Operations on the Ancre, January – March 1917

After the Battle of the Ancre (13–18 November 1916), British attacks on the Somme front were stopped by the weather. During the rest of 1916 and early January 1917, military operations by both sides were mostly restricted to survival in the rain, snow, fog, mud fields, waterlogged trenches and shell-holes. As preparations for the offensive at Arras continued, the British attempted to keep German attention on the Somme front. The Fifth Army was instructed by Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig to prepare systematic attacks to capture portions of the German defences. Short advances could progressively uncover the remaining German positions in the Ancre valley, threaten the German hold on the village of Serre to the north and expose German positions beyond to ground observation. Artillery-fire could be directed with greater accuracy by ground observers and make overlooked German defences untenable. A more ambitious plan for the spring, was an attack into the salient that had formed north of Bapaume, during the Battle of the Somme in 1916. The attack was to be directed northwards from the Ancre valley and southwards from the original front line near Arras to meet at St. Léger, as soon as the ground recovered from the winter and was intended to combine with the effect of the offensive planned at Arras. British operations on the Ancre from 10 January – 22 February 1917, forced the Germans back 5 mi on a 4 mi front, ahead of the schedule of the Alberich Bewegung ("Alberich Manoeuvre"/"Operation Alberich") and eventually took 5,284 prisoners. On 22/23 February the Germans fell back another 3 mi on a 15 mi front. The Germans then withdrew from much of the R. I Stellung to the R. II Stellung on 11 March, forestalling a British attack, which was not noticed by the British until dark on 12 March; the main German withdrawal from the Noyon salient to the Hindenburg Line (Operation Alberich) commenced on schedule on 16 March.

German defences on the Ancre, winter 1916–1917
By the end of 1916 the German defences on the south bank of the Ancre valley had been pushed back from the original front line of 1 July 1916 and were based on the sites of fortified villages, connected by networks of trenches, most on reverse slopes sheltered from observation from the south and obscured from the north by the convex nature of the slopes. On the north bank the Germans had retained most of the Beaumont Hamel spur, beyond which to the north were the original front line defences, running west of Serre northwards to Gommecourt and Monchy-au-Bois. The Germans had built R. I Stellung ("Switch Trench I Position") a double line of trenches and barbed-wire several miles further back, as a new second line of defence along the ridge north of the Ancre valley, from Essarts–Bucquoy–west of Achiet le Petit–Loupart Wood–south of Grévillers–west of Bapaume–le Transloy to Sailly Saillisel. On the reverse slope of that ridge, another line R. II Stellung ran from Ablainzevelle–west of Logeast Wood–west of Achiet le Grand–western outskirts of Bapaume–Rocquigny–le Mesnil en Arrousaise to Vaux Wood. R. III Stellung branched from R. II Stellung at Achiet le Grand and ran clockwise around Bapaume, then south to Beugny, Ytres, Nurlu and Templeux la Fosse. The First Army held the Somme front from the Somme river north to Gommecourt and had a similar number of troops to the British opposite, with ten divisions in reserve. On the night of 1/2 January a German attack captured Hope Post near the Beaumont Hamel–Serre road, before being lost with another post on the night of 5/6 January.

British positions on the Ancre, winter 1916–1917
The Fifth Army held about ten miles of the Somme front in January 1917, from Le Sars west to the Grandcourt–Thiepval road, across the Ancre east of Beaucourt, along the lower slopes of the Beaumont Hamel spur, to the original front line south of the Serre road, north to Gommecourt Park. The right flank was held by IV Corps up to the north side of the Ancre river, with the XIII Corps on the north bank up to the boundary with the Third Army. II Corps and V Corps were in reserve resting, training and preparing to relieve the corps in line around 7–21 February, except for the divisional artilleries, which were to be joined by those of the relieving divisions.

An advance to close up to the "Le Transloy–Loupart Line" (the British used several terms for the R. I Stellung) which ran from Essarts–Bucquoy–west of Achiet le Petit–Loupart Wood–south of Grévillers–west of Bapaume–le Transloy to Sailly Saillisel, had been the first objective of British operations in the Ancre valley after the capture of Beaumont Hamel in late 1916 and began with an attack on 18 November, before the deterioration of the ground made operations impossible. Ground had been gained on a 5000 yd front south of the Ancre and positions improved on Redan Ridge on the north bank. Over the winter the Fifth Army submitted plans to General Headquarters (GHQ) which were eventually settled in mid-February, after Joffre was replaced by Nivelle and the changes of emphasis, caused by the French decision to fight a decisive battle on the Aisne. The obvious difficulties the Germans were in on the Ancre front made it important to deny the Germans the ability to withdraw to the new defences being built behind the Noyon salient (eventually known as the Hindenburg Line/Siegfriedstellung) in their own time. Such a retirement had potential to disrupt the forthcoming British offensive at Arras and became urgent as the possibility of such a withdrawal became more likely in February and March according to the results of air reconnaissance, agent reports and gleanings from prisoners.

Reaching a good position for an attack on the "Bihucourt Line" (R. II Stellung) which ran from Ablainzevelle–west of Logeast Wood–west of Achiet le Grand–western outskirts of Bapaume–Rocquigny–le Mesnil en Arrousaise to Vaux Wood was made the objective of a series of attacks so that the Fifth Army would be in a position to attack it three days before the commencement of the offensive at Arras and then conduct an advance to St Léger to meet the Third Army to trap the German defenders in their positions south-west of Arras. The first stage was to be an attack on 17 February, in which II Corps was to capture Hill 130. Gird Trench and the Butte de Warlencourt was to be captured by I Anzac Corps on 1 March, Serre was to be taken by V Corps on 7 March which would then extend its right flank to the Ancre to relieve the 63rd Division of II Corps and capture Miraumont by 10 March. These operations would lead to the attack on the "Bihucourt Line" by II Corps and I Anzac Corps. These arrangements were maintained until 24 February, when German local withdrawals in the Ancre valley required the Fifth Army divisions to make a general advance to regain contact.

Winter on the Somme, 1916–1917
The condition of the ground on the Somme front became much worse in November 1916, when constant rain fell and the ground which had been churned by shell-fire since June, turned to deep mud. (Some witnesses considered that the state of the ground was worse than at Ypres a year later.) The ground in the Ancre valley was in the worst condition, a wilderness of mud, flooded trenches, shell-hole posts, corpses and broken equipment, overlooked and vulnerable to sniping from German positions. Little more could be done beyond holding the line and frequently relieving troops, who found the physical and mental strain almost unbearable. All supplies had to be moved up by soldiers at night to avoid sniping by German infantry and artillery-fire. Horses in transport units were used as pack animals, many of whom died when the oat ration was reduced to 6 lb per day. The weather slightly improved in January and on 14 January the temperature fell enough to freeze the ground.

On the south side of the Ancre valley, the 51st Division took over from the 4th Canadian Division on 27 November near Courcelette. The division had only just been relieved from the line on the north bank, after the Battle of the Ancre (13–18 November 1916) with very little time for rest. Constant rain wet the ground so badly that horses drowned and men became stuck up to their waists; in December ropes were issued to drag soldiers out of the mud. New trenches collapsed as they were dug so the front and support lines were held by shell-hole posts, which became islands of squalor, as duckboards and ration boxes used as platforms sank under the mud, cooking became impossible and movement in daylight suicidal. There was an epidemic of trench foot and frostbite, old wounds opened and troops became ill with dysentery. Morale plummeted and moving about after dark led to working parties, runners, reliefs and ration parties getting lost and wandering around until exhausted. No man's land was not wired on this part of the front and British and German troops blundered into each other's positions, Germans being taken prisoner on six occasions. Some dug-outs in Regina Trench were usable but conditions in the artillery lines were as bad as the front line, with ammunition being delivered by pack horse under German artillery fire. "Elephant" shelters (the materials for which took ten men to carry forward and 24 hours to build) were placed in the front-line, sunk below trench and shell-hole parapets. Larger shelters were dug into the sides of roads further back and only a minimal number of troops kept in the front zone.

After three weeks's work positions in the front line had been improved and a frost made the ground harder, until a thaw made the ground even worse than before. The 51st Division stores obtained enough gum boots for a brigade of infantry but many were lost in the mud as men struggled to get free. The division wore highland kilts, which left the tops of the leg bare underneath and the edges of the boots chafed the skin and caused septic sores, until 6,000 pairs of trousers were issued. Wearing the boots and standing for long periods made men's feet swell, to the point that walking became almost impossible. Buses were brought up to Pozières to collect soldiers as they straggled back from the front-line during a relief. Food containers proved too heavy to carry 2,000 yd into the front line and had to be replaced by "Tommy Cookers", cans of solidified alcohol with which soldiers could heat tins of food. Quartermasters improvised large numbers of extra cookers, so that the troops in the line could eat hot food when they pleased but the improvements made little difference to sickness wastage. The division began to relieve battalions after 48 hours, with 24 hours rest before and after each period in the line. On 11 December the front of the division was reduced to two battalions, with the front of each battalion area being held by a company and two Lewis-gun crews. The strength of companies was down to 50–60 men, so few and thinly spread that a stray German soldier taken prisoner near a brigade headquarters, saw no sign of British troops until he was captured. In December and January casualties due to enemy action were 439, far fewer than those due to the weather and illness; the division was relieved by the 2nd Division on 12 January.

The 2nd Division, also transferred from the north side of the Ancre valley, took over from the 51st Division on 13 January, on a front of 2500 yd, 1200 yd south of the village of Pys. The front line consisted of 18 infantry posts and support positions held by ten platoons, with no positions behind until Courcelette, where three platoons were based with two companies in the vicinity. Ironside Avenue (a communication trench) ran forward 800 yd towards the front line but was so full of mud as to be impassable. Brushwood tracks, unusable in daylight, continued the route towards the front line. Two battalions took over the front posts, with two more back towards Ovillers and La Boisselle, with the 15th Division on the right and the 18th Division on the left. The 2nd Division continued the consolidation begun earlier by the 51st Division, large working parties worked non-stop to dig out, clean and pump trenches, fit duck-boards and provide overhead cover for the infantry posts in the front line; tramways were built by engineers behind the line. Both sides were quiet during the rest of January, until the Germans attempted a raid, which was stopped by machine-gun fire before they had passed through the German barbed wire. On the north side of the valley other British troops captured the rest of the Beaumont Hamel spur. Conditions had been improved by the end of the month, although snowstorms covered such landmarks as existed and relieving parties frequently got lost. There was little artillery fire in the divisional areas but much German aircraft activity, British reconnaissance aircraft managed to photograph the front line on 29 January, giving the divisional commander the first accurate information about the position of the front line. The freeze lasted about five weeks to mid-February, which made movement of carrying-parties much easier, as preparations for the next offensive were made.

On the north bank of the Ancre the 7th Division returned to the line after a month of rest and reorganisation in Flanders. It had marched 82 mi south in rain and fog before returning to the line on 23 November, to relieve the 32nd Division and the right of the 37th Division along New Munich Trench, which ran north-west to south-east below the crest of Beaumont Hamel spur and Beaucourt Trench, which ran east from the south end of New Munich Trench. The British line was parallel to the German lines of Munich Trench and Muck Trench. Conditions were worse if possible, than those on the south side of the Ancre valley, causing much sickness, despite precautions like rubbing whale-oil into the feet to prevent trench foot and bringing dry socks up with the rations. One battalion had 38 men sick after a period in the line. The temperature dropped several times in December, which began to harden the ground but this brought torrential rains, an even worse ordeal. British casualties from snipers were frequent and on one trench relief the mud was so bad, that a special rescue-party had to be sent to dig out troops caught in the mud. Despite swift medical attention, a large number had to be taken to hospital and one man died of exposure. The area was covered with trenches, many derelict, damaged, half-built or nearly obliterated by artillery fire. Identifying the course of the front line or relating it to the map was impossible, as was the reconstruction of the front line because trenches collapsed as soon as they were dug. Despite the conditions raids were mounted by both sides. A party of about 100 Germans was repulsed from New Munich Trench on 25 November. Despite the conditions, New Munich Trench was extended by the British to the north and another 250 yd dug to the south, in preparation for an attack on Munich Trench as soon as conditions allowed. The British line was held by posts about 30 yd apart by day and on 29 November a German raid on an outpost failed. At the end of December a sudden increase in the number of German prisoners being taken was noticed, partly because a new German division had arrived and during reliefs many men got lost in the fog and stumbled into British positions and partly because of an unusual willingness to surrender. Twenty Germans were captured on 1 January, 29 prisoners taken on 2 January and another 50 prisoners were taken during the week, many of whom chose to give themselves up.

Raiding continued and on 1 January two officers on the way to Hope Post with the rum ration, met a German attack coming down Serre Trench and had to struggle back to Despair Post. A hurried counter-attack failed against German machine-gun fire and another attempt was postponed until the evening of 5 January, when at 5:15 p.m. 500 x 9.2-inch, 200 x 8-inch and 250 x 6-inch howitzer shells were fired at the post in fifteen minutes. At 5:30 p.m. fifty British troops attacked up Serre Trench and along the ground on either side as fast as they could through the mud and re-captured the post, taking nine prisoners for a loss of one casualty. An attack by the 3rd Division on Post 88 on the left at the same also succeeded. German artillery fire was so severe that the British were forced back out but were able to return after the bombardment before German infantry arrived, defending the post until they ran out of hand-grenades and withdrew; the post was recaptured again and consolidated when a fresh supply of grenades arrived.

Trench raid, 4/5 February
A 2nd Division battalion was ordered to prepare a raid for the night of 4/5 February. The raiding-party was to have two officers and 60 men with stretcher-bearers, for an attack on a salient at the junction of Guard and Desire Support trenches, to take prisoners or documents, destroy machine-guns, study the state of the trenches and the way the Germans were holding the line. Stokes mortars but no artillery was to be fired before the raid and when it began a box barrage was to be fired to isolate the objective. White suits were provided, in case of snow on the ground and all means of identification were to be removed by the raiders, who were told to give name, rank and number only if captured. A deputy was to be chosen to take over if the raid leader became a casualty. That night the battalion (1st Royal Berkshire) was relieved and went into reserve near La Boiselle. Trenches resembling the target were found and used for five day and night rehearsals. The attack was scheduled for 3:00 a.m. on 5 February and the party moved forward to the Miraumont dug-outs at 6:00 p.m. on 2 February. The battalion commander made a reconnaissance and chose the jumping-off position. Three wooden markers, painted black on the British side and white on the German, to mark the centre and flanks of the raiding route were placed in no man's land, about 30 yd beyond the British wire.

About 15 minutes before zero hour the party stole forward in pairs, wearing white smocks and helmet-covers and formed two waves 15 yd apart at the tripods. Three more tripods had been placed 30 – further on, to help the raiders keep direction. The Stokes mortars of the 99th Trench Mortar Battery opened fire, one mortar firing "rapid" at a particular German post at zero and one minute later the divisional artillery began the box-barrage, as the raiding party moved to within 50 yd of the objective and lay down. As the Stokes mortars ceased fire the party rushed the German position, through three rows of barbed wire, each 2.5 ft thick. The first wave moved towards the east side of the salient, then from there to the western face, as the second wave jumped over the trench and ran along the parados, until they saw Germans in the trench near the apex. Several Germans were shot and the rest taken prisoner. After twenty minutes searching dug-outs, the party withdrew with 51 prisoners (including two officers) having smashed a machine-gun and killed or wounded 14 German soldiers. One raider was killed and twelve wounded. Another raid was ordered for 8/9 February then postponed until 10 February. On this raid several Germans were killed as they retreated and soldiers in four dug-outs were killed with hand-grenades, when they refused to surrender. Seven prisoners were taken and the party of 36 had three killed, seven wounded and three missing. The Germans retaliated on 12 February, when about 70 men raided the area between posts 9 and 10 and took seven prisoners. Five dead Germans were found between the posts but machine-gun fire prevented no man's land being searched.

11 January – 14 February
The British operations at the end of the Battle of the Ancre in November 1916, had captured German positions on Beaumont Hamel spur and the village of Beaucourt before the weather stopped operations. In the early hours of 10 January a battalion of the 7th Division attacked "The Triangle" and the trenches either side including Muck Trench, about 1000 yd east of Beaumont Hamel. The attack began after an 18-hour bombardment and a standing barrage on the objective. Due to the state of the ground, the infantry advanced in three parties, who carried duck boards and had 20 minutes to cross 200 – of no man's land. The objectives were captured and consolidated and a German counter-attack was broken up by British artillery fire, a prisoner later reporting that a second one was cancelled. The 7th Division captured 142 prisoners for a loss of 65 casualties. The success covered the right flank of the 7th Division for the main attack next day against Munich Trench, from The Triangle to the Beaumont Hamel–Serre road and a smaller attack by the 11th Division against German defences east of Muck Trench. The 11th Division operation failed when an un-noticed German dug-out was overrun in the fog. German troops emerged and attacked the British troops from behind, at the same time that German counter-attacks from further east began, which pushed the British back to their start line.

A bombardment had been fired on the whole Fifth Army front for two days, particularly in the neighbourhood of Serre, intended to mislead the Germans. The attack by a brigade of the 7th Division began at 5:00 a.m. when the leading companies lined up on tapes 200 – from Munich Trench. At 6:37 a.m. three divisional artilleries began a standing barrage on the trench and a creeping barrage on no man's land, in thick fog, movement was so difficult that the barrage moved at 100 yd in ten minutes. German resistance was slight except at one post, where the garrison held on until 8:00 a.m. After the fog cleared at 10:30 a.m. the ground was consolidated, most of it free from observation from the remaining German defences. V Corps took over from XIII Corps with the 32nd and 19th divisions by 11 January, with II Corps on the south bank facing north with the 2nd and 18th divisions. The 11th Division stayed in the line for another attack on the slope west of the Beaucourt–Puisieux road. The bunker overrun un-noticed in the previous attack, was found empty but German artillery caused many casualties, before a British bombardment stopped a German counter-attack, as it was forming up at 10:00 a.m. and the division was relieved on 20 January. For the rest of the month British troops sapped forward (by digging new posts in advance of their positions at night and then linking them to the front line, before repeating the process) over the crest of Beaumont Hamel spur, the freeze continuing to make movement easier, despite temperatures which fell to 15 F on 25 January. Trench foot cases declined and small attacks became easier, although digging was almost impossible. The rearrangement of corps and divisions on the Fifth Army front continued, IV Corps moving to the southern boundary of the Fourth Army, to take over ground from the French Sixth Army. Command of I Anzac Corps on the northern Fourth Army boundary was transferred to the Fifth Army.

The 32nd Division (V Corps) advanced slightly into unoccupied ground on 2 February near the Beaucourt–Puisieux road and next day Puisieux and River trenches, running north from the Ancre west of Grandcourt were attacked by the 63rd Division. Surprise was attempted, despite moonlight and snow on the ground. Two battalions advanced on a 1300 yd front, with one battalion guarding the left flank. Neighbouring divisional artilleries co-operated and a decoy barrage was fired near Pys, on the Fourth Army boundary. Counter-battery fire began on all German batteries in range of the attack at 11:03 a.m. and seven heavy artillery groups bombarded Grandcourt, Baillescourt Farm, Beauregard Dovecote and German trench lines. Direction was lost during the infantry advance but by dawn the wreckage of Puisieux and River trenches had been captured, apart from about 200 yd in the centre and posts on either flank. A German counter-attack on the right at 10:30 a.m. recaptured a post and at 4:00 a.m. a second attack was stopped by artillery fire. In the evening another British battalion continued the attack, as German counter-attacks were made all night, which recaptured several posts near the river. The last part of Puisieux Trench was captured in the morning at 11:30 a.m., with 671 British casualties against 176 German prisoners taken. Grandcourt on the south bank of the Ancre had been made untenable and was abandoned by the Germans overnight, which led the British to bring forward an attack on Baillescourt Farm, to late on 7 February by the 63rd Division and captured, along with part of Folly Trench south of Grandcourt, taken by the 18th Division.

On 10 February the 32nd Division threatened Serre by an advance of 600 yd, capturing the rest of Ten Tree Alley east of the road from Beaumont to Serre. The temperature was still below freezing but slightly warmer than earlier, which made movement relatively easy for the 97th Brigade battalions, which attacked on a front of 1100 yd. A German counter-attack at 4:30 a.m. on 11 February, recaptured part of the trench before being forced out. On 13 February another German attack recaptured half of the trench, before two fresh British battalions again drove them out. The advance was costly, with 382 British casualties, "heavy" German losses and 210 prisoners taken. All of the small British attacks had succeeded, each capture of ground had secured a view over another part of the German defences and denied the defenders observation over British positions. Over the next few days the Fourth Army extended its front south to Genermont and the transfer of I Anzac Corps was completed on 15 February, the Fifth Army boundary being extended to the north of Gueudecourt.

Actions of Miraumont, 17–18 February
As a preliminary to capturing the Loupart Wood line (another British term for R. I Stellung), Gough intended the Fifth Army to continue the process of small advances in the Ancre valley, with attacks on Hill 130, the Butte de Warlencourt, Gueudecourt, Serre and Miraumont before attacking the Loupart Wood line, three days before the Third Army attacked at Arras. Capture of Hill 130 would command the southern approach to Miraumont and Pys and expose German artillery positions behind Serre to ground observation, while attacks on the north bank took ground overlooking Miraumont from the west, possibly inducing the Germans to withdraw voluntarily and uncover Serre. II Corps planned to attack on 17 February with the 2nd, 18th and 63rd divisions on a 3000 yd front. With the ground still frozen assembly trenches could not be dug, so it was decided that the troops would assemble in the open for the attack. The artillery of II Corps began a destructive and wire-cutting bombardment on 14 February, using the new fuze 106 against the German wire which proved an effective wire-cutter, although fog and mist made aiming and observation of the results difficult. At zero hour, four siege groups were to begin a bombardment of rear lines and machine-gun nests and four counter-battery groups were to neutralize all German artillery within range of the attack. Artillery tactics were based on the experience of 1916, with a creeping barrage fired by half of the 18-pdrs beginning 200 yd in front of the infantry and moving at 100 yd in three minutes. Other 18-pdrs searched and swept the area from the German trenches to 250 yd further back in succession, as the British infantry reached and attacked them. The rest of the 18-pdrs fired standing barrages on each line of trenches, until the creeping barrage arrived then lifted with it. A protective barrage was then formed beyond the objective according to the barrage timetable.

A thaw set in on 16 February and at dawn on 17 February dark clouds were overhead and mist was on the ground, which turned soft and slippery before reverting to deep mud. The speed of the creeping barrage had been based on the infantry crossing frozen ground and was too fast for the conditions. At 4:30 a.m. the German artillery bombarded the front from which the British were to attack, apparently alerted by a captured document and a deserter. The German bombardment caused many casualties as the British infantry assembled but no retaliatory fire was opened, in the hope that the German artillery would not be provoked. The subsidiary attack on the right flank on Desire Support and Guard trenches south of Pys, by a 6th Brigade battalion of the 2nd Division, disappeared into the dark until 9:00 a.m., when it was reported that the objective had been reached and prisoners taken, before the attackers had been repulsed; British casualties and daylight made a resumption of the attack impossible. The effect of the failure on the right affected the attack further west by the 99th Brigade of the 2nd Division and the 54th and 53rd Brigades of the 18th Division, which attacked the high ground from the right-hand Courcelette–Miraumont road to the Albert–Arras railway line in the Ancre valley. The divisional boundary was west of the western road from Courcelette to Miraumont, the 99th Brigade attacking on a 700 yd front with boundaries marked by the two sunken roads. The 54th Brigade had a front which sloped steeply to the left and included Boom Ravine (Baum Mulde), with both brigades vulnerable to flanking fire from the right. The 53rd Brigade on the left of the attack had a wider front, much of which was also exposed to fire from positions on the north bank (due to be attacked by the 63rd Division) and was to consolidate at the second objective. The main attack had three objectives, the first about 600 yd forward along the southern slope of Hill 130, the second objective was South Miraumont Trench requiring an advance of another 600 yd to the north slope of Hill 130 on the right and the railway between Grandcourt and Miraumont on the western flank, the final objective being the southern fringe of Petit Miraumont.

Each brigade attacked with two battalions, the 99th Brigade with two companies to extend the defensive flank formed on the right with the subsidiary attack and 2½ companies following-on to leap-frog through to the final objective. In the 18th Division area the 54th Brigade attacked with an extra company to capture dug-outs up to Boom Ravine and consolidate the first objective, while the 53rd Brigade formed a defensive flank on the left. Artillery support came from the divisional artillery, army field brigades and the neighbouring Australian corps. The creeping and standing barrages began at 5:45 a.m. and the infantry advanced against a poor German artillery reply. The German infantry proved alert and inflicted many casualties with small-arms fire, which with the darkness, fog and a sea of mud slowed the advance and caused units to become disorganised. The 99th Brigade reached the first objective and established a defensive flank against German counter-attacks but the 54th Brigade found uncut wire at Grandcourt Trench and lost the barrage while looking for gaps. The German garrison was able to emerge from cover and engage the British infantry, holding them up on the right. The left-hand battalion found more gaps but had so many casualties that it was also held up. On the 53rd Brigade front Grandcourt Trench was captured quickly but the advance was held up at Coffee Trench further on, by more uncut wire. The Germans in Boom Ravine were engaged from the flank and three machine-guns silenced, before the advance in the centre resumed and infantry found their way through the wire at Coffee Trench and captured it by 6:10 a.m.. Boom Ravine was eventually captured at 7:45 a.m. and the advance resumed, way behind the creeping barrage and the line outside Petit Miraumont attacked. The 99th Brigade attack on the right advanced towards the second objective but was much hampered by the fog and mud. The failure to maintain the defensive flank on the right left the Germans free to rake the brigade with machine-gun fire from the right, which added to the many casualties already incurred. South Miraumont Trench was entered by a small number of troops, who were then forced back to the first objective. Fresh German troops also counter-attacked from Petit Miraumont and the railway bank to the west. Many of the British troops had weapons clogged with mud and fell back, troops on the right forming a defensive flank along West Miraumont road, where it was fired on from South Miraumont Trench behind its left flank and withdrew to a line 100 yd north of Boom Ravine. The attack had not reached its further objectives but had advanced the line 500 yd on the right, 1000 yd in the centre and 800 yd on the left. Boom Ravine was captured but the Germans had retained Hill 130 and inflicted 118 casualties on the 6th Brigade, 779 casualties on the 99th Brigade of the 2nd Division and 1,189 casualties in the 18th Division of a total of 2,207 British casualties.

On the north bank the 63rd Division attacked with the 188th Brigade and two battalions of the 189th Brigade, to capture 700 yd of the road north from Baillescourt Farm towards Puisieux, to gain observation over Miraumont and form a defensive flank on the left, back to the existing front line. Two battalions attacked with a third battalion ready on the right flank to reinforce them or to co-operate with the 18th Division between the Ancre and the Miraumont road. On the northern flank two infantry companies, engineers and pioneers were placed to establish the defensive flank on the left. The divisional artillery and an army field brigade with 54 x 18-pdr field guns and 18 x 4.5-inch howitzers provided fire support with three field batteries from the 62nd Division further north, to place a protective barrage along the northern flank. The darkness, fog and mud were as bad as on the south bank but the German defence was far less effective. The creeping barrage moved at 100 yd in four minutes, slower than the rate on the south bank (100 yd in three minutes to the first objective then 100 yd in four minutes), the Germans in a small number of strong-points were quickly overcome and the objective was reached by 6:40 a.m. and the defensive flank established, a final German strong-point being captured at 10:50 a.m. No German counter-attack was made until next day, which was stopped by artillery-fire. The 63rd Division lost 549 casualties and the three divisions took 599 prisoners.

The sudden thaw, fog and unexpected darkness interfered with wire-cutting, slowed the infantry, who fell behind the barrage and the apparent betrayal of the attack forewarned the German defenders, who were able to contain the attack and inflict considerable casualties. Troops were ordered to edge forward during the next few days, wherever German resistance was slight but the failure to capture Hill 130 and persistent fog left the British overlooked and unable accurately to bombard German positions. Further deliberate attacks intended on Crest Trench were made impossible by a downpour which began on 20 February. Edging forward continued in the 2nd Division area which gained 100 yd since 19 February. From 10 January – 22 February the Germans had been pushed back 5 mi on a 4 mi front. The effect of the Action of Miraumont, was to force the Germans to begin withdrawing from the Ancre valley before the planned withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line began. At 2:15 a.m. on 24 February reports arrived that the Germans had gone and by 10:00 a.m. patrols from the 2nd Australian Division on the right and the 2nd and 18th Divisions in the centre and left, were advancing in a thick mist with no sign of German troops. Further south the German positions around Le Transloy were found abandoned on the night of 12/13 March and Australian Light Horse and infantry patrols entered Bapaume on 17 March.

Minor operations
During January and February the Fourth Army began to relieve French troops south of Bouchavesnes. XV Corps took over the ground to the Somme on 22 January, III Corps moved south to Genermont on 13 February and IV Corps transferred from the Fifth Army to relieve French forces south to the Amiens–Roye road. Despite the disruption of these moves, minor operations were conducted as part of the attempt to deceive the Germans that the Battle of the Somme was resuming. On 27 January a brigade of the 29th Division attacked northwards on a 750 yd front astride the Frégicourt–Le Transloy road, towards an objective 400 yd away. The attack had the support of creeping and standing barrages from 96 x 18-pdr field guns, extended on either side by the neighbouring divisions and 16 x 4.5-inch howitzers, 2 x 6-inch and one 9.2-inch howitzer batteries. A section of 8-inch howitzers was available for the bombardment of strong-points and road junctions; XIV Corps heavy batteries were able to neutralize German artillery during the attack. The operation took 368 prisoners (an unexpectedly large number) for a loss of 382 casualties.

A 400 yd length of Stormy Trench was attacked by part of a battalion of the 2nd Australian Division late on 1 February, which took the left-hand section and bombed down it to take the rest, before being forced out by a German counter-attack at 4:00 a.m. The Australians attacked again on the night of 4 February, with a battalion and an extra company, with more artillery support and a stock of 12,000 grenades, since the first attack had been defeated when they had run out. The attack succeeded and the German counter-attack was repulsed after a long bombing-fight, although the Australians had more casualties (350–250 losses) in the success than the earlier failed attack. On 8 February a battalion of the 17th Division attacked part of a trench overlooking Saillisel, after it had taken three weeks to dig assembly trenches in the frozen ground. Artillery support was similar to that of the 29th Division attack and the objective was gained quickly, with troops wearing sandbags over their boots to grip the ice. German counter-attacks failed but a greater number of casualties were inflicted after the success of the attack, mainly by German artllery fire over the next two days. British attacks on the Fourth Army front ceased until the end of the month.

The 8th Division conducted an attack on 4 March which was prepared in great detail, a practice that had fallen into disuse in 1915 due to the dilution of the British army's skill and experience, caused by the losses of 1914 and the rapid expansion of the army in 1915–1916. In February instructions were issued from the divisional headquarters covering communications, supply dumps, equipment, arms and ammunition to be carried by each soldier, the proportion of the attacking units to be left out of battle, medical arrangements, substitute commanders, liaison, wire-cutting and bombardment arrangements, SOS signals for artillery and machine-gun barrages, gas bombardment and smoke screens and measures to deal with stragglers and prisoners. The instructions went into great detail, stipulating that officers were to dress the same as their men, precautions to stop machine-gun barrages falling on friendly troops, the positions of observers and the calculation of safety distances. Signals to open fire were a green very light, a red and white rocket, a yellow and black flag or Morse SOS by signal lamp, at which the machine-gunners were to fire for ten minutes. Low morale existed in British as well as German units and special arrangements were made to collect "stragglers" at brigade and divisional posts, where soldiers' names were to be taken, before being rearmed and equipped with items taken from wounded troops in Advanced Dressing Stations.

The objective of the attack was to capture the north end of the Épine de Malassise, a hog's-back (long sharp-crested) ridge, which overlooked Bouchavesnes and the Moislains valley towards Nurlu and to deny observation of the valley behind Bouchavesnes and the view towards Rancourt to the Germans. Two trenches on a front of 1200 yd were to be captured to the east and north-east of the village, which would also threaten the German positions north of Péronne, potentially hastening any German withdrawal contemplated on the Somme front. The 25th Brigade on the right was to attack with one battalion on a 300 yd front and the 24th Brigade on the left with two battalions over 800 yd, with mopping-up parties and carriers provided by other battalions. No destructive bombardment on the objectives was fired, as it was intended to occupy them but wire-cutting and the bombardment of strong-points, trench junctions, machine-gun nests took place for several days before the attack. Machine-gun barrages fired over the heads of the attacking troops and on the flanks were arranged with the divisional machine-gun unit and that of the 40th Division. The freezing weather had prevented the digging of assembly trenches so the leading waves had to form up on lines of tapes, ready for the attack to begin at 5:15 a.m.. Chewing-gum was issued to the troops, which stopped them coughing, a slight mist aided concealment and a slight frost improved the going. The barrage began on time and after five minutes began to lift. The first objective (Pallas Trench) was taken on time with few losses and at the junction of the attacking brigades, a small section which held out was quickly captured, before reverse fire by the Germans there could stop the troops who had passed beyond. Pallas Trench was occupied by moppers-up and the attacking troops reached the second objective at Fritz Trench on the right and Pallas Support Trench on the left, some troops advancing so swiftly that they went beyond the objective to Fritz Trench and captured a machine-gun before returning.

The German defenders had resisted the attack particularly effectively at a position called "The Triangle", which when captured, required troops on the flanks to reinforce the attacking troops, who had incurred many losses. British arrangements for holding their gains worked well and a German battalion preparing to counter-attack from a wood near Moislains, was dispersed by the machine-gun barrage with 400 casualties. German troops overrun by the attack were captured or killed, by the mopping-up parties following the advanced troops. During the day the Germans nearby counter-attacked five times over open ground but the observation obtained from Fritz Trench led to them being easily seen and repulsed by small-arms fire. German attempts to bomb their way back up communication trenches were also defeated. German artillery-fire on the captured area, the former no man's land and around Bouchavesnes caused considerably more casualties, as two communications trenches were being dug to link the new positions with the old British front line. German bombardments continued during the night of 4/5 March before an attack on the British right flank, which captured a trench block and about 100 yd of Fritz Trench to the north, before a British hasty counter-attack recovered the recaptured ground. German artillery-fire continued all day and at 7:30 p.m., German infantry seen to be massing again on the right flank were dispersed by SOS artillery and machine-gun barrages before they could attack; German bombardments continued on 6 March before slowly diminishing. The operation cost the British 1,137 casualties, 217 German prisoners and seven machine-guns were captured and "exceedingly heavy" German casualties inflicted, according to surveys of the vicinity after the German withdrawal to the Hindenburg Line (Siegfriedstellung). The new positions menaced the German defences at Péronne and the defences further south, which with the capture of Irles by the Fifth Army on 10 March, forced the Germans commence their retirement towards the Siegfriedstellung two weeks early.

Air operations
The Royal Flying Corps undertook a considerable tactical reorganisation after the battle of the Somme, according to the principles incorporated in documents published between November 1916 and April 1917. During the winter on the Somme 1916–1917, the new organisation proved effective. On the few days of good flying weather, much air fighting took place as German aircraft began to patrol the front line; of 27 British aircraft shot down in December 1916, 17 aeroplanes were lost on the British side of the front line. German aircraft were most active on the Arras front to the north of the Somme, where Richthofen's Jasta 11 was based. By January 1917 the German resurgence had been contained by the practice of formation-flying and the dispatch of Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) pilots from Dunkirk flying the Sopwith Pup, which had a comparable performance to the best German aircraft; both sides also began to conduct routine night operations. Distant reconnaissance continued, despite the danger of interception by superior German aircraft, to observe the German fortification-building behind the Somme and Arras fronts, which had been detected in November 1916 and on 25 February brought news of numerous fires burning behind the German front line, back to the new fortifications. Next day 18 Squadron reported the formidable nature of the new line and the strengthening of German intermediate lines on the Somme front.

German withdrawals on the Ancre
British attacks in January 1917 had taken place against exhausted German troops in poor defensive positions, some of whom had low morale and showed an unusual willingness to surrender. The army group commander Generalfeldmarschall Crown Prince Rupprecht advocated a withdrawal to the Siegfriedstellung on 28 January, which was initially refused but then authorised on 4 February, with the first "Alberich day" set for 9 February. The British attacks at Miraumont on 17–18 February and anticipation of further attacks, led Rupprecht on 18 March to order a withdrawal of about 3 mi on 15 mi of the First Army front, to the R. I Stellung, from Essarts to Le Transloy, which was to be made on 22 February. This withdrawal caused some surprise to the British, despite the interception of wireless messages on 20 and 21 February. The second German withdrawal of 11 March took place during the British bombardment preparatory to an attack and was not noticed until the night of 12 March, when British patrols found the line empty between Bapaume and Achiet le Petit and strongly held on either side. A British attack on Bucquoy at the north end of R. I Stellung on the night of 13/14 March was a costly failure. German withdrawals on the Ancre spread south, beginning with a retirement from the salient around St. Pierre Vaast Wood. On 16 March, the main German withdrawal to the Siegfriedstellung began. The retirement was conducted in a slow and deliberate manner, through a series of defensive lines over 25 mi at the deepest point, behind rear-guards, local counter-attacks and the demolitions of the Alberich plan.

Analysis
The British operations on the Ancre, took place during a period of considerable change in British methods and equipment. Over the winter, an increasing flow of weapons and munitions from British industry and overseas suppliers, was used to increase the number of Lewis guns to 16 per battalion, a scale of one per platoon. A new infantry training manual (which became SS 143, February 1917) to standardise the structure, equipment and methods of the infantry platoon was prepared over the winter and the division was organised according to the system given in SS 135 of December 1916. The 8th Division attack at Bouchavesnes on 4 March took place after the changes to the structure, equipment and training of infantry platoons had been implemented in the division, which provided platoons with the means to fight forward in the absence of artillery support under local command, as part of a much more structured all-arms attack than had been achieved in 1916. The advance was still conducted in waves behind a creeping barrage, to ensure that the infantry arrived simultaneously at German trenches but the waves were composed of skirmish lines and columns of sections, often advancing in "artillery formation" to allow them to deploy quickly when German resistance was encountered. Artillery was much more plentiful and efficient and had been equipped with a local communications network, which led a corresponding devolution of authority and a much quicker response to changing circumstances. The success of the attack led to a set of the orders and instructions being sent to the U.S. Command & Staff College to serve as models.

The organisation of artillery was revised according to a War Office pamphlet of January 1917, "Artillery Notes No.4–Artillery in Offensive Operations" which put the artillery of each corps under one commander, established a Counter Bombardment Staff Officer, provided for the artillery of several divisions to be coordinated in support of individual divisions and laid down that artillery matters were to be considered from the beginning when planning an attack. The roles of equipment was standardised, the 18-pounder field gun was to be mainly used for barrages, bombardment of German infantry in the open, obstructing communications close to the front line, wire cutting, destroying breastworks and preventing the repair of defences, using high explosive (H. E.), Shrapnel shell and the new smoke shells. The QF 4.5-inch howitzer were for neutralising German artillery with gas shells, bombarding weaker defences, blocking communication trenches, night barrages and wire-cutting on ground where field guns could not reach. The BL 60 pounder gun was to be used for longer-range barrages and counter-battery fire, the 6-inch Gun for counter-battery fire, neutralisation-fire and wire-cutting using fuze 106. The larger howitzers were reserved for counter-battery fire against well-protected German artillery and the larger guns for long-range fire against targets like road junctions, bridges and headquarters.

Co-ordination of artillery was improved by using more telephone exchanges, which put artillery observers in touch with more batteries. Observing stations were built to report to the headquarters of the artillery (at corps headquarters) on the progress of infantry and a corps signals officer was appointed to oversee artillery communication, which had become much more elaborate. Visual signalling was used as a substitute for line communications but some short-range (7000 yd) wireless transmitters were introduced. With a weight of 101 lb needing four men to carry and considerable time to set up, they proved of limited use. Artillery boards came into use, which had blank sheets with a 1:10,000 scale grid in place of maps and datum shooting was used to check gun accuracy 2–3 times a day and better calibration drills and meteor (weather) telegrams were announced. The tactical role of artillery was defined as the overpowering of enemy artillery, the killing or incapacitating of enemy infantry and the destruction of defences and obstacles to movement. Barbed-wire was the most difficult obstruction to tackle, the best range for cutting it with the 18-pdr field gun (with regular calibration and stable gun platforms) was 1800 –, conditions which were not always met. A barrage drill was devised "to prevent the enemy from manning his parapets and installing his machine-guns in time to meet the assault". Attacks were supported by "creeping" barrages, "standing" barrages covered an area for a period of time, "back" barrages were to cover exploitation by "searching" and "sweeping" ground to catch troops and reinforcements while moving. One 18-pdr for each 15 yd of barrage line was specified, to be decided at the corps artillery headquarters and creeping barrages should move at 100 yd a minute and stop 300 yd beyond an objective, to allow the infantry room to consolidate. Surplus guns were added the barrage, to be ready to engage unforeseen targets. A limit of four shells per minute was imposed on 18-pdr guns to retard barrel wear (before 1917 lack of ammunition had made barrel-wear a minor problem) and use of smoke shell was recommended, despite the small quantity available. Ammunition expenditure rates were laid down for each type of gun and howitzer, with 200 shells per gun per day for the 18-pdr.

The experience of the Royal Flying Corps (RFC) in 1916, showed that single-engined fighters with superior performance could operate in pairs but where the aircraft were of inferior performance, formation flying was essential, even though fighting in the air split formations. By flying in formations which were made up of permanent sub-units of 2–3 aircraft, British squadrons gained the benefit of concentration and a measure of flexibility, the formations being made up of three units; extra formations could be added to be mutually supporting. Tactics were left to individual discretion but freelancing became less marked. By the end of the Somme battle it had become common for reconnaissance aircraft to operate in formation with escorts and for bomber formations to have a close escort of six F.E.2bs and a distant escort of six single-seater fighters. The revival of the Luftstreitkräfte in late 1916, led in October to the British using wireless interception stations ("Compass Stations") quickly to locate aircraft operating over the British front, as part of an integrated system. Trained observers gleaned information on German aircraft movements from wireless signals or ground observation and communicated the bearing from interception stations by wireless to wing headquarters or telephoned squadrons direct. Aircraft on patrol were directed to busy areas of the front by ground signals, although no attempt was made to control the interception of individual aircraft from the ground.

Alberich Bewegung ("Alberich Manoeuvre"), 14 March – 5 April 1917


The severe cold during February ended in March, when thaws turned the roads behind the British front into mudslides. German demolitions provided a means to repair the roads once the British advance began but the traffic carrying the material did as much damage as the weather. Attempts to move artillery forward encountered severe delays. Ammunition had been moved forward in preference to road material in February but the German withdrawals in the Ancre valley left the guns out of range. During the winter many British draught horses had died of cold, overwork and lack of food, leaving the Fifth Army 14,000 horses short. Despite the difficulties (the line of the road from Serre to Bucquoy, through Puisieux was almost impossible to trace) the 62nd Division and 19th Division on the flanks the 7th Division V Corps fought its way into Puisieux on 27 February and began skirmishing towards Bucquoy by 2 March. The 18th Division surrounded and swiftly captured Irles on 10 March and the 7th Division and 46th Division were ordered to capture Bucquoy on 14 March, in the belief that it was undefended, when air reconnaissance reported it almost deserted. Despite protests from Major-General G. de S. Barrow, the 7th Division commander, Brigadier-General H. Cumming, commander of the 91st Brigade, Major-General W. Thwaites of the 46th Division and the commander of his 137th Brigade, after patrols reported that the village was protected by many machine-guns and three belts of wire, despite two days of wire-cutting, the attack was insisted upon by the V Corps commander Lieut.-General E. Fanshawe, who only agreed to a short delay until the moon rose at 1:00 a.m. The artillery bombardment was fired from 10:00 p.m.–10:30 p.m. alerting the German defenders, who repulsed the attack. The 91st Brigade lost 262 casualties and the 137th Brigade 312 casualties; the Germans withdrew two days later.

On 19 March the Fifth Army commander ordered I Anzac Corps to advance on Lagnicourt and Noreuil, under the impression that the fires seen behind the German lines foreshadowed a retirement further back than the Hindenburg Line. The 2nd Australian Division and the 5th Australian Division had already advanced beyond Bapaume, advancing on Beaumetz and Morchies and followed up the withdrawal of the 26th Reserve Division from Vaux-Vraucourt. Beaumetz was captured by 22 March then lost that night to a German counter-attack, which led to a plan to capture Doignies and Louveral, beyond Beaumetz on the Bapaume–Cambrai road, by the 15th Brigade of the 5th Australian Division, in daylight without artillery or flank support. The attack was countermanded by the divisional commander Major-General Talbot Hobbs as soon as he heard of it and nearly led to the dismissal of Brigadier-General Elliott. On the northern flank of the Fifth Army, Barrow the 7th Division commander, mindful of the costly repulse of the attack on Bucquoy, delayed his 1200 yd advance on Ecoust and Croisilles, to coordinate artillery support with the 58th Division to the north-west. Gough ordered the attack on Croisilles to begin without delay and the advance was stopped by the Germans at uncut wire on the outskirts of the village, leading to Gough sacking Barrow and leaving his replacement Major-General T. Shoubridge under no doubt about the need for haste. The Hindenburg Line was unfinished on the Fifth Army front and a rapid advance through the German rearguards in the outpost villages, might make a British attack possible before the Germans were able to make the line "impregnable". The village eventually fell during a larger co-ordinated attack on a 10 mi front on 2 April, by I Anzac Corps on the right flank and the 7th Division and the 21st Division of V Corps on the left, after four days of bombardment and wire-cutting.

The British Official Historian described the great difficulty in moving over devastated ground beyond the British front line and the greater difficulty of carrying supplies and equipment over roads even behind the original British front line, caused by over-use, the effect of repeated freezing and thaws and the disappearance of the roads beyond no man's land and the demolitions behind the German front line. The reluctance of the British command to risk a serious counter-attack against unsupported forces and the evidence from the Fifth Army front, that hasty attacks became impractical once the Germans began the main retirement between 16 and 20 March led to a steady pursuit. The Australian Official Historian, Charles Bean, wrote in contrast that the advanced troops of I Anzac Corps had gone out on a limb, which had led to the reverse at Noreuil on 20 March, after Gough's instructions to press forward to the Hindenburg Line were misinterpreted. Advances were delayed as roads were rebuilt and more pack transport organised to carry artillery and ammunition forward, for larger attacks on the German outpost villages. Walker (1998) contrasted the local withdrawals on the Ancre valley where hasty but well organised British attacks had sometimes succeeded in ousting German garrisons and the determined German defence of outpost villages, after rapid scheduled part of the German retirement in 2–3 days, after which the Germans fought to hold outpost villages to gain time to complete the remodelling of the Hindenburg Line, in the area from south of Arras to St Quentin. The Fifth Army was far enough advanced by 8 April to assist the Third Army attack at Arras on 9 April, having captured the outpost villages of Doignies, Louveral, Noreuil, Longatte, Ecoust St. Mein, Croisilles and Hénin sur Cojeul on 2 April. Hermies, Demicourt and Boursies on the right flank were captured by the 1st Australian Division on 8 April, after the Fourth Army took Havrincourt Wood on the right flank.