Day of Deceit

Day of Deceit: The Truth About FDR and Pearl Harbor is a book by Robert Stinnett alleging that the Roosevelt administration deliberately provoked and allowed the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in order to bring the United States into World War II. Stinnett claimed to have found information showing that the attacking fleet was detected through radio and intelligence intercepts, but that the information was deliberately withheld from Admiral Kimmel, the commander of the base.

First released in December 1999, it received a nuanced review in the New York Times and is frequently referenced by proponents of advance knowledge theories. Historians of the period, however, in general reject its thesis, pointing to several key errors and reliance on doubtful sources.

Stinnett's proposition
Stinnett's starting point is a memorandum written by Lieutenant Commander Arthur H. McCollum in October 1940, which was obtained through the Freedom of Information Act. McCollum, who was head of the Far East desk of the Office of Naval Intelligence at the time, discussed the strategic situation in the Pacific and ended with a list of eight actions directed at the Japanese threat. Stinnett characterizes the actions as "provocations" and states his belief in McCollum's point F ("Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands") was intended to lure the Japanese into attacking it. Stinnett asserts that the overall intent was to provoke an act of war which would allow Roosevelt to enter into active conflict with Germany in support of the United Kingdom.

Short and Kimmel were ordered to remain in a defensive posture with respect to the Japanese. Stinnett claims that intelligence intercepts were deliberately withheld from them in order to prevent them from mounting an adequate defense. He also claims radio traffic was intercepted from the fleet as it approached Hawaii, allowing it to be tracked, but that again this information was withheld so that the defenders would be unprepared. All of this, says Stinnett, was directed from the White House itself with Roosevelt's knowledge and at his behest.

Reception
Most, if not all, scholars of this topic are dismissive of Stinnett's claims, as many of his claims appear to be baseless. An article in Salon quotes CIA historian Donald Steury:"[Stinnett] concocted this theory pretty much from whole cloth. Those who have been able to check his alleged sources also are unanimous in their condemnation of his methodology. Basically, the author has made up his sources; when he does not make up the source, he lies about what the source says." Nor has evidence of the enormous conspiracy required to substantiate his claim, which has to number in the low hundreds, been uncovered. Stinnett's evidence the memo went to Roosevelt is illusory. His promise to provide all his documents and recordings and thereby prove his allegations, made when Day of Deceit was published, as of 27 June 2009 remained unfulfilled. Stinnett's premise that a US war with Japan would benefit the UK is widely challenged: such a dividing of American military attention was contrary to Britain's best interests, and Churchill, Roosevelt and Hitler knew it.

Certain points in Stinnett's argument were disputed by many reviewers. His characterization of the McCollum memorandum was not accepted by Conrad Crane, Chief of Historical Services and Support at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center, who wrote:"A close reading shows that its recommendations were supposed to deter and contain Japan, while better preparing the United States for a future conflict in the Pacific. There is an offhand remark that an overt Japanese act of war would make it easier to garner public support for actions against Japan, but the document's intent was not to ensure that event happened." In actuality, Stinnett attributes to McCollum a position McCollum expressly refuted. Furthermore, McCollum's own sworn testimony also refutes it. Furthermore, he ignores the fact a war between the U.S. and Japan is contrary to President Roosevelt's desire to aid Britain, and Prime Minister Churchill's desire to avoid "another war".

Philip Zelikow, writing in Foreign Affairs, objected to Stennitt's claim that the Japanese naval code was being read at the time (the JN-25 code was changed shortly before the attack and was not decrypted again until May 1942), an objection also raised by Crane. A review posted on the U.S. Naval Cryptologic Veterans Association website addresses the intelligence issues in greater detail and disputes claims that the fleet was detected through direction finding; the author also criticizes Stinnett's use of testimony from Robert Ogg, originally identified as "Seaman Z" by John Toland in his 1986 book. Indeed, Ogg expressly denies saying what Toland quotes him as saying. In their annotations on the 1995 Pentagon study of the attack, Frederic Borch and Daniel Martinez, chief historian at the USS Arizona Memorial, also dispute these claims and call his claims "totally false".

Stinnett's claims of "intercepts" are contradicted by Japanese testimony, which unequivocally state there were none, and even transmitter keys were removed from radios of ships in the task force. (The claim of a need for "low-power radio" made by Stinnett ignores standard fleet practise under radio silence, use of flag or blinker.)  Moreover, his "intercepts" do not amount to direction finding bearings, contrary to his claims, while his document allegedly showing the plot of these nonexistent bearings contains nothing of the kind.

"If there was this vast and humongous conspiracy", its members had to number in the hundreds. Among them would have to be Lt. Kermit Tyler who, on the morning of 7 December, was contacted about a radar contact on an inbound flight, and told the operators to forget about it. One would also have to include the Navy duty officer, who was asleep when Ward first tried to report a minsub contact, thereby losing over three hours' warning. It would also include the officer who ordered AAF fighters be parked in close proximity to avoid sabotage. Also included would be the senior antiaircraft officers, who ordered ammunition to be locked up far from the guns.

Furthermore, Stinnett makes numerous and contradictory claims of the number of messages originated by the Kido Butai, attributing to it messages from shore stations, Yamamoto's flagship (which was not accompanying the task force), deception measures, and traffic from before the task force even sailed. Moreover, he finds "not a single one" originating from the Kido Butai after it sortied 26 November.