Second Battle of Sirte

The Second Battle of Sirte was a naval engagement in which the escorting warships of a British convoy to Malta frustrated a much more powerful Regia Marina (Italian Navy) squadron. The British convoy was composed of four merchant ships escorted by four light cruisers, one anti-aircraft cruiser, and 17 destroyers. The Italian force comprised a battleship, two heavy cruisers, one light cruiser, and eight destroyers. Despite the initial British success at warding off the Italian squadron, the battle delayed the convoy's planned arrival before dawn, which exposed it to intense air attacks that sank all four merchant ships and one of the escorting destroyers in the following days. The battle occurred on 22 March 1942, in the Mediterranean, north of the Gulf of Sidra and southeast of Malta, during the Second World War.

Background
Malta had long been a major factor in British successes against Italian convoys to North Africa, and in return became the target of an increasing number of heavy Axis air raids. By early 1942, however, the Allies lost the initiative in the central Mediterranean as Italian and German forces gained the upper hand in their attempts to isolate Malta and even made plans to remove it as a threat. Indeed, after a series of Allied setbacks changed the overall scenario, the Italians achieved naval superiority over their enemies by spring 1942. As Malta was running short of aircraft, antiaircraft guns, fuel, food and ammunition, convoy MW10 sailed from Alexandria on 21 March.

The British expected opposition from German and Italian aircraft as well as Italian surface units. In December 1941, the two battleships (HMS Queen Elizabeth (1913) and HMS Valiant (1914)) stationed in the eastern Mediterranean had been disabled by an attack by Italian frogmen, and so their Alexandria squadron consisted only of cruisers and destroyers. Meanwhile, a diversion was organized from Gibraltar: on the morning of 20 March, the battleship HMS Malaya—with the aircraft carriers HMS Eagle (1918) and HMS Argus (I49), supported by the cruiser HMS Hermione (74) and eight destroyers—set sail from "The Rock". The next day, the squadron aborted the operation and returned to port - the carriers were unable to fly off aircraft reinforcements to Malta due to defective long-range fuel tanks.

The escort of convoy MW10 relied heavily on destroyers—including lighter-built destroyer escorts—to provide anti-submarine protection and included the anti-aircraft cruiser HMS Carlisle (D67) to bolster the convoy's anti-aircraft capability. Additional destroyers and another light cruiser were also sent from Malta.

British defensive plan
Admiral Sir Philip Vian, commanding the convoy, organised his ships into six divisions plus a close escort for the convoy of five Hunt-class destroyers.
 * 1st Division: destroyers Jervis, Kipling, Kelvin and Kingston
 * 2nd Division: light cruisers Dido and Penelope with the destroyer Legion
 * 3rd Division: destroyers Zulu and Hasty
 * 4th Division: light cruisers Cleopatra (flagship) and Euryalus
 * 5th Division: destroyers Sikh, Lively, Hero and Havock
 * 6th Division: anti-aircraft cruiser Carlisle and Hunt-class destroyer Avon Vale

In case of an Italian surface attack, the first five divisions were to stand off from the convoy to face the enemy while the sixth division laid smoke across the wake of the convoy to obscure it from the enemy. The first five divisions would act as a rearguard to lay smoke and delay the enemy while Carlisle and the Hunt-class destroyers proceeded with the cargo ships to Malta.

The battle


At 14:30 the next day, the British were faced by a pair of heavy cruisers and escorting destroyers. Admiral Vian immediately implemented his plan; the cargo ships and escorts turned away to the south while the light cruisers and remaining destroyers laid smoke and charged the Italians. After an exchange of fire, the two Italian heavy cruisers backed off in an attempt to lure the British toward the incoming main Italian squadron, and at 16:37 they returned to attack with the battleship ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio, a light cruiser and their screening destroyers.

The battle raged for two and a half hours, with the British ships leaving the safety of their huge smoke screen to fire a few volleys and then returning to it when the Italian salvoes got too close. During one of these exchanges, HMS Havock (H43) suffered heavy damage from a near-miss when fired at by the Italian battleship, and was ordered to withdraw from the battle line and join the convoy. At 18:34, Vian decided to send his destroyers in to launch torpedo attacks from about 5000 yd, the closest the Italians would allow the British to approach. None of the torpedoes found their target, but as HMS Kingston (F64) turned she was hit hard by a round which penetrated her boiler room, ignited a fire and temporarily brought her to a halt. The battle began with a 25 kn wind blowing to the North-west, with the wind continuing to increase during the day; a factor which favoured the gunnery of the larger Italian ships throughout the battle, but the direction of the wind aided the laying of smokescreens by Vian's ships.

HMS Lively (G40) was also struck by shell splinters from the battleship's main guns that pierced a bulkhead, causing some flooding but no casualties.

Right at the end of the action, at 18:55, ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio had been hit by a 4.7 in (120 mm) shell, with negligible damage. Her floatplane caught fire from the blast from a salvo of her after turret at the same time. This led to the claim by the British that one of the torpedoes struck home.

At dusk, about 19:00, the Italians gave up and turned for home. Without radar, they would have been at a significant disadvantage in a night action, as in the Battle of Cape Matapan. The Italians outgunned their British counterparts but they appeared unwilling to close for a decisive blow, perhaps wary of the torpedo threat from the numerically superior British destroyer force.

Battle damage
According to British reports, "HMS Cleopatra (33) was struck on the after part of the bridge at 16:44...", by a 6 in hit from the light cruiser ITALIAN CRUISER Giovanni dalle Bande Nere; 16 seamen were killed. Cruisers HMS Euryalus (42) and HMS Penelope (97) were also damaged, with Euryalus straddled by ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio at 16:43 and at 18:41. Kingston was hit amidships by a shell from Littorio that killed 15 men of her crew. and left the destroyer dead in the water, with her whaler torn apart, her anti-aircraft guns, searchlight tower and torpedo launchers shattered by the explosion. Some sources claim that she was hit by the guns of the heavy cruiser ITALIAN CRUISER Gorizia. Although Kingston had an engine in flames and a flooded boiler, she managed however to recover speed, reaching Malta the next day. Havock was also badly damaged in a boiler by a ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio near miss at 17:20, suffering eight deaths. Lively was forced to retreat to Tobruk for repairs after a near miss at 18:55 from ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio′s after turret. Three more destroyers—HMS Sikh (F82), HMS Legion (G74) and HMS Lance (G87)—suffered lesser damage from 8 in cruiser fire. The Italian fleet expended 1,511 rounds of all calibers upon the British squadron; the only destroyer to open fire was ITALIAN DESTROYER Aviere. The British cruisers had replied with 1,553 rounds and the destroyers with about 1,300 rounds as well as 38 torpedoes. Axis aircraft made continual attacks, mainly against the convoy, throughout the naval action and Royal Navy AA gunners claimed the destruction of seven Axis aircraft and damage to several more.

Follow-up actions
Most of the escort force, now short of fuel and ammunition due to the protracted engagement and unable to find the convoy, turned back for Alexandria. The damaged destroyers and the cargo ships were sent on to Malta, with Carlisle, Penelope and Legion. The next day, they were subjected to continuous air attacks. The cargo ship Clan Campbell was sunk twenty miles from harbour, and the oil tanker Breconshire was too damaged to reach Valletta. Nonetheless, the other two merchantmen, Talabot and steamer Pampas, reached Malta's Grand Harbour virtually unharmed. Pampas had been hit by two bombs but these failed to explode. Penelope attempted to tow Breconshire, but the tow parted in heavy seas. She anchored short of the protective minefields and the destroyer Southwold attempted to take her in tow, hitting a mine in the process. She was eventually towed into Marsaxlokk Bay by tugs.

Intense Axis air raids against Malta on 24–25 March failed to damage the three surviving convoy ships. However, on 26 March, German dive bombers scored bomb hits on all three ships, sinking Talabot and Pampas that day with Breconshire capsizing on 27 March. Much of Breconshire′s oil was salvaged through the hole in her hull. Only about 5000 ST of cargo had been unloaded, of the 26000 ST that had been loaded in Alexandria.

The Italian fleet units were no more lucky after the battle. After failing to destroy the convoy by themselves, they were caught en route to their bases by a severe storm that sank the destroyers ITALIAN DESTROYER Scirocco and ITALIAN DESTROYER Lanciere.

While under repair in dry dock at Malta, Kingston was attacked a few days later by German aircraft and suffered further damage, this time beyond repair. She was scrapped at Malta in the following months.

Assessments
Almost all sources with an opinion on the matter have assessed the battle as a British victory, credited to the escort of light cruisers and destroyers which successfully prevented the Italians from inflicting any damage whatsoever on the convoy by staving off an Italian squadron, composed of a battleship and two heavy cruisers, while fending off heavy Axis air attacks. On the other hand, some authors while generally acknowledging the British success, write of the battle as a partial Italian achievement in delaying and turning the convoy aside.

Nearly all sources acknowledge the Italian fleet inflicted significant damage and several casualties on the British squadron while suffering minimal damage and no casualties in return. The action, however, represented a failure on the Italians' part to exploit their advantage and destroy the convoy. Indeed, they were unable to sink or cripple a single cargo ship. This was due to Admiral Vian's vigorous and skillful defence in the face of a superior adversary. The overwhelming strength of the Italian fleet was not fully exploited by Admiral Iachino also because bad weather and lack of radar prevented him from continuing the pursuit of the convoy at dusk.

But when the main objective, to re-supply Malta, is included in the assessment, the outcome is different. The British intention to reach Malta before dawn with a substantial escort was disrupted by the intervention of the Italian Navy. This left the cargo ships exposed to Axis air supremacy. Bauer, Young & others, page 763:
 * "The result of this second battle of Sirte was not as disappointing for the Italians as it might at first have seemed. Admiral Cunningham had lost the destroyers Havock and Kingston, which had been heavily damaged and had had to make for Malta. The convoy, having had to sail south-west for hours, could not now reach Valletta before dawn on the 23rd."
 * Belot, pp. 162–163:


 * "Although it had escaped the Italian fleet, the convoy had not reached the end of its troubles. It had been delayed for several hours by evasive maneuvers during the battle, a delay which must be credited to Iachino's actions, and it could no longer reach Malta by dawn as had been planned. Furthermore, the cruisers had had to leave the convoy during the night and return to Egypt so as to avoid having to take on fuel from the limited supply at Malta. On the morning of the 23rd the merchant ships, sailing with reduced escort, were subjected to violent attacks from Axis aircraft."
 * Bernotti, page 79:


 * La seconda battaglia della Sirte si era conclusa. Considerando lo scontro si può tranquillamente dire che fù una vittoria inglese (infatti ad Alessandria si festeggò la vittoria), visto l'enorme disparità di forze: una divisione di incrociatori aveva tenuto in scacco una formazione molto più forte senza subire perdite, anche se non ne aveva inflitte. Però lo scopo italiano era quello di attaccare il convoglio e qui raggiunse dei risultati: la manovra di battaglia costrinse il convoglio inglese a spostarsi molto a sud e lo attardò, cosicchè il mattino dopo, all'alba, aerei tedeschi riuscirono ad attaccarlo: alle 10.30 del 23 marzo il primo piroscafo và a fondo, poi, a 8 miglia da Malta, viene centrata la petroliera Breconshire, che, costretta ad arenarsi, viene poi definitivamente distrutta. I rimanenti due mercantili entano nel porto di Malta ed attraccano, ma vengono anche qui attaccati dagli aerei e distrutti: delle 25000 tonnellate di rifornimenti diretti a Malta ne vennero scaricate solo 5000. (Translation: "The Second battle of Sirte was over. If you assess the encounter, you can say that this was a British victory [indeed, the victory was celebrated at Alexandria], given the disparity of forces: a cruiser squadron fought off a fairly stronger force without suffer any losses, even if no damage was inflicting upon the enemy. But the Italian aim was to attack the convoy, and on this they achieve some results: the maneuver forced the convoy to move too far to the south, delaying it. Therefore the following morning, at dawn, German aircraft were able to assault them. At 10:30 AM of 23 March the first merchantman gone down; later, the tanker Breconshire was hit 8 miles away from Malta, beached, and eventually destroyed. The remaining two steamers reached Malta, but were bombed there and sank; only 5,000 tn out of 25,000 were eventually uploaded.")
 * Bragadin, page 166:


 * "The four British supply ships with their precious cargo for Malta did not suffer any direct damage from the Italians in the battle itself, but the fight indirectly brought important results. The convoy was scheduled to arrive at Malta during the night, and was to begin unloading before the (expected) air raids began, but the naval battle made it at least four hours late in arriving, and this delay proved fatal. When the axis aircraft began its air raids next morning, the convoy was still considerably south of Malta."
 * Hough, page 231:


 * "The Second Battle of Sirte was a bloodless victory of moral superiority (...) But Sirte could also be called a hollow victory. The diversion from their course forced upon the transports prevented their entering Valletta harbour that night and in the morning dived bombers picked them off – all but one – in spite of the efforts of Vian and his men."
 * Llewellyn, page 52:


 * "Captain Hutchison, of the "Breconshire", the convoy commodore, had in fact complied with the operation orders on his own initiative at 19:00, dispersing the ships on diverging courses with a destroyer or two apiece for escort, each ship to make her best speed so as to reach Malta as early as possible next morning; they had been intended to arrive at dawn, but the Italian fleet, by forcing the convoy south of its route, had given the German bombers a second chance, as Admiral Iachino had foreseen."
 * Macintyre, page 136:


 * "Nevertheless Iachino had partially achieved his aim. The diversion of the convoy to the southward, under the threat posed by his approach, had caused just enough delay to prevent the ships from reaching Malta at first light on 23rd."
 * Roskill, page 55:


 * "Unfortunately the delays caused by the recent battle prevented the convoy making harbour early on the 23rd, and this gave the German bombers another chance."
 * Sadkovich, page 245:


 * "Because Iachino had delayed the convoy, after the weather had partially cleared the next day, Axis aircraft were able to sink the cargo ships Talabot and Clan Campbell at sea and the Breconshire and Pampas in port."
 * Shore & Malizia, page 140:


 * "The merchant vessels, meanwhile, had veered from their course to avoid the battle, being forced further south. As a result they were now way behind schedule, since it was necessary for them to reach Malta early next morning to avoid being caught in daylight by the full force of the Axis units from Sicily."
 * De la Sierra, page 365:


 * Sin embargo, los esfuerzos y los riesgos corridos por los italianos no resultaron inútiles, pues aparte de los daños logrados en cuatro buques británicos-dos de lo cuales serían después hundidos precisamente por no poder escapar a tiempo del infierno de Malta-, el retraso impuesto al convoy iba a resultarle fatal. (Translation: "The efforts and risks taken by the Italians were not in vain; besides the damage inflicted upon four British vessels -two of them later sunk at Malta- the delay imposed on the convoy would prove to be fatal.")
 * Simpson, pp. 119–120:


 * "However, Vian's triumph was only a tactical victory (even that is disputed by Italian apologists). The action had delayed the convoy and pushed it far to the south, thus bringing it well within the range of enemy bombers on the following day.(...) The March convoy represented, therefore, a strategic defeat; though the Italian fleet had failed to locate it, its pressure had placed the ships in the palms of Axis airmen. The collective gunfire of the warships might have saved ships which, supported by a single warship, became easy targets."
 * Stephen, page 115:


 * "Iachino had succeeded in forcing the convoy to manoeuvre so far south that Axis air power was able to act in synergy to ensure its destruction."
 * Thomas, page 150:


 * "By driving the convoy south, the Italian fleet had given the Luftwaffe a longer journey that last morning."
 * Wilmott & Fowler, page 45:


 * "...however, the Italians did have some compensation for the action delayed the arrival of the convoy at Malta with the result that two of the merchantmen were sunk by aircraft the following day; had there been no delay then almost certainly these ships would have survived."
 * and Weichold (cited by Sadkovich, page 246):


 * "...Weichold, who believed at the time that the action had been crucial to the GAFs success the following day."

Thereafter, Italian and German aircraft caught the British convoy at sea and chased the surviving steamers to the harbour; more than 80% of the supplies were lost. The British convoy operation was, therefore, a strategic failure.

Italy



 * Admiral Angelo Iachino
 * 1 battleship: ITALIAN BATTLESHIP Littorio
 * 6 destroyers: Alfredo Oriani, Ascari, Aviere, Geniere, ITALIAN DESTROYER Grecale, ITALIAN DESTROYER Scirocco (sunk by a storm after the action)
 * 2nd division, Admiral Parona
 * 2 heavy cruisers: Gorizia, ITALIAN CRUISER Trento
 * 1 light cruiser: ITALIAN CRUISER Giovanni delle Bande Nere
 * 4 destroyers: Alpino, Bersagliere, Fuciliere, ITALIAN DESTROYER Lanciere (sunk by a storm after the action)
 * Submarine: Platino

United Kingdom



 * Carlisle squadron:
 * 1 C-class light cruiser: HMS Carlisle (D67);
 * 5th Destroyer Flotilla (Hunt-class destroyer escorts) from Tobruk: HMS Southwold (L10) (sunk by a mine on 23 March); HMS Beaufort (L14); HMS Dulverton (L63); HMS Hurworth (L28); HMS Avon Vale (L06); HMS Eridge (L68). HMS Heythrop lost en route on 20 March to submarine GS U-652
 * 4 cargo ships: Clan Campbell, Breconshire, Pampas and Talabot (all sunk by 26 March)


 * 15th Cruiser Squadron (Admiral Vian):
 * 3 light cruisers: HMS Dido (37); HMS Euryalus (42) (slightly damaged); HMS Cleopatra (33) (seriously damaged)
 * 14th Destroyer Flotilla: HMS Jervis (F00); HMS Kipling (F91); HMS Kelvin (F37); HMS Kingston (F64) (heavily damaged)
 * 22nd Destroyer Flotilla: HMS Hasty (H24); HMS Havock (H43) (heavily damaged); HMS Hero (H99); HMS Lively (G40) (seriously damaged); HMS Sikh (F82) (slightly damaged); HMS Zulu (F18) (structural damage due to high speed manoevring )


 * Support squadron from Malta:
 * 1 cruiser: HMS Penelope (97);
 * 1 destroyer: HMS Legion (G74) (damaged by near miss during air attack on 23 March, sunk by air attack on 26 March while awaiting repair)
 * 3 submarines: Unbeaten, Upholder and Ultimatum


 * Submarine based in Alexandria:
 * HMS Proteus (N29) (Parthian class)

References and external links

 * Royal Navy official despatches relating to the battle, written shortly after the battle, but not published until after the war. Also available as a single pdf file at ibiblio.org
 * The 2nd Battle of the Sirte
 * Seconda Battaglia della Sirte – Plancia di Comando
 * Main page with link to sources (scroll down and open link to Bibliografia)
 * "Our Navy in Action" video newsreel film