History of the Great War

The History of the Great War is a series of 29 volumes covering the military operations of the British Army during the First World War. The full title is the History of the Great War Based on Official Documents but the series is usually referred to as the British Official History. It was produced by the Historical Section of the Committee of Imperial Defence under the control of official historian Brigadier-General Sir James Edmonds. The first volume was published in 1923 and the final volume was published in 1949.

The History of the Great War was written as a technical history for military staff, rather than as a popular history for consumption by the general public. British historian John Keegan, critical of the dry, featureless prose, said "the compilers... have achieved the remarkable feat of writing an exhaustive account of one of the world's greatest tragedies without the display of any emotion at all.".

Volumes

 * Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1914
 * Volume I: Mons, the Retreat to the Seine, the Marne and the Aisne, August – October 1914, Brigadier-General Sir James E. Edmonds, 1922 archive.org
 * Volume II: Antwerp, La Bassé, Armentières, Messines and Ypres, October – November 1914, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1925 archive.org
 * Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1915
 * Volume I: Winter 1914–15: Battle of Neuve Chapelle: Battles of Ypres, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds and Captain G. C. Wynne, 1927
 * Volume II: Battles of Aubers Ridge, Festubert, and Loos, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1928
 * Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1916
 * Volume I: Sir Douglas Haig's Command to the 1st July: Battle of the Somme, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1932
 * Volume II: 2 July 1916 to the end of the Battles of the Somme, Captain Wilfrid Miles, 1938
 * Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1917
 * Volume I: The German Retreat to the Hindenburg Line and the Battles of Arras, Captain Cyril Falls, 1940
 * Volume II: Messines and third Ypres (Passchendaele), Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1948
 * Volume III: The Battle of Cambrai, Captain Wilfrid Miles, 1948
 * Military Operations: France and Belgium, 1918
 * Volume I: The German March Offensive and its Preliminaries, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1935
 * Volume II: March–April: Continuation of the German Offensives, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1937
 * Volume III: May–July: The German Diversion Offensives and the First Allied Counter-Offensive, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1939
 * Volume IV: 8 August-26 September: The Franco-British Offensive, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds, 1947
 * Volume V: 26 September-11 November: The Advance to Victory, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds and Lieutenant-Colonel R. Maxwell-Hyslop, 1947
 * Military Operations: Gallipoli
 * Volume I, Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, 1929
 * Volume II, Brigadier-General C. F. Aspinall-Oglander, 1932
 * Military Operations: Italy, 1915–1919, Brigadier-General Sir J. E. Edmonds and H. R. Davies, 1949
 * Military Operations: East Africa, 1914–1916
 * Volume I, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Hordern, 1941
 * Volume II, unpublished
 * Military Operations: Togoland and the Cameroons, 1914–1916, Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, 1931
 * Military Operations: Macedonia
 * Volume I: From the Outbreak of War to the Spring of 1917, Captain Cyril Falls, 1933
 * Volume II: From the Spring of 1917 to the End of the War, Captain Cyril Falls, 1935
 * Military Operations: Egypt and Palestine
 * Volume I, Captain Cyril Falls, 1928
 * Volume II, Part I, Captain Cyril Falls, 1930
 * Volume II, Part II, Captain Cyril Falls, 1930
 * Military Operations: Mesopotamia
 * Volume I: Outbreak of Hostilities, Campaign in Lower Mesopotamia, Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, 1923
 * Volume II: April 1916: The Attempt on Baghdad, the Battle of Ctesiphon, the Siege and the Fall of Kut-al-Amara, Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly,1924
 * Volume III: April 1917: The Capture and Consolidation of Baghdad, Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, 1926
 * Volume IV: The Campaign in Upper Mesopotamia to the Armistice, Brigadier-General F. J. Moberly, 1927
 * Transportation on the Western Front, 1914–1918, Colonel A. M. Henniker, 1937.

Tim Travers, 1987
In The Killing Ground: The British Army, the Western Front & the Emergence of modern War 1900–1918 (1987), Tim Travers wrote that on the planning and conduct of the battles of Pilckem Ridge (31 July – 2 August) and Langemarck, (16–18 August) in the Third Ypres campaign, (31 July – 10 November 1917) described in Military Operations: France and Belgium 1917 part II, there were three controversies. Travers wrote that General Sir Hubert Gough the Fifth Army commander, believed that Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig had ordered him to plan a breakthrough offensive, particularly at a meeting on 28 June, yet a few days later Haig vacillated and wanted a step-by-step attack. Travers also wrote that it was illogical to give the principal command of a step-by-step attack to a "thruster" like General Gough, when General Sir Herbert Plumer the Second Army commander had a reputation for thoroughness. Travers held that Haig wavered in his thinking about what he wanted but left Gough believing that he was to plan for a breakthrough.

Travers found that Haig emphasised the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau, particularly at the meeting of 28 June and that on 30 June, Haig had written "Capture the Passchendaele–Staden Ridge.", on his copy of the Fifth Army plan. The emphasis given by Haig to the Gheluvelt plateau also occurs in GHQ orders of 5 July and Fifth Army orders on 8 July. Travers wrote that the Fifth Army failed to give adequate emphasis to this requirement and that a structural obstacle constrained the Fifth Army, since the southern edge of the Gheluvelt plateau was beyond the boundary between the Fifth and Second armies. Travers concluded that Haig and GHQ chose the time, place and strategy of the campaign and that Gough and the Fifth Army staff selected tactics for the attacks of Pilckem Ridge and Langemarck. Travers described Wynne's first draft of the Official History, completed in 1943 as "anti-Haig", the second draft of 1944 "anti-Gough", the third draft of 1945 as "anti-Haig and anti-Gough" and Edmonds's fourth draft published in 1948 as "pro-Haig and anti-Gough", at which Wynne removed his name from the volume. In a chapter of sixteen pages with forty footnotes, Travers wrote that Edmonds was willing to accept some criticism by interested parties, to whom drafts were circulated and make amendments. Travers also considered that Edmonds became increasingly protective of Haig's reputation and noticeably autocratic in his dealings with the other historians.

Travers described a leadership vacuum in the BEF, which was caused by the practice of delegation and that Edmonds's failure to stress this in the Official History was "scandalous". Gough had attempted a breakthrough offensive, conforming to the decisions laid down by Haig. Gough was at fault for overlooking the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau and for ignoring a suggestion of Lieutenant-General Cavan, the XIV Corps commander to add weight to the attack opposite the plateau. Travers wrote that the Official History omitted a request, made by Gough in August for a conference to discuss a remedy for the lack of weight being brought against the Gheluvelt plateau, which Haig and the staff at GHQ should have settled along with the awkward placing of the boundary between the Fifth and Second armies, long before the attack commenced. The Official History laid most of the blame for the decisions on the type of offensive, the width and direction of attacks and responsibility for planning on Gough and the Fifth Army staff, rather than on Haig and GHQ for selecting the Ypres salient at all, beginning controversies which have yet to end.

Andrew Green, 2003
Andrew Green devoted a chapter of his study Writing the Great War, Sir James Edmonds and the Official Histories 1915–1948 (2003) to the production of the Passchendaele volume of the Official History. In 27 pages and 106 footnotes, (none referring to a 1917 source) Green described the writing of the book by G. C. Wynne and then the circulation of the first draft to participants. Hubert Gough found the first draft highly objectionable and since so many other participants in the battle had died, his views were given considerable attention by J. E. Edmonds, during Wynne's absence on war work in 1943. Gough held that the draft exaggerated his intention to break through the German defences at Ypres. Gough described the meeting held on 28 June 1917 by Haig with Gough and Plumer, as evidence of Haig's understanding and acceptance of the Fifth Army plan. Gough noted that General Headquarters had caused a road to be built and kept clear for the use of cavalry and that Haig had rejected Rawlinson and Plumer's plans as too limited. Gough stressed that his plan was not limited by specific objectives which had hampered attacks at Loos and Gallipoli (1915) and the Somme (1916). Wynne had referred to Davidson's memo of 26 June but Gough pointed out that reserves should be available, close to the attacking troops to exploit advantages that emerged, not that the attacking troops should advance indefinitely.

Green wrote that Edmonds told Wynne to include the points made by Gough but that Wynne had objected, as Davidson had related how Haig revised his views, after a 25 June meeting with the Cabinet in London and had written "wear down the enemy but have an objective" on the Fifth Army plan. Wynne claimed that Gough had misunderstood Haig's intention in 1917, which was the source of his objections to the draft. At first Edmonds supported Wynne's position but later accepted Gough's views. Green concluded that Haig had intended Gough to conduct a breakthrough attempt and that Edmonds had included this in the draft, as well as describing the changes in Haig's outlook during 1917, as the prospect of significant French support varied. Gough had added a fourth objective to meet Haig's requirements but overlooked the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau, spreading his forces equally across the attack front. Green noted that Prior and Wilson had found this in their 1998 study. Green noted that Edmonds referred to the continuity of Haig's optimism about the possibility of a deep advance on 4 August, 21 September and in early October, long after the likelihood had ended.

Green added another example of Edmonds changing the draft in Gough's favour by demonstrating that the weather in August was unusually wet. Edmonds included extracts from a French climate study Le Climat de La France (Bigourdan) which contradicted the account of the August weather by Haig's Chief Intelligence Officer (1915–1918) Brigadier-General J. Charteris in his 1929 biography of Haig. Edmonds wrote that the worst of the weather was from 12 October − 10 November, yet vividly described the wet and muddy conditions in August and their morale-sapping effect on British troops. Wynne had written extensively on the difficulties of the French Army in the aftermath of the Nivelle offensive and the effect they had on British strategy but Edmonds drastically reduced this aspect of Wynne's draft. Green noted that Edmonds left much of the remainder of Wynne's draft untouched, despite Gough's objection that it implied that Haig had abrogated his authority by delegating so much to Gough and not imposing changes, in accordance with his doubts about the feasibility of the Fifth Army plan, where it concerned the Gheluvelt plateau. Edmonds noted the persistence with which Haig pursued objectives and that Haig advocated attacks regardless of their geographical progress, to keep pressure on the German Army.

Green related the estrangement between Wynne and Edmonds over Edmonds' willingness to accept Gough's objections. Edmonds sent Wynne to meet Gough, which led to Wynne making a substantial change of view. Wynne revised his draft to remove much of the blame from Gough, writing that Haig bore principal responsibility for the Fifth Army plan in his third draft submitted in 1945. Edmonds then found this draft objectionable and quarrelled with Wynne, who removed his name from the authors of the book. In Green's view, Edmonds and Wynne had changed their views about Gough and made the narrative of his role in the events of 1917 much more accurate, it being noticeably less defensive of Haig. Wynne's conclusion had been that the strategy of retaining the initiative, to protect the French Army had succeeded and that the tactical intention to clear the Belgian coast had failed, due to an underestimation of German resilience and the mistaken attempt at a breakthrough. Earlier plans had been for short steps and an emphasis on the Gheluvelt plateau. Haig was responsible for accepting Gough's plan for 31 July, despite his cautious reminder to Gough on 6 July giving the Passchendaele–Staden ridge and the Belgian coast as targets. Wynne removed these details from his draft but concluded that the GHQ 1917 plan might have been as crushing as the attack at Messines ridge on 7 June. Edmonds had also accepted the logic of an offensive in Flanders but not that of appointing Gough. If Haig had wanted a step-by-step attack he was wrong to have superseded Plumer. Green showed that Edmonds acknowledged the constraints affecting Haig but that he had wanted a breakthrough attack, chose Gough who known as a "thruster" and encouraged his optimistic views about what could be achieved. Any misgivings felt by Haig had not been communicated to Gough.

Green referred directly to Travers's 1987 analysis and noted that Travers had taken the same view as Edmonds on the questions of the intended breakthrough and the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau. Edmonds had written that Haig had accepted Gough's wishes and Green concluded that this did not mean that Gough was aware of Haig's doubts. Edmonds's version was that Haig wanted a decisive success and the capture of distant objectives on the first day, despite doubts which he had not shared with Gough. Travers had concluded that the Edmonds draft was wrong, yet Green wrote that Travers had formed the same conclusions as Edmonds. Travers had criticised the published draft, for failing to record that Haig had not resolved disagreements and problems among his subordinates long before the offensive began; Green pointed out that Edmonds had made the same criticism. Green wrote that judging the four drafts of the volume as "pro-" or "anti-" Haig and Gough was facile and led to inconsistent conclusions. Green noted that if the published draft was "anti-" Gough that it was surprising that he had called it a great improvement.

Green compared the Official History with later studies. The Official History narrative did not support an explanation of the gap between 7 June and 31 July being caused by a need to divert the Germans from the French Army. Haig had decided on 7 May, to begin the Messines operation in early June and had not been informed of the state of the French Army until 2 June. Edmonds had written that the capture of Messines ridge took place on 7 June because of the difficulty of mounting three simultaneous attacks at Ypres. Edmonds ascribed the period between 7 June and 31 July to Haig's decision to give principal responsibility to Gough. Wynne had claimed that Edmonds had failed to reveal the superiority of German tactics but Prior and Wilson, (1998) had shown that British tactics had evolved in 1917, although their application was inconsistent. Edmonds had shown that the attack on Messines ridge was a limited attack, intended to advance 1–2 miles and that the plan incorporated progressive elements like those used at Arras on 9 April, particularly an emphasis on counter-battery and a carefully controlled creeping barrage. 2,266 guns and howitzers used 144000 LT of ammunition, 2½ times greater than that available for the opening of the Battle of the Somme to counter the deep German defence zones and their counter-attack Eingreif divisions. Strongpoints were destroyed, wire was cut and German artillery suppressed. Three layers of creeping barrage 700 yd deep, had preceded infantry trained in the pillbox fighting methods used at Vimy ridge. The infantry were followed by mopping-up parties, who captured by-passed German positions. Use of such techniques had been possible because the Royal Artillery had become more accurate. The gunners also had more ammunition to use and had been able to suppress German defences as the British advanced; objectives had been chosen within range of the British artillery and had led to a great victory. Prior and Wilson claimed that these methods were not used on 31 July, because Haig had overruled Rawlinson, Plumer and Davidson; Gough had overreached and left the British infantry vulnerable to German counter-attacks. Edmonds had concluded that on 31 July, too great a demand had been placed on the British artillery whch had spread its fire too thinly.

Green wrote that at the end of August Haig had turned to Plumer and bite-and-hold methods, which Edmonds had referred to as a radical revision. The greatest weight possible was to be massed against the Gheluvelt plateau, for a successon of strictly limited attacks. Plumer planned four steps at six day intervals, to give time to move artillery and supplies forward. The steps were limited to a depth of 1500 yd and a large increase in medium and heavy artillery was to be used to smash pillboxes and to add to the counter-battery effort. The attack of 20 September had double the number of guns on half the depth of attack, making four times the weight of shell compared to 31 July. Infantry tactics also emphasised systematic consolidation of all captured ground and strong-points. With the new battle drill and unprecedented artillery support, the attack was a complete success. Green noted that Prior and Wilson considered that Menin Road was a triumph of reduced expectations and that Passchendaele ridge was still 4500 yd away. Despite these changes Haig insisted on preparations for a breakthrough but inadequate artillery preparation led to the traumatic failures on 9 and 12 October. Green concluded that when the volume was published in 1948, there was much to awaken controversy, particularly the contrast between the effect of flawed tactics and the methods used successfully earlier in 1917. Green wrote that the volume mostly accords with modern writing and contains little bias regarding Haig. Edmonds had referred to the external constraints of lack of manpower and the state of the French Army acting on Haig, yet his narrative had made the military errors manfest; Haig's desire for a breakthrough had led to a failure to relate strategy and tactics. Haig had failed adequately to communicate with Plumer and Gough and his persistence prolonged the offensive beyond the period of good weather. Green concluded that Edmonds had produced a work of lasting authority, in a series of substantial historical, military and literary value. Later scholars who have accused Edmonds of bias have had to acknowledge that his assessments and conclusions are largely accurate.

Flanders, 1917 part II, 1948
In Military Operations France and Belgium Volume II, 7th June – 10th November: Messines and Third Ypres (Passchendaele). (1948) the Official Historian J. E. Edmonds wrote that Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force and General Gough the Fifth Army commander were at cross purposes before and during the early part of the Third Ypres campaign. The Historian described meetings between Gough and his Corps Commanders on 6 and 16 June, at which deeper objectives than those of the GHQ 1917 plan were decided and that an extra objective was added, to be attempted at the discretion of divisional commanders. The fourth objective (red line) was beyond the range of most of the Fifth Army's field artillery, so all heavy artillery was to be on call to put a defensive barrage beyond advanced posts along it. An advance to the red line was to be attempted only against weak opposition.

Brigadier-General J.H. Davidson, head of the Operations Branch at General Headquarters, questioned the Fifth Army plan in a memorandum of 26 June, recommending that the objectives be limited and that the provision for an advance of 5000 yd to the red line be abandoned. A Fifth Army order of 27 June, summarized a meeting of Gough and the corps commanders on 26 June and laid down the green line as the main objective, which required an advance of 1000 yd in the south to 3500 yd in the centre and 2500 yd in the north at the junction with the First (French) Army. Patrols were to be sent forward from it, to probe the German defences and occupy vacant ground but it was more important to avoid a ragged front line. In a reply to Davidson, Gough wrote that the green line should be attempted and that an opportunity to take ground up to the red line, "without much opposition" should be taken.

On 28 June Haig discussed Davidson's concerns at a meeting with Gough and General Plumer, commander of the Second Army and emphasised the importance of the Gheluvelt plateau. The Historian wrote that the Fifth Army plan did not conform to Haig's judgement, that the main battle would be fought for the Gheluvelt plateau. Gough had spread the Fifth Army divisions evenly along the front, failing to increase the size of II Corps, which faced the German defences on the Gheluvelt plateau. In a footnote the Historian described Fifth Army intelligence summaries in July, which stressed the strength of the German defences on the plateau, that the Germans were building more defences there than on the rest of the front and that the assembly areas of the German Eingreif divisions were behind the plateau and Broodseinde–Passchendaele ridge. The summaries predicted that the Germans would try to hold the area, even if driven back across the Steenbeek further north.

The description of the misunderstanding between Haig and Gough is contradicted by an account on the following pages of a visit made on 27 June by Haig to the headquarters of II Corps. Lieutenant-General Sir Claud Jacob the II Corps commander asked that his southern flank be extended, to allow an attack on the spur (Tower Hamlets) across the Bassevillebeek valley. Jacob wanted to deny the German army a jumping-off place, for counter-attacks against the right flank of II Corps. Haig agreed with Jacob, emphasised the importance of the capture of the Gheluvelt plateau and arranged with the Fifth Army headquarters "at once", for II Corps to take command of the 24th Division to the south, which was the northernmost division of the Second Army. The Fifth Army boundary was extended south on 4 July to the Klein Zillebeke–Zandvoorde road. In a footnote the Historian also described the transfer of the artillery of the 23rd and 24th divisions and thirteen medium (60-pdr) and 25 heavy (fifteen 6-inch gun, five 8-inch and five 9.2-inch howitzer) batteries from the Second Army.

In the history of the 18th Division, (1922) the writer includes an anecdote that II Corps had 1,000 guns and that each division in II Corps had twelve brigades of field artillery. The Official Historian recorded 226 heavy and medium guns and 526 heavy and medium howitzers, (752) and 1,098 field guns and 324 field howitzers, (1,422) a total of 2,174 artillery pieces in the Fifth Army. or 2,299 pieces "on the Fifth Army front". Footnotes add that II Corps had an "extra division", three heavy counter-battery and three heavy bombardment double groups; (a single group having four to six siege, heavy or medium batteries) each of the three corps to the north, had two heavy counter-battery double groups and three heavy bombardment single groups. The II Corps divisions had eight or nine field artillery brigades each, rather than the six in the divisions of the other corps.