3rd Ranger Infantry Company (United States)

The 3rd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) was a Ranger light infantry company of the United States Army active during the Korean War. As a small special forces unit, it specialized in irregular warfare.

Formed in the fall of 1950, the 3rd Ranger Company was used for several months as a cadre of training staff for the Ranger Training Center at Fort Benning, Georgia. The company deployed to South Korea in March 1951 and was assigned to the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division for four months, where it was used as a reconnaissance and scouting unit, probing North Korean People's Volunteer Army positions. The company is known for its "Battle of Bloody Ridge" on 11 April where it stumbled into a Chinese ambush on its first mission, but was able to push the opposing force back. The company later supported the 3rd Infantry Division at the Battle of the Imjin River.

Later in the summer, the company was used as a stealth "target acquisition" force, infiltrating Chinese positions and spotting concentrations of troops and equipment for artillery attack. The company was deactivated on 1 August 1951, and was merged with the U.S. 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team alongside all other Ranger units.

Origins
With the 25 June 1950 outbreak of the Korean War, the North Korean People's Army had invaded the Republic of Korea (ROK) with 90,000 well-trained and equipped troops who had easily overrun the smaller and more poorly equipped Republic of Korea Army. The United States (U.S.) and United Nations (UN) began an intervention campaign to prevent South Korea from collapsing. The U.S. troops engaged the North Koreans first at the Battle of Osan, being badly defeated on 5 July by the better-trained North Koreans. From then on, the U.S. and UN saw a steady stream of defeats until they had been pushed back to the tip of the peninsula, into a 140 mi-long fortification dubbed Pusan Perimeter by August. At the same time, North Korean agents began to infiltrate behind UN lines and attack military targets and cities.

UN units, spread out along the Pusan Perimeter, were having a difficult time repelling these units as they were untrained in combating guerrilla warfare. North Korean special forces units such as the NK 766th Independent Infantry Regiment had defeated ROK troops and used irregular warfare tactics effectively, prompting Army Chief of Staff General J. Lawton Collins to order the creation of an elite force which could "infiltrate through enemy lines and attack command posts, artillery, tank parks, and key communications centers or facilities." All U.S. Army Ranger units had been disbanded after World War II because they required time-consuming training, specialization, and expensive equipment.

With the defeat of the NK 766th Regiment at the Battle of P'ohang-dong, and the strength of U.S. infantry units in question, U.S. commanders felt recreating Ranger units was essential. In early August, as the Battle of Pusan Perimeter was beginning, the Eighth United States Army, in command of all US forces in Korea, ordered Lieutenant Colonel John H. McGee, the head of its G-3 Operations miscellaneous division, to create a new experimental Army Ranger unit, the Eighth Army Ranger Company. In the meantime, the Ranger Training Center was established at Fort Benning, Georgia.

Organization
With the successful development of the Eighth Army Ranger Company as a "test" unit for the United States Army to bring back Army Ranger units, additional Ranger companies were ordered. The companies were small light infantry special forces units which specialized in infiltration and irregular warfare.

The new 3rd Army Ranger Infantry Company was formulated based on the Table of Organization and Equipment documents of Ranger units in World War II, all of which had been deactivated. The 3rd Ranger Infantry Company was organized into three heavily armed platoons. A headquarters element of five men oversaw the platoons. Each platoon comprised 36 men in three squads, two assault squads and one heavy weapons squad. Each platoon was also furnished with 60mm M2 mortars, M20 Super Bazookas, and M1918 Browning Automatic Rifles. One sniper was designated for each platoon, with the remainder of the troops equipped with M1 Garand and M2 Carbine rifles. They were authorized two vehicles; an M38 Jeep and an M35 2½ ton cargo truck. Overall, the company was far more heavily armed than both the Eighth Army Ranger Company and standard infantry companies. Like the other numbered Ranger companies, its organization called for five officers and 107 enlisted men in three platoons.

The troops for the Ranger company were to be Airborne qualified, so the Ranger Training Center heavily recruited troops from the 82nd Airborne Division and 11th Airborne Division who had already completed United States Army Airborne School. In spite of this, only one Ranger operation in the conflict ever required an airborne landing. They initially wore a black and gold scroll as a shoulder sleeve insignia, but that insignia was later redesignated the Ranger Tab and the Rangers adopted a black, red and white scroll similar to that unofficially worn by Ranger Battalions in World War II.

Formation and training
Of a pool of 5,000 applicants, the Ranger Training School selected 22 officers and 314 enlisted men for the first three Ranger companies on 2 October, which were entirely white. A fourth, all African-American company was organized several days later. The 3rd Ranger Infantry Company (Airborne) was organized on 9 October 1950, assuming the lineage of A Company of the 3rd Ranger Battalion. It had an initial strength of 135 enlisted men and five officers. The unit was formally activated on 25 October 1950 at Fort Benning. It was placed under command of Captain Jesse Tidwell and executive officer Captain Bob Channon.

The Rangers trained extensively in reconnaissance, long-range patrols, motorized scouting, setting up roadblocks, land navigation, camouflage, concealment, and adjusting indirect fire. They undertook frequent live fire exercises, many at night, simulating raids, ambushes and infiltrations. The Rangers trained 60 hours per week and ran 5 mi each day and frequently held 20 mi speed marches, which were considered traditions for Ranger training from World War II. The training for the numbered companies included much of the program used by second lieutenant Ralph Puckett to train the Eighth Army Ranger Company. In spite of a 30 percent dropout rate, most of the men completed the course and graduated 15 November 1950.

While the 1st, 2nd and 4th Ranger Company each embarked for Korea shortly after their training was complete, the 3rd Ranger Company was retained at Fort Benning, to train the next cycle of Rangers, the 5th, 6th, 7th and 8th Ranger Company. This proved beneficial to the 3rd Company, as it was given cold-weather training alongside the 5th and 8th companies at Fort Carson, Colorado, after the training cycle was complete; the Ranger units already in Korea had not received this training and were thus unprepared for the Korean winter. The 3rd Company also received additional training which better prepared it for combat, including tactics of the People's Volunteer Army, which the other companies had learned in battle and tracer designation of targets during night attacks. They also received a 57mm Recoilless Rifle section, and were trained to be their own forward observers for artillery. In March 1951, the 3rd, 5th, and 8th Companies sailed for Korea, a trip which was fraught with frequent discipline problems as the Rangers continuously got into fights with U.S. Marines on board the troopship while en route. After the trip, they spent most of the month in Yokohama, Japan training and preparing for the front lines.

Bloody Nose Ridge
The Rangers sailed for Korea on 24 March, passing Pusan and arriving at Inchon on 31 March. There, it separated from its sister companies and was attached to the US 3rd Infantry Division near the Imjin River, where the division was engaged in an intense battle with Chinese forces, attempting to push them further north.

The 3rd Ranger Company entered action on 11 April, part of a tank-infantry task force conducting aggressive reconnaissance in a wide valley near the river. Encountering a village, 1st and 2nd Platoons cleared the village and killed two Chinese stragglers. Covered by tanks, the platoons then moved to the high ground around the village, later known as "Bloody Nose Ridge." Tidwell and Channon split the company into two forces which attempted to move along the ridge. Channon's force, on the east ridge, was ambushed by a company of Chinese infantry as it attempted to move up. In the ensuing confusion, Channon was wounded and evacuated on the supporting tanks, leaving his two platoons alone and facing the Chinese force. Tidwell's platoons were also held up by Chinese fire, and with all of the company radiotelephone operators wounded and equipment not working, the Ranger elements were unable to communicate with one another or their artillery support.

Channon was eventually able to return to his men, ordering them to attack the ridge to push the Chinese off. Channon's force advanced 600 m across paddy land while under attack from three Chinese machine gun positions and mortar fire. Once at the base of the ridge, they encountered additional Chinese resistance in trenches that necessitated tank support. The rangers then fought entrenched Chinese troops at grenade range, and, after intense fighting, they were able to push the Chinese off the ridge. Eventually a bayonet charge, coupled with the tanks moving into supporting positions, forced the Chinese troops to retreat. Four Rangers were killed and 32 wounded in this first engagement.

The company then advanced up the valley under sniper and artillery fire until it located and destroyed a Chinese communications and supply center at the end, before returning to 3rd Infantry Division lines. In all, they had killed over 100 Chinese in this fight, and the division commanders considered the mission a success in spite of the high casualty count. In this action, the Rangers adopted a new motto, "Die Bastard, die!"

Imjin River missions
Despite suffering over 50 percent casualties by this time and with few reinforcements, 3rd Ranger Company remained on the line, and was used as a reconnaissance element for the division. As the 3rd Infantry Division advanced, pressing gains from the Chinese, the company was used to guard a vital bridge over the Hantan River. It then massed with several combat engineers and other division elements to form Task Force Rogers. The task force then probed north searching for Chinese concentrations, but did not encounter any Chinese troops.

On 19 April, the Chinese conducted a counteroffensive in the 3rd Infantry Division sector, first striking to the east, followed by a feint that struck near the Rangers' position. The task force was assigned to rescue a group of five 3rd Division tanks that had been disabled 8 mi inside Chinese territory. Advancing, they suppressed a Chinese ambush before the Chinese could attack, and advanced under mortar attack and took the hills surrounding the tanks. They then returned the stranded tanks to UN lines at a cost of two wounded.

On 22 April, the Rangers, tanks and engineers conducted another probe of the Chinese positions, to ensure they could not launch a surprise attack on nearby Republic of Korea Army formations. Encountering two Chinese companies dug in at a hill with one route of attack, Tidwell ordered a surprise attack on the hill, which was successful in pushing Chinese forces off the outlying fortifications.

It then moved to reinforce the British 29th Infantry Brigade, which was cut off on Hill 235 after ROK troops folded under attack. After two days of intense fighting and foot marching, the Rangers moved to relieve the British troops, despite itself being at only 67 percent strength. Encountering heavy resistance, they were initially unable to break through Chinese formations to relieve the British.

Chinese forces counterattacked, destroying a 3rd Infantry Division tank column sent to assist the Rangers and attacking the 3rd Ranger Company from three sides, as they dug into a hill. Though the Rangers eventually were forced to withdraw, the defense of the Rangers, the US 3rd Division and the British 29th Brigade had broken the momentum of the Chinese offensive.

Target acquisition unit
The 3rd Infantry Division then moved to the offensive, in early May 1951 they were used to scout for Chinese concentrations and then call in artillery to destroy them. These actions have been viewed by historians as one of few instances where Rangers in Korea were effectively employed, used as a stealthy infiltration force for terrain too difficult for conventional units.

On 11 May, with Chinese forces slackening their offensive, 3rd Ranger Company was recalled to Kimpo Airfield for parachute proficiency training, above the objections of the 3rd Infantry Division commanders who considered the company invaluable. The company spent several weeks in division reserve, and undertook various missions such as convoy security and guarding command posts, as well as surveillance and visiting patrols behind the front lines. In one of these rearguard actions, the Rangers evacuated a rundown village only to have one member of the unit, Corporal Dave Rauls, captured by three Chinese infiltrators.

By 17 June, the company was returned to the front and operated again as a target acquisition unit. Paired with 3rd Infantry Division's reconnaissance company, an artillery battery and a forward air control party, they became known as "Task Force Ferret." Positioned 6 mi ahead of the main division positions, the unit was also placed to warn the rest of the lines should the Chinese attack. By this time, however, the front lines in the battle had begun to largely stabilize, and as both armies fortified stationary positions, the Rangers infiltration abilities became unusable.

Final mission and disbandment
In July, the division was holding on the "Iron Triangle," strategically important and defensible ground. In an attempt to strengthen its forces, the 3rd Infantry Division evacuated hills 682 and 717 at the southern base of the triangle, positioning the Rangers to appear as if they were still manned the hills. After eight days of patrols, Tidwell ordered an aggressive patrol to strike Chinese positions. Over three nights, they ambushed four Chinese patrols, causing several casualties and suffering few of their own.

On 10 July, the U.S. Army ordered the deactivation of all of its Ranger companies. The Army noted that the Ranger companies were only an exercise directed by The Pentagon which was complete. The 3rd Ranger Company was deactivated on 1 August 1951 in Korea. Like many of the other Ranger units, most of the Ranger veterans were folded into the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, where their airborne skills could be used. Still, Operation Tomahawk was the last airborne jump of the war.

Awards and decorations
The 3rd Ranger Infantry Company was awarded three campaign streamers and two unit citations for its service in the Korean War. In 1953, the unit was again designated A Company of the 3rd Battalion, 75th Ranger Regiment, that unit carries on the 3rd Ranger Company's lineage.