Waterloo Campaign: Start of hostilities (15 June)

The Waterloo Campaign started with a pre-emptive attack by the French Army of the North under the command of Napoleon Bonaparte. The first elements of the Army of the North moved from their peace time depots on 8 June to their rendezvous point just on the French side of the Franco-Belgian border, from where they launched their pre-emptive attack on the two Coalition armies that were cantoned in Belgium—The Anglo-Allied army under the command of the Duke of Wellington and a Prussian army under the command of Prince Blücher.

Hostilities commencement shortly after the French advanced guard crossed the the border and encountered the first Coalition outposts manned by soldiers of the Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) around 3:30 on 15 June. For the rest of the day the I Corps engaged in a fighting retreat against the overwhelming force of the French Army of the North. By midnight of 15/16 of July the French had advanced north and through Charleroi and in doing so successfully crossed the river Sambre, the only significant river between the French army and Brussels.

At 19:00 on 15 June Marshal Ney who had ridden up from Paris, met Napoleon near Charleroi, at the point where the road to Fleurus branches off from the one to Brussels. He was ordered to take command of the left wing of the Army of the North and press north up the Charleroi–Brussels road towards the Anglo-Allied army and "drive back the enemy" while Napoleon would advance up the Fleurus road and do the same thing to the Prussians. The advance up the two roads continued until darkness but slowed during the evening as Coalition troops fell back on reinforcements. The French planned to renew their advance on the 16 June, while the two Coalition armies planned to check them at Quatre Bras and Ligny.

Prelude
On 1 March 1815 Napoleon Bonaparte landed in France after his escape from Elba, he marched on Paris. When it became clear that the troops sent to arrest him would not do so and his arrival in the capital was imminent, Louis XVIII fled.

The representatives of the other European powers assembled at the Congress of Vienna issued a deceleration outlawing Napoleon and agreed to place armies of at least 150,000 each in the field to oppose him.

The Coalition Powers agreed on a coordinated invasion of France to start on 1 July 1815. To this end it was agreed that:
 * Britain and Prussia would assemble their armies in Belgium (a territory recently acquired by United Kingdom of the Netherlands)
 * The Russians would assemble an army and advance through Germany towards the French frontier
 * The Austrians would assemble two armies and advance on the French frontiers
 * The troops of Bavaria, Baden, Wurtemburg, and of Hesse, would assemble their troops on the upper Rhine under the command of Prince of Württemberg.

As soon as it became apparent that the Coalition Powers were determined to use force against him, Napoleon started to prepare for war. He had a choice of two strategies either to assemble his forces in and around Paris and defeat the Coalition Powers as they attempted to invest the the city, or to launch a pre-emptive attack and destroy each of his enemies' armies before they could combine. He chose the latter strategy and decided to attack the two Coalition armies in Belgium which were cantoned close to the borders of France.

The Prussian army, commanded by Prince Blücher, was cantoned south east of Brussels with its headquarters in Namur. The Anglo-allied army, commanded by the Duke of Wellington, was cantoned south west Brussels with its headquarters in Brussels. Wellington's army included contingents from the British Army (including the KGL), Hanover (their king was also the king of Britain), Brunswick (until very recently closely associated with Hanover and hence the British), the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Dutch and Belgian troops), Nassau (had close dynastic ties with the Netherlands and part of the territory had until very recently been ruled by the King of the Netherlands).

Napoleon's plan of campaign
Having decided to attack the Coalition forces in what is now Belgium, Napoleon had several strategies open to him and although the Coalition commanders knew that they might well be attacked they were uncertain as to timing and the line of advance that Napoleon would choose.

From his spies Napoleon knew how widely the Coalition forces were spread over the Low Countries. He was aware that the two armies had two distinct and divergent bases, and were commanded by two generals differing materially in character. His only chance of success lay in swift marches and crashing victories. To win the victories he must defeat his foes in detail, and though his aggregate force was weaker than their aggregate force, yet he must contrive to be always the stronger at the point of contact.

Therefore, Napoleon argued in conference with his generals, that he must neither attack between the rivers Moselle and the Meuse, because that course would allow Wellington to join Blücher without molestation; nor must he attack between the rivers Sambre and Scheldt, because in that case Blücher would be able to effect a junction with Wellington. Nor, and for similar reasons, did he deem it prudent to descend the Meuse and attack the city of Namur.

The fact that the Coalition armies would require the longest time to concentrate on their inner flanks did not escape him. He, therefore, determined to attack between the rivers Sambre and the Meuse. He calculated that if he struck at the centre of the two armies he should be able to wedge himself in between them, crushing any divisions which attempted to obstruct his progress, and having won a position of vantage he imagined that it would be in his power to manoeuvre with rapidity from side to side, and defeat each army in succession.

Napoleon had selected for the line of his main operations the direct road to Brussels, by Charleroi, that being the road on which Wellington's left wing, and Blücher's right wing respectively rested.

As the Prussians front line covered Charleroi and the French territory immediately to the south of Charleroi, while the Anglo-allies most advanced outpost was further up the Charleroi–Brussels road at Franse (about 10 mi north of Charleroi), he planned to overcome the Prussian army, and then attack the Anglo-Allied troops before they could be collected in sufficient strength to prevent his further progress; his grand object being to impede the junction of the two armies; to vanquish them in detail; to establish himself in Brussels; to arouse the dense population in Belgium, of which a vast proportion secretly adhered to his cause; to re-annex the country to the French Empire; to excite the desertion of the Belgian soldiery from the service of the Netherlands; to prevent a check by these means to the operations of the invading Armies crossing the Rhine; perhaps also to enter into negotiations; and, at all events, to gain, what was to him of vital importance, time for the advance and cooperation of further reinforcements from France.

Advance of the French Army of the North
French IV Corps (Gérard's) left Metz on 6 of June, with orders to reach Philippeville by 14 June. The Imperial Guard (commanded by Drouot) began its march from Paris on 8 June, and reached Avesnes on 13 June, as did also VI Corps (Lobau's) from Laon. I Corps (d'Erlon's) from Lille, II Corps (Reille's) from Valenciennes, and III Corps (Vandamme's) from Mézières, likewise arrived at Maubeuge and Avesnes on 13 June. The IV Corps of Reserve Cavalry (Milhaud's) concentrated upon the Upper Sombre.

Napoleon joins the army
The junction of the several corps on the same day, and almost at the same hour (with the exception of the IV, which joined the next day), displayed the usual skill of Napoleon in the combination of movements. Their leaders congratulated themselves upon these auspicious preparations, and upon finding the "Grand Army" once more assembled in "all the pomp and circumstance of glorious war": the appearance of the troops, though fatigued, was all that could be desired; and their enthusiasm was at the highest on hearing that the Emperor himself, who had left Paris at 03:00 on 12 June and passed the night at Laon, had actually arrived amongst them.

Upon the following day, the French Army bivouacked on three different points:
 * The left wing, consisting of the I Corps (d'Erlon's) and the II Corps (Reille's), and amounting to about 44,000 men, was posted on the right bank of the Sambre at Solre-sur-Sambre.
 * The centre, consisting of the III Corps (Vandamme's) and VI Corps (Lobau's), of the Imperial Guard, and of the Cavalry Reserves (I (Pajol's), II (Exelmans's), III (Kellermann's)) amounting altogether to about 60,000 men, was at Beaumont, which was made the headquarters.
 * The right wing, composed of the IV Corps (Gerard's) and of a division of Heavy Cavalry, amounting altogether to about 16,000 men, was in front of Philippeville.

The bivouacs were established in rear of some slight eminences, with a view to conceal their fires from the observation of Coalition pickets and scouts.

The Army, while thus assembled, on the eve of opening the Campaign, received through the medium of an ordre du jour (order of the day) spirit-stirring appeal to his army from their commander and emperor(see "Proclamation on the Anniversary of the Battles of Marengo and Friedland, 14 June 1815").

French deception and limited Coalition intelligence
Napoleon, by his precautionary measures of strengthening his advanced posts, and of displaying along the whole line of the Belgian frontier an equal degree of vigilance and activity, had effectually concealed from his adversaries the combined movements of his several corps and their concentration on the right bank of the Sambre. During the night of 13 June, however, the light reflected upon the sky by the fires of the French bivouacs, did not escape the vigilant observation outposts of the Prussian I Corps (Zieten's), whence it was communicated to the rear that these fires appeared to be in the direction of Walcourt and of Beaumont, and also in the vicinity of Solre-sur-Sambre; further, that all reports received through spies and deserters concurred in representing that Napoleon was expected to join the French army on that evening; that the Imperial Guard and the II Corps had arrived at Avesnes-sur-Helpe ("Avesnes") and Maubeuge; also that, at 13:00 four French battalions had crossed the river at Solre-sur-Sambre, and occupied Merbes-le-Château; that later in the night the French had pushed forward a strong detachment as far as Sars-la-Buissière; and lastly, that an attack by the French would certainly take place on 14th or 15th June.

First news of the French concentration
On 14 June, the Dutch-Belgian Major-General van Merlen, who was stationed at Saint-Symphorien, near Mons, and who commanded the outposts between the latter place and Binche which formed the extreme right of the Prussians, ascertained that the French troops had moved from Maubeuge and its vicinity by Beaumont towards Philippeville, that there was no longer any hostile force in his front, except a picket at Bettignies, and some National Guards in other villages. He forwarded this important information to the Prussian General Steinmetz, on his left, with whom he was in constant communication, and by whom it was despatched to General Zieten at Charleroi.

The Prussian General Pirch II, who's 2nd Brigade posted on the left of Steinmetz, also sent word to Zieten that he had received information through his outposts that the French army had concentrated in the vicinity of Beaumont and Merbes-le-Château; that their army consisted of 150,000 men, and was commanded by General Vandamme, Prince Jerome Bonaparte, and some other distinguished officers; that since the previous day all crossing of the frontier had been forbidden by the French under pain of death; and that a French patrol had been observed that day near Biercée, not far from Thuin.

During the day, frequent accounts were brought to the troops of Prussian I Corps (Zieten's), generally corroborative of the above, by the country people who were bringing away, and seeking some place of safety for, their cattle. Intelligence was also obtained of the arrival of Napoleon, and of his brother Jerome.

Zieten immediately transmitted the substance of this information to Prince Blücher and to the Duke of Wellington; and it was perfectly consistent with that which the latter had received from Major General Dörnberg, who had been posted in observation at Mons, and from General van Merlen (through William, Prince of Orange) who, as already mentioned, commanded the outposts between Mons and Binche. Nothing, however, was as yet positively known concerning the real point of concentration, the probable strength of the French, or Napoleon's intended offensive movements, and the two Coalition commanders therefore refrained from making any alteration in their dispositions, and awaited the arrival of reports of a more definite character concerning the Napoleon's designs.

Blücher orders the concentration his army
Zieten's troops were kept under arms during the night, and were collected by battalions at their respective points of assembly.

Later in the day Zieten ascertained, through his outposts, that strong French columns, composed of all arms, were assembling in his front, and that every thing portended an attack on the following morning. Zieten's communication of this intelligence reached Blücher between 21:00 and 22:00 on 14 June.

Simultaneous orders were consequently despatched by 23:00 for the march of the II Corps (Pirch I's) from Namur upon Sombreffe (a village on the Nivelles-Namur road close to Ligny), and of the III Corps (Thielemann's) from Ciney to Namur. An order had already, in the course of the day, been forwarded to Bülow at Liege, desiring him to make such a disposition of his corps as should admit of its concentration at Hannut in one march; and at midnight a further order was despatched, requiring him to concentrate his troops in cantonment about Hannut.

Zieten was directed to await the advance of the French in his position upon the river Sambre; and, in the event of his being attacked by superior numbers, and compelled to retire, to effect his retreat as slowly as circumstances would permit, in the direction of Fleurus, so as to afford sufficient time for the concentration of the other three Prussian corps in rear of the latter point.

Collation uncertainty as to Napoleon's main line of attack
The vigilance which was thus exercised along both the Anglo-Allied and Prussian line of outposts, obtained for Wellington and Blücher the fullest extent of information which they could reasonably have calculated on receiving respecting the dispositions of Napoleon immediately prior to an attack. They had been put in possession of the fact that considerable masses of French troops had moved by their right, and assembled in front of Charleroi. Still, this baring of the frontier beyond Tournai, Mons, and Binche, of the troops which had previously occupied that line, and their concentration in front of Charleroi, might be designed to mask the real line of operation, to draw the Anglo-Allied troops towards Charleroi, upon which a feigned attack would be made, while the real attack was intended to be by Mons. Hence no alteration was made by Wellington in the disposition of his forces; but the Prussian Field Marshal immediately ordered the concentration of his own troops at Sombreffe (a village on the Nivelles-Namur at the junction of a road that ran to Charleroi). They would then be in place to hinder an advance through Charleroi should that be the real line of attack, but also astride a road that would allow them to move rapidly to support Wellington, should that attack be made by the Mons road.

Zieten's dispositions
Zieten's position, and his line of advanced posts, from Bonne-Espérance (south of Binche) to Lobbes and Thuin on the Sambre through Gerpinnes and Sosoye to Dinant on the Meuse. His right brigade (the 1st, commanded by Steinmetz), having its headquarters at Fontaine L'Evêque, held the ground between Binche and the Sambre; his centre brigade (the 2nd commanded by Pirch II) lay along the Sambre, occupying Marchienne-au-Pont, Dampremy, Roux, Charleroi, Gilly and Châtelet; and a portion of his 3rd Brigade, commanded by Jagow) occupied Farciennes and Tamines on the Sambre, while the remainder was posted in reserve between Fleurus and the Sambre; and his left brigade (the 4th, commanded by Donnersmarck) was extended along this river nearly as far as Namur. The reserve cavalry of the I Corps had been brought more in advance, and was now cantoned in the vicinity of the Piéton, having Gosselies for its point of concentration.

In this position, Zieten, without making the slightest alteration, remained fully prepared for the expected attack on 15 June.

Desertion of de Bourmont to the Coalition
While Napoleon was occupied in prescribing his intended order of attack, he received a despatch from Count Gérard announcing that Lieutenant General de Bourmont, and Colonels Clouet and Villoutreys, attached to the IV Corps, had deserted to the Coalition — a circumstance which induced Napoleon to make some alteration in his dispositions.

Advance of the French army
The morning of 15 June had scarcely broken, when the French army commenced its march towards the Sambre, in three columns, from the three bivouacs taken up during the previous night. The left column advanced from Solre-sur-Sambre, by Thuin, upon Marchienne-au-Pont; the Centre from Beaumont, by Ham-sur-Heure, upon Charleroi; and the right column from Philippeville, by Gerpinnes, upon Châtelet.

Commencement of hostilities
As early as 3:30 in the morning, the head of the left column came in contact with the Prussian troops in front of Lobbes, firing upon, and driving in, the pickets of the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, commanded by Captain von Gillhausen. This officer who was well aware that the French troops that had assembled, the night before, in great force in his front, intended to attack him in the morning, had posted his battalion so as to afford it every advantage to be derived from the hilly and intersected ground it occupied. The French, however, inclined more to their right, and joined other troops advancing along the road to Thuin, which lay on his left. Shortly after, they drove back an advanced cavalry vedette; and, at 04:30, commenced a fire from four guns upon the outpost at Maladrie, about 1 mi in front of Thuin.

This cannonade, which announced the opening of the campaign by the French, was heard by the Prussian troops forming the left wing of Steinmetz's Brigade; but the atmosphere, which was extremely thick and heavy, was most unfavourable for the conveyance of sound; so much so, that the greater portion of the right wing of the Brigade remained for a considerable time in ignorance of the French advance.

The firing, however, was distinctly heard at Charleroi; and Zieten, who, by the reports which he forwarded on 14 June to Blücher and Wellington, had fully prepared these commanders to expect an attack, lost no time in communicating to them the important fact, that hostilities had actually commenced.

Shortly before 05:00, he despatched Courier Jäger to their respective headquarters, Brussels (Wellington) and Namur (Blücher), with letters containing the information that since 04:30, he had heard several cannon shots fired in his front, and at the time he was writing, the fire of musketry also, but that he had not yet received any report from his outposts. To Blücher he at the same time intimated that he should direct the whole Corps to fall back into position; and, should it become absolutely necessary, to concentrate at Fleurus.

His report to Wellington arrived in Brussels at 09:00; that to Blücher reached Namur between 08:00 and 09:00 on 15 June. The former, while it placed the British commander on the qui vive (alert), did not induce him to adopt any particular measure—he awaited further and more definite information; but the latter satisfied the Prussian Field Marshal that he had taken a wise precaution in having already ordered the concentration of his several corps in the position of Sombreffe.

Before 10:00 of 15 June, an order was despatched from the Prussian headquarters to the III Corps (Thielemann's) to the effect that after resting during the night at Namur, it was to continue its march upon the morning of 16 June, towards Sombreffe.

At 11:30 a despatch was forwarded to Bülow, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the IV Corps after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux no later than daybreak on 16 June.

Prussian outposts driven in, the French capture Thuin and cross the Sambre
Meanwile the Prussian I Corpse engaged the advancing. The Prussian troops at Maladrie checked, for a time, the advance of the French upon Thuin, and maintained their ground for more than an hour, with the greatest bravery, but they were overpowered, and driven back upon Thuin.

This place was occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, under Major von Monsterberg, who, after an obstinate and gallant resistance, during which the battalion suffered an immense loss, was forced to retire, about 07:00, upon Montigny-le-Tilleul, where he found Lieutenant-Colonel Woisky, with two squadrons of the 1st West Prussian Dragoons.

The French succeeded in taking this village, and the retreat was then continued in good order, under the protection of Woisky's dragoons, towards Marchienne-au-Pont; but before reaching this place, the latter were attacked, and completely overthrown by the French cavalry; and the infantry getting into disorder at the same moment were partly cut down, and many were taken prisoners. Indeed so severe was the loss which the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr suffered in this retreat, that the mere handful of men which remained could not possibly be looked upon as constituting a battalion in the proper meaning of the term. It was reduced to a mere skeleton. Lieutenant-Colonel von Woisky was wounded on this occasion; but continued, nevertheless, at the head of his dragoons.

Captain von Gillhausen, who, as before stated, commanded the Prussian battalion posted at Lobbes, as soon as he had satisfied himself that Thuin was taken, saw the necessity of effecting his own retreat, which he did, after the lapse of half an hour, drawing in his pickets, and occupying the bridge over the Sambre with one company. He then fell back, and occupied the wood of Sart-de-Lobbes (near Lobbes), where he received an order, as soon as the post at Hourpes was also taken by the French, to continue his retreat, taking a direction between Fontaine-l'Evêque and Anderlues.

The Prussian post near Aulne Abbey, occupied by the 3rd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr, under the temporary command of Captain Grollmann, fell into the hands of the French, between 08:00 and 09:00, Hourpes which is close to the Abbey fell to the French at about the same time. There are no action reports for the capture of these two outposts, so the Westphalians may have abandoned them shortly before Reille's advanced guard occupied them.

Retreat of Zieten's troops
As soon as Greneral Steinmetz, the commander of the Prussian 1st Brigade, was made acquainted with the attack upon his most advanced posts along the Sambre, he despatched Major Arnauld, an officer of his staff, to the Dutch-Belgian General van Merlen at Saint-Symphorien, situated on the road between Binche and Mons, to make him fully acquainted with what had taken place, and with the fact that his brigade was falling back into position. On his way, Major Arnauld directed Major Engelhardt, who commanded the outposts on the right, to lose not a moment in withdrawing the chain of pickets; and on arriving at Binche, he spread the alarm that the French had attacked, and that the left of the brigade was warmly engaged, which rendered it necessary that the right should retire with the utmost expedition. Until arrival of Major Arnauld, the Prussian troops in this quarter were wholly ignorant of the attack; the state of the atmosphere, to which allusion has already been made, having prevented their hearing the slightest sound of any firing. They had a much greater extent of ground to pass over in retreat than the rest of the brigade, and yet, by the above unfortunate circumstance, they were the last to retire.

Zieten, having ascertained, about 08:00, that the whole French army appeared to be in motion, and that the direction of the advance of its columns seemed to indicate the probability of Charleroi and its vicinity being the main object of the attack, sent out the necessary orders to his brigades:
 * The 1st was to retire by Courcelles to the position in rear of Gosselies
 * The 2nd was to defend the three bridges over the Sambre, at Marchienne-au-Pont, Charleroi, and Châtelet, for a time sufficient to enable the 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's) to effect its retreat towards Gosselies, and thus to prevent its being cut off by the French, after which it was to retire behind Gilly
 * The 3rd and 4th brigades, as also the reserve cavalry and artillery, were to concentrate as rapidly as possible, and to take up a position in rear of Fleurus.

The three points by which the 1st Brigade was to fall back, were Mont-Sainte-Aldegonde, for the troops on the right, Anderlues for those in the centre, and Fontaine-l'Evêque for the left in order that they might reach these three points about the same time, Zieten ordered that those in front of Fontaine-l'Evêque should yield their ground as slowly as the French attack would admit.

Having reached the line of these three points, about 10:00, the brigade commenced its further retreat towards Courcelles, having its proper left protected by a separate column consisting of the 1st Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr and two companies of Silesian Rifles, led by Colonel Hoffmann, in the direction of Roux and Jumet, towards Gosselies.

At Marchienne-au-Pont stood the 2nd Battalion of the Prussian 6th Regiment, belonging to the 2nd Brigade of Zieten's Corps. The bridge was barricaded, and with the aid of two guns, resolutely maintained against several attacks; after which these troops commenced their retreat upon Gilly, by Dampremy. In the latter place were three companies of the 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Westphalian Landwehr, with four guns. These also retired about the same time towards Gilly, the guns protecting the retreat by their fire from the Churchyard; after which they moved off as rapidly as possible towards Gilly, while the Battalion marched upon Feurus; but the 4th Company, which defended the ridge of Roux until Charleroi was taken, was too late to rejoin the latter, and therefore attached itself to the 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's), which was retreating on its right flank.

Skirmish at Couillet
Light cavalry of the I Calvary Reserve Corps (Lieutenant General Pajol's) formed the advanced guard of the centre column of the French army. It was to have been supported by Vandamme's Corps of Infantry, but by some mistake, Vandamme had not received his orders, and at 06:00 had not left his bivouac. Napoleon, perceiving the error, led forward the Imperial Guards in immediate support of Pajol. As the latter advanced, the Prussian outposts, though hard pressed, retired, skirmishing in good order. At Couillet, on the Sambre, about 1.5 mi below Charleroi, the French cavalry fell upon a company of the 3rd Battalion of the Prussian 28th Regiment, surrounded it, and forced it to surrender.

French capture Charleroi
Immediately afterwards, the French gained possession of Marcinelle, (in 1815 a village) close to Charleroi, and connected with this town by a dike about 800 yd in length, terminating at a bridge, the head of which was palisaded. Along this dike the French cavalry ventured to advance, but was suddenly driven back by the Prussian skirmishers, who lined the hedges and ditches intersecting the opposite slope of the embankment. A part of the village was retaken, and an attempt made to destroy the bridge. The French, however, having renewed the attack with increased force, succeeded in finally carrying both the dike and the bridge, and by this means effected their entrance into Charleroi. Major Rohr, who commanded this post, abandoned the town and retreated with the 1st Battalion of the Prussian 6th Regiment, towards a prearranged position in rear of Gilly, which he did in good order, though hotly pursued by detachments of Pajol's dragoons.

11:00, the French were in full possession of Charleroi, as also of both banks of the Sambre above the town, and Reille's Corps was effecting its passage over the river at Marchienne-au-Pont.

The right column of the French Army, commanded by Gérard, having a longer distance to traverse, had not yet reached its destined point, Chatelet on the Sambre.

Prussians continue to retreat
The 4th Brigade (Donnersmarck's) of I Corps (Zieten's), as also the advanced portion of the 3rd, continued their retreat towards Fleurus. General Jagow, who commanded the latter, having left the two Silesian rifle companies and the Fusilier Battalion of the Prussian 7th Regiment at Farciennes and Tamines, for the purpose of watching the points of passage across the Sambre, and of protecting the left flank of the position at Gilly. But, from the moment the French made themselves masters of Charleroi, and of the left bank of the Sambre above that town, the situation of the 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's) became extremely critical Zieten immediately ordered Greneral Jagow, whose brigade was in reserve, to detach Colonel Rüchel-Kleist with the 29th Regiment of Infantry to Gosselies, for the purpose of facilitating General Steinmetz's retreat.

Action at Gosselies
Colonel Rüchel-Kleist found that Greneral Röder (commanding the I Corps cavalry) had posted there the Prussian 6th Regiment of Uhlans (Lancers) under Lieutenant Colonel Lützow, to whom he confided the defence of Gosselies, which he occupied with the 2nd Battalion of the 29th Regiment, while he placed himself in reserve with the other two battalions.

As soon as the French had assembled in sufficient force at Charleroi, Napoleon ordered Pajol to detach the 1st Brigade (General Clary's) towards Gosselies, and to advance with the remainder of the I Corps of reserve cavalry towards Gilly. General Clary, with the French 1st Hussars, reached Jumet, on the left of the Brussels road, and only but little more than 1 mi from Gosselies, before the Prussian 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's) had crossed the Piéton. He now advanced to attack Gosselies, but was met by Lieutenant Colonel Lützow and his dragoons, who defeated and repulsed him, and thus secured for General Steinmetz time to pass the Piéton; and as soon as the latter had turned the Defile of Gosselies, Colonel Rüchel-Kleist with the 29th Regiment moved off to rejoin the 2rd Brigade.

The check thus experienced by General Clary led to his being supported by Lieutenant General Lefebvre-Desnouettes, with the light cavalry of the Guard and the two batteries attached to this force; and a regiment from the Young Guard Division (Lieutenant General Duhesme's) was advanced midway between Charleroi and Gosselies as a reserve to Lefebvre-Desnouettes. The advanced guard of the II Corps (Reille's), which had crossed the Sambre at Marchienne-au-Pont, was also moving directly upon Gosselies, with the design both of cutting off the retreat of Zieten^s troops along the Brussels road, and of separating the Prussians from the Anglo-Allied army. The French I Corps (d'Erlon's), which was considerably in the rear, received orders to follow and support Reille.

Action at Heppignies
Greneral Steinmetz, upon approaching Gosselies, and perceiving the strength of the French and the consequent danger of being completely cut off, with the utmost promptitude and decision directed the 2nd Battalion of the 1st Westphalian Landwehr to march against the French left flank, with a view to divert his attention and to check his advance, while, protected by the 6th Lancers and the 1st Silesian Hussars, he continued his retreat towards Heppignies. This plan was attended with complete success; and Steinmetz reached Heppignies with scarcely any loss, persuaded by General Girard at the head of the French 7th Division of the II Corps, with the remainder of which Reille continued his advance along the Brussels road.

Heppignies was already occupied by the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the Prussian 12th Regiment, and with this increase of strength Steinmetz drew up in order of battle, and upon Girard's attempting to force the place, after having previously occupied Bansart, he advanced against him, and drove him back in the direction of Gosselies. A brisk cannonade ensued, which was maintained on the part of the Prussians, only so long as it was deemed necessary for covering their retreat upon Fleurus.

Prussians stand at Gilly
In conformity with Zieten's orders, General Pirch II, when forced to abandon Charleroi, retired to Gilly, where, having concentrated the 2nd Brigade, about 02:00 he took up a favourable position along a ridge in rear of a stream; his right resting upon Soleilmont Abbey, his left extending towards Châtelineau, which flank was also protected by a detachment occupying the bridge of Châtelet, Gerard's Corps not having as yet arrived at that point.

Pirch II posted the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment in a small wood which lay in advance on the exterior slope of the ridge; four guns on the right, upon an eminence commanding the valley in front; two guns between this point and the Fleurus road, as also two guns on the right of the road, to impede as much as possible the advance of any columns towards Gilly. The sharp shooters of the Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment, by lining some adjacent hedges, afforded protection to the artillery. The 2nd Battalion of the 28th Regiment was stationed beyond the Fleurus road, near Soleilmont Abbey, in such a manner as to be concealed from the enemy. The 1st Battalion of this Regiment stood across the road leading to Lambusart; and its Fusilier Battalion was posted more to the left, towards Châtelet. The 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr was posted in support of the battery in rear of Gilly, The 1st Battalion of 2nd Westphalian Landwehr as on the march from Dampremy to Fleurus, passed through Lodelinsart and  Soleilmont, and rejoined the Brigade in rear of Gilly, before the affair had terminated. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 6th Regiment formed the reserve. The 1st West Prussian Dragoons were posted on the declivity of the ridge towards Châtelet: they furnished the vedettes, and patrolled the valley of the Sambre, maintaining the communication with the detachment at Farciennes, belonging to the 3rd Brigade (Jagow's).

General Pirch, foreseeing that in the event of the French succeeding in turning his right, a rapid advance along the Fleurns road would be the means of greatly molesting, if not of seriously endangering, his retreat upon Lambusart, took the precaution of having this road blocked up by an abatis in the wood through which it led.

French advance on Gilly
Vandammme did not reach Charleroi until 15:00, when he received orders to pursue the Prussians, in conjunction with Grouchy, along the Fleurus road. It was, however, a considerable time before any advance was made. In the first place, the whole of III Corps (Vandamme's) had to cross the Sambre by a single bridge; secondly, both generals were deceived by exaggerated reports concerning the strength of the Prussians in rear of the Fleurus Woods; and Grouchy who had gone forward to reconnoitre, returned to his Emperor with a request for further instructions. Upon this. Napoleon undertook a reconnaissance in person, accompanied by the four Squadrons de Service; and having formed an opinion that the amount of force in question did not exceed 18–20,000 men, he gave his orders for the attack of the 2nd Brigade (Pirch II's).

The French generals having directed their preparatory dispositions from the windmill near the Farm of Grand Drieu, opened the engagement about 18:00 in the evening, with a fire from two batteries. Three columns of infantry advanced in echelon from the right, the first directing its course towards the little wood occupied by the Prussian Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment; the second passing to the right of Gilly; and the third winding round the left of this village. The attack was supported by two brigades of the II Cavalry Corps (Exelmans'), namely, those of brigadier generals Burthe and Bonnemains; of which one was directed towards Chatelet, thus menacing the Prussian left flank, and the other advanced along the Fleurus road.

Action
The battery attached to the Prussian 2nd Brigade was in the act of replying to the superior fire from the French artillery, and the light troops were already engaged, when General Pirch received Zieten's orders to avoid an action against superior numbers, and to retire by Lambusart upon Fleurus.

Perceiving the formidable advance and overwhelming force of the French, Pirch II did not hesitate a moment in carrying those orders into effect, and made his dispositions accordingly; but the retreat had scarcely commenced when his battalions were vigorously assailed by the French cavalry. Napoleon, in the hope of profiting by the Prussian's retrograde movement, sent against the retreating columns the four Squadrons de Service of the Guard, under General Letort, a dashing and well liked and respected cavalry commander attached to his staff.

The Prussian infantry withstood the repeated attacks of the French cavalry with undaunted bravery, and aided by the exertions of Lieutenant Colonel Woisky, who boldly met the French cavalry with the 1st West Prussian Dragoons, and checked his progress, the greater part of it succeeded in gaining the Wood of Fleurus. The Fusilier Battalion of the 28th Regiment (of which it will be recollected, one company had previously been captured on the right bank of the Sambre) was the only column broken on this occasion. It had been ordered to retire into the Trichehève wood behind the hamlet of Rondchamp (or Pierrerondchamp), to the north-east of Pironchamps, but before it could complete the movement, it was overtaken by French Imperial Guard cavalry, by which it was furiously assailed, and suffered a loss of two thirds of its number.

The Fusilier Battalion of the 6th Regiment was more fortunate. When about 500 yd from the wood, it was attacked by French cavalry on the plain, but forming square, and reserving its fire until the French horsemen had approached within twenty or thirty paces, it repelled several charges. As the vigour with which these attacks were made began to slacken, the Battalion cleared its way with the bayonet through the cavalry that continued hovering round it. One of its companies immediately extended itself along the edge of the wood, and kept the French cavalry at bay. The latter suffered severely on this occasion. General Letort who led the attacks was mortally wounded and died two days later on 17 June. Historians such as Philip Haythornthwaite postulate that if Letort had been present at Waterloo on 18 June, he might have affected the great French cavalry charge and perhaps the outcome of the battle.

The Brandenburg Dragoons (Watzdorf's) had been detached by Zieten in support of the 2nd Brigade (Pirch II's) and opportunely reaching the field of action, they made several charges against the French cavalry, which they repulsed and compelled to relinquish its pursuit.

The 2nd Brigade (Pirch II's) now took up a position in front of Lambusart, which was occupied by some battalions of the 3rd Brigade (Jagow's), and General Röder joined it with his remaining three regiments of cavalry and a battery of horse artillery. At this moment, the French cavalry, which was formed up in position, opened a fire from three batteries of horse artillery, and thus brought on a cannonade, with which, however, the affair terminated.

Prussian retreat is concluded
The Prussian 1st Brigade (Steinmetz's) having safely executed its retreat from Heppignies, towards Fleurus, reached Saint-Amand about 23:00.

The detachments left by the 3rd Brigade (Jagow's) at Farciennes and Tamines, had been previously called in, and effected their retreat without any molestation, as did also, subsequently, the 2nd Brigade (Pirch II's) from Lambusart, by Wanfercée-Baulet, towards Fleurus, protected by the reserve cavalry.

I Corps (Zieten's), at 03:00 had possessed a line of advanced posts, from Dinant on the Meuse, crossing the Sambre at Thuin, and extending as far as Bonne-Espérance, in advance of Binche thus stretching along a space of from 40 mi to 40 mi in length: its main force occupied the Sambre from Thuin as far as its confluence with the Meuse, an extent of, at least, 36 mi, exclusive of the numerous windings throughout the whole course of the river between those two points.

The Prussians of I Corps had, since daybreak, been constantly under arms, in motion, and almost as constantly engaged, pursued, and assailed upon all points by an overwhelming superiority of force, headed by the elite of the French cavalry; and it was not until about 23:00 that I Corps effected its concentration in position between Ligny and Saint-Amand, at a distance varying from 14 mi to 20 mi in rear of its original extended line of outposts; after having successfully fulfilled the arduous task imposed upon it of gaining sufficient time for the concentration, on the following day, of all the Prussian Corps, by stemming, as well as its scattered force would admit, the advance of the whole of the French Army of the North.

Concentration of the Prussian Army
By 15:00 of 15 June, the II Corps (Pirch I's) had taken up the position assigned to it between Onoz and Mazy in the immediate vicinity of Sombreffe, with the exception, however, of the 7th Brigade, which, having been stationed in the most remote of the quarters occupied by the II Corps, did not reach Namur until midnight. Here the latter found an order for its continuance in Namur until the arrival of the III Corps (Thielemann's); but as this had already taken place, the brigade, after a few hours' rest, resumed its march, and joined the II Corps at Sombreffe about 10:00 on 16 June. Thielemann passed the night at Namur, which he occupied with the 10th Brigade; the 9th Brigade bivouacked on the right, and the 11th on the left, of Belgrade, a village at a short distance from the town, on the road to Sombreffe. The 12th Brigade in rear of the 9th; the reserve cavalry at Flawinne, between that road and the Sambre; and the reserve artillery on the left of the road.

Miscarriage of orders to Bülow
It has already been mentioned above that on 14 June, Blücher sent off a despatch to Bülow, commander of the Prussian IV Corps, desiring him to make such a disposition of his Corps as should enable his troops to reach Hannut in one march; and that at midnight of 14 June, a second despatch was forwarded, requiring him to concentrate the IV Corps at Hannut.

The first of these despatches reached Bülow, at Liege, at 05:00 15 June; when he issued the necessary orders with an instruction that they should be acted upon as soon as the troops had breakfasted, and forwarded a report of this arrangement to headquarters. These orders to his troops had been despatched some hours, and the consequent movements were for the most part in operation, when, around 12:00, the second despatch arrived. Bülow, considering the effect which the change required by this new order would have upon the troops, inasmuch as their reception was prepared in quarters to which, in this case they would no longer proceed, and they wold have nothing provided for them in the destined bivouac near Hannut, also as a great proportion of them could not receive the orders for the change in the direction of their march until evening, decided upon deferring the new movement until dawn of 16 June.

The despatch, moreover, did not require him to establish his headquarters at Hannut, but merely suggested that the latter appeared the most suitable for the purpose. Bülow was, besides, perfectly unconscious of the commencement of hostilities, which, indeed, he had expected would be preceded by a declaration of war; and he had also good grounds for an opinion which he had formed that it was in contemplation to assemble the whole Prussian army at Hannut.

Bülow made a report to Blücher's headquarters of his reasons for deferring the execution of the order, with the intimation that he would be at Hannut by 12:00 on 16 June. Captain Bklow, on Bülow's staff, who carried this despatch, arrived at 21:00 on 15 June at Namur, where he discovered that the headquarters of the army had been transferred to Sombreffe.

At 11:30 on 15 June, another despatch was forwarded to Bülow from Namur, announcing the advance of the French, and requesting that the IV Corps, after having rested at Hannut, should commence its march upon Gembloux, by daybreak on 16 June at latest. The orderly who carried it was directed to proceed to Hannut, Bülow's presumed headquarters on that day. On reaching that place, the orderly found the previous despatch lying in readiness for the General, and, mounting a fresh horse, he then went on with both despatches to Liege, where he arrived at sunrise.

The orders which they contained had now, however, become impracticable, in consequence of Bülow's not having immediately carried into effect the first order to collect at Hannut; and thus by one of those mischances, which, in war, occasionally mar the best planned operations, the opportune arrival of the Prussian IV Corps at the Battle of Ligny, which would, in all probability, have changed the aspect of affairs, was rendered a matter of impossibility.

Late in the evening of 15 June, and after Blücher had established his headquarters at Sombreffe, Captain Below arrived with the before mentioned report from Bülow; on receiving which Blücher was made aware that he could no longer calculate with certainty upon being joined by the IV Corps on the following day.

Prussian dispositions on night June 15/16
Of Blücher's four corps, only one, I Corps (Zieten's), had assembled in the chosen position of Ligny, on the night of 15/16 June. Of the others the:
 * II Corps (Pirch I's) which had arrived from Namur, was in bivouac between Onoz and Mazy, about 6 mi
 * III Corps (Thielmann's), which had left its cantonments around Ciney at 07:30, passed the night at Namur, about 15 mi from Ligny
 * IV Corps (Bölow's), supposed by Blücher to be then at Hannut, was still at Liege, about 60 mi distant from Ligny.

Prussian and French casualites
The loss of the Prussian I Corps on 15 of June, amounted to 1,200 men. The Fusilier Battalions of the 28th Regiment and of the 2nd Westphalian Landwehr, reduced to mere skeletons, were united, and formed into one battalion.

The French forces which attack the Prussian I Corps sustained casualties of between 300–400 men

First news at Quatre Bras
The extreme left of the Duke of Wellington's army, composed of 2nd Netherlands Division (Perponcher's), rested upon the Charleroi-Brussels road. The 2nd Brigade (Colonel Goedecke's) of this division, was located thus: There was also at Frasnes a Dutch horse artillery battery, under Captain Byleveld.
 * 1st Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau (Büsgen's)), at Houtain-le-Val;
 * 2nd Battalion (Normann's), at Frasnes-lez-Gosselies ("Frasnes") and Villers-Perwin;
 * 3rd Battalion (Hechmann's), at Baisy-Thy, Quatre Bras and Sart-Dames-Avelines;
 * both battalions of the 28th Regiment of Orange-Nassau (Prince Bernhard's), at Genappe.

Early on the morning of 15 June, these troops were lying quietly in their cantonments, perfectly unconscious of the advance of the French army, when they heard a brisk, cannonade at a distance in the direction of Charleroi; but not having received the slightest intimation of the approach of the French, they concluded that the firing proceeded from the Prussian artillery practice, which they had frequently heard before, and to which they had therefore become accustomed.

Gradually towards noon, however, the cannonade became more distinctly audible; and, in the afternoon, the arrival of a wounded Prussian soldier completely set at rest all doubt as to the advance of the French. A messenger was immediately despatched with the intelligence to the Regimental headquarters, whence it was also communicated to Perponcher's headquarters at Nivelles.

In the meantime. Major Normann, who commanded the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, drew up the latter with the battery in position in rear of Frasnes, and upon the road to Quatre Bras, after having posted a picket of observation in advance of the village.

Pebponcher lost not a moment in ordering both brigades of his division to hasten towards their respective points of assembly; the 1st Brigade (General Bylandt's), to Nivelles, and the 2nd Brigade (Goedecke's), to Quatre Bras.

Opening of direct hostilities
About 18:00, parties of French Lancers belonging to Piré's Light Cavalry Division of Reille's Corps appeared in front of Frasnes, and soon drove in Major Normann's picket. This officer placed a company on the south or French side of Frasnes, for the purpose of preventing as long as possible the entrance of the French into the village. Byleveld's battery took post on the north side of the village, and the remaining companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau drew up in its support. Two guns were upon the road, and three on each side of it.

After some time, the French Lancers, having been reinforced, compelled Normann's company to retire through the village and fall back upon the main body, which then opened a vigorous fire, by which this front attack by the French cavalry was defeated. The latter then made a disposition to turn the left flank of these troops; on perceiving which Major Normann and Captain Byleveld resolved upon falling back to within a short distance in front of Quatre Bras. The retreat was conducted in excellent order, the battery continuing to fire along the high road.

Nassau dispositions at Quatre Bras
Before Pebponcher's order, could possibly reach the 2nd Brigade (Goedecke's). Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, who commanded the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, at Genappe, having been informed by the officer of the Dutch-Belgian Maréchaussées, who had been compelled to quit his post at Charleroi, that the French were advancing from that place, took upon himself to move forward with his regiment from Genappe to Quatre Bras, and despatched a report of such movement to the headquarters of the Brigade at Hautain-le-Val, as also, subsequently, to Perponcher at Nivelles, by Captain Gagern, of the Dutch-Belgian Staff, who happened to be just then at Genappe, for the purpose of collecting information.

Quatre Bras was the rendezvous of the 2nd Brigade (Goedecke's); and the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, which was cantoned in its immediate vicinity, had already, without waiting for the receipt of superior orders, assembled at that point Prince Bernhard, on arriving there with the Regiment of Orange-Nassau, and learning the particulars of the engagement at Frasnes, assumed the command as senior officer.

Being fully impressed with the importance of securing the point of junction of the high road from Charleroi to Brussels, with that from Namur to Nivelles, Prince Bernhard came to the resolution of making a firm stand at Quatre Bras. This decision accorded entirely with the spirit of the orders which had in the meantime been despatched from the the Dutch-Belgian headquarters at Braine-le-Comte, on the receipt of intelligence of the French having crossed the Sambre.

General de Perponcher, who commanded the Division, had also approved of the Prince's determination, and as Goerecke, the Colonel of the 2nd Brigade, had broken his leg, and who was at Hautain-le-Val, now tendered his command to Prince Bernhard, who immediately accepted it.

The Prince pushed forward the 3rd Battalion of the 2nd Regiment of Nassau, in column, upon the high road towards Frasnes, detached two companies of the 1st Battalion, and the Volunteer Jägers to the defence of the Bossu wood, and the remaining companies on the high road towards Hautain le Val; and posted the remainder of the Brigade at Quatre Bras, along the Namur road. Four guns of Byleveld's horse battery were posted in advance in the direction of Frasnes, two on the road to Namur, and two in rear of the main body.

Ney joins the Grand Army
It was 19:00 16 June, when Marshal Ney, who had just arrived, joined the Emperor near Charleroi, at the point where the road to Fleurus branches off from the one to Brussels. Having expressed the pleasure he felt at seeing him, Napoleon gave him the command of the I and II Corps; explaining at the same time that Reille was advancing with three divisions upon Gosselies; that d'Erlon would pass the night at Marchienne au Pont; that he would find under his orders PirXX's Light Cavalry Division; as also the two regiments of chasseurs and lancers of the Guard, of which, however, he was not to make use except as a reserve. "To-morrow," added the Emperor, "you will be joined by the reserve corps of heavy Cavalry under Kellermann. Go and drive back the Enemy".

By the determined show of resistance which his Prince Bernhard displayed, as well as by the vigorous cannonade which he maintained, Piré's advanced guard, the left flank of which became endangered by the Dutch occupying the Bossu wood, was forced to retire in its turn, which it did unmolested, and brought back intelligence that Quatre Bras was occupied by ten battalions with artillery, and that Wellington's troops were moving to concentrate at this important point.

Ney's dispositions
At 22:00 Ney's forces were thus disposed:
 * Piré's light Cavalry Division and Bachelu's Infantry Division occupied Frasnes-lez-Gosselies, a village situated upon the Brussels road, about 2 mi on south of Quatre Bras; the two Regiments of Chasseurs and Lancers of the Guard were in reserve in rear of Frasnes.
 * Reill's was with two Divisions, and the artillery attached to them, at Gosselies: these Divisions ensured the communication until the arrival of d'Erlon's Corps, which was to remain that night at Marchienne-au-Pont.
 * The remaining Division of Reille's Corps (Girard's) was at Heppignies, and thus served to maintain the communication with the main column under Napoleon.

The troops were greatly fatigued by having been kept constantly on the march since 03:00; the strength of the different Regiments, the names of their Colonels, and even of the Generals, were unknown to the Marshal, as also the number of men that had been able to keep up with the heads of the columns at the end of this long march.

These circumstances, combined with the information brought in from Quatre Bras, induced Ney to decline risking a night attack upon that point; and he contented himself with taking up a position in advance of Frasnes-lez-Gosselies.

Having issued such orders as he deemed essential, and enjoined the most vigilant look out, Ney returned to Charleroi, where he arrived about midnight; partook of supper with Napoleon (who had just arrived from the right wing of the army), and conferred with the Emperor upon the state of affairs until two o'clock in the morning.

Other French dispostions
The centre column of the French Army was thus located:
 * III Corps (Vandamme's) bivouacked in the Wood of Fleurus;
 * Light cavalry of the I Calvary Reserve Corps (Pajol's) at Lambusart;
 * the 3rd Light Cavalry Division (Domon's), on the left, at the outlet of the Wood, and the heavy cavalry of the II Cavalry Corps (Excelmans's) between the light cavalry and III Corps;
 * the Imperial Guards bivouacked between Charleroi and Gilly;
 * VI Corps (Lobau's), together with heavy cavalry of the IV Cavalry Corps (Édouard Jean Baptiste Milhaud|Milhaud's), lay in rear of Charleroi.

The right column, consisting of IV Corps (Gérard's), had by the evening of the 15 June advanced as far as the bridge at Chatelet and it bivouacked on the northern bank of the Sambre.

Wellington's earliest news and orders
The first intimation which the Duke of Wellington received on 15 June, of hostilities having commenced, was conveyed in the report already alluded to, as having been forwarded by General Zieten, shortly before 05:00, and as having reached Brussels at 09:00. It was not, however, of a nature to enable Wellington to form an opinion as to any real attack being contemplated by the French in that quarter. It simply announced that the Prussian outposts in front of Charleroi were engaged. It might be the commencement of a real attack in this direction, but it might also be a diversion in favour of an attack in some other direction, such as Mons.

Not long after 15:00, the William, Prince of Orange arrived in Brussels, and informed Wellington that the Prussian outposts had been attacked and forced to fall back. The Prince had ridden to the front at 05:00 in the morning, from Braine-le-Comte, and had a personal interview at Saint-Symphorien, with General van Merlen, whose troops were on the immediate right of the Prussians, who had retired. After having given van Merlen verbal orders respecting his brigade, the Prince left the outposts between 09:00 and 10:00, and travelled to Brussels to communicate to Wellington all the information he had obtained respecting the French attack upon the Prussian's advanced outposts.

Wellington did not consider this sufficient evidence to take any immediate steps; but, about an hour afterwards, around 16:30, General von Müffling, the Prussian officer attached to the British headquarters, gave Wellington a communication which had been despatched from Namur by Blücher at noon, conveying the intelligence that the French had attacked the Prussian posts at Thuin and Lobbes on the Sambre, and that they appeared to be advancing in the direction of Charleroi.

Wellington was fully prepared for this intelligence, though uncertain how soon it might arrive. The reports which had been made to him from the outposts, especially from those of the 1st Hussars of the King's German Legion, stationed in the vicinity of Mons and Tournai, gave sufficient indication that Napoleon was concentrating his forces. Wellington was determined to make no movement until the real line of attack should become manifest; and hence it was, that if the attack had been made even at a later period, his dispositions would have remained precisely the same.

Wellington at once gave orders for the whole of his troops to assemble at the headquarters of their respective Divisions and to hold themselves in immediate readiness to march. At the same time an express was despatched to Major General Dörnberg, requiring information concerning any movement that might have been made on the part of the French in the direction of Mons.

Wellington ordered the following movements:
 * Upon the left of the Anglo-Allied army, which was nearest to the presumed point of attack — Netherlands 2nd Division (Perponcher's) and Netherlands 3rd  Division (Chassé's) were to be assembled that night at Nivelles, on which point British 3rd Division (Alten's) was to march as soon as collected at Braine-le-Comte; but this movement was not to be made until the French attack upon the right of the Prussian army and the left of Wellington's had become a matter of certainty. British 1st Division (Cooke's) was to be collected that night at Enghien, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.
 * Along the central portion of the army — British 2nd Division (Clinton's) was to be assembled that night at Ath, and to be in readiness also to move at a moment's notice. British 4th Division (Colville's) was to be collected that night at Grammont, with the exception of the troops beyond the Scheldt, which were to be moved to Audenarde.
 * Upon the right of Wellington's army — 1st Netherlands Division (Stedman's), and Netherlands Indies Brigade (Anthing's) were, after occupying Audenarde with 500 men, to be assembled at Zottegem, so as to be ready to march in the morning.
 * The cavalry were to be collected that night at Ninove, with the exception of the 2nd Hussars of the King's German Legion (Linsingen's), who were to remain on the look out between the Scheldt and the Lys; and British 3rd Cavalry Brigade (Dörnberg's), with the Cumberland Hussars (Hake's), which were to march that night upon Vilvorde, and to bivouac on the high road near to that town.
 * The reserve was thus disposed — British 5th Division (Picton's), the 2/81st British Regiment (Milling's), and 4th Hanoverian Brigade (Best's) — of 6th Division (Cole's), were to be in readiness to march from Brussels at a moment's notice.
 * 5th Hanoverian Brigade (Vincke's — of British 5th Division (Picton's) was to be collected that night at Hal, and to be in readiness at daylight on the following morning to move towards Brussels, and to halt on the road between Alost and Asse for further orders.
 * Brunswick Corps (Frederick, Duke of Brunswick's) was to be collected that night on the high road between Brussels and Vilvorde.
 * Nassau Brigade (Nassau 1st Infantry Regiment — Keuse's) was to be collected at daylight on the following morning upon the Louvain road, and to be in readiness to move at a moment's notice.
 * The British Reserve Artillery (Drummond's) was to be in readiness to move at daylight.

Prince of Orange is informed
It was 22:00 when the first intelligence of the attack made by the French in the direction of Frasnes, was received at the Prince of Orange's headquarters, at Braine-le-Comte. It was carried by Captain Gagern, who, as previously mentioned (see above), had been despatched by Prince Bernhard of Saxe Weimar, with his report of the affair, to General Perponcher at Nivelles, and who was subsequently sent on by Perponcher, with this information to the Prince of Orange's headquarters. Lieutenant Webster, (aide-de-camp to the Prince of Orange), started soon afterwards for Brussels, with a report from the Dutch Quartermaster General, de Constant Rebecque, stating what had taken place, and detailing the measures which he had thought proper to adopt. These measures did not entirely coincide with the instructions as issued by Wellington that afternoon, because they were consequent upon the attack on Frasnes, with which Wellington at that time was unacquainted; but they were perfectly consistent with the spirit of those instructions, inasmuch as they were not adopted "until the enemy's attack upon the right of the Prussian army, and the left of the Allied army had become a matter of certainty."

The French advance along the Charleroi road had already been successfully checked at Quatre Bras, and the necessity of immediately collecting at this important point, the troops ordered by Wellington "to be assembled that night at Nivelles" was too obvious to be mistaken.

Wellington's second orders
A little before 22:00 on the same evening, a further communication reached Wellington from Blücher, announcing the crossing of the Sambre by the French Army of the North, headed by Napoleon in person; and the required intelligence from other quarters having arrived almost at the same moment, and confirmed him in the opinion "that the Enemy's movement upon Charleroi was the real attack". At 22:00 Wellington issued issued the following orders for the march of his troops to their left:
 * British 3rd Division (Alten's)to continue its movement from Braine-le-Comte upon Nivelles.
 * British 1st Division (Cooke's) to move from Enghien upon Braine-le-Comte.
 * British 2nd and 4th Divisions (Clinton's and Colville's) to move from Ath, Grammont, and Audenarde, upon Enghien.
 * The cavalry to continue its movement from Ninove upon Enghien.

Remarks on Napoleon's operations
In the the opinion of the historian William Siborne the result of the proceedings on the 15 June was highly favourable to Napoleon. He had completely effected the passage of the Sambre; he was operating with the main portion of his forces directly upon the preconcerted point of concentration of Blücher's army, and was already in the in front of the chosen position, before that concentration could be accomplished; he was also operating with another portion upon the high road to Brussels, and had come in contact with the left of Wellington's troops; he had also placed himself so far in advance upon this line, that even a partial junction of the forces of the Coalition Commanders was already rendered a hazardous operation, without first retreating back towards Brussels, and he thus had it in his power to bring the principal weight of his arms against the one, whilst, with the remainder of his force, he held the other at bay. This formed the grand object of his operations on the next day.

William Siborne was also of the option that however excellent, or even perfect, this plan of operation may appear in theory, still there were other circumstances, which, if taken into consideration, that put the outcome in jeopardy for the French. Napoleon's troops had been constantly under arms, marching, and fighting, since 02:00 in the morning, (the hour at which they broke up from their position at Solre sur Sambre, Beaumont, and Philippeville, within the French frontier) so they required time for rest and refreshment. They lay widely scattered between their advanced posts and the Sambre. Ney's forces were in detached bodies from Frasnes as far as Marchienne au Pont, the halting place of d'Erlon's Corps; and although Vandamme's Corps was in the Fleurus Woods, Lobau's Corps and the Imperial Guards were halted at Charleroi, and Gisraed's Corps at Chatelet. Hence, instead of an imposing advance, with the first glimmering of the dawn on 16 Jume, the whole morning would necessarily be employed by the French in effecting a closer junction of their forces, and in making their preparatory dispositions for attack. This interval of time ws to be invaluable to the Coalition's generals, for it allowed then time to concentrate sufficient force to hold Napoleon in check, and to frustrate his design of defeating them in detail.

Given the inability of the Prussians to concatenate at Ligny before dawn on the 16 June, if Napoleon had instilled more vigour in his Corps commanders he could have destroyed the Prussian Corps individually before they could concentrate or forced them to retreat away form Wellington's army allowing him to turn on his other enemy. William Siborne compares the relative laxity of Napoleon's orders to Ney and his dispositions, to the that energetic perseverance and restless activity which characterised the most critical of his operations in former wars, and concludes that to a very great degree, explain the failure of the campaign on the part of the French.

Instead of what happened? Napoleon did not advance towards Fleurus until around 11:30 on the 16 June, by which time the Prussian I Corps (Zieten's), II Corps (Pirch II's), and III Corps (Thielemann's) were all concentrated and in position, and he did not commence the Battle of Ligny until nearly 15:00. Nay on his side, in consequence of his operations having been rendered subordinate to those of Napoleon, dallied and did not advance with any degree of against of vigour agaist Wellington's forces  until around 14:30, by which time Wellington's reserve reached Quatre Bras, from Brussels, and joined the forces then engaged in the Battle of Quatre Bras.