Role of Douglas Haig in 1918

In 1918 Field Marshal Douglas Haig, 1st Earl Haig commanded the BEF in the defeat of the German Spring Offensives, the Allied victory at Amiens, and the Hundred Days Offensive, which led to the war-ending armistice in 1918.

Political Manoeuvres
Over lunch at 10 Downing Street with Derby and Lloyd George in January (Derby bet a sceptical Lloyd George 100 cigars to 100 cigarettes that the war would be over by the following year), Haig predicted that the war would end within a year because of the “internal state of Germany”. Charteris’ final intelligence report had deduced that Germany was bringing 32 divisions, ten per month, from the moribund Eastern Front, so the most likely time for a German Offensive was in late March (a correct prediction). Bonar Law asked Haig what he would do if he were a German general: Haig replied that a German offensive would be a “gambler’s throw” as Germany had only a million men as reserves and the balance of manpower would shift in favour of the Allies in August (this prediction was also correct) and that if he were a German general he would launch only limited offensives, although he did warn that the German generals might try to keep the civilians out of power by launching an attack to knock out France. Haig left the War Cabinet with the impression that he thought the Germans would launch small attacks on the scale of Cambrai.

Haig also recommended that the British should keep the initiative and draw in German reserves by renewing the offensive around Ypres, a proposal which did not meet with political approval, and besides the logistical infrastructure was not available for a breakout from the Ypres salient. By now Haig’s 1917 offensives were being criticised in the press (Lovat Fraser wrote a highly critical article in Northcliffe’s “Daily Mail” on 21 January) and in Parliament, where J.C.Wedgwood MP openly demanded a change of command.

The purge of Haig’s staff continued, with the removal of Lt-Gen Launcelot Kiggell as BEF Chief of Staff. It is possible that Derby was covering Haig’s back, advising him to ask for Herbert Lawrence (a much stronger character than Kiggell, and who having made money in business and having no plans to stay in the Army after the War, was not beholden to Haig - actually in time the two men made a good team ) as the new CGS not General Butler. If so, Haig was not grateful, likening Derby to “a feather pillow which bears the mark of the last person who sat on him”. Haig also lost the Deputy Chief of General Staff, Maxwell (QuarterMaster General), the engineer in chief and the director-general of medical services. Even Terraine admits the changes strengthened the BEF.

In January the Cabinet Minister Jan Christiaan Smuts and the Cabinet Secretary Maurice Hankey, whom Lloyd George had contemplated appointing to Kiggell's job, were sent to France to take discreet soundings among the Army Commanders to see whether any of them were willing to replace Haig - none of them were. The only possibility seemed to be Claud Jacob, GOC II Corps. Hankey formed the opinion that nobody important amongst the British generals thought a major German attack likely.

At the Supreme War Council at Versailles (29 January) Haig and Petain complained of shortage of troops (the BEF was facing a 100,000 manpower shortage by June 1918 ), but Haig’s political credibility was so low that Hankey wrote that they “made asses of themselves”. It was agreed that an Allied General Reserve be set up, under Foch with Henry Wilson as his deputy; Haig was reluctant to hand over divisions to the General Reserve. Haig argued against a common command, claiming that it would be “unconstitutional” for him to take orders from a foreign general, and that he did not have the reserves to spare (worrying that they would be shipped off to Turkey but thinking the proposal would take time to be become operational) and suggested to Clemenceau (who was suspicious of Foch’s ambition to become generalissimo) that he might resign. Milner thought Haig’s stance “desperately stupid”, although Haig had a point that control of reserves by a committee was not necessarily sensible. Clemenceau attacked Lloyd George’s wish to make offensives against Turkey top priority.

Lloyd George now had his showdown with Robertson, who was still unhappy over the handing over of British divisions to General Reserve. He proposed that the CIGS be reduced to his pre-1915 powers (i.e. reporting to the Secretary of State for War, not direct to the Cabinet) and that the British military representative at the Supreme War Council in Versailles be Deputy CIGS and a member of the Army Council (i.e. empowered to issue orders to Haig). He offered Robertson a choice of remaining as CIGS with reduced powers or else accepting demotion to Deputy CIGS at Versailles – either way, Lloyd George would now have been able to cut him out of the decision-making loop. Derby summoned Haig to London, expecting him to support him in backing Robertson. In a private meeting with Lloyd George, Haig agreed with Robertson’s position that the CIGS should himself be the delegate to Versailles, or else that the Versailles delegate be clearly subordinate to the CIGS to preserve unity of command. However, he accepted that the War Cabinet must ultimately make the decision, and according to Lloyd George “put up no fight for Robertson” and was contemptuous of Derby’s threats to resign - he persuaded him not to do so after Robertson was pushed out. Haig thought Robertson (who had begun his military career as a private) egotistical, coarse, power-crazed and not “a gentleman” and was unhappy at the way Robertson had allowed divisions to be diverted to other fronts, even though Robertson had in fact fought to keep such diversions to a minimum. Henry Wilson now became CIGS, with Rawlinson as British military representative at Versailles. Haig wrote in his diary (10+11 February) that it was Robertson’s "duty" to go to Versailles if the government wanted. Although Haig had been suspicious of Henry Wilson, they gradually established a warily respectful relationship, and interactions were socially more smooth than they had been with Robertson.

German Michael Offensive
By March 1918 Germany's Western Front armies had been reinforced to a strength of almost 200 divisions by the release of troops from the Eastern Front. With a German offensive clearly imminent, at a meeting in London (14 March), Lloyd George and Bonar Law accused Haig of having said that there would not be a major German offensive (which was not actually what he had said – he had said it would be “a gambler’s throw”) but agreed to shelve the General Reserve for the time being until enough American troops had arrived.

At this point Haig had 52 divisions in his front line Armies, and another 8 in GHQ reserve, and 3 cavalry divisions. British troops were tired and weakened, and British divisions had been cut in size from 12 battalions to 9. Allied intelligence did not fall for German deceptions that they might attack in Italy or the Balkans, but thought that the main attack might fall in the Cambrai-St Quentin (Third Army) sector. Haig wrote to his wife (22 February) that he was “quite confident” and that it was “God’s Battle” quoting 2 Chronicles XX Chap.

Haig privately thought the Guards Division “our only reliable reserve”. He has been criticised for writing (2 March) that he “was only afraid that the Enemy would find our front so very strong that he will hesitate to commit his Army to the attack with the almost certainty of losing very heavily”, but this in fact referred to the First, Third and Fourth (formerly Second, now renumbered, at Ypres) Army fronts which he had spent a week inspecting, and which were well-defended – Smuts and Hankey had come to the same conclusion in January. Haig thought the Canadians “really fine disciplined soldiers now and so smart and clean” compared to the Australians.

Whereas Second/Fourth Army had 14 divisions holding 23 miles, First Army 16 divisions holding 33 miles and Third Army 16 divisions holding 28 miles, Fifth Army had only 14 divisions holding 42 miles. Haig had warned Gough to prepare defence in depth and had warned him he might have to retreat to Peronne then counterattack when Petain sent the promised reinforcements (Instructions to Fifth Army 9 Feb 1918). Gough had too many men too far forward in positions too far apart to be mutually supporting. Haig inspected Fifth Army (7–9 March) and noted widespread concerns, which he shared, at lack of reserves – he released one division from Flanders to Fifth Army and deployed another, under GHQ control, to the rear of Fifth Army. As late as 17 March Cox, who had replaced Charteris as Intelligence Chief, predicted that the German Offensive was not yet immediately imminent; Haig still believed that a power-struggle between generals and politicians in Germany (in fact the generals were very much in control) would determine if there was any attack. By 20 March deployment of German trench mortars had been reported by deserters, and British artillery began some spoiling fire.

Germany launched an attack, "Michael" (21 March 1918), with 76 divisions and 7,000 guns, a force larger than the entire BEF (German divisions were somewhat smaller than British) and enjoying superiority of 5:1 over the 12 divisions of Gough’s Fifth Army, which were spread thinly over line recently taken over from the French. Haig was initially calm on 21 March, as owing to the communications of the time GHQ was “an information vacuum” where detailed reports often took over a day to reach him, and spent much of the day entertaining foreign dignitaries including the US War Secretary. Third Army retreated as planned from the Flesquieres Salient, freeing up a division. On three-quarters of the 50 mile front attacked, British troops fought hard and the Germans failed to reach their first day objectives. However, lacking reserves Gough had to retreat behind the Crozat Canal. 22 March saw Fifth Army retreat to the Somme; Haig still anticipated further German attacks in Champagne or Arras. Although the Germans did not initially realise the importance of Amiens as an objective, the offensive, with greater superiority of men and guns than Haig had ever had for his own offensives, almost destroyed Gough's Fifth Army, and threatened to split the British forces apart from the French Armies.

Haig did not speak to or visit Gough until 23 March. Having at first regarded the situation as in hand, he was incredulous that Fifth Army was retreating behind the Somme and Tortville rivers. That day Haig arranged for reserves to be sent down from Flanders. Formal orders were issued to Fifth Army to maintain contact with Third Army to their north and the French to their south. After initial optimism, Tim Travers has written of “panic” setting in amongst senior officers like Herbert Lawrence and Tavish Davidson at GHQ on 23 March, and there is evidence that a retreat towards the Channel Ports may have been considered.

Doullens
Haig's GHQ Reserve was massed in the north, 72 hours’ march away, to protect the Channel Ports. The French Commander-in-Chief, Pétain and Haig met on 23 March (4pm), and Petain stressed the need for Gough’s Fifth Army to keep in touch with Pelle’s French V Corps on its right. Petain agreed to place two French armies under Fayolle as a reserve in the Somme valley, but could not agree to Haig’s request to send 20 French divisions to Amiens because of the risk of a German attack around Champagne. Amidst mutual suspicion – a French officer recorded Petain’s increasing fears on 22 and 23 March that the British would retreat on the Channel Ports - Petain was issuing orders to cover Paris as a priority and maintain contact with the British “if possible”.

24 March was “probably the most traumatic day (Haig) had endured since” First Ypres in 1914. Half of BEF supplies came in to Le Havre, Rouen and Dieppe and passed by train through Amiens, making it a major choke point. Planning that winter had left open the question of whether the BEF would retreat southwest or form “an island” around the Channel Ports (Calais, Boulogne, Dunkirk) through which Haig's armies drew the other half of their supplies. A retreat on the ports does not seem to have been decided until some days after 21 March. Haig remained composed in front of more junior officers.

This is one of the occasions where doubt has been cast on the authenticity of Haig’s diary. Haig’s handwritten diary of the next meeting (Dury, 24 March at 11pm) is brief. The typed diary – probably based on notes prepared in April - describes Petain as “almost unbalanced and most anxious”, claiming that after attending a Cabinet meeting in Paris, where he had been ordered to “cover Paris at all costs”, he threatened to retreat on Paris, leaving the British right flank uncovered. Tim Travers argues that Petain said at the meeting that he would only retreat on Paris if Haig retreated on the Channel Ports, and that Major-General Clive reported from the meeting that Petain had come away satisfied that Haig would not break contact. In a postwar exchange of letters with Haig Petain denied that he had ordered a retreat on Paris or had threatened Haig that he might, a recollection which Herbert Lawrence appears to have supported. It has been suggested that Haig and Lawrence, on the long drive back to GHQ from their meeting with Petain may simply have misunderstood his intentions, and that any factual errors in Haig's diary for this period were honest if mistaken recollections.

In the typed diary, Haig also claimed that at on returning at 3am he telegraphed to Wilson (CIGS) and Milner (War Secretary – an error on Haig’s part, as Milner did not hold this position until April) to come over to France and ensure the appointment of “Foch or some other determined general who would fight” as Allied Generalissimo. There is no record of the telegram, and Milner and Wilson were in fact already on their way to France at the time. Wilson’s diary records that Haig telephoned him at 7 or 8pm on 24 March, before the meeting with Petain, and after Haig’s evening visit to Third Army, at which he had ordered that Army to maintain contact at all costs with First Army to its north. Travers suggests that Haig had written off both Fifth Army and the link with the French at this point, that he called Henry Wilson over to France to discuss a retreat on the Channel Ports, and that he wanted the 20 French divisions at Amiens not to maintain the link with the French but to cover the British retreat or perhaps to counterattack.

Haig’s letter of 25 March, sent via Weygand, asked for 20 French divisions to cover the southern British flank as the BEF fought its way back “covering the Channel Ports”. The letter is ambiguous and does not specifically mention a retreat "to" the ports. Sheffield argues that orders to Third Army were not a precursor to retreat but “a means to an end”, pointing to orders for, if needs be, a counterattack onto the northern flank of the German attackers, and also argues that although GHQ had a duty to consider contingency plans, unlike in 1940, evacuation was never actually likely.

Wilson’s diary for their meeting on 25 March (11am) describes Haig as “cowed” and saying that unless the French sent more help the BEF was beaten and “it would be better to make peace on any terms we could”. Wilson claimed that Haig suggested Petain be appointed Allied generalissimo (which is not consistent with Haig’s later claim that Petain was unwilling to help the British) and that he proposed Foch over Haig’s objections. Petain had sent 3 French divisions on the evening of 21 March to help the British, not the 20 Haig demanded, vindicating Henry Wilson's warnings that relying on bilateral agreement with Petain would provide “very cold charity”.

At the Doullens Conference (26 March), Haig accepted the appointment of Foch to coordinate reserves of all nationalities wherever he saw fit. In his typed diary Haig claimed much of the credit for Foch’s appointment and to have insisted that he have wider powers over Petain than Clemenceau had wanted to grant him. However, the typed version of Haig’s diary, although fuller, does not specifically contradict the handwritten original, and it has been suggested that Haig either needed to reconcile himself psychologically to the need to accept a French superior or else was simply letting off steam and wanted to give himself the credit he felt he deserved. Milner, who represented the British government at Doullens, recorded that Clemenceau was unhappy with Petain's recent efforts, but claimed that he himself had persuaded Haig to accept the appointment of Foch; Haig's official biographer Duff Cooper gave Haig the credit but commented that the idea had probably occurred to several participants simultaneously. Wilson recorded that Haig seemed “10 years younger” that evening after Doullens.

After a German offensive near Arras ("Mars", 9 German divisions, 28 March ) was beaten back, between 29 and 31 March the Germans pushed on Amiens. A Canadian brigade took part in an action at Moreuil Wood. Attacks on 4 April (Villers-Bretonneux, east of Amiens, 25 miles from the German starting point on 21 March) and 5 April on the Third Army front were beaten back by British and Australian forces, although contingency plans were still being prepared to cover Rouen and Le Havre in case Amiens fell.

German Georgette Offensive
Lloyd George demanded Haig sack Gough, and when Haig was reluctant he was given a direct order to do so by Derby (4 April). Haig recommended Cavan for the vacancy (it went to Rawlinson), and twice asked the politicians to accept his judgement or replace him. Lloyd George wanted to accept Haig’s resignation and read out his offer to a meeting of the War Cabinet called (8 April) to discuss, in Hankey's words, “the desirability of getting rid of Haig”, but the other ministers, and Henry Wilson, thought there was no obvious successor (Hankey thought the only possibility was Plumer who was “about as stupid as Haig himself”). Rumours were rife in GHQ that Haig would soon be dismissed in favour of Robertson, Wilson (who may have been a prime mover for Haig's dismissal ), or more likely Plumer, Byng or Allenby. In April Haig’s political position was further weakened when Lord Milner, an ally of Lloyd George and a sceptic of British efforts on the Western Front, replaced Haig’s ally Lord Derby as Secretary of State for War.

During the second major German offensive, "Georgette" in Flanders (9 April), Haig issued his famous order (11 April) that his men must carry on fighting "With Our Backs to the Wall and believing in the Justice of our Cause" to protect “The safety of our homes and the Freedom of mankind” - the latter being a real concern after recent British propaganda dwelled on the harsh terms imposed on Russia at Brest-Litovsk. Just as "Michael" had swept over the Cambrai and the Somme battlefields, won at such cost by Haig's own offensives in previous years, this one swept over Passchendaele although not Ypres itself. The German offensive had a 2:1 numerical advantage and advanced 5 km towards Hazebrouck, “the Amiens of the north”, a key railhead through which supplies were brought from the Channel Ports – had it fallen the Channel Ports might have been at risk and Plumer’s Second Army might have been cut off.

Foch had earlier refused to send 4 French divisions to Flanders but now redeployed Maistre’s Tenth French Army to the Somme sector, freeing up British forces. At Beauvais (3 April) Foch had been given power of “strategic direction”, although his powers were still largely based on persuasion rather than command and he was given the title of Generalissimo (he would have preferred “Commander-in-Chief”) (14 April) to give him more clout over Petain, who was still reluctant to release French reserves. Eventually, later in the year, Petain would simply be placed under Foch’s command, although Haig and Pershing retained their right of appeal to their own governments. During a renewed attack (17 April) Foch drew attention to the valour of the British at First Ypres and refused to send further French reinforcements so as to keep a strategic reserve. 24 April saw a further unsuccessful German attack at Villers-Bretonneux near Amiens, featuring the first tank-to-tank combat. Haig was suspicious of Foch’s request to move British divisions to the French sector to free up French reserves, worrying that this might lead to “a permanent Amalgam” of French and British forces. Milner agreed but at a meeting on 27 April meeting the dispute was smoothed over, and British IX Corps moved to the French sector. By the end of April Haig claimed to notice a slackening of enemy fighting spirit and on 30 April Ludendorff called a halt to the Flanders offensive.

Although some American divisions were now serving with the British forces, Haig thought Pershing “very obstinate and stupid” for refusing to integrate US troops (1 May) with Allied units (an ironic complaint in view of his reluctance to integrate British troops with French). At Abbeville (2 May) it was agreed that in the event of renewed attack British forces would retreat south if necessary and abandon the Channel Ports rather than lose touch with the French. Contingency plans were made (11 May) although it is unclear that they would ever have been executed.

The near-debacle of March 1918 was an object of political controversy. Repington wrote that it was “the worst defeat in the history of the Army”. Bonar Law claimed in a House of Commons debate (23 April) that Haig and Petain had agreed the extension of the British line, which was not wholly true as in January 1918 the Supreme War Council had ordered a longer extension than Haig and Petain had agreed between themselves in December 1917, only leaving them to sort out the details. Lloyd George was accused (in the Maurice Debate of 9 May 1918 in the House of Commons, after Maurice's public accusation three days earlier) of having hoarded troops in the UK to make it harder for Haig to launch offensives. Lloyd George misled the House of Commons in claiming that Haig's forces were stronger (1.75 million men) at the start of 1918 than they had been a year earlier (1.5 million men) - in fact the increase was caused by an increase of 335,000 in the number of labourers (Chinese, Indians and black South Africans), and Haig had fewer combat infantry (630,000, down from 900,000 a year earlier), holding a longer stretch of front (the rest of Haig's men would have been tank, air & artillery crews and above all logistical support personnel). Haig had opposed Maurice in taking his concerns into public, but was disappointed at how Lloyd George was able to get off the hook with a “claptrap speech”. Maurice believed he had saved Haig from dismissal.

German Bluecher Offensive
By late spring the BEF had taken just over 300,000 casualties. Battalions had had to be brought in from the Middle East. Haig spent time touring his forces in May. Haig's wife reported rumours (11 May) that he was to be brought home as Commander-in-Chief Home Forces; when Wilson denied the rumours to Haig’s face, Haig recorded (20 May) that “no one has been chosen yet!” to replace him.

A third major German offensive against the French on the Aisne ("Bluecher"), starting on 27 May, again achieved a 25 mile penetration and overwhelmed Hamilton-Gordon’s IX British Corps which had been sent there to refit after being involved in "Michael" and "Georgette". At a conference at Versailles (1 June) there was friction between Haig, who was worried that the Germans would attack his sector again (intelligence reported extra German hospital spaces being made available near La Bassee) - this was indeed the German plan but the offensive in question, "Hagen", was repeatedly postponed and never actually took place - and Foch, who demanded that the US divisions trained by the British be moved to his sector to release French divisions (of whose fighting ability Haig was privately scornful) - Foch also accused Lloyd George of withholding British troops in the UK. Foch moved French forces down from Flanders, but there was further friction at a meeting in Paris about the Foch's request to move British reserves south (7 June). Haig threatened to appeal to the British Government if he felt Foch was demanding too many British troops, so it was agreed that Haig and Foch should meet more frequently, and in time they developed a good working relationship (although wags at GHQ said he had to fight “Boche, Foch and Loygeorges” ).

Cooperation improved when the Germans launched their "Gneisenau" Offensive on 9 June, to widen the "Bluecher" salient westwards. Lloyd George and Milner gave their full support to Foch on moving four British divisions. They told Haig that he should consider himself subordinate to Foch for the time being and that they were no longer interested in sacking him (this may have been untrue – as late as August on eve of the battle of Amiens Lloyd George may have been trying to replace Haig with Cavan ). "Gneisenau" was quickly defeated by the French General Mangin at the Battle of the Matz (11 June), and the next Haig-Foch meeting proved more cordial as the arrival of more US divisions had begun to ease the situation, as had the moving of German reserves from Flanders to the Marne sector.

On 4 July the 4th Australian Division, assisted by four US companies, attacked at Hamel, and took 1,470 prisoners at a cost of 1,000 casualties. Haig’s only direct involvement was to dissuade Pershing from removing the American troops. A tactical pamphlet on the lessons was quickly published. Haig forbade Rawlinson to push any further, but asked him to draw up a plan for an attack in the Amiens area.

With another German attack imminent, Herbert Lawrence was asked (12–13 July – Haig was on leave in England) to send 8 Divisions – he sent only 2 (XXII Corps). Haig thought this was breaching an agreement of 1 July that covering Paris and the Somme area was to take priority. Wilson consulted the War Cabinet then (in the small hours of 15 July) told Haig to “exercise his judgement” about holding the British line. Haig felt that they would take credit for Foch’s victory but might dismiss him if disaster befell the British forces. The German "Peace Offensive" began against the French at Rheims on the same day. Haig eventually agreed that the French could use XXII Corps if necessary “for exploitation”.

Amiens: The Turn of the Tide
The "Peace Offensive" turned out to be the last German throw of the dice. "Hagen" was finally cancelled, and in July the Germans were defeated by Franco-American forces at the Second Battle of the Marne.

Rawlinson drew up plans to use both the Canadian Corps as well as the Australian Corps for Fourth Army's forthcoming attack at Amiens, and found (16 July) that Haig had already had the same idea. The Canadians were transferred to the front in secrecy – the Germans thought they were still at Arras. Brudenell White, Chief Of Staff Australian Corps, drew up many of the plans.

Foch placed Debeney (First French Army) under Haig’s command, against Rawlinson’s wishes, and encouraged him to aim for a penetration to Roye, 25 miles South East of Amiens. Neither the Prime Minister (who wanted to wait for the Americans to be ready before beginning major offensives ) nor the CIGS were told about the offensive until zero hour, Haig telling Wilson that “nothing startling” had happened at his meeting with Foch on 25 July. On that same day Henry Wilson had submitted a document forecasting that stalemate would continue on the Western Front until mid-1919, and that other fronts offered better prospects. Haig wrote on the cover of his copy: “Words! Words! Words! Lots of words! And little else.”

To Rawlinson’s dismay Haig, at the request of Foch (who was pleased at the success of the Second Marne, but worried that the Allied advance might bog down), brought the date two days forward to 8 August, and extended the planned advance to Ham, a further 15 miles east of Roye. Prior & Wilson criticise Haig for this overambition, but Sheffield argues that there was little concrete change in the operational plans, as the more distant objectives were beyond artillery range anyway, and suggests that Haig was both paying lip service to Foch’s wishes and prodding Rawlinson to more aggressive exploitation in the event of success – in the event Haig did not criticise the cavalry for not reaching Ham. Haig set up his own Advanced HQ in a train at Wiry-au-Mont.

Amiens began at 4.20am on 8 August with an attack with 11 divisions, Allied air superiority and 552 tanks across a 19,000 yard front. The Germans were bombarded with 350,000 shells from 1,236 field guns and 677 heavy guns, 450 of them on counterbattery work, and far more accurate and effective than before, with 504 out of 530 German guns already identified. Cavalry were involved from the outset, alongside light Whippet tanks (the attempt to coordinate the two was not, in the event, a success). Fourth Army advanced 8 miles (6,000 yards had been planned), the longest one-day advance since 1914. The Germans lost 15,000 casualties, 400 guns and 12,000 prisoners while French took 3,000 more - earning General Erich Ludendorff's description of the battle as "The Black Day of the German Army".

Foch, claiming that the Germans were showing signs of demoralisation, demanded (10 August) that Haig push on and capture the Somme crossings. Haig would have preferred to have First Army attack at Aubers and Third Army towards Bapaume, and after initially agreeing with Foch’s demand, changed his mind after consulting Currie and Lambert (GOC 32nd Division). Edmonds later claimed that Rawlinson was “almost insubordinate” in asking Haig whether he or “Marechal Foch” was in command, but this may be doubtful as there is no record of the two men meeting that day. Haig told Byng (11 August) to be ready to attack with Third Army towards Bapaume and permitted Rawlinson to order a pause. Foch visited Haig’s train that evening and concurred with the decision. Haig initially ordered Rawlinson to be ready to attack again after a short halt – this decision has been criticised but Sheffield suggests that Haig had to defer to Foch this time, to clear the way for Byng’s attack. Haig then cancelled Fourth Army’s attack on Currie’s advice (based on aerial reconnaissance) that it would be “a desperate enterprise” for the BEF to overreach itself and engage new German troops with tired Allied ones who had outrun much of their artillery cover, and he switched to a new line of offensive. Haig wrote that on 15 August he “spoke to Foch quite straightly, and let him understand that I was responsible for the handling of the British forces”. Foch had little choice but to agree, and interfered little with Haig’s decisions thereafter, but removed First French Army from Haig’s command.

Pursuit After Amiens
Allied logistics had now improved to the point where a steady rhythm of limited attacks could be kept up, as opposed to single large attacks which ran out of steam like the Spring German offensives. Byng's Third Army launched the Battle of Albert between the Scarpe and the Ancre on 21 August. Byng had fewer tanks (156) than Rawlinson had had at Amiens, and apart from the elite New Zealand and Guards divisions, his troops were largely teenaged British conscripts. Haig - as with his previous offensives in 1916 and 1917, but now also urged on by Foch - encouraged his subordinates to aim for ambitious objectives, in this case urging Byng to revise his plans to thrust from Albert to Bapaume as quickly as possible, although Byng appears to have largely ignored him and made little use of cavalry. The attack reached Amiens-Arras railway.

On 21 August Haig was with Winston Churchill, Minister of Munitions, who had fought many battles to prevent the conscription of skilled munitions workers into the army, and who told him that new equipment (tanks, guns, new poison gases etc) was being produced ready for what the government expected to be the war-winning offensive in July 1919. Haig told him the Allies were “wearing out” the enemy and should not allow him time to regroup and rebuild his strength. Sheffield points out that this was the same argument he had used in previous years, but this time he was right. Byng called a halt that evening, but Haig demanded further attacks, due for 23 August.

On 22 August, the day Fourth Army retook Albert (a symbolic victory as it had been their forward base at the Somme two years earlier) Haig ordered his Army Commanders to pass down to all ranks the message that bold attacks were now needed, even to the point of divisions driving for distant objectives leaving their flanks uncovered: “risks which a month ago would have been criminal to incur, ought now to be incurred as a duty”. It has been suggested that this was aimed in part as a rebuke to Byng. The following day he sent out further guidance, quoting the relevant passage of Field Service Regulations, on how “advance guards” should feel for weak spots in the enemy defences.

Sheffield (disagreeing with Harris & Barr pp146–7) argues that Haig was still aiming for relatively limited objectives, but with bigger bites across a wider front as he had wanted to do since 1915, and that he was aiming for “soft-spot infiltration”, although still hoping for a complete enemy breakdown which would allow deep cavalry exploitation.

The Battle of Albert (21–3 August) saw Third Army push forward up to 4,000 yards over an 11 mile front, taking 5,000 prisoners, with Fourth Army attacking on the southern flank - in Gary Sheffield's description, a victory for ordinary British troops which would not have happened without Haig’s prodding of Byng. The attacks continued for another two days, then on 26 August Currie’s Canadian Corps, now part of First Army, attacked at Arras further north. Haig wrote to his wife that this, the Battle of the Scarpe, was “the greatest victory which a British Army has ever achieved”, and although it did not achieve quite the planned level of success – cavalry, including a brigade of infantry in buses, had been ready to exploit – Ludendorff ordered further withdrawals that evening, including the ground gained by “Georgette” in April.

Advance to the Hindenburg Line
After his recent successes Haig was Foch’s most important subordinate, and in a letter of 27 August advised him to attack with several concentric major offensives into German-held territory, which would require the Americans to call a halt to their September offensive northeast from St Mihiel towards Metz and instead attack north from the Argonne. Foch adopted this policy in his Directive of 3 September.

Haig still expected the decisive attack to be made by the Canadians attacking the Drocourt-Queant Line, but on 27–9 August Fourth Army advanced six miles towards Peronne, whilst further north the New Zealand Division (part of Third Army) took Bapaume, the objective of the Somme offensive of 1916.

Haig knew that because of manpower constraints the BEF would soon be cut from 61 divisions to 42 (10 of them from the Dominions) and that Pershing was withdrawing three of the five US divisions serving on the British sector. By this time Haig was keen to preserve the strength of the Canadian Corps, ordering them not to attack the Drocourt-Queant position unless sure of taking it, and the cavalry. In late August-early September the Germans had been driven back 15 miles and 40,000 prisoners taken, but at the cost of 80,000 casualties and Haig was aware that immediate decisive victory was unlikely.

When Haig's forces began to advance towards the Hindenburg Line Haig received a supposedly "personal" telegram from the CIGS Henry Wilson (31 August), warning him that he was not to take unnecessary losses in storming these fortifications. Haig, surmising that the War Cabinet were not forbidding him to attack but might dismiss him if the assault failed, telegraphed Wilson back the following day that they were a "wretched lot" (Wilson replied that the government were worried about needing to retain troops in the UK because of a police strike) and wrote that attacking the Germans now would be less costly than allowing them time to regroup and consolidate. Byng, Horne and Rawlinson also wanted to attack rather than let the Germans consolidate. The advance up to the Hindenburg Line was difficult as many formerly British trenches in front of it had been converted to German use.

Acting largely on his own initiative, Monash captured Mont Saint Quentin (31 August) then Peronne (2 September), making untenable a position which Ludendorff had hoped to hold throughout the winter – Haig ordered III Corps to reinforce the Australians. That day Haig met with Roger Keyes to discuss a possible landing on the North Sea Coast, and told him that he doubted the Germans could hold the Hindenburg Line.

On 2 September the Canadian Corps and British XVII Corps took the Drocourt-Queant Line. That night the Germans retreated to the Hindenburg Line, along with further withdrawals in the Ypres and Lens areas – all the German gains from the spring offensives had been retaken. Haig gave orders (3 September) to advance cautiously but to avoid “deliberate operations on a large scale” to conserve manpower for the forthcoming decisive battle. Haig thought the Germans’ optimal strategy would be to abandon the Hindenburg Line and retreat to the Antwerp-Meuse Line, but although this was indeed Hindenburg’s preference Ludendorff would not contemplate it.

Plumer’s Second Army was (9 September) hived off from Haig's direct command into Group d’Armees de Flandres (GAF), commanded by King Albert of the Belgians with the French General Degoutte as chief of Staff. Haig had to agree but declined to loan three cavalry divisions as well. Dissatisfied by Plumer’s plan for a limited offensive to retake Messines, Haig urged him to retake the high ground around Ypres (the British objectives from the previous autumn) and be prepared to land a division on the coast at Ostend. Plumer was sceptical as late as 13 September.

On 10 September Haig, on a brief visit to London, told Lord Milner (Secretary of State for War) that 77,000 prisoners and nearly 800 guns had been taken in four weeks. He said German morale was disintegrating and it was “the beginning of the end”. He thought that the aim should be to win the war that year, and by spring 1919 at the latest, not July 1919 as the politicians had in mind, and urged that all available able-bodied men and transportation in the UK be sent, as well as men earmarked for the Royal Navy and for munitions production, even at the cost of reducing future munitions output. Milner and Haig met again at GHQ in France (21 September) - Milner warned Haig that manpower would not be available for 1919 if squandered now and told Wilson (23 September) that Haig was being “ridiculously optimistic”, might “embark on another Paschendal (sic)” and that he “had grave doubts whether he had got inside of DH’s head”; Wilson thought the War Cabinet would have to “watch this tendency & stupidity of DH”. He complained that Haig, Foch and du Cane did not understand the shortage of manpower – in fact Haig understood it perfectly well but hoped to win the war before British manpower ran out. Lloyd George still hoped to shift British efforts to other fronts, leaving the Americans to take over more of the burden on the Western Front going forward.

On 12 September, the day the Americans attacked at St Mihiel, Third Army began moving up to the Hindenburg Line by attacking at Havrincourt, beginning a fortnight of grinding progress against Germans who were still fighting hard on that sector. On 18 September Fourth Army attacked at Epehy, reaching the Hindenburg Line. Haig received a congratulatory note from Wilson saying “you must be a famous general", to which he replied that he was not (as this would have meant currying favour with Repington and the Northcliffe Press) but “we have a number of very capable generals”.

By this stage the British cavalry were weakened just as they were playing a much large role in the war. 2nd Cavalry Division had been broken up to provide a squadron of cavalry for each division, leaving Kavanagh’s Cavalry Corps with only two cavalry divisions, supported by a brigade of infantry in buses. (By contrast, of Allenby’s 11 divisions in Palestine, 4 were cavalry.) Haig spent the whole of 17 September at a cavalry pursuit training exercise, followed by a conference, and then wrote up the report personally. He still hoped that cavalry could conduct a deeper exploitation towards Ghent or Valenciennes, but no longer had the resources to do so. With few functioning tanks and armoured cars left, the British were hampered by lack of cavalry.

Storming the Hindenburg Line
The Allied “Grand Offensive”, planned by Foch and Haig, now began, the most important attack being that on the Hindenburg Line. Haig spent 26 September touring senior British Headquarters, contrasting Rawlinson’s optimism with Byng’s caution, and – at Monash’s request – giving a short pep talk and shaking hands with senior officers of the Australian Corps. On that day the Franco-American attack began in the Meuse-Argonne, then on 27 September British First and Third Armies attacked. First Army, which included the Canadian Corps, had to cross three trench systems and the Canal du Nord (dry but 100 feet wide), pinning many German reserves in five days of hard fighting and in due course penetrating 6 miles over a 12 mile front and taking 10,000 prisoners. On 28 September the Flanders Army Group (GAF) attacked in Flanders, eventually advancing six miles and almost reaching Roulers. On 29 September Fourth Army attacked, including the famous crossing of the St Quentin Canal (35 feet wide and 6 feet deep) by 46th Division, part of IX Corps, the men using lifebelts taken from Channel Ferries, after a mustard gas bombardment. Fourth Army was attacking forces of roughly equal strength, with the Australians (including the US 27th and 30th Divisions) covered by 1,488 guns and massed Vickers Guns. Rawlinson’s artillery density was equal only to that of 1 July 1916 but infantry had more organic firepower now. There were conflicting reports as to whether the US II Corps had captured the crossing over Bellincourt Tunnel (where the canal disappeared underground) – when asked for guidance by Monash, Haig ordered that his own attack must proceed as planned, even if American troops were killed by friendly fire. A cavalry brigade commanded by Haig’s cousin, Brigadier-General Neil Haig, was briefly committed to dismount and fight as infantry. By early October Fourth Army was through the Beaurevoir (German Reserve) Line and into open country. In late September Bulgaria sought an armistice, which also contributed to Ludendorff wanting an end to the war.

On 3 October Haig received a memo from Winston Churchill arguing for the conservation of resources for a decisive struggle in 1920. Haig thanked him politely, but wrote on his copy “What rubbish: Who will last until 1920. Only America?” There were still rumours that Haig might be dismissed and replaced by Allenby.

With the GAF and Argonne attacks frustrated by logistical problems (Pershing refused Haig’s request to send any further American divisions to the British sector, where the bulk of German forces were deployed and where Haig felt he could make better use of them). At a meeting with Byng and Rawlinson on 1 October “they agreed that no further orders from (Haig) were necessary”, as all attacks were proceeding satisfactorily. In early October Fifth Army, now under Birdwood, took Aubers Ridge and Loos.

On 2 October Hindenburg told the Kaiser’s Crown Council that Germany could no longer win a military victory, and the following day a new government was formed under Prince Max, which approached President Wilson for peace based on the Fourteen Points. When Haig met Foch on 6 October, Foch showed him the newspaper reports of this and told him it was a direct result of the BEF breach of the Hindenburg Line at its strongest point, although the almost simultaneous capitulation of Bulgaria was also a factor and discussions continued for a month until the ceasefire on 11 November. At the meeting Haig again asked for US divisions for his sector, and was told this was not going to happen.

Final Victory & Armistice Negotiations
The Germans retreated to the River Selle after a further British victory at the Second Battle of Cambrai, at which massed cavalry were used. On 10 October Haig received a paper from Foch recommending the seizure of the Rhineland – he disapproved, thinking this was too much like asking the Germans to surrender. The following day he received a telegram of congratulation from Lloyd George, which annoyed him by implying that the victories had been won by Marshal Foch.

By 12 October Third Army was held on the Selle River (east of Cambrai). On 14 October Plumer resumed his advance in the north, taking Roulers, which had been one of the objectives of autumn 1917 and reaching Courtrai. On the same day President Wilson rejected German peace overtures, causing the Germans to abandon the Belgian Coast and the city of Lille (17 October) which they had been hoping to hold as bargaining chips. On the same day Fourth Army crossed the River Sambre and plans were made to advance on the River Selle, amidst worrying signs of a stiffening of German resistance.

When asked his opinion about the armistice terms which should be offered to Germany, Haig presented pessimistic advice to the War Cabinet on 19 October. He urged moderation, warning that intelligence reports suggested that the German Army was still "far from beaten" (an ironic claim in view of his willingness to pronounce Germany on the verge of defeat in previous years) and was concerned that the Germans were holding back the 1920 Class of conscripts to form a new reserve. He warned that the French and Americans “are not capable of making a serious offensive now. The British alone might bring the enemy to his knees. But why expend more British lives – and for what?” (Herbert Lawrence had also advised Haig it was in Britain’s interests for the war to end on lenient terms) and that prolonged fighting would increase the influence of the USA, and that harsh terms might encourage Germany to turn either to Bolshevism or else back to military rule. As far back as January 1918 Haig had told the King that the democratising of Germany – just enunciated by Lloyd George in his Caxton Hall speech as a war aim – was not worth “the loss of an Englishman” (like many Scots of his era, Haig often referred to Britain or even the British Empire as “England”) and might well push Germany, like Russia, into revolution. He advised that the Allies should simply demand that Germany give up Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine. After one meeting on 21 October Haig suspected Henry Wilson, a staunch Unionist, of wanting to prolong the war as an excuse to subdue southern Ireland by bringing in conscription there.

Haig gave Foch the same advice at the Senlis Conference (25 October) – he was privately suspicious of French plans to occupy the Rhineland, writing to his wife (1 November) that the peace of world for the next fifty years depended on not driving Germany to seek future revenge by humiliating her. He would later (e.g. in June 1919) defend the decision to save lives and money by offering Germany an armistice once she was clearly beaten, although with hindsight this allowed the myth to grow up that Germany had not really been defeated. The Allies agreed to offer peace on the basis of the Fourteen Points with a British opt-out for Point 2 (Freedom of the Seas).

First and Third Armies crossed the Selle on 20 October. Fourth Army advanced to the Sambre and Second Army to the Scheldt. President Wilson publicly refused to offer Germany a separate peace (23 October). Ludendorff, Germany’s military leader, resigned (26 October), whilst Turkey sued for peace at the end of October. The German fleet mutinied (30 October). The Americans broke out of the Argonne on 1 November and two days later cut the Lille-Metz railway. 4 November saw an armistice with Austria-Hungary after the victory of the Italians – with British and French assistance - at Vittorio Veneto; Hungary and the Slav parts of Austria-Hungary had already declared independence in late October. The collapse of Austria-Hungary encouraged the politicians to demand stricter armistice terms (although less strict than Foch or Pershing would have liked) and Germany was required to evacuate the Rhineland as well.

Between 26 October and 1 November was a period of quiet for resupply, then after 1 November followed three days of small gains. Haig had been irritated on Foch's insistence that Plumer's Second Army remain part of the GAF (an Army Group commanded by the King of the Belgians) so that the French and Belgians could take credit for liberating Brussels., and after an ill-tempered exchange of letters with Foch, Haig got back control of Second Army (4 November). German fighting capacity was deteriorating, with much of their resistance coming from machine guns and artillery. The last offensive began on 4 November, including Sambre-Oise (where the poet Wilfred Owen was killed ) where makeshift tank bridges were used, and the Forest of Mormal where the BEF had fought in August 1914. The crossing of the Sambre (4 November) saw further mass surrenders of German troops and made the German High Command realise that they must make peace before their army, which they wanted at home to use to prevent Germany turning to Bolshevism, disintegrated altogether.

Haig was now recovering his optimism. The Scheld was crossed on 9 November, two days ahead of schedule, with the Germans now offering little resistance as they retreated to the Antwerp-Meuse Line. Byng and Rawlinson politely declined Haig’s plans to exploit with Kavanagh’s Cavalry Corps, citing logistical difficulties. The Canadians attacked the German Seventeenth Army at Mons, ending the war at the place where the BEF had begun it. When the armistice took effect (11am on 11 November) Haig was at Cambrai in conference with his Army Commanders and Kavanagh – after planning the British contribution to the occupation of the Rhineland they posed for a group photograph. In England it was rumoured in England that the Kaiser, before being diverted into exile in Holland, had been intending to surrender personally to Haig.

Analysis
There is some dispute over how much direct operational control Haig maintained in the Hundred Days, Tim Travers arguing that he exercised “a symbolic form of leadership”, allowing his Army Commanders (Plumer, Byng, Horne, Birdwood and Rawlinson) a very free hand, whilst at the same time Ferdinand Foch, whose role had initially been confined to advice and deployment of reserves, was exerting ever-greater influence over strategy. Robin Prior argues that by the second half of 1918 both Lloyd George and Haig were “moving steadily to the sidelines”, although he also concedes that Haig intervened in operations much less now he knew the BEF to be a fine fighting instrument, and “he proved far more effective as a commander” as a result. By contrast Sheffield argues that Haig was Foch’s principal subordinate - they met sixty times between April and November - and influenced his strategy (in Wiest's view Foch was also “a buffer between Haig and his political tormentors in London” ). “At last (Haig) was able to behave as the sort of “arms-length” Commander-in-Chief that was his ideal: setting broad objectives” but devolving detailed planning of battles. Besides, “he had presided over the transformation of the army” and “Haig’s performance as a general improved as the army matured. He was … doing fewer things better”. GHQ also played a key role in sequencing the attacks of the armies in late September, and keeping them fully supplied.

The forces under Haig's command - including Monash’s Australian Corps and Currie’s Canadian Corps - achieved impressive results: whereas the French, American and Belgian armies combined captured 196,700 prisoners-of-war and 3,775 German guns between 18 July and the end of the war, Haig's forces, with a smaller army than the French, engaged the main mass of the German Army and captured 188,700 prisoners and 2,840 guns - around half of these prisoners were captured by British cavalry. British daily casualty rates (3,645 per day) were heavier during this period than at the Somme (2,950) or Third Ypres (2,121) (but not Arras: 4,070 over a shorter period), because British forces were attacking across the line, instead of being rotated through a single offensive. The military historian, Gary Sheffield, called this, the so-called Hundred Days Offensive, 'by far the greatest military victory in British history'.

Biographies

 * Arthur, Sir George Lord Haig (London: William Heinemann, 1928)
 * De Groot, Gerard Douglas Haig 1861–1928 (Larkfield, Maidstone: Unwin Hyman, 1988)
 * Harris, J.P. Douglas Haig and the First World War. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-521-89802-7
 * Marshall-Cornwall, General Sir James Haig as Military Commander (London: Batsford, 1973)
 * Mead, Gary, The Good Soldier. The Biography of Douglas Haig (London: Atlantic Books, 2008) ISBN 978-1-84354-281-0
 * Reid, Walter. Architect of Victory: Douglas Haig (Birlinn Ltd, Edinburgh, 2006.) ISBN 1-84158-517-3
 * Sheffield, Gary, “The Chief” (Aurum, London, 2011) ISBN 978-1-84513-691-8
 * Sixsmith, E.K.G. Douglas Haig (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1976)
 * Terraine, John. Douglas Haig: The Educated Soldier. (London: Hutchinson, 1963) ISBN 0-304-35319-1
 * Warner, Philip Field Marshal Earl Haig (London: Bodley Head, 1991; Cassell, 2001)
 * Winter, Denis Haig’s Command (London: Viking, 1991)