubian, HMS Manly (1914), HMS Myngs (1914), HMS Melpomene (1915), HMS Termagant (1915), HMS Trident (1915), HMS Nugent (1917), HMS Phoebe (1916)

Submarines operating with the Battle Fleet
 * 12th S/MF: HMS K2, HMS K3, HMS K5, HMS K6, HMS K7, HMS K8, HMS K15
 * 13th S/MF: HMS K9, HMS K10, HMS K11, HMS K12, HMS K14, HMS K16, HMS K22

North Sea patrols
 * 8th S/MF (Yarmouth) submarines: HMS H21, HMS H28, HMS H29, HMS H30
 * 9th S/MF (Harwich) submarines: HMS E29, HMS E31, HMS E41, HMS E43, HMS E45, HMS E51, HMS E52, HMS E53, HMS E56, HMS L9, HMS L15, HMS L14, HMS L17, HMS C23, HMS C25
 * 10th S/MF (Tees) submarines: HMS E27, HMS E33, HMS E39, HMS E40, HMS E42, HMS E44, HMS G6, HMS G12, HMS G13, HMS L11, HMS L12, HMS L16
 * 11th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: HMS G1, HMS G2, HMS G3, HMS G4, HMS G5, HMS G10, HMS J2, HMS J3, HMS J4, HMS J5, HMS J6, HMS J7
 * 14th S/MF (Blyth) submarines: HMS H8, HMS H11, HMS H12, HMS H14, HMS H15, HMS H22, HMS H23, HMS H24, HMS H25, HMS H26, HMS L8, HMS R1, HMS R2, HMS R9, HMS R12

Abbreviations
Adm: Admiral BCS: Battle Cruiser Squadron BS: Battle Squadron (German: Geschwader) Cdre: Commodore (German: Kommodore) CS: Cruiser Squadron DF: Destroyer Flotilla F: Flagship FKpt: Frigate Captain (German: Fregattenkapitän) hf: half-flotilla (German: halbflottille) LCS: Light Cruiser Squadron RAdm: Rear Admiral (German: Kontreadmiral) (RAN): Denotes a ship of the Royal Australian Navy S/MF: Submarine Flotilla SG: Scouting Group (German: Aufklärungsgruppe) TBF: Torpedo-Boat Flotilla (German: Torpedoboot Flottille) (USN): Denotes a ship of the United States Navy VAdm: Vice Admiral (German: Vizeadmiral)

Published Sources

 * Patrick Beesly (1984) Room 40: British Naval Intelligence, 1914-1918 (Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-281468-0).
 * F. J. Dittmar and J. J. Colledge (1972), British Warships 1914-1919 (Shepperton: Ian Allan Ltd. SBN 7110 0380 7).
 * Admiral Walter Gladisch (GE) (1965), Der Krieg zur See 1914-18/Nordsee Bd.7 (Frankfurt: Verlag E S Mittler & Sohn).
 * Robert M. Grant (1969), U-Boat Intelligence 1914-1918 (London: Putnam).
 * Erich Gröner(GE)(1983), Die deutschen Kriegsschiffe 1815-1945, Bd.2: Torpedoboote, Zerstörer, Schnellboote, Minensuchboote, Minenräumboote (Koblenz: Bernard & Graefe Verlag. ISBN 3-7637-4801-6).
 * Prof. Arthur J. Marder (1969), From the Dreadnought to Scapa Flow, Vol.5: Victory and Aftermath (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
 * Henry Newbolt (1931),The History of the Great War: Naval Operations Vol.5 (London: Longmans, Green and Co.)
 * Tobias R. Philbin III (1982), Admiral von Hipper: The Inconvenient Hero (Amsterdam: B. R. Grüner Publishing Co. ISBN 90-6032-200-2).
 * Reinhard Scheer (1920), Germany's High Seas Fleet in the World War, English edition (London: Cassell and Company, Ltd.), Ch.18.
 * Rear Admiral Arno Spindler (1966), Der Krieg zur See 1914-18/Handelskrieg mit U-booten, Bd.5 (Frankfurt: Verlag E S Mittler & Sohn).