Waterloo Campaign: Ligny through Wavre to Waterloo

After their defeat at the Battle of Ligny (16 June 1815) the Prussians successfully disengaged and withdrew to north west to Wavre where they reorganised and then three corps advanced westward to attack the right flank of the French army at the Battle of Waterloo. The French were desultory in the aftermath of Ligny. Napoleon wasted the morning of 17 June by taking a late breakfast and going to see the previous day's battlefield before organising a pursuit of the two Coalition armies. He took the reserves and marched with Marshal Ney in pursuit of the Duke of Wellington's Anglo-allied army, and he gave instructions to Marshal Grouchy to pursue the Prussians wherever they were going and harry them so that they had no time to reorganise.

Both Napoleon and Grouchy assumed that the Prussians were retreating towards Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the river Meuse, and so during 17 June Grouchy sent the bulk of his cavalry ranging in that direction as far as Perwez. In his despatch to Napoleon written at 22:00 he was still thought that most of the Prussian army was retreating north-east, although he by then realised that two Prussian corps were heading north towards Wavre. In a second dispatch written four hours later he informed Napoleon that he now intended to advance either on Corbais or Wavre. The problem for the French was that by the end of 17 June, most of Grouchy's detachment was now behind the Prussians, on the far side of the Dyle. This meant that they were incapable of preventing the Prussians moving from Wavre towards Waterloo and too far away themselves to go directly to the aid of Napoleon on 18 June should Wellington turn and fight south of Brussels.

On the morning of 18 June those Prussians who had not already done so crossed the Dyle in and around Wavre and headed westwards towards the Waterloo battlefield. Grouchy was at Sart-lez-Walhain when at about 11:30 he and his staff heard the sound of cannonades in the distance, which a local notary said sounded as if it was coming from what is now known as the battlefield of Waterloo. This was in a north-westerly direction, at a distance of about 23 km as the crow flies, with no direct roads between Grouchy's position and the battlefield. The distance to Wavre (nor'-nor'-west) was about 13 km with some larger minor road leading there. After considering his options, Grouchy decided to advance to Wavre and engage whatever Prussians he found there, and so aid Napoleon by preventing those Prussians from moving towards Waterloo.

Grouchy arrived at Wavre at around 16:00 and immediately engaged the Prussian III Corps (Thielemann's), which was acting as the rearguard of the Prussian army and which had been about to leave for Waterloo) in what became the Battle of Wavre. The Prussian advance to the Waterloo battlefield was impeded by the swollen streams, which had turned their valleys into muddy swamps, in particular the valley of the small river Lasne close to Saint-Lambert, but not by any French forces as Napoleon had neglected to send patrols out on his right flank. The Prussian vanguard started to arrive in strength out of the Wood of Paris at around 17:00 on 18 June and were soon attacking the right flank of Napoleon's army engaged in the Battle of Waterloo.

Ligny to Wavre, 17 June
It was not until the night of 16 June, after Prussian I Corps (Zieten's) and the II Corps (Pirch I's) had retired to Tilly and Gentinnes, that it was decided the Prussian Army should retreat upon Wavre. This decision was communicated in the orders then transmitted from the Prussian headquarters to Zieten and Pirch I directing them to bivouac at Bierge and Saint-Anne, in the vicinity of Wavre; as also in the orders forwarded, on the next morning, to the bivouacs of the III and IV corps(Thielemann's and Bülow), at Gembloux and, directing them to fall back, and bivouac at , and  near Wavre.

Ziten's and Pirch I's corps retired by Mont-Saint-Guibert, in rear of which defile the latter corps remained a considerable time as the rearguard, while the former marched on to Wavre, where it arrived about midday, crossed the Dyle, and took up its position at Bierge. Pirch I followed the same route, but took post on the right bank of the Dyle, between Sainte Anne and Aisémont.

With the first glimmering of daylight the troops, which, under the command of General Jagow, had continued in full possession of Brye and its immediate vicinity during the night, began to retire, firstly, in the direction of Sombreffe, and thence to Gembloux, which they reached before the arrival of III Corps (Thielemann's). After the receipt of the order pointing out the direction of the retreat, Jagow conducted these troops, in the course of 17 June, towards their respective brigades.

Thielemann retires to Gembloux
Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, whose cavalry brigade with half a horse battery, formed the rearguard of the line of retreat of Zieten's and Pirch's Corps, received orders to take up a concealed position between Tilly and Gentinnes, thence to watch the movements of the French; and, as soon as he found himself pressed by the latter, to fall back upon the defile of Mont-Saint-Guibert.

Thielemann, who, had received a message from Gneisenau, Blücher's chief-of-staff, (and while Blücher was recovering from his fall at the Battle of Ligny in command), leaving it optional with him to retire by Tilly or Gembloux, according to circumstances, decided on falling back upon the latter point; being well aware that the French was in possession of the villages of Saint-Amand and Ligny, and of the Ligny battle field to within a very short distance from Sombreffe.

He had collected together his widely disseminated brigades, and drawn in his advanced posts; an operation which, executed in the darkness of the night, retarded his departure so much that it was 02:00 before the reserve artillery, which formed the head of the column, travelled to the crossroads of Nivelles–Namur, Fleurus–Gembloux and then onto the Gembloux road. The rearguard of this line of retreat—which consisted of the 8th Infantry Brigade (Borcke's), and the reserve cavalry (III Corps Cavalry (Hobe's)—was drawn up along the Namur road, having in its front the Fleurus chaussée (high road), leading directly towards the French, did not commence its march until after 04:00, when the sun had risen. The main body of the III Corps reached Gembloux at 06:00.

Thielemann joins Bülow
On approaching Gembloux, Thielemann learned that Bülow had posted the IV Corps about 3 mi in rear of Grembloux, upon the old Roman road; whereupon Major Weyrach, aide-de-camp to Prince Blücher, who had continued with Thielemann during the night of 16 June, set off to seek out Blücher, and to report to him the position and attendant circumstances of the III and IV Corps, He soon succeeded in discovering the Prussian headquarters at Mellery, and communicated the above important information to Gneisenau.

Thielemann allowed the III Corps to halt on the other side of the town, so that his troops might rest and obtain refreshment.

The vanguard of IV Corps (Bülow's) had reached Baudecet, upon the old Roman road, at nightfall of 16 June. It was here that Greneral Bülow became acquainted with the loss of the Battle of Ligny: whereupon he ordered the brigades of his corps to be posted at intervals along this road, with the exception of the 13th (Hake's) which was directed to bivouac more to the rear, near, where the same road is intersected by that which conducts from Namur to Louvain.

Both corps remained for some hours in a state of uncertainty as to the direction to be taken for forming a junction with the I and II corps. Thielemann wrote to Bülow that he had received no orders from Blücher (their superior officer), but that he presumed the retreat was upon Saint-Trond. He also stated that he had not been followed by the French, but that he had heard distant firing on the right, which he concluded was connected with the Duke of Wellington's Anglo-allied Army.

At about 09:30, Prince Blücher's aide-de-camp, Major Weyrach, arrived at Bülow's headquarters, and brought the orders for the retreat of the IV Corps to Dion-le-Mont, near Wavre, by Walhain and The orders also required that Bülow should post the main body of his rearguard (which consisted of the 14th Brigade) at Vieux-Sart; as also that he should send a detachment, consisting of one regiment of cavalry, two battalions of infantry, and two guns of horse artillery, to the defile of Mont-Saint-Guibert, to act, in the first instance as a support to Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, who was at Tilly, and then, upon the latter falling back, to act as rearguard. Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur was accordingly detached upon this duty with the 10th Hussars, the fusilier battalions of the 11th Regiment of Infantry and 1st Regiment of Pomeranian Landwehr, together with two guns from the Horse Battery No. 12.

The main body of the IV Corps moved directly upon Dion-le-Mont, and on reaching the height near that town, on which is situated the public house of A tous vents, took up a position close to the intersection of the roads leading to Louvain, Wavre, and Gembloux.

At 14:00, Thielemann commenced his march upon Wavre; where the III Corps arrived late in the evening, and took up its position at Bawette, leaving the 9th Infantry Brigade (General Borcke) and the  Cavalry Brigade of Colonel Count Lottum, on the right bank of the Dyle. In this position the Corps was now rejoined by Colonel Marwitz' Cavalry Brigade, which had retired by Tilly ; as also by the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Kurmark Landwehr, and the two squadrons of the 6th Kurmark Landwehr Cavalry, which troops had been left at Dinant. The Squadron of the 7th Uhlans that had been detached to Onoz, also joined, but having fallen in with a superior force of the French cavalry, had experienced a great loss (see below). The two squadrons of the 9th Hussars, belonging to this corps, had not yet arrived from Ciney.

The Prussian headquarters were established, early on 17 June, at Wavre, The veteran Field Marshal, Blücher, who was still suffering considerably in consequence of his fall was obliged to seek rest the moment he arrived there, and did not quit his bed during the remainder of the day.

Wellington's message to Blücher
In the course of late morning, Lieutenant, who had been despatched with a message to Wellington, returned with the one from him, communicating his intention to fall back upon Waterloo and accept a battle there, provided he received the support of two Prussian corps. There was every disposition to enter into this proposal, but some deree of uncertainty existed as to whether Bülow's Corps would join the Army on 17 June, as also a certain misgiving respecting the park of ammunition of both# Ziten's and Pirch I's corps, which had been directed upon Grembloux, a circumstance that excited apprehensions as to the possibility of furnishing the much needed supply of ammunition to these corps which were at hand. In this state of uncertainty, no other resolution could be adopted than that of holding the position in front and in rear of the Dyle (with the vanguard of the VI Corps as far forward as Mont-Saint-Guibert), until the required ammunition should be obtained; and Blücher deferred replying to Wellington's communication, in the hope that the problems could soon be resolved or knowing for certain that his army could not arrive at Waterloo in time to aid Wellington.

While the Prussians were thus effecting their retreat in good order, along minor roads (in that part of the country there were no high roads chaussée), no corresponding activity manifested itself on the part of the French, whom the morning's dawn found still lying in their bivouac. Their vedettes stood within .5 mi of the columns of Thielemann's rearguard; the retreat of which, not having commenced until after sunrise, might have been easily noticed: and had the French detached but the smallest patrol, they could not have failed to discover the direction of that retreat—whether towards Namur or Gembloux.

Pajol's light cavalry capture a Prussian battery
It was not until after Thielemann had retired a sufficient distance to escape further notice that any disposition for movement occurred to disturb the perfect quietude of their repose. Then, Pajol with the 4th cavalry division (Pierre Soult's) of his light Cavalry Corps, of the 1st (Clary's), 4th (Blot's), and 5th (Liégeard's) Hussars, was detached in pursuit of the Prussians. He struck into the Namur road, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant General Baron Teste's 21st Infantry Division of Lobau's VI Corps, followed in support, and took up a position on the heights above Mazy.

Pajol had not proceeded very far when he perceived a Prussian battery retiring upon Namur, which he lost no time in capturing and forwarding to headquarters; where the circumstance strengthened the belief that Bücher had retreated by that road. It was the Prussian Horse Battery No. 14, belonging to the II Corps, which, having towards the end of the battle expended every shot, had driven off the field to procure a fresh supply of ammunition, but had not succeeded in falling in with the reserve ammunition wagons. The battery neither returned to its own corps, nor did it comply with Thielemann's express order to march upon Gembloux, but consumed much time in uselessly driving first in one direction, and then in another. It was accompanied at this moment by a squadron of the 7th Prussian Uhlans, which the III Corps had neglected to recall from Onoz. The squadron retired on the approach of the French cavalry, and escaped with a loss of 30 men (see above); but all the guns fell into the hands of the French.

Napoleon inspects the battlefield of Ligny and wastes time
Pajol, feeling at last some reason to doubt that Namur was a point in the Prussian retreat, diverged from the high road, and proceeded to Saint-Denis, where he was joined by Teste's Division. A Brigade of Exelmans' Heavy Cavalry Corps had been detached to offer support to Pajol, should the latter require it; but in consequence of certain information, gained upon the road, it was subsequently directed to proceed towards Gembloux, on approaching which it discovered traces of the Prussian retreat.

Marshal Grouchy, who commanded the Right Wing of the French Army in Napoleon's absence, repaired early in the morning to the Napoleon's quarters at Fleurus, for instructions, according to an order he had received to that effect on the previous evening. He was desired to wait and accompany Napoleon, who was going to visit yesterday's field of battle. The latter, however, did not start from Fleurus until between 08:00 and 09:00, and on reaching Saint-Amand, he examined the approaches by which this village had been attacked the day before; then, he rode about the field, gave directions for the care of the wounded; and, as he passed in front of different regiments, that were falling in without arms on the ground where they were bivouacked, he was received with loud cheers. He addressed himself to nearly all the corps, and assured them of the lively satisfaction he had felt on witnessing their conduct in the battle. Having dismounted, he conversed freely, and at great length, with Grouchy and Gérard (commander of the IV Corps), on the state of public opinion in Paris, the different political parties, and on various other subjects quite unconnected with those military operations upon which immediate success was more pressing.

Napoleon's fatal inactivity
In the opinion of the 19th-century military historian William Siborne, that Napoleon should have neglected to follow up the advantages which fortune had thrown in his way on the morning of 17 June, is quite incomprehensible. With the exception of a Prussian picket at Gentinnes, his whole front as far as Gembloux, was perfectly clear of an enemy. Wellington was still in position at Quatre Bras, where his left had become exposed by the retreat of the Prussians, and in rear of which point was the defile of Genappe. There was nothing to prevent Napoleon from marching directly upon that defile; and supporting, by a vigorous attack upon the Anglo-allied left and rear, a simultaneous movement against the front by the force under Marshal Ney. Writing in the 21st centenary Peter Hofschröer states that by allowing the Prussians to slip away with no clear idea of where they had gone "Napoleon had already all but lost Waterloo, although it was to early for him to realise".

Napoleon's army was no more fatigued than was that of Wellington, which had arrived at Quatre Bras by forced marches. The troops which he subsequently did lead upon that point, when it was too late, consisting chiefly of the Imperial Guard and the VI Corps, were comparatively fresh. The former had not been engaged at Ligny until towards the end of the battle, when they suffered scarcely any loss; the latter, which arrived later, had remained intact. The idea of forming a junction with Ney, with a view of attacking Wellington, was certainly entertained; but its execution was most unaccountably and unnecessarily delayed until its intended effect was dissipated into minor cavalry skirmishes between Wellington's rearguard and Napoleon's vanguard during Wellington retreat from Quatre Bras to Waterloo.

Whither, asks Siborne, had fled the mighty spirit which had shone forth with such dazzling brilliancy in former wars, and which had never displayed the energy of its powers of combination, and activity in following up successes, more eminently than in the campaign of the previous year? When before did he omit pressing every advantage to the utmost, or neglect to seize that moment of time, in which, having defeated one portion of his enemies, he was enabled to fall with combined force upon another?

Napoleon's only hope of winning the campaign rested on defeating his adversaries before their armies combined. Having beaten the Prussians the day before he ought to have turned on Wellington on 17 June so bringing his local superiority against Wellington's smaller army before it retreated to a more favourable position, but having planned an audacious campaign, after the first day's strategic triumph, his execution of the rest of the campaign was lethargic, and he showed little of genius he had displayed in earlier campaigns up to and including that of the previous year.

Napoleon divides his main army.
It was not until nearly 12:00 on 17 June, upon receiving a report of a reconnaissance, made in the direction of Quatre Bras, and upon learning that a considerable body of Prussians had been discovered at Gembloux, that Napoleon made any disposition for the movement of his troops, beyond the previous detaching of Pajol's light cavalry in pursuit of the Prussians along the Namur road.

He now ordered the following troops to proceed to occupy a position in advance of Marbais, across the Namur road, facing Quatre Bras:
 * Lobau's VI Infantry Corps, with the exception of the 21st Division, under Lieutenant General Teste, which had already been detached in support of Pajol;
 * Milhaud's IV Cavalry Reserve Corps (a corps of Heavy Cavalry Cuirassiers), along with Lieutenant General Baron Subervie's Light Cavalry Division (detached from Pajol's I Cavalry Reserve Corps);
 * Lieutenant General Baron Domon's 3rd Light Cavalry Division (of the II Corps);
 * and the Imperial Guard, both Cavalry and Infantry.

Napoleon's instructions to Grouchy
Napoleon assigned the pursuit of the Prussians to Marshal Grouchy, and for this purpose Napoleon placed at his disposal as great an extent of force as his limited means would admit: a force, certainly not sufficient to enable that Marshal to confront the whole Prussian army, should the latter, after having rallied and concentrated its strength, make a stand against him, but quite so to enable him to watch its movements, and to manoeuvre so as to maintain his communication with the main French army, and, if pressed by superior numbers, to effect a junction with Napoleon.

The following were the troops thus detached under Grouchy:

The 7th Infantry Division, under Lieutenant General Girard (belonging to the II Corps) having suffered very severely in the previous day's battle, was left at Ligny.

Napoleon's instructions to Grouchy were extremely simple and concise: ""Pursue the Prussians, complete their defeat by attacking them as soon as you come up with them, and never let them out of your sight. I am going to unite the remainder of this portion of the Army with Marshal Ney's Corps, to march against the English, and to fight them if they should hold their ground between this and the Forest of Soignies. You will communicate with me by the paved road which leads to Quatre Bras."

No particular direction was prescribed, because Napoleon was totally ignorant of the real line of the Prussian retreat. At the same time he was strongly impressed with the idea that Blücher had retired upon Namur and Liege, with a view to occupy the line of the Meuse, whence he might seriously endanger the right wing of the French Army, as also its main line of operation, should it advance upon Brussels.

Grouchy did not hesitate to remark to Napoleon, that the Prussians, having commenced their retreat at 22:00 the previous night, had gained several hours' start on the troops with which he was to follow them; that although the reports received from the advanced cavalry conveyed no positive information as to the direction in which the great mass of the Prussian army had effected its retreat, appearances as yet seemed to justify the supposition that Blücher had fallen back upon Namur; and that as he would thus have to pursue in a direction contrary to that which Napoleon was himself going to take, with very little chance of being able to prevent the execution of any dispositions the Prussians might have resolved upon when leaving the battlefield, he begged to be allowed to follow Napoleon in his projected movement upon Quatre Bras.

Napoleon declined to entertain this proposition, repeated the order he had already given to him, adding that it rested with Grouchy to discover the route taken by the Prussians, whose defeat he was to complete by attacking them the moment he came up with them; while he himself would proceed to fight Wellington.

Napoleon's advance on Quatre Bras
Having arranged for the Presuit of the Prussians by Grouchy, Napoleon immediately gave the order for the advance of the troops previously assembled near Marbais, preceded by 5th Light Cavalry Division (Subervie's), as vanguard. By the time they reached Quatre Bras, which was about 14:00, the whole of Wellington's infantry had crossed the Dyle, and was retiring along the high road to Brussels, protected by the cavalry, which was now pressed by the French (see Waterloo Campaign: Quatre Bras to Waterloo).

Marshal Grouchy's dispositions
The march of the French troops through Brye, in the direction of Quatre Bras, became known to the Prussians through Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, who still held his cavalry brigade, posted in rear of Tilly. Shortly afterwards, some of the French cavalry having approached, he began to retire slowly towards Mont-Saint-Guibert, and, as he frequently formed up, in wait for the French, he did not reach that point until the evening of 17 June. Here he found Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur, who had arrived with his detachment, and had received orders to defend the defile.

Upon the departure of Napoleon, Grouchy ordered Vandamme and Gérard to get their corps under arms, and to move them, in the first instance, to the junction of the Gembloux road with that to Namur; and having subsequently received intelligence that a considerable body of Prussians had passed through the former town, he desired that those two corps should continue their movement upon that point. In the mean time, he went to the advanced posts of Exelmans' dragoons, which were by this time beyond Gembloux. It was part of this cavalry which followed Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, on the left. They merely threw out skirmishers against him; and, as night set in, they abandoned the pursuit in this direction.

Vandamme's and Gérard's corps did not reach Gembloux until very late in the evening. The former was posted in advance, the latter, in rear, of the town; near which also, and on the right bank of the Orneau, was stationed the 6th Light Cavalry Division, (under Brigadier General Vallin, who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant General Maurin being wounded at the Battle of Ligny. The 1st Brigade of Lieutenant General Chastel's 10th Cavalry Division, consisting of the 4th and 12th Dragoons, under Brigadier General Bonnemain, was pushed on to Sart-lez-Walhain and the 15th Dragoons (from General Brigade of the 9th Cavalry Division, under Lieutenant General Baron Strolz), were detached to Perwez. From both these points, reports were sent into Gembloux that the Prussians had retired upon Wavre.

Pajol, with his light cavalry and Teste's infantry division, had returned from Saint-Denis, between Namur and Gembloux, to the original position occupied by the latter in the morning, at Mazy, in the immediate vicinity of the Field of Ligny. Which Siborne states was a movement for which no satisfactory cause has ever been assigned.

Grouchy's report to Napoleon
The extent of information obtained by Grouchy concerning the Prussian retreat, and the nature of the dispositions which he adopted in consequence, are contained in a despatch he sent Napoleon: "{"

Although the information conveyed in this despatch was incorrect on some points, and imperfect on others, inasmuch as it represented that Prussian columns had retired upon Namur and Perwez, which was not the case, and gave no account of the columns (the Prussian I and II corps) which had retreated by Tilly and Qentinnes, still it was well calculated to satisfy Napoleon, that at least the spirit of his instructions had been understood by the Marshal. The latter had stated that he suspected a portion of the Prussian troops was proceeding to join Wellington, and that, should he ascertain, through his cavalry detached to Sart-lez-Walhain and Perwez, that the great mass of the Prussians was retiring upon Wavre, it was his intention to pursue them in that direction, "so as to prevent them from reaching Brussels, and to keep them separated from Wellington".

Four hours afterwards (that is, at 02:00 on the morning of 18 June) Grouchy sent off another despatch to Napoleon, reporting that he had decided on marching upon either Corbais or Wavre.

Skilful retreat of the Prussians
The retreat of the Prussian army, after its defeat at Ligny on 16 June, was conducted with great skill, and executed in very good order. By detaining Thielemann's Corps upon the battlefield until the morning of 17 June, ample security was afforded to the line of retreat by Gembloux; and by not withdrawing Bülow's Corps from that town until Thielemann drew near to it, the distance between the main bodies of these two Corps became so limited as to present the ready means of opposing their combined force to a vigorous pursuit, should such be attempted.

By the evening of 17 June, the entire Prussian army (with the exception of the 9th and 13th Brigades (Borcke's and Hacke's), and the reserve cavalry (Hobe's) of the III Corps (Vandamme's), which arrived by 06:00 the following morning) had assembled in the immediate vicinity of Wavre — two corps on the right, and the remaining two corps on the left, bank of the Dyle — in perfect order, and fully prepared to resume the offensive. Upon the two lines of retreat, the rearguards were well disposed at Vieux-Sart and Mont-Saint-Guibert; where they continued during that night, and whence they retired leisurely on the following day.

On the Prussian left, patrols were despatched towards the main road leading from Namur to Louvain. On the right, a detachment was sent from I Corps (Zieten's) to Limale, on the left bank of the Dyle, to cover the flank, and patrols were pushed higher up the river, to communicate with the post of Mont-Saint-Guibert.

Major Falkenhausen had been detached, during the day, to for the purpose of reconnoitring the country in the vicinity of Genappe, and of the high road to Brussels; and he succeeded in discovering, from the wooded tracts beyond Céroux, the advance of the French army along the high road from Genappe to Brussels. Patrols were also detached towards Lasne, Couture-Saint-Germain, and, to observe the defiles along the streams of the Lasne.

Such were the dispositions of the defeated Prussians on the evening of 17 June, while the victorious French contingent under Grouchy had not advanced beyond Grembloux. The former had fallen back, in good order, upon a line with, and a short distance from, the Anglo-allied Army on their right; while their opponents, though encountering no obstacle of importance, had made but little progress, and were widely diverging from, instead of closely co-operating with, the main army from which they had been detached. These dispositions, so ably planned and so efficiently performed, were well calculated to facilitate the grand operation of the morrow, namely, Blücher's flank movement to the right, to effect a junction with Wellington.

Prussian reserve ammunition train reaches Wavre
The retreat to Wavre did not in any way incapacitate the Prussian army for the resumption of actively offensive operations. With respect to its material, it so happened that the park of reserve ammunition wagons had, in the first instance, been directed upon Gembloux; and Colonel von Röhl, who superintended the Ordnance Department of the army, sent his aide-de-camp during the night of 16 June to conduct this reserve to Wavre; whilst he himself hastened to the latter town, for the purpose of putting the whole of the artillery, accordingly as it arrived there, again in a fit state for action.

The supply of ammunition, however, was necessarily incomplete; but in order to prevent any failure in this respect, should some mishap occur to the park of reserve ammunition wagons, a courier was despatched to Maestricht, with directions for the speedy transport of a supply of ammunition from thence to the army, by means of the common wagons of the country. Similar orders were conveyed to Cologne, Wesel, and Münster: and, by way of precaution, an express was sent to Liege for the removal of the battering train to Maastricht; as also for the destruction, in case of danger, of the iron foundry in the arsenal of the former place.

Fortunately for the Prussians, the reserve ammunition wagons reached Wavre safely at 17:00 on 17 June. The corps and batteries were furnished with a complete supply of ammunition, and the Prussian army was thus placed in a perfectly efficient state for commencing another battle. This turn of affairs was most encouraging, and Blücher delayed not another moment in despatching to Wellington the reply: "I shall not come with two Corps only, but with my whole army; upon this understanding, however, that should the French not attack us on the 18th, we shall attack them on the 19th."

Prussian morale
As regards the influence which the defeat at Ligny exercised over the morale of the Prussian army, its injurious effects were made manifest amongst the newly raised drafts from the Rhenish and Westphalian provinces, and from the Duchy of Berg. Of these troops, 8,000 men fled and did not stop until they reached Liege and Aix-la-Chapelle. Among the Rhenish troops, particularly those from provinces which had formerly belonged to France, there were many old French soldiers; and although several of them fought with great bravery, others evinced a bad disposition, and there were instances in which they passed over to their former companions in arms. Such, however, was not the case with the troops from the other western districts of the Prussian State: there was scarcely a single man amongst the missing, who belonged to any of the old Westphalian Provinces, Mark, Cleve, Minden, and Ravensberg, whilst several came from that of Münster.

But the morale of the great mass of the Prussian army continued unshaken. The spirit of the troops was neither tamed nor broken; and their enthusiasm, though damped, had not been subdued. Unbounded confidence was placed in the firm decision and restless energy of their aged and venerated commander; who, though suffering from the effects of his fall, by which his whole frame had sustained a severe shock, evinced not the slightest apprehension of fatal consequences to the campaign resulting from this defeat. His unbending nature led him to cast aside for the moment those purely political interests and theoretically strategical principles, by which a more cautious and less enterprising commander might have been induced to secure the line of the Meuse, and to preserve his direct communications with the Prussian States, and thus afford but a doubtful and an inefficient support to his ally. Placing full reliance on the resources of his own mind, and on the stern, warlike character of his troops; he devoted his whole energies to the attainment of the one grand object—that of crushing Napoleon by combining with Wellington. This confidence in himself and in his soldiers was strikingly and characteristically manifested in the concluding words of a General Order which he issued to the Army on the morning of 17 June: "I shall immediately lead you against the Enemy; — we shall beat him, because it is our duty to do so."

Wavre to Waterloo, 18 June
Towards midnight on 17/18 June, a communication reached Prince Blücher from General Müffling (attached to the Duke of Wellington's headquarters) to the following effect. "The Anglo-Allied Army is posted with its right upon Braine l'Alleud, its Centre upon Mont St Jean, and its Left near La Haye ; having the Enemy in its front. The Duke awaits the attack, but calculates upon Prussian support."

This intelligence was forwarded, at midnight, to General Count Bülow, accompanied by the following order: — "You will therefore, at daybreak, march with the IV Corps from Dion-le-Mont, through Wavre, taking the direction of Chapelle-Saint-Lambert, in which vicinity you will keep your force concealed as much as possible, in case the Enemy should not, by that time, be seriously engaged with the Duke of Wellington ; but should it be otherwise, you will make a most vigorous attack upon the Enemy's right flank. The II Corps will follow you as a direct support; the I and III corps will also be held in readiness to move in the same direction if necessary. You will leave a detachment in observation at Mont-Saint-Guibert; which, if pressed, will gradually fall back upon Wavre. All the baggage train, and everything not actually required in the field of action, will be sent to Louvain."

Instructions, in conformity with the above, were also forwarded to the commanders of the other corps; and a communication of these arrangements was despatched to General Müffling, with an explanation that the fatigue of the troops could not possibly admit of earlier support. Müffling, at the same time, requested to forward timely intelligence of the attack upon Wellington, and of the nature of that attack, that measures might be adopted accordingly.

French start to follow the Prussians to Wavre
At 05:00 18 June, Pajol started from Mazy, with Soult's cavalry division and Teste's infantry division, marching by Saint-Denis and, to ; where he was to await further orders. At about 08:00, Exelmans' Heavy Cavalry Corps Corps, consisting of eight regiments of dragoons, was put in motion; and at 09:00, the two French infantry corps, III Corps (Vandamme's) and IV Corps (Gérard's),began their march along one and the same road, by Sart-lez-Walhain, upon Wavre. The left of this column was protected, towards the Dyle, by the advance of 6th Light Cavalry Division (under Brigadier General Vallin, who succeeded to the command, upon Lieutenant General Maurin being wounded at the Battle of Ligny).

Skirmish near Vieux-Sart
It was about 10:30, when Exelmans' vanguard came up with the Prussian rearguard, on the road to Wavre. He immediately formed his troops on a front of 2 mi, resting their left upon the wooded ravine near the Farm of La Plaquerie, and their right in the direction of Neuf-Sart (about 0.5 km) south of Vieux-Sart) While his skirmishers were engaged with those of the Prussians, he sent the Chef d'Escadron d'Estourmel, to inform Marshal Grouchy of what was going on in front, and also to make known to him that the Prussian army had continued its retreat upon Wavre during a part of the night and that morning, for the  purpose of forming a closer communication with the Duke of Wellington's forces.

The march of the III and IV Corps was greatly impeded by the bad state of the roads, and frequent halts were occasioned by the narrowness and miry nature of the defiles. Gérard, having preceded the column, reached Sart-lez-Walhain at 11:00, where he found Grouchy breakfasting in the house of M. Hollaëbt, a notary.

Grouchy decides to follow the Prussians to Wavre
At about 11:30, Colonel Simon Lorière, who was acting as Grouchy's chief of staff, suddenly heard, while walking in the garden of Wallain, a distant but violent cannonade, of which he immediately went to apprise his General. Grouchy immediately came out into the garden, accompanied by Gérard, Vandamme, Exelmans, and several other Officers. He immediately called for M, Hollaëbt, and asked him in what part of the country he considered this tremendous cannonade to be going on. The latter, pointing to the Forest of Soignies, replied that it must be in the direction of Plancenoit, Mont-Saint-Jean and that vicinity.

Gérard then declared his opinion to be in favour of the expediency of marching in the direction of the cannonade, in order to connect the movements of the detached force more closely with Napoleon's operations; and offered to lead his own corps towards the battle. This measure was opposed by the Marshal, as also by General Baltus, of the artillery, who represented the difficulties of a march in which this arm might be compromised. On the other hand, General Valaze, Commanding Engineer of Gérard's Corps, after having coincided in the opinion expressed by the latter, observed that he had three Companies of Sappers, by aid of which he could remove many obstacles Gérard then gave his assurance that he could at all events move on with the guns carriages and limbers.

Grouchy, however, stated his determination to act in conformity with his instructions; which were, to pursue and attack the Prussians, and never to lose sight of them. It had just been intimated to him that his troops had come up with a rearguard of the Prussian infantry, and he did not consider his information was sufficient to warrant the conclusion that Blücher was drawn up, in expectation of being attacked by him at Wavre; or that he would continue his retreat towards Brussels; or, that if, in manoeuvring to effect his junction with Wellington, he would do so in front, or in rear, of the Forest of Soignies.

After the war Grouchy, that he did not deem it his duty to follow the counsel given by Gérard, but to attack the Prussians; that to effect the proposed movement with the whole of his forces would have been acting contrary to his orders; that to have detached only a portion of those forces in the direction of the Forest of Soignies, would have been to separate the two corps of his wing of the French Army of the North by the river Dyle, whose waters were swollen by the rain, and whose banks were swampy, and thus have rendered their mutual support impossible, however essential it might have become; finally, that a war of inspiration appertains alone to the General in Chief, and that his Lieutenants must confine themselves to that of execution. Hence the march to Wavre was continued.

Whilst proceeding to the vanguard, Grouchy received the despatch, dated from the Farm of Caillou, 18 June, at 10:00, acquainting him that Napoleon was going to attack the Anglo-Allied army, in its position at Waterloo; desiring him to direct his movements upon Wavre in such a manner as to draw his forces nearer to those of Napoleon, and, especially, to keep up a close communication with the latter.

The receipt of these instructions was not followed by any immediate change in Grouchy's dispositions. He despatched no cavalry force — not even a single Patrol — to watch any movements that might be attempted, or actually then in course of execution, by the Prussians, towards Waterloo the battlefield on which Napoleon had intimated to him his intention of attacking the force under Wellington; and hence it is almost needless to add, that be neglected to establish that close and active communication with the main army which was so essentially important for the accomplishment of the object of the general plan of operations, and to which Napoleon had especially directed his attention in the before mentioned despatch. His sole aim seemed to be a direct advance upon Wavre; and this he carried into execution without at all detaching to, or in any way manoeuvring by, his left. On the contrary, upon arriving in person at the position occupied by Exelmans, he desired the latter to move to his right, and take post at ; and the ground thus vacated was shortly afterwards taken up by Vallin's Light Cavalry Division.

Bülow commences his flank march
At daybreak of 18 June, Bülow, in conformity with the order which he had received during the previous night from Blücher, left his position near Dion-le-Mont, to march through Wavre to Saint-Lambert. This was the start of the important flank movement of the Prussians in support of the Anglo-allied army in position in front of Waterloo; and every measure of precaution was adopted with a view to its being carried into effect with certainty and safety.

Prussian patrols dominate the territory between Waterloo and Wavre
The sun had not yet risen when Major Witowsky was despatched with a detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars, to Maransart, for the purpose of closely reconnoitring the defiles of the Lasne, which had already been patrolled the evening before, and to observe the country in front of those defiles, in the direction of the French positions. Major Falkenhausen, who had pushed a reconnaissance beyond on 17 June, was now directed also to reconnoitre the Lasne. Scouring parties were sent out, which kept up the communication that had been opened the previous day with Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur at Mont-Saint-Guibert: the whole country between the Dyle and the Charleroi high road was carefully explored; and correct intelligence was continually sent to the rear concerning the French army.

By means of this vigilant look out, the Prussians secured the important advantage of disrupting the communications between the Napoleon and Grouchy, since it compelled the bearer of despatches to pursue a very circuitous route.

Blücher's letter to Wellington
At 09:30 18 June, whilst Bülow's Crorps was on the march to Saint-Lambert, the following additional despatch was forwarded by Blücher to General Müffling, the Prussian liaison officer at Wellington's headquarters: "Wayre, 18th Jane 1815, at half past nine o'clock.

I request you will say to the Duke of Wellington, in my name, that even ill as I am, I shall, nevertheless, put myself at the head of my troops, for the purpose of immediately attacking the Enemy's Right Flank, should Napoleon undertake anything against the Duke. If, however, the day should pass over without a hostile attack, it is my opinion that we ought tomorrow, with our combined forces, to attack the French Army. I commission you to communicate this as the result of my inward conviction, and to represent to him that I consider this proposal to be the best and most suitable in our present position.

Blücher."

Blücher orders his whole army to Waterloo
The Prussians very soon discovered that the French had made no disposition whatever for the protection of their right flank. Major Witowsky had proceeded as far as Maransart before he fell in with a French patrol; and Major Falkenhausen found the defiles of the Lasne perfectly free and unobserved. Upon receiving this intelligence, Blücher decided upon supporting the Anglo-allied army, by directing the march of his whole force, or at least of III Corps, towards the Wood of Paris, and debouching from thence upon the flank and rear of the French; and Major Lützow was immediately despatched for the purpose of narrowly watching, from the other side of the above wood, the French movements directed against the position of the Anglo-allied army.

No report as yet had been received from the rearguard, concerning Grouchy's advance, and as Blücher's object was now to gain the defiles of the Lasne without interruption, and to occupy in force the Wood of Paris, he determined to avail himself of the time and opportunity which offered for the projected movement. Being, however, uncertain as to the amount of Grouchy's force, Blücher deemed it advisable that Wavre should not be abandoned until the greater part of the Prussian army had passed the defiles of Saint-Lambert; and with this view, he directed that as soon as IV Corps 9 Bülow's) should have proceeded beyond Wavre, I Corps (Zieten's) was to commence its march by Fromont and Ohain to join the left wing of Wellington's army near La Haye. II Corps (Pirch's) was ordered to follow Bülow's in the direction of Saint-Lambert; and III Corps (Thielemann's), after retaining possession of the defile of Wavrc sufficiently long to render the general movement of the Prussian army secure, was then gradually to follow Zieten's Corps upon Ohain.

Fire in the main street in Wavre
An unfortunate incident occurred for the Prussians during the passage of the IV Corps (Bülow's), through Wavre, which materially impeded the march of the troops. The vanguard, consisting of the 15th Brigade (under General Losthin), with the 2nd Silesian Hussars, and a twelve pounder battery, had scarcely passed through the town when a fire broke out in the main street, and extended itself with great rapidity. This not only caused a suspension of the march of the main body of the Corps, but created much alarm because of the great number of ammunition wagons in the place. Every exertion was made to extinguish the fire. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, under Major Löwenfeld, and the 7th Pioneer Company, were ordered to put out the fire, and after they had encountered considerable difficulty, their successful.

In the mean time the vanguard of IV Corps (Bülow's) had continued its march, and reached Saint-Lambert by 11:00. The 16th, and then the 13th (Hacke's), brigades arrived much later; and the 14th Brigade, which formed the rearguard, was a long way behind. The vanguard did not wait the arrival of the other brigades, but proceeded forthwith to cross the defile of Saint-Lambert. Having effected the passage, which was attended with great difficulty, in consequence of the soft and miry state of the valley, it halted in the Wood of Paris, where it continued a considerable time, waiting for the approach of the main body. Patrols, however, from the 2nd Silesian Hussars, were immediately sent forward to feel for the Anglo-allied left, and to reconnoitre the French right.

The I Corps (Zieten's) commenced its march, upon the left bank of the Dyle, towards Ohain, about 12:00.

Skirmish during the Prussian retreat to Wavre
Whilst Bülow's Reserve Cavalry, following the 13th Infantry Brigade, was passing through Wavre, French cavalry had penetrated between the rearguard of this Corps, at Vieux-Sart, and the detachment under Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur at Mont-Saint-Guibert, The 2nd Pomeranian, and the 1st Silesian, Landwehr Cavalry were immediately detached from the reserve cavalry of the Corps, to aid in checking the advance of the French.

The Prussian Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur, who was still at Mont-Saint-Guibert, having received intelligence of the approach of the French, decided on commencing his retreat towards Wavre. Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, who had fallen back early in the morning from Mont-Saint-Guibert, sent 150 cavalry and two guns of horse artillery as a reinforcement to Ledebur.

The latter now succeeded in forming a junction with the two cavalry regiments detached from the Reserve, as also, subsequently, with the cavalry brigade under Sohr, after a slight affair with the French III Corps (Vandamme's), whilst making good his retreat to the Farm de Auzel.

The Prussian II Corps (Pirch's) broke up from its position between Saint-Anne and Aisémont, on the right bank of the Dyle, about noon, for the purpose of passing the defile of Wavre. The 1st Battalion of the 14th Regiment, which occupied this town, was relieved by a battalion of the 30th Regiment, belonging to the Prussian III Corps (Thielemann's).

Pirch had just put his Corps in motion, with a view to cross the Dyle by the town of Wavre, when the approach of the French was announced. The Defile was crowded with the troops; the progress of their march could not be otherwise than slow; and at this moment Lieutenant Colonel Sohr, whose brigade formed the rearguard of the Corps, sent in word, that the French presented a force of six regiments of cavalry, ten pieces of artillery, and two strong columns of infantry.

Prussian rearguard reaches Wavre
The Wood of Sarats, close to the Farm of Auzel, was now occupied by some battalions of the 8th Brigade (of the II Corps), the command of which had devolved upon Colonel Reckow.

Pirch placed the whole of the rearguard under the orders of General Brause, the Commander of the 7th Brigade, and reinforced Lieutenant Colonel Sohr with the 11th Hussars and four pieces of horse artillery. Brause posted the remaining battalions of the 8th Brigade in rear of the wood, and the three Regiments of Cavalry on the right, with the Foot Battery No. 12 in their front. The 7th Brigade, deployed into line, remained in reserve.

Lieutenant Colonel Ledebur retired slowly before the French, and formed a junction with the 8th Brigade, under Colonel Reckow; who maintained his position until 15:00, against the vanguard of French III Corps (Vandamme's). Between 15:00 and 16:00 General Brause ordered the retreat Lieutenant Colonel Sohr crossed the bridge at the Mill of Bierges, which was occupied by two companies of the 2nd Battalion of the 14th Regiment; and then followed the reserve cavalry of II Corps (Pirch's), to which his Brigade belonged, but which he did not overtake until he reached the Field of Waterloo. The French did not advance with much vigour: the Prussian retreat was conducted with perfect order, and the Fusilier Battalion of the 1st Pomeranian Landwehr, under Major Krüger, distinguished itself on the occasion. After the passage of the river had been effected, the 1st Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr remained at until the bridge was destroyed and the mill set on fire. The 11th Hussars and the 2nd Battalion of the Elbe Landwehr were posted in observation of the passages across the Dyle, and did not rejoin the Corps before the following day.

Blücher's orders to Thielemann
Blücher had left Wavre before 11:00, and gone to the vicinity of Limale, in order to make himself acquainted with the nature of the country in the direction of Saint-Lambert. Here he received intelligence of the approach of the French towards Wavre. Colonel Clausemotz, Chief of the Staff of the III Corps, was immediately made the bearer of an order for Thielemann to defend the position at this place, in the event of the French advancing in force; but, should the latter cross the Dyle higher up the stream, or not appear in great strength (a point concerning which nothing positive was then known), he was to leave only a few battalions in position at Wavre, and to follow the main army, with his corps, as a reserve, in the direction of Couture-Saint-Germain.

Battle of Wavre (16:00)
It was nearly 16:00 on 18 June when Vandamme's Corps arrived in front of the position which Thielemann was in the act of leaving, with a view to follow and support the remaining three Prussian Corps that were at that moment on the march towards the battlefield of Waterloo; and, with a fire that was opened from the French batteries, commenced the Battle of Wavre.

Prussians patrol meets a British picket
Some time before the Battle of Waterloo commenced, a Prussian patrol reached the village of Smohain, in which as posted a squadron of the British 10th Hussars, under Captain Taylor. A Prussian staff officer accompanying the patrol, asked for a report—that Bülow was at Saint-Lambert, and advancing with the IV Corps—to be forwarded to Wellington. Taylor dispatched Lieutenant Lindsey with the report to Wellington's headquarters, but this information was misleading as Bülow's advance was slower than this implied and only his vanguard had by this time reached Saint-Lambert.

Prussians take possession of Wood of Paris
Since the reconnaissance patrols had been pushed forward, early in the day and successfully established communication with the Anglo-allies, it then became desirable to explore the ground that lay more to the right front of the Prussians, in the direction of the right flank of the main French army, in order to ascertain the nature of any precautionary measures adopted by Napoleon to impede the junction of the two Coalition armies. Major Lützow, of the staff, was sent upon this duty, with a detachment of the 2nd Silesian Hussars; and on reaching the Wood of Paris, he not only found this unoccupied, but discovered that no steps whatever had been taken by the French to cover and secure their right flank. A Prussian troop of Hussars advanced beyond the Wood of Paris, to a point near Frischermont, whence it had a good view of both the French and Anglo-allied dispositions and movements; and where it was not even menaced by the approach of any hostile party.

As Major Lützow, fully alive to the importances of speedily occupying the Wood of Paris, was returning to communicate the above intelligence to Blücher, he met General Grolman, the Quartermaster General of the Army, to whom he immediately explained how matters stood: when this officer directly pushed forward the Silesian Hussars and two battalions of infantry from Bülow's vanguard, to take possession of the wood; these troops having just crossed the defile of Saint-Lambert. Grolman at the same time sent a message to Blücher, suggesting that the 15th and 16th brigades should be ordered to follow the vanguard as soon as they should be collected on the Waterloo side of the defile.

Passage of the defile of Saint-Lambert
Great as had been the difficulties encountered along the Prussian line of march, the passage of the defile of Saint-Lambert seemed to present an almost insurmountable obstacle. The rain which had set in during the afternoon of 17 June, and had continued without cessation the entire night, had transformed the valley of the Lasne into a swamp. The miry and watery state of the roads between Wavre and Saint-Lambert had caused so many stoppages and breaks in the columns that they were frequently lengthened out for miles.

Blücher showed himself on every point of the line of march, encouraging his exhausted soldiers, and inciting them to renewed efforts. The troops, after a short halt to collect their scattered ranks, entered the defile. As the ground yielded to their pressure, both cavalry and infantry became dispirited; and when the artillery were fairly checked by the guns sinking axle deep, and the men, already worn down by fatigue, were required to work them out it. They started to grumble that too much was being asked of them. It required a short speech of encouragement by Blücher to revive the drooping energies of the men, and to stimulate then to still further to successful exertions.

At length, after considerable delay and constant difficulty, the passage of the 15th and 16th brigades, as also of the reserve of both cavalry and artillery, was accomplished; and by 16:00 these troops had ascended the opposite slope of the valley, and reached the plateau of the ridge which, constituting the narrow interval between the Lasne and the Smohain, with a rapid fall on either side towards those streams, presented a comparatively dry and firm soil favourable for the further operations of the Prussian forces in this direction.

Prussians occupy the Wood of Paris in strength
As the troops reached the Wood of Paris, they were deployed, along a considerable front, and in a close compact order, on each side of the road leading from Lasne towards Plancenoit. The artillery kept to the road itself; and the cavalry was drawn up in rear of the wood, ready to follow the infantry. Shortly after the 15th Brigade (Losthin's) deployed at around 15:00 his cavalry screen skirmished with a French patrol in which Colonel Wilhelm Werner Otto von Schwerin was killed. It is likely that he was the first Prussian officer killed at the Battle of Waterloo and later a memorial was erected at the site.

The 13th and 14th brigades were expected to join in a short time; and the II Corps (Pirch's) was following along the same line. It had been Blücher's intention to await the arrival of these troops, and then to debouch with the assembled force; but having watched the progress of the battle, he became apprehensive, on perceiving the tremendous cannonade, and the renewed attack after 16:00, that the French might direct a still greater force against Wellington's line, and succeed in breaking the latter before he commenced the attack on his side of the battlefield. He could clearly distinguish Napoleon's reserves, in rear of La Belle Alliance, evidently prepared for being launched against the Anglo-allied line, which had already sustained the most desperate attacks. The frequent and pressing communications he had received from Wellington also showed how anxiously the latter relied on his support.

These considerations satisfied Blücher, that the moment had arrived in which his appearance on the battlefield would be productive of consequences the most favourable to the views of his ally, and the most influential on the development of their combined exertions; and he now gave the order for the attack to commence, even with the small amount of force then at his disposal, as also for the hastening of the march of the troops still in the rear.

Advance of the Prussians from the Wood of Paris (16:30)
It was 16:30 when the 15th (Losthin's) and 16th (Hiller's) debouched from the Wood of Paris; the former on the right, the latter on the left; and each in the usual brigade formation for advance peculiar to Prussian tactics. The direction of the attack was perpendicular to the right flank of the French Army; and consequently, also, to the Charleroi road, which constituted the French main line of operation.

In order to cover the left flank, Colonel Hiller, commanding the 16th brigade, detached both the 3rd battalions of the 15th Regiment and the 1st Silesian landwehr, under Major Keller, to keep a look out in that direction as far as the Lasne stream; beyond which, Major Falkenhausen was scouring the country with one hundred Horsemen of the 3rd Regiment of Silesian Landwehr Cavalry.

General, commanding the 15th Brigade, detached three battalions towards Frischermont and Smohain, to cover the right flank. They were the 2nd Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and the 3rd Battalion of the 3rd Silesian Landwehr, followed by the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment.

Domon's cavalry attack
During his march from Genappe to La Belle Alliance Napoleon had detached the 3rd Cavalry Division (Domon's), from his main line of advance to reconnoitre the country to the east (between the high road to Brussels and the Dyle). The 4th Regiment of Chasseurs (Desmichels') pushed as far as the bridge at Mousty, on which line its skirmishers exchanged a few carbine shots with some Prussian dragoons, who did not, however, appear willing to engage further with them. It was by means of this reconnaissance that Napoleon ascertained the retreat, through Tilly and Gentinnes, of the principal Prussian column, consisting of I and II corps (Zieten's and Pirch's), although the line by which they retired was undiscovered by Grouchy (on 17 June), in whose immediate sphere of operations it was situated.

Domon's cavalry continued drawn up en potence, and was at a considerable distance from the Prussian vanguard, when Blücher ordered a cannonade to open upon it; more with a view to make known his arrival to the Anglo-allied army, and to induce the French to withhold the employment of a still greater force against the latter, than from any motive affecting his own immediate operations at the moment.

Domon now sent forward a Regiment of chasseurs to attack the Prussian column, whilst he followed with his whole line. Hereupon the 2nd Silesian Hussars and the 2nd Neumark Landwehr Cavalry moved through the intervals of the Infantry, and formed up in front; the Hussars to the left, and the Landwehr to the right. They then advanced, followed by the 3rd Silesian Landwehr Cavalry in support, and drove back the French Chasseurs; but becoming menaced in flank, and observing Domon's whole line advancing, they were, in their turn, compelled to retire.

This movement was covered by the Horse Battery No. 11; and more particularly by Captain Schmidt's Foot Battery of the 15th Brigade, which drew up to oppose the pursuit of the French cavalry. The vigorous fire which continued to be maintained by both these batteries, combined with the advance of the Prussian infantry columns, induced Domon to decline following up his attack at the moment.

Battle of Waterloo (17:30)
The three battalions already mentioned as having been detached to the right, had, by this time, reached Smohain. Their advance in that direction had been conducted with so much caution, that they debouched from the south-eastern enclosures of the village most unexpectedly for both the Anglo-allied troops in that vicinity, and the infantry forming the extreme right of the French front line. The Prussians continued to advance; crossed the principal fence which separated them from the French extreme right, and drew up in line almost at right angles with the direction of the French front — two battalions in line, with the third in support. It was 17:30 when this took place and the moment when the Prussians became fully engaged in the Battle of Waterloo.

Remarks on Grouchy's movements
Grouchy's movements, on 17–18 June, form so striking a feature in the history of the Waterloo Campaign, and exercised so important an influence upon the fate of the decisive Battle of Waterloo, that it becomes an essential point in the study of that history, to examine how far he complied with, and carried into effect, the instructions received from Napoleon, and to what degree his proceedings, consequent upon his ascertaining the direction of the Prussian retreat, coincided with the general plan and object of Napoleon's operations.

On a reference to the account of his transactions during 17 June, given in the despatch written at 10:00 on that night, it appears he was completely ignorant of the line by which the principal mass of the Prussian army had retreated, namely, that of Tilly and Gentinnes, by I and II corps (Zieten's and Pirch's), although his cavalry had driven back the Prussian detachment from the latter place to Mont-Saint-Guibert, but from whence it appears to have been withdrawn in the night. His attention seems to have been much less devoted to this quarter than it was to his right, in which direction he sent detachments as far as Perwez. The main body of his forces did not proceed further than Gembloux on 17 June, that is, about 8 km from the battlefield of Ligny.

There is a striking contrast between the march of Grouchy's large detachment, in pursuit of a defeated army, which had commenced its retreat on the previous night, and which presented no check to the advance, and the march of Napoleon from the same battlefield, by Quatre Bras and Genappe, as far as La Belle Alliance, in front of the Waterloo position, a distance of about 16.5 mi; and this, too, in rear of a victorious army, with a cavalry rearguard boldly and successfully impeding the advance of its pursuers.

It must, however, be taken into account, that in one most important respect Napoleon possessed a decided advantage over Grouchy — an advantage, the magnitude of which increased with every moment that elapsed after the wet weather had set in; for while the former moved the whole distance along a paved high road, the latter had to proceed entirely by cross roads, which may more properly be designated common field roads.

It is to this particular point that both Grouchy and Gérard refer in justification of the late arrival of the infantry at Gembloux. Nevertheless, Grouchy sent considerable cavalry forces to the right, misled by the same idea which had prevailed with Napoleon, that Blücher had retreated upon the Meuse; and the very circumstance of his dragoons having reached Perwez on the night of 17 June, proves that had he organised a more extended, more combined, and more energetic reconnaissance, with the sixty five squadrons of cavalry which had been placed under his orders, he might have connected his operations on the right of the Dyle with those of Napoleon on the left of that river, by occupying the line of Nil Sait Vincent, Corbaix, Mont-Saint-Guibert, and the bridge at Mousty.

The only check he would have experienced would have been at the Prussian post of Mont-Saint-Guibert; which, however, in the case of an active reconnaissance, as above, might have been attacked by a strong Detachment in front, and turned by Corbaix on its left.

Grouchy's errors in judgement
But if such good grounds exist for inferring that, on 17 June, an earlier and a clearer insight into the Prussian's movements might have been obtained by the corps detached in pursuit of the Prussians, and that when obtained, it would have rendered the communication with the operations of the main army, on the left of the Dyle, a matter not only important in the highest degee, but also perfectly practicable; and if a failure in this respect be attributable to the absence of sufficient energy and vigour on the part of Grouchy, much more forcibly does it not expose the extraordinary, the unaccountable, dilatoriness of Napoleon himself during the whole of the precious morning of 17 June. How striking a view it unfolds of what might have been accomplished, had the bivouac at Ligny been broken up a few hours earlier! Then, Wellington's army was still between Quatre Bras and the narrow defile of Genappe, open to a holding attack in front by Ney, simultaneously with one in flank by the force collected at Marbais (a part of which might have been detached across the Dyle, towards the rear of the Anglo-allied army, by Villers-la-Ville and Bousseval, masked by the Wood of Berme); and the rearmost Corps of the Prussian Army (Thielemann's), which was retreating through Gembloux, might have been attacked with effect, by the superior force of all Arms under Grouchy. As regards Grouchy's movements during the early part of 18 June, it is very remarkable, that although he had in his despatch, written at 22:00 the previous night, communicated to Napoleon his surmises of an intended junction of a portion of Blücher's forces with those of Wellington, and his consequent intention of following the Prussians in the direction of Wavre, "afin qu'ils ne puissent pas gagner Bruxelles, et de les séparer de Wellington", and although he must or ought to have been aware that Wavre was only twelve miles distant from Napoleon's main line of operations, whereas Gembloux was about fifteen miles distant from Wavre, he not only delayed his departure from Gembloux until between 07:00 and 08:00, but manoeuvred by his right; taking the more circuitous line, through Sart-lez-Walhain, and rendering his operations still more dilatory by moving both Vandamme's and Gérard's Corps along one and the same road. Had he not, from want of sufficient vigilance, continued ignorant of the fact,

that the principal Prussian Column, consisting of the I and II Corps, had retired upon Wavre, at so short a distance from his left as by the line of Tilly, Gentinnes, and Mont-Saint-Guibert, there can be very little doubt that he would have marched upon the latter point, which the Prussians, aware of its importance, had occupied with a rearguard; but even with the amount of information which he possessed, and with the inference justly impressed upon his mind that a co-operation between Blücher and Wellington was projected, we are at a loss to account for his not having moved upon Mont-Saint-Guibert, and manoeuvred by his left.

What Grouchy might have done
In his despatch, written at two o'clock in the morning, he mentioned to Napoleon his design of marching upon Corbaix or Wavre; a movement of which Napoleon, in his reply, expressed his approval; and if he had directed one of his Infantry Corps along the line of Corbaix and La Beiraque, and the other by that of Mont-Saint-Guibert and Mousty, there can be no doubt that, even late as was the hour at which he started from Gembloux, he would, in a great measure, have fulfilled the expectations of Napoleon.

In this case, he would naturally have so divided his cavalry, that one portion would have scoured the country along the front and right of the column marching by Corbaix and, and the other portion would have been employed in a similar manner along the front and Left of the Column moving upon Mont-Saint-Guibert and Mousty. Both at this point and at Ottignies, about 800 yard lower down the stream, there is a stone bridge across the Dyle. There is a direct road from Mousty to Saint-Lambert, scarcely 8 km, and another to the Field of Waterloo. The cavalry in advance of the left column could not have failed to discover the Prussian troops in march to join the Left of Wellington; for they were then passing slowly, and with extreme difficulty, through the defiles of Saint-Lambert and Lasne.

This discovery would have led to the right column being moved by its left, from La Baraque to Mousty; the cavalry attached to it masking the movement as long as possible. The left column would then, in all probability, have followed its advanced cavalry to Saint-Lambert; and the right corps have either moved upon the same point as a reinforcement, or have diverged upon Lasne as a Support, upon which the former might have fallen back, if compelled to effect its retreat towards Plancenoit.

In this manner might Grouchy have so far realised the anxious expectation of Napoleon as to have fallen upon Bulow flagrante delicto, and have materially procrastinated the co-operation of Blücher with Wellington on 18 Jume; a co-operation which a contrary proceeding, originating in fatal tardiness of movement, and exhibiting useless manoeuvring in a false direction, could not fail to render easy in execution and successful in result.

But beyond such procrastination of the meditated junction of Blücher's and Wellington's forces. Grouchy could have effected nothing. The junction itself could not have been prevented. The tendency of Grouchy's movements had been too narrowly watched ; the country between the Dyle and the Charleroi road to Brussels had been too vigilantly explored; and the movements, in succession, of the different Prussian Corps had been too nicely calculated and determined; to admit of the possibility of a failure, as regarded the arrival of a considerable portion of the Prussian forces on the Left of the Anglo- Allied Army.

Blücher's admirable dispositions
Blücher had made so admirable a disposition of his four Corps, that two of them could at any time have combined, and therefore have presented a superior force to Grouchy, at any point between Wavre and Plancenoit; whilst the remainder of the Army might have continued its march to the Field of Waterloo. Had Grouchy moved by Mont-Saint-Guibert and Mousty upon Saint-Lambert, Thielemann's Corps would then have been on the march towards Couture-Saint-Germain, according to his original instructions; and finding Bulow engaged with the French, would have joined him. Grouchy might then have contrived to hold both these Corps at bay, and thus have reduced the co-operating Prussian force at Waterloo to the two Corps under Zieten and Pirch, besides considerably retarding that co-operation; since without having experienced the effects of any such interruption to the progress of the other Corps, as we have here supposed, these two Generals did not reach the Field of Battle until seven o'clock in the evening of the 18th.

Grouchy's error in marching on Wavre
Such is the extent of the advantage which, under the circumstances, Grouchy would have gained by a march from Gembloux upon Saint-Lambert; a most important one, no doubt, as time for pushing the struggle with Wellington, with the whole force at his immediate disposal, before the arrival of the Prussians, was of the most vital consequence to Napoleon; and this advantage Grouchy entirely lost by his march upon Wavre — a march which enabled Blücher to appear with three, out of his four corps, on the great and decisive field of action; and that in sufficient time to render the victory as complete as could reasonably be desired.

Napoleon's errors at this time
No exertions, however, on the part of Grouchy, after he broke up from Gembloux on the morning of 18 June, could have effectually frustrated the junction of Wellington and Blücher. Two great errors, for which that Marshal was not accountable, reduced the contemplated junction from a measure of calculation to one of certainty.

The first and principal of these has already been adverted to at some length, and cannot be too closely kept in view — the fatal neglect of a vigorous pursuit of the defeated Prussians, on the night of 16 June and morning of 17 June by a detached Corps; combined with the extraordinary delay in the attack upon Wellington at Quatre Bras, on the latter day. The second error arose from the want of a strong reconnaissance and vigilant look out on the right of the main French army, on the morning of 18 June, followed up by the occupation of the defiles of the river Lasne.