Operation Abanadela

Operation Abanadela was a military operation launched by the Portuguese Armed Forces in Mozambique during the Mozambican War of Independence against FRELIMO guerrillas in July 1970. designates a set of patrols carried out along the Zambezi River in Mozambique between the 20th and the 30th July 1970 in order to protect the construction of the Cahora Bassa dam from possible attacks the guerrillas of FRELIMO and the passage of these to the south towards Tete. The Portuguese patrols were carried out by small groups of soldiers from the Portuguese Marine Corps.

Cahora Bassa Dam
When, in 1969, the Minister of Economy, Dias Rosas, argued against the system of financing organized to build the Cahora Bassa dam, which made the Portuguese State the guarantor of the work and left out South Africa's financial risks, which would be the main client, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Franco Nogueira, remarked that the dam was not business, but symbol of the will of the Portuguese to remain in Africa. The Minister of Economy, one of the government's technocrats, eventually resigned, after which the last illusions of rational investment were left with such arguments. The Cahora Bassa Dam is a classic example of the divorce between politics and strategy.

All the surrounding factors represented obvious and enormous risk: its deployment in war territory, a short distance of two hundred kilometres from the perilous border with Zambia, the six hundred kilometres separating it from the port of landing of the materials, Beira, and the eight hundred kilometres of the energy transport line in Mozambican territory, with 6,000 support posts. In addition, the energy produced by the dam could not be spent in Mozambique due to lack of installed industrial capacity and was not indispensable to its main destination, South Africa, since it had alternative sources. In short, Cahora Bassa was unnecessary as an energy producer, it was doubtful viability as an economic enterprise, and its construction and exploitation were at high risk.

The two sides of the conflict understood the construction of the dam as a challenge that would decide the fate of the war, since for the Portuguese regime it represented the affirmation of its vitality and, more than that, the transmission abroad of the certainty of being able to win that war. Politically, it would give the image of Portugal strong, capable of motivating international support and attract economic investments, which would translate into political commitments. For Frelimo, the construction of the dam and its normal exploitation would imply the image of weakness and inability to control the land and the populations. Worse than that, its success could be accompanied by the installation of about one million white settlers in the Zambezi valley, which would decisively alter the human environment of the zone where the movement acted.

Significantly, in the first interview he gave as Frelimo's president, Samora Machel, still in 1970, and before Kaulza de Arriaga launched Operation Gordian Node, he said that preventing the construction of the dam continued to be Frelimo's main objective. Cahora Bassa was thus transformed into the decisive goal that materialised the victory of the attacker or the defender. But before progressing to the construction of the dam, it was indispensable for the Government to obtain the guarantee, on the part of the military, of the security of the enterprise and the respective line of transport of energy.

The analysis of the situation, which led Defence Minister Sá Viana Rebelo in 1968 to respond positively to this question. As for the enemy, on a reasonable assessment of Frelimo's military potential, its objectives and areas of action, it seemed unlikely that in three years the guerrillas would have been able to travel eight hundred kilometres from their base in Tanzania to settle and to spread through the Tete area on the two banks of the Zambezi so as to oblige, in 1971, to affect almost half of the Portuguese troops in Mozambique to the safety of the dam.

It was admitted in the initial study that between the Zambezi River and the Zambian border some small guerrilla groups would be set up, which would make the area operationally identical to that of Niassa. The Portuguese staff was certain that on the southern bank of the river, whose frontier was controlled by Rhodesia, it would be impossible to develop significant actions on the part of Frelimo. In order to guarantee this scenario, it was enough to strengthen the area north of the Zambezi, which was done by placing battalions at Furancungo and Bene, whose mission was to prevent infiltrations from Zambia through the Capoche river valley. With regard to the safety of the eight hundred kilometres of power transmission line, they were running along the border with Rhodesia and South Africa, so there would be no serious problems in this field either.

The Portuguese optimism of 1968 was reinforced by the conviction that local populations are not very permeable to Frelimo propaganda, and still less available to organise and fight because they are peasants with little political awareness, they are dispersed and have some tradition of emigration to South Africa. This scenario changed radically in three years. In 1971, it was necessary for the Portuguese forces to install COFI, first in Chicoa and then in Estima, at the base of the mountains of Cahora Bassa, command of large operations.

The reason for changing the assumptions on which the previous analysis was based was, first and foremost, the acute awareness of the importance of the construction of the dam by Frelimo. The nationalist leaders quickly became aware of the danger it posed and began immediately to prepare the response. Their efforts at political penetration have been directed to this area, in a process in which they tried not to overlook them, but which provoked some confrontations with the traditional authorities, developed a network of contacts that assured them transit and installation facilities in Zambia, repositioned weapons and equipment and recognised objectives and berth of refuge. That is, they sought to provide a solid foundation for a response that they knew was not easy. Frelimo's preparatory actions in Tete underwent a significant evolution in 1970.

The arrival of General Kaulza de Arriaga and the major operations he set in the north forced the movement to withdraw from the Planalto dos Macondes some of its staff, which were available for use in other areas. Tete has become your destination. On the other hand, the large concentration of Portuguese forces in the North further alleviated the military pressure in that zone, which was used by Frelimo to pass as many personnel and equipment to the south of the Zambezi as possible. At the beginning of 1971, three hundred guerrillas entered Mozambique to reach Zumbo near the border with Rhodesia and then progressed towards Zobué, on the border with Malawi, and engulfed Angonia from the south. The conditions were thus met for Frelimo to start actions in the Tete area as soon as Operation Gordian Node ended, which forced the transfer of Portuguese forces in the North. In fact, the great operations of Kaúlza de Arriaga in the Planalto dos Macondes will accelerate the decision of Frelimo to increase the fight in Tete.

By early 1971, the data had already been released. The main board playing the war in Mozambique was Tete and Cahora Bassa, with their umbilical cord, the Beira corridor, at a time when Portuguese troops were still deeply involved in Operation Frontier with Rovuma. As of 1971, the Cahora Bassa dam now requires the mobilisation of an increasing volume of means to defend it. The military device mounted aims to achieve three objectives: - Defend Cahora Bassa through the Cahora Bassa Defence Operational Command (CODCB); - Guarantee the transportation of materials through the Command of Critical Loads; - Prevent the spread of Frelimo south of the Zambezi River, and protect the future energy transport line through COFI and an ever-tightening mesh grid. The facility was continuously strengthened with regular, interventional units, GE and GEP, and the area underwent successive refurbishments, culminating in the creation of the Tete Operational Zone (ZOT) in May 1971.

In 1973, an advanced command of the Territorial Command of the Center, in Vila Gouveia, with the explicit mission of trying to stop the progression of Frelimo further south, a threat that was already being drawn.

Until 1974, the situation in Tete would not be aggravated by the progress of Frelimo's activities in areas nearer to Beira, but the awareness of the Portuguese military was so strong that its decisive objective was to secure the conclusion of the with which they had committed themselves, who had always understood that they were complying with it by avoiding significant disturbances in their work, despite the fact that their enemy had already forced them to concentrate around them more than 50 per cent of the total workforce in Mozambique, to have them involved in a war of attrition in which, with increasing frequency, they were confronted with delicate situations against black populations, religious authorities and in which they were discredited before the white settlers. Frelimo, with an economic war on casualties, was expanding its activities around Cahora Bassa and threatened to control the Isthmus of Beira, which would separate northern South Mozambique, by taking action in Vila Pery, Vila Gouveia and Inhaminga. Cahora Bassa, who had been presented as a symbol of victory, was finally bringing the war to the heart of Mozambique and accelerating its outcome.