Operation Soberanía

Operación Soberanía (Operation Sovereignty) was a planned Argentine military invasion of Chile started on 22 December 1978 due to the Beagle conflict dispute. The invasion was halted after a few hours and Argentine forces retreated from the conflict zone without a fight. Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile cannot be established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border.

In 1971 Chile and Argentina agreed to binding arbitration of an international tribunal to settle a boundary dispute (Beagle Channel Arbitration). On 22 May 1977 Queen Elizabeth II announced the judgment, which awarded the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands to Chile.

On 25 January 1978 Argentina rejected the decision and attempted to militarily coerce   Chile into negotiating a division of the islands that would produce a boundary consistent with Argentine claims.

Date, objective and name of the operation
According to Argentine sources after the Argentine refuse of the Arbitral award in January 1978, the plan of invasion was given different names depending on the planning level and phase. Also the targets of the invasion changed according to the political situation and to the information about the Chilean defense effort: first only the Picton, Nueva and Lennox islands, then the "little" Evout, Hoorn, Deceit and Barnevelt islands, then both groups of islands. Finally, on Friday 15 December 1978 Argentina's President Jorge Videla signed the order to invasion on 21 December 1978 at 04:30 as the beginning of the invasion, but it was postponed for the next day because of the bad weather conditions in the landing zone.

Military imbalance
At the time of the crisis, the Argentine military was substantially larger than that of Chile; in addition, the Chilean regime was more politically isolated and had suffered deteriorating relations with its chief suppliers of arms. The Chilean military, however, had the advantage of defending difficult terrain, as well as being a more professional force. On the other hand decades of intervention by the Argentine armed forces in day-to-day politics had degraded their professional skills.

There was considerable international condemnation of the Chilean regime's human rights record, with the United States expressing particular concern after Orlando Letelier's 1976 assassination in Washington D.C. The United States banned the export of weapons to Chile through the Kennedy Amendment, later International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. 16 Northrop F-5's were delivered to Chile before the embargo took effect, but they arrived without any armament. In 1980 Chile was excluded from UNITAS joint naval maneuvers because of human rights violations. Germany, Austria and the United Kingdom the traditional supplier of the Chilean Armed Forces, did not supply weapons to Chile.

In 1978, the United States extended the Kennedy amendment to Argentina as well because of its human rights record, which led to the Armed Forces purchases shifting to Europe: France, Germany, and Austria exported weapons to Argentina even during the critical phase of the Beagle conflict, as Argentina had already rejected the international binding Arbitral Award. In December 1978, when the outbreak of war appeared unavoidable, the German shipbuilding and engineering works Blohm + Voss and the Argentine Junta agreed to the building of four destroyers. In November 1978 France delivered two corvettes to Argentina, originally built for the apartheid Regime in South Africa. The corvettes, Good Hope and Transvaal, could not be delivered because of anti-apartheid embargoes. In Argentina they were renamed ARA  Drummond  and ARA  Guerrico . United States President Ronald Reagan (1981–1989) would later improve relations to Argentina due their military support in fighting Nicaragua's Contras. (See Operation Charly).

The United Kingdom delivered Type 42 destroyers to the Argentine junta. On 19 September 1977 the ARA Hércules (built and completed in the UK) sailed to Argentina from the Vickers Shipbuilding yard in Barrow-in-Furness; on 28 November 1981 the ARA Santísima Trinidad (built in Argentina, completed in the UK) sailed from Portsmouth.

An overview of both countries' defense spending:  * Costs in millions of 1979 US dollars.

The Argentines' numerical advantage was counterbalanced by the following factors:
 * Defense is less risky than attack


 * Chile spent a higher portion of its gross domestic product on defense
 * The politicization of the Argentine armed forces diminished their military readiness


 * The Andes mountain range is a difficult natural barrier and the geography of the Tierra del Fuego provided advantages to Chilean naval forces in the immediate operational theatre

The Ambassador of the United States in Argentina (1978) Raúl Castro described the attitude of the Argentine military towards a possible war with the following:


 * "They supposed that they were going to invade Chile, Santiago especially. It seemed to them something very easy; Just a matter of crossing the border and that the Chileans were going to surrender right away. And I told them: No, no, you are mistaken. They have a better Navy than yours. They are well armed, and are very strong"

Augusto Pinochet foresaw a long and bloody war, a kind of partisan war:
 * "a guerrilla war, killing every day, shooting people, by both sides, and in the end, by a matter of fatigue, we would have reached peace"

Argentina solicited a Peruvian attack in Chile's north, but Peru rejected this demand and ordered only a partial mobilization.

Argentine plan
No Argentine official documents or statements concerning the planning of the war of aggression Clarín Buenos Aires, Argentina, 20 December 1998 ... la mediación del papa Juan Pablo II fue providencial para la Argentina: no sólo evitó una guerra de agresión contra Chile .... Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998: "De hecho, Chile no iba a ser el país atacante. Lo tenía todo: las islas y más aún. Era el generalato argentino el que auspiciaba el estallido.". La Nación, Argentina 12 August 1996: "Se tomó, por tanto, la decisión de invadir a Chile y se puso en marcha el reloj de la cuenta regresiva.". See pages 242 and 243 from "Argentina in the twentieth Century" or "Breve Historia Contemporanea de la Argentina", Luis Alberto Romero, 1994, Pennsylvania State University Press or Fondo de Cultura Economica, ISBN 0-271-02191-8 or ISBN 0-271-02192-6: "The aggression against Chile ...". Pacho O'Donnell, "Historias Argentinas", 1. Edicion, Buenos Aires, Sudamerica, 2006 ISBN 950-07-2749-8, Chapter: Se necesita una guerra (page 315). Interview with Pio Laghi, Nuntius in Argentina in 1978, Clarín 20 December 1998:"El ministro de Economía, Martínez de Hoz, y el jefe del Ejército, general Viola, que no querían que estallara el conflicto, me informaron en una cena diplomática que se había tomado la decisión de desencadenar la guerra". Robert Pastor, US-national security advisor, to the Argentine Junta: "Si ustedes toman una sola roca, por minúscula que sea, el gobierno de los Estados Unidos y sus aliados de la OTAN los van a calificar de agresores. Le pediría que transmitiera este mensaje con claridad absoluta a Buenos Aires. El presidente Carter está al tanto de nuestra conversación..." La Nación, Argentina, 21 December 2003 "En su lógica" Río Negro 5 September 2005: "Ahí, Argentina rompió reglas y apuró la guerra con el país vecino.". Siehe Interview with Sergio Onofre Jarpa, Ambassador Chile's in Argentina in 1978, La Tercera, Chile: "Había una campaña muy odiosa contra Chile a través de la prensa y los medios de comunicación, que demostraba cuál era la actitud del oficialismo.". "Cartas desde el abismo" Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998: "el drama que se estaba por abatir sobre la Argentina y Chile en 1978, impulsado por el afán belicista de los halcones del régimen militar argentino". Interview with General es:Reynaldo Bignone in Clarín, Argentina, 20 December 1998:"Si hay tipos que pensaban que no había otra solución que la cachetada, allá ellos.". "Cachetada" ("a slap in the face") is Euphemism für Aggression war. Interview of Augusto Pinochet with María Eugenia Oyarzún in "Augusto Pinochet: Diálogos con su historia", Editorial Sudamericana, Santiago, Chile, 1999. (S. 127): "Usted comprenderá que uno llega a estos grados pensando los pro y los contra de las cosas. Una guerra significa una detención o retroceso para un país de a lo menos 20 años. Hay que comenzar de nuevo. ¡No quiero guerra yo!; por lo demás, nosotros no habríamos peleado por ambiciones expansionistas sino defendiendo lo que teníamos, nada más. Ello, a pesar de que en el otro lado había deseos de agresión y vientos de guerra" against Chile have been released. But so many individual accounts exist among the Argentine ranks that the existence of a plan has not been disputed.

The Argentine Government planned to first occupy the islands around Cape Horn and then, in a second phase, either to stop or continue hostilities according to the Chilean reaction. Argentina had already drafted a declaration of war.

An Argentine complaint in the UN Security Council over Chile's military occupation of the disputed islands was to precede the attack.

Rubén Madrid Murúa in "La Estrategia Nacional y Militar que planificó Argentina, en el marco de una estrategia total, para enfrentar el conflicto con Chile el año 1978", ("Memorial del Ejército de Chile", Edición Nº 471, Santiago, Chile, 2003, S. 54-55), stated that the Argentine General Staff planned the operation under the name "Planeamiento Conjunto de Operaciones Previstas contra Chile".

The Argentines planned amphibious landings to seize the islands southwards of the Beagle Channel, along with massive land-based attacks:


 * 1) at 20:00 on 22 December 1978 a task force of the Argentine Navy and the Argentine Marines ( Batallón N° 5 ) under the command of Humberto José Barbuzzi would seize the islands Horn, Freycinet, Hershell, Deceit and Wollaston.
 * 2) at 22:00 on 22 December 1978 the Argentine task force (with Batallones N° 3 und N° 4 of the Naval Infantry) would seize Picton, Nueva und Lennox islands and secure for the navy the east mouth of the Beagle Channel.
 * 3) at 24:00 on 22 December 1978 the invasion of continental Chile would begin. The Fifth Army Corps under command of José Antonio Vaquero would seize Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales, the largest two cities of the Chilean Magallanes Region.
 * 4) at daylight 23 December 1978 the Argentine Argentine Air Force would begin attacks against Chilean Air Force.
 * 5) Later, Third Army Corps under the command of Luciano Benjamín Menéndez would start an offensive through the Andean passes of "Libertadores", "Maipo" and "Puyehue" (today Cardenal Samore Pass) to seize Santiago, Valparaíso and the Los Lagos Region.

The Second Army Corps under the command of Leopoldo Galtieri would protect the north of Argentina from a potential Brazilian attack and its II Brigada de Caballería blindada would protect the Argentine region of Río Mayo in Chubut Province from a possible Chilean attack.

The Argentine Armed Forces expected between 30,000 and 50,000 dead in the course of the war.

Plan for the time after the invasion
For the postwar phase of the operation, the Argentine Navy prepared political instructions to be followed in the southern zone after the disputed islands were under Argentinian sovereignty. They defined the new border, navigation rights for Chilean ships, instructions in case of confrontations with the Chilean Navy, dealing with injured personnel, prisoners of war, etc.

Chilean preparedness


There was no surprise factor, since the Chilean military kept movements of the Argentine fleet under surveillance and monitored the buildup of Argentine troops. Chilean troops were deployed along the border, ready to meet any invaders.

Chile planted mines in certain areas along its borders with Argentina, Bolivia and Peru. and dynamited some mountain passes

Parts of route 9-CH between Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales were selected to serve as extra airstrips in the case of an invasion. A defensive position was built up the narrowest part of Brunswick Peninsula in order to avoid or delay an Argentine capture of Punta Arenas. In contrast to the defensive war planned by the Chilean Army in Punta Arenas and Puerto Natales, the Chilean army had plans for an attack to invade the Argentine part of Tierra del Fuego, but the control of Tierra del Fuego Island was considered a secondary goal since its control was believed to depend on the outcome of the clash of the navies.

The combat-ready Chilean fleet sailed on 22 December 1978 from the fjords of Hoste Island to frustrate an Argentine landing. Rear Admiral Raúl López, Chief of the Chilean fleet, kept silent as to whether he would simply wait or initiate an attack on the enemy navy.

Operation aborted
On D-day, a severe storm impeded Argentine operations in the disputed area. Meanwhile Pope John Paul II, alarmed by the situation, decided to act personally and informed both governments that he was sending his personal envoy, Cardinal Antonio Samoré, to both capitals. Six hours before landing, the Argentine fleet turned back and Operation Soberanía was called off.

Whether the Argentine infantry actually crossed the border into Chile or only waited at the border for the result of the naval combat cannot be established. Argentine sources insist that they crossed the border which would be inconsistent with the two-phase war plan.

Alejandro Luis Corbacho, in "Predicting the probability of war during brinkmanship crisis: The Beagle and the Malvinas conflicts" considers the reasons for cancelling the operation (p. 45):

"The newspaper Clarín explained some years later that such caution was based, in part, on military concerns. In order to achieve a victory, certain objectives had to be reached before the seventh day after the attack. Some military leaders considered this not enough time due to the difficulty involved in transportation through the passes over the Andean Mountains."

On p. 46:

"According to Clarín, two consequences were feared. First, those who were dubious feared a possible regionalization of the conflict. Second, as a consequence, the conflict could acquire great power proportions. In the first case decisionmakers speculated that Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Brazil might intervene. Then the great powers could take sides. In this case, the resolution of the conflict would depend not on the combatants, but on the countries that supplied the weapons."

Analysis
Unlike the prelude to the 1982 invasion of the Falkland Islands, from the beginning of Operation Soberanía there were no critical misconceptions on Argentina's side about Chile's commitment to defend its territory: the entire Chilean Navy was in the disputed area, an unequivocal fact at Cape Horn. As stated by David R. Mares in "Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America":
 * These Chilean advantages do not imply that it could have won the war against Argentina, but that is not the relevant point. To deter their neighbors the Chileans do not have to demonstrate a capability to win. They need, instead, to make a credible case that a military adventure against Chile would not be cheap. In 1978, the Argentine Junta could not be very confident that war would produce a low-cost victory against Chile.

Although it had called off the operation, the Argentine government never gave up on the use of military force to pressure Chile. After the invasion of the Falklands on 2 April 1982, the Argentine junta planned the military occupation of the disputed islands in the Beagle channel, as stated by Brigadier Basilio Lami Dozo, chief of the Argentine Air Force during the Falklands war, in an interview with the Argentine magazine Perfil:
 * L.F. Galtieri: "[Chile] have to know that what we are doing now, because they will be the next in turn. Argentine magazine Perfil on 22 November 2009, retrieved on 22 November 2009:
 * Para colmo, Galtieri dijo en un discurso: “Que saquen el ejemplo de lo que estamos haciendo ahora porque después les toca a ellos”.

Also Óscar Camilión, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina from 29 March 1981 to 11 December 1981, in his "Memorias Políticas", Editorial Planeta, Buenos Aires, 1999, page 281 confirms the plan of Argentine military:
 * «Los planes militares eran, en la hipótesis de resolver el caso Malvinas, invadir las islas en disputa en el Beagle. Esa era la decisión de la Armada…»
 * (transl.:«The military planning was, with the Falklands in Argentine hand, to invade the disputed islands in the Beagle Channel. That was the determination of the (Argentine) navy…»)

See also Kalevi Jaakko Holsti, The State, War, and the State of War Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 1996, 271 pages, ISBN 0-521-57790-X. See also here On page 160:
 * Displaying the mentality of the Argentine military regime in the 1970s, as another example, there was "Plan Rosario" according to which Argentina would attack the Malvinas and then turn to settle the Beagle Channel problem by force. The sequence, according to the plan, could also be reversed.

See also article of Manfred Schönfeld in La Prensa (Buenos Aires) on 2 June 1982 about the Argentine Course of Action after the War:
 * Para nosotros no lo estará [terminada la guerra], porque, inmediatamente después de barrido el enemigo de las Malvinas, debe serlo de las Georgias, Sandwich del Sur y de todos los demás archipiélagos australes argentinos, ...

All articles of M. Schönfeld in "La Prensa" from 10 January 1982 to 2 August 1982 are in La Guerra Austral, Manfred Schönfeld, Desafío Editores S.A., 1982, ISBN 950-02-0500-9.

Argentine Falklands War veteran Martín Balza, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Army (1991–1999), caused a stir in 2003 when he declared his conviction that in 1978, Chile would have won the war had it broken out.