Southern Russia Intervention

The Southern Russia Intervention was a French-led military intervention in Ukraine between December 1918 and April 1919 on the Black Sea shores of the former Russian Empire, as part of the Allied Intervention in Russia after the October Revolution. The intervention was an involvement in the Russian Civil War on the side of the White movement, but ended in failure.

Reasons behind the campaign
On 11 November 1918, the German Army capitulated on the Western Front, which created a vacuum in German controlled Ukraine. Fighting broke out between Bolshivik, White Russian and Ukrainian Independist forces. French Prime-Minister George Clemenceau decided to send an International French-led expedition to Ukraine, to assure the retreat of the Germans, to stop the spread of Bolshivism and to establish an economic sphere of influence.

In their attempt to give the expedition an International character, the French only found a response in Greece, which sent a sizeable contingent (the 2nd and 13th Divisions) under Major General Konstantinos Nider. Also some Polish, Rumanian and Czech units arrived in the following months. Command of the expedition was given to general Henri Bertholot, commander of the French Army of the Danube in Romania.

The Intervention
The situation in Ukraine in December 1918 was very complex. There was the German-backed Hetman of Ukraine Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who had just been overthrown by the Nationalist Ukrainian People's Republic, led by Symon Petliura. Then there was the Pro-Russian White Volunteer Army led by Anton Denikin. Further there were the Bolshevik forces, which had invaded the Ukraine and were marching upon Kiev. Finally, there were also a number of independent smaller armies or bands, which switched sides at their convenience.

The French landed in Odessa on 18 December 1918, in Sebastopol on 26 December, and in Nikolaev, Kherson and Tiraspol in January 1919. They found a very tense situation between Petliura's Ukrainian Army and the White Volunteer Army. They were also appalled by the lack of discipline and military qualities of their Russian allies. An other unpleasant surprise was the hostile reaction of the population towards the French and especially towards the Greek, who were seen as invaders and not as liberators. All these factors increased the war-weariness amongst the Allied troops, some of which even became susceptible to Bolshevik propaganda.

By the end of January 1919, Berthelot complained that he still had less than 3,000 soldiers to occupy all of the Ukraine, and that he needed 20 divisions in total. But in the meantime, the Bolsheviks and their allies had already come to the same conclusion.

Kherson, Nikolaev and Odessa


A local warlord, Ataman Nikifor Grigoriev, aligned himself with the Bolsheviks on 18 February 1919 and advanced his army against the foreign invaders. With his army of 10-12,000 men, he first attacked Kherson on 2 March which was occupied by just 150 French, 700 Greek and a few hundred Volunteers of questionable reliability. After heavy fighting, the city was taken on 9 March, and the allied soldiers were evacuated by the French Fleet under cover of an intense bombardment. The allied soldiers not only had to fight the forces of Grigoriev, but had also come under sniper fire from inhabitants of the city. The French lost 4 killed and 22 wounded, while the Greeks had some 250 casualties. Local Greek residents were also killed in the aftermath.

After the conquest of Kherson, Grigorev turned his forces against Nikolaev, where there were even less allied troops present. There were still 12,000 well equiped German troops in the city, but they had no intention to participate in the fighting. The local French commander was allowed to negotiate a truce with Grigoriev, and on 14-16 March all allied and German troops were evacuated by sea without any fighting, leaving considerable quantities of war material behind.

The allies fell back on their last stronghold, Odessa, where the situation looked very grim. Although they had 25,000 soldiers in the city, the strength of Grigoriev's Army was now estimated between 30 and 40,000 men. The allies were outnumbered, their forces were discouraged, there was a shortage of supplies and revolution was simmering amongst the population. Bertholot, who had asked for reinforcements several times, asked to be relieved of his command on 16 March. In the meantime, the pro-Bolshevik forces, now some 17,000 men strong, approached the city from the North, easily overrunning Berezovka on 18 March and Ochakov a few days later. Supreme Commander of the Allied Army of the East, Franchet d'Esperey, arrived in Odessa on 20 March and quickly concluded that an evacuation was unavoidable. He asked General D'Anselme to start preparations for the evacuation, but he didn't inform the Volunteer Army nor the Greek allies. On 29 March, Franchet d'Esperey received permission from Clemenceau for the withdrawal. On 1 April Franchet d'Esperey ordered D'Anselme to execute his evacuation plan and by 6 April, all allied troops, their material and some 50,000 civilians had left the city. Not every one was evacuated over sea, a large part of the Army marched to Romania.

Sebastopol and the Crimea


Clemenceau urged Franchet d'Esperey to hold on to Sebastopol and the Crimea as a bastion for further action in Southern Russia, but the problems here were the same as in Odessa. By 14 April there were only 5,000 allied soldiers in Sebastopol, including 2,000 Greek and 1,500 Algerian and Senegalese troops. On 3 April, Bolshevik forces (2nd Ukrainian Soviet Army) had already easily broken through the Perekop Isthmus and were advancing quickly towards Sebastopol, reaching the outskirts of the city on 14 April. A first attack was launched upon the city on 16 April, but beaten off by artillery fire from French ships. The next day, the French asked for a truce to evacuate the city.

On 19 April a mutiny broke out on the French ships France and Jean Bart from a combination of war-weariness, Communist sympathizers in the crew and difficult conditions. The mutiny was suppressed, but delayed the evacuation until 29 April, when the Bolsheviks entered the deserted city.

Reasons for the failure
The allied intervention was a complete failure for several reasons:
 * The invasion was badly organized, insufficiently supplied and ill-defined in its objectives.
 * There was war-weariness among the Allied troops, who had more sympathy for the Reds than for the Whites, what even led to refusals to obey orders and mutinies.
 * The population in Southern Russia was predominantly hostile to the allied troops.
 * The Bolshevik military opposition was disciplined and efficient, while the White soldiers in the region were of little military value.

Aftermath
Allied policy turned from direct intervention to indirect aid to the White forces and a diplomatic cordon sanitaire against the Bolsheviks. Odessa was soon retaken by the Russian White Army, but finally by the end of 1920 the Soviet Red Army managed to overpower both the Ukrainian and Russian White Army and secure Ukraine.