M26 Pershing

The Pershing was the first operational heavy tank of the US Army. It was designated a heavy tank when it was designed in WWII due to its 90mm gun, which was at the time the largest caliber gun found on a US tank. In 1957, the US developed the M103 tank which had an even larger 120mm gun, and the M26 Pershing was re-designated as a medium tank. The tank is named after General John J. Pershing who led the American Expeditionary Force in Europe in World War I, it was briefly used both in World War II and in the Korean War. Intended as an improvement of the M4 Sherman, the prolonged time of development meant only a small number saw combat in the European theater, most notably the 9th Armored Division's dramatic dash to take the Bridge at Remagen. In combat it was, unlike the M4 Sherman, fairly equal in firepower and protection to both the Tiger I and Panther tanks but was underpowered and mechanically unreliable. This became even more evident in the Korean War, where the M26, while an overmatch for the T-34-85, had severe problems with the hilly terrain and was withdrawn in 1951 in favor of its improved derivative, the M46 Patton, which had a more powerful and reliable engine. The lineage of the M26 continued with the M47 Patton, and was reflected in the new designs of the later M48 Patton and M60 Combat Tank.

Development
The M26 was the culmination of a series of tank prototypes which began with the T20 in 1942 and represented a significant design departure from the previous line of U.S. Army tanks that had ended with the M4 Sherman; a number of design features were tested in the various prototypes, some of which were experimental dead-ends, but many of which would become permanent characteristics of subsequent modern U.S. Army tanks. The prototype series began as a medium tank upgrade of the M4 Sherman and ended as the U.S. Army's first operational heavy tank.

Improving on the M4
The army's first lineage of tanks had evolved from the M1 Combat Car and progressed to the M2 Light Tank, M2 Medium Tank, M3 Lee, and finally the M4 Sherman; these tanks all shared the common traits of using rear-mounted Continental air-cooled radial engines and a front sprocket drive. The rear engine-front sprocket drive layout required a driveshaft to cross underneath the turret, which increased the overall height of the tank, a characteristic shared with German tanks of World War II which also used this layout. In addition, the large diameter of the radial engines in the M4 line of tanks added further to the hull height. These mechanical features accounted for the high silhouette and large side sponsons that were characteristic of the M4 lineage.

In the spring of 1942, as the M4 Sherman was entering production, U.S. Army Ordnance began work on a follow up tank. The T20 tank reached a mockup stage in May 1942, and was intended as an improved medium tank to follow the M4. An earlier heavy tank, the M6 had been standardized in February 1942, but proved to be a failure. The U.S. Army had no doctrinal use for a heavy tank at the time.

T20
The T20 was designed to have a more compact hull compared to the M4. The Ford GAN V-8, a lower silhouette version of the GAA engine used in later variants of the M4, had become available. The engine had originally been an effort by Ford to produce a V-12 liquid cooled aircraft engine patterned after the Rolls-Royce Merlin, but failed to earn any aircraft orders and so was adapted as a V-8 for use in tanks; use of this lower profile engine together with the choice of a rear transmission and rear sprocket drive layout made it possible to lower the hull silhouette and eliminate the side sponsons.

The T20 was fitted with the new 76 mm M1A1 gun, developed from the 3 inch anti-aircraft gun. The 3 inch front hull armor was .5 in thicker than the 63 mm front armor of the M4. The glacis plate slope was similar at 46°. The T20's overall weight was approximately the same as the M4.

The T20 used an early version of the horizontal volute spring suspension (HVSS), another improvement compared to the less robust vertical volute spring suspension (VVSS) of the early versions of the M4. Later prototypes of the M26 tested a torsion bar suspension, which would become the standard for future U.S. tank suspension systems.

T22 and T23
The T22 series reverted to the M4 transmission because of problems with the early Torqmatic transmission used in the T20. The T22E1 tested an autoloader for the main gun, and eliminated the loader's position with a small two-man turret.

Through much of 1943, there was little perceived need within the U.S. Army for a better tank than the 75 mm M4 Sherman, and so, lacking any insights from the rest of the army as to what was needed, the Ordnance Department next took a developmental detour into electrical transmissions with the T23 series.

The electrical transmission was built by General Electric, and had the engine driving a generator which powered two traction motors. The concept was similar to the drive system of the German "Porsche Tiger" (later rebuilt as the Ferdinand/Elefant). It had performance advantages in rough or hilly terrain, where the system could better handle the rapid changes in torque requirements.

The electrical transmission T23 was championed by the Ordnance Department during this phase of development. After the initial prototypes were built in early 1943, an additional 250 T23 tanks were produced from May–December 1943. These were the first tanks in the U.S. Army with the 76 mm M1A1 gun to go into production. However, the T23 would have required that the army adopt an entirely separate line of training, repair, and maintenance, and so was rejected for combat operations.

The primary legacy of the T23 would thus be its production cast turret, which was designed from the outset to be interchangeable with the turret ring of the M4 Sherman. The T23 turret was used on all production versions of the 76 mm M4 Sherman as the original M4 75 mm turret was found to be too small to easily mount the 76 mm M1A1 gun. The first production 76 mm M4 with the T23 turret, the M4E6, was built in the summer of 1943.

T25 and T26
The T25 and T26 lines of tanks came into being in the midst of a heated internal debate within the U.S. Army in the mid-1943 to early 1944 over the need for tanks with greater firepower and armor. A 90 mm gun mounted in a massive new turret was installed in both series. The T26 series were given additional frontal hull armor, with the glacis plate increased to 4 in. This increased the weight of the T26 series to over 40 ST and decreased their mobility and durability as the engine and powertrain were not improved to compensate for the weight gain.

The T26E3 was the production version of the T26E1 with a number of minor modifications made as the result of field testing. Following its introduction into combat, it was renamed the M26 in March 1945.

After the war
Post World War II, some 800 M26 tanks were upgraded with improved engines and transmissions and 90-mm gun and were redesignated as the M46 Patton.

Delayed production
The M26 was introduced late into World War II and saw only a limited amount of combat. Controversy continues to exist as to why the production of the M26 was so delayed.

In his 1998 book Death Traps, Belton Cooper, who was a lieutenant in the 3rd Armored Division during World War II, working as a liaison officer for the division's armor repair units, made the claim that General George S. Patton was primarily responsible for delaying the development and production of the M26. Cooper's claim and his other criticisms of the M4 Sherman have since been widely repeated by readers of his book, and have even come to be cited as references. In 2000, the author appeared in the History Channel TV show "Suicide Missions: Tank Crews of World War II" to expound on his views.

Tank historians such as Richard P. Hunnicutt, George Forty and Steven Zaloga have generally agreed that the main cause of the delay in production of the M26 was opposition to the tank from Army Ground Forces, headed by General Lesley McNair. Zaloga in particular has identified several specific factors that led both to the delay of the M26 program and limited improvements in the firepower of the M4:

McNair, who was an artillery officer by trade, had promulgated the "tank destroyer doctrine" in the U.S. Army. In this doctrine, tanks were primarily for infantry support and exploitation of breakthroughs. Enemy tanks were supposed to be dealt with by the tank destroyer forces, which were composed of lightly armored but relatively fast vehicles carrying more powerful anti-tank guns, as well as towed versions of these anti-tank guns. Under the tank destroyer doctrine, emphasis was placed only on improving the firepower of the tank destroyers, as there was a strong bias against developing a heavy tank to take on enemy tanks. This also limited improvements in the firepower of the M4 Sherman.
 * Tank destroyer doctrine

McNair established a "battle need" criteria for acquisition of weapons in order to make best use of America's 3000 mi supply line to Europe by preventing the introduction of weapons that would prove unnecessary, extravagant or unreliable on the battlefield. In his view, introduction of a new heavy tank had many problems in terms of transportation, supply, service, and reliability, and was not necessary in 1943 or early 1944. Tank development took time, and so the sudden appearance of a new tank threat could not be met quickly enough under such rigid criteria.
 * Simplification of supply

A sense of complacency fell upon those in charge of developing tanks in the U.S. Army because the M4 Sherman in 1942 was considered by the Americans to be superior to the most common German tanks: the Panzer III and early models of the Panzer IV. Even through most of 1943, the 75-mm M4 Sherman was adequate against the majority of German armor, although the widespread appearance of the German 7.5 cm KwK 40 tank gun during this time had led to a growing awareness that the M4 was becoming outgunned. There was insufficient forward thinking to understand that there was an arms race in tanks and that the U.S. needed to anticipate future German tank threats. The Tiger I and Panther tanks that appeared in 1943 were seen in only very limited numbers by U.S. forces and hence were not considered as major threats. The end result was that in 1943, the Ordnance Dept. lacking any guidance from the rest of the Army, concentrated its efforts in tank development mainly on its pet project, the electrical transmission T23. In contrast, 1943 saw the British begin development of the 51-ton Centurion tank (although this tank would reach service too late to see combat in World War II) and, on the Eastern Front, a full-blown tank arms race was underway, with the Soviets responding to the German heavy tanks by starting development work on the T34/85 and IS-2 tanks.
 * Complacency

The most critical period was from mid-1943 to mid-1944, which was when the M26 could still have come to fruition in time for the Normandy invasion. During this time, development of the 90 mm up-armored T26 prototype continued to proceed slowly due to disagreements within the U.S. Army about its future tank needs. The details of what exactly happened during this time vary by historian, but all agree that AGF was the main source of resistance that delayed production of the T26.

In his 2008 book Armored Thunderbolt, Zaloga significantly revised an earlier version of this story which had appeared in his 2000 book M26/M46 Pershing Tank 1943–53, quoting from a much more extensive list of original documents from the Ordnance Deptment, Army Ground Forces and General McNair's correspondence. In September–October 1943, a series of discussions occurred over the issue of beginning production of the T26E1, which was advocated by the head of the Armored Force, General Jacob Devers. Ordnance favored its pet project, the 76 mm gun, electrical transmission T23. Theater commanders generally favored a 76 mm gun medium tank such as the T23, and were against a heavy 90 mm gun tank. However, testing of the T23 at Fort Knox had demonstrated reliability problems in the electrical transmission of which most army commanders were unaware. The new 76 mm M1A1 gun approved for the M4 Sherman seemed to address concerns about firepower against the German tanks. All participants in the debate were however unaware of the inadequacy of the 76 mm gun against the front armor of the Panther tank, as they had not researched the effectiveness of this gun against the new German tanks which had already been encountered in combat.
 * Zaloga version

Gen. Lesley J. McNair had agreed to the production of the 76 mm M4 Sherman, and he strongly opposed the additional production of the T26E1. In the fall of 1943, he wrote this letter to Devers, responding to the latter's advocacy of the T26E1:

"The M4 tank, particularly the M4A3, has been widely hailed as the best tank on the battlefield today. There are indications that the enemy concurs in this view. Apparently, the M4 is an ideal combination of mobility, dependability, speed, protection, and firepower. Other than this particular request—which represents the British view—there has been no call from any theater for a 90mm tank gun. There appears to be no fear on the part of our forces of the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank... There can be no basis for the T26 tank other than the conception of a tank versus tank duel—which is believed unsound and unnecessary. Both British and American battle experience has demonstrated that the antitank gun in suitable number and disposed properly is the master of the tank. Any attempt to armor and gun tanks so as to outmatch antitank guns is foredoomed to failure... There is no indication that the 76mm antitank gun is inadequate against the German Mark VI (Tiger) tank."

General Devers pressed on with his advocacy for the T26, going over McNair's head to General George Marshall, and on 16 Dec 1943, Marshall overruled McNair and authorized the production of 250 T26E1 tanks. Then, in late December 1943, Devers was transferred to the Mediterranean, where he eventually led the invasion of Southern France with the 6th Army Group. In his absence, further attempts were made to derail the T26 program, but continued support from Generals Marshall and Eisenhower kept the production order alive. Testing and production of the T26E1 proceeded slowly, however, and the T26E1 did not begin full production until November 1944. These production models were designated as the T26E3.

A single prototype of a T26 turret mounted on an M4A3 chassis was built by Chrysler in the summer of 1944, but did not progress into production.

Hunnicutt, working from Ordnance Department documents, reports that Ordnance requested production of 500 each of the T23, T25E1, and T26E1 in October 1943. The AGF objected to the 90 mm gun of the tanks, whereas the Armored Force wanted the 90 mm gun mounted in a Sherman tank chassis. General Devers cabled from London a request for production of the T26E1. In January 1944, 250 T26E1s were authorized. General Barnes of Ordnance continued to press for production of 1,000 tanks.
 * Hunnicutt version

According to Forty, Ordnance recommended that 1,500 of the T26E1 be built. The Armored Force recommended only 500. The AGF rejected the 90 mm version of the tank, and wanted it to be built with the 76 mm gun instead. Somehow, Ordnance managed to get production of the T26E1 started in November 1944. Forty primarily quoted from a post-war report from the Ordnance Dept.
 * Forty version

Production
Regardless of how it came about, production finally began in November 1944. Ten T26E3 tanks were produced that month at the Fisher Tank Arsenal, 30 in December, 70 in January 1945, and 132 in February. The Detroit Tank Arsenal also started production in March 1945, and the combined output was 194 tanks for that month. Production continued through the end of the war, and over 2,000 were produced by the end of 1945.

Following its introduction into combat in Europe, the T26E3 tanks were redesignated as the M26 in March 1945.

Super Pershing


The 90-mm M3 gun of the Pershing was similar to the German 88 mm KwK 36 used on the Tiger I. In an effort to match the firepower of the Tiger II's more powerful 88 mm KwK43, the T15E1 90 mm gun was developed and mounted in a T26E1 in January 1945. This tank was designated T26E1-1. The T15E1 gun was 73 calibers in length and had a much longer high-capacity chamber. This gave it a muzzle velocity of 3750 ft/s with the T30E16 APCR shot and could penetrate the Panther's frontal armor at up to 2600 yd. This model used a single-piece 50 in ammunition and was the only Super Pershing sent to Europe.

A second pilot tank was converted from a T26E3 and used a modified T15E2 gun that used a two-piece ammunition. A total of 25 of these tanks were built and designated as the T26E4. An improved mounting removed the need for stabilizer springs

Post-war, two M26 tanks had the T54 gun installed, which had the same long gun barrel, but the ammunition cartridge was designed to be shorter and fatter, while still retaining the propellant force of the original round. They also had the muzzle brake and bore evacuator from the M3A1 gun of the M26A1 and M46. The tanks were designated as the M26E1 tank, but lack of funds cut off further production.

Post World War II
In May 1946, due to changing conceptions of the U.S. Army's tank needs, the M26 was reclassified as a medium tank. Designed as a heavy tank, the Pershing was a significant upgrade from the M4 Sherman in terms of firepower and protection. On the other hand, its mobility was unsatisfactory for a medium tank (it used the same engine that powered the M4A3, which was some ten tons lighter) and its transmission was somewhat unreliable. In 1948, the M26E2 version was developed with a new powerpack. Eventually the new version was redesignated the M46 General Patton and 1,160 M26s were rebuilt to this new standard. Thus the M26 became a base of the Patton tank series, which replaced it in early 1950s. The M47 Patton was an M46 Patton with a new turret. The later M48 Patton and M60 Patton, which saw service in later Vietnam and Mideast conflicts and still serve in active duty in many nations today, were evolutionary redesigns of the original layout set down by the Pershing.

World War II
Development of the M26 during World War II was prolonged by a number of factors, the most important being opposition to the tank from Army Ground Forces (AGF). As a result, only the initial 20 M26 (T26E3) tanks deployed to Europe in January 1945 saw combat in World War II.

Europe


The heavy U.S. tank losses in the Battle of the Bulge against a concentrated German tank force composed of some 400 Panther tanks, as well as Tiger II tanks and other German armored fighting vehicles, revealed the deficiencies in the M4 Shermans and tank destroyers on the U.S. side. The British forces armour was better equipped to deal with such a force. On 22 December 1944, while the battle still raged, the brand new T26E3 tanks were ordered to be deployed to Europe. The unexpected German tank attack had settled the question once and for all as to whether the T26 was needed. Twenty were sent in the first shipment arriving at the port of Antwerp in January 1945. They were given to the 1st Army, split between the 3rd and 9th Armored Divisions. A total of 310 T26E3 tanks would be sent to Europe before VE Day, but only the first 20 would see any combat action.

In February 1945, General Gladeon Barnes, chief of the Research and Development Section of Army Ordnance, personally led a special team to the European Theater, called the Zebra Mission. Its purpose was to support the T26E3 tanks, which still had teething problems, as well as to test other new weapons.

After training the tank crews, the T26E3 tanks were first committed to combat on 25 February, with the 3rd Armored Division, in the fighting for the Roer River. On 26 February, a T26E3 named Fireball was knocked out in an ambush at Elsdorf while overwatching a roadblock. Silhouetted by a nearby fire, the Pershing was in a disadvantageous position. A concealed Tiger tank fired three shots from about 100 yd. The first penetrated the turret through the machine gun port in the mantlet killing both the gunner and the loader. The second shot hit the gun barrel causing the round that was in the chamber to fire with the effect of distorting the barrel. The last shot glanced off the turret side taking off the upper cupola hatch. While backing up to escape, the Tiger became entangled in debris and was abandoned by the crew. Fireball was quickly repaired and returned to service on 7 March.

Shortly afterward, also at Elsdorf, another T26E3 knocked out a Tiger I and two Panzer IVs. The Tiger was knocked out at 900 yd with the 90-mm HVAP T30E16 ammunition. Photographs of this knocked out Tiger I in Hunnicutt's book showed a penetration through the front gun mantlet.

On 6 March, in the city of Cologne, a T26E3 knocked out a Panther tank in front of the Cologne Cathedral after the Panther had knocked out at least one M4 Sherman. The action was recorded by a Signal Corps cameraman.

On the same day, another T26E3 was knocked out in the town of Niehl near Cologne, by an 88 mm self-propelled anti-tank gun, at a range of under 300 yd. There were two other tank engagements involving the T26E3, with one Tiger I knocked out during the fighting around Cologne, and one Panzer IV knocked out at Mannheim.

The T26E3s with the 9th Armored Division saw action in fighting around the Roer River with one Pershing disabled by two hits from a German 150 mm field gun.

Four T26E3s were involved in the 9th Armored Division's dramatic dash to take the Bridge at Remagen, providing fire support to the infantry in order to take the bridgehead before the Germans could blow it up. Some of the division's other tanks were able to cross the bridge but the T26E3s were too large and heavy to cross the damaged bridge and had to wait five days before getting across the river by barge. Europe's bridges were in general not designed for heavy loads, which had been one of the original objections to sending a heavy tank to Europe.

Super Pershing


A single Super Pershing was shipped to Europe and given additional armor to the gun mantlet and front hull by the maintenance unit before being assigned to one of the tank crews of the Third Armored Division. An account of the combat actions of this tank appeared in the war memoir Another River, Another Town, by John P. Irwin, who was the tank gunner. Zaloga described three actions in his book. On 4 April, the Super Pershing engaged and destroyed a German tank, or something resembling a tank, at a range of 1500 yd. On 12 April, the Super Pershing claimed a German tank of unknown type. On 21 April, the Super Pershing was involved in a short-range tank duel with a German tank identified as a Tiger which was knocked out by the Super Pershing with a shot to the belly. Irwin described the tank as a Tiger but Zaloga expressed skepticism that it was a Tiger. After the war, the single Super Pershing in Europe was last photographed in a vehicle dump in Kassel, Germany, and was most likely scrapped.

Okinawa
In May 1945, as fierce fighting continued on the island of Okinawa, and M4 tank losses mounted, plans were made to ship the M26 Pershing tanks to that battle. A cargo ship carrying 12 Pershing tanks departed on 31 May, but the tanks were not completely offloaded on the beach at Naha, Okinawa until 4 August. By then, fighting on Okinawa had come to an end, and VJ Day followed on 15 August.

Korean War


The M26 saw service in the Korean War. When the war began in June 1950, the four American infantry divisions on occupation duty in Japan had no medium tanks at all, having only one active tank company (equipped with M24 Chaffee light tanks) each. When these divisions were sent to Korea at the end of June 1950, they soon found that the 75mm gun on the M24 could not penetrate the armor of North Korean T-34 tanks, which had no difficulty penetrating the M24's thin armor. Three M26 Pershing tanks were found in poor condition in a Tokyo ordnance depot. They were hastily brought back into operation with missing fanbelts improvised. These three M26s were formed into a provisional tank platoon commanded by Lieutenant Samuel Fowler and sent to Korea in mid-July. When used to defend the town of Chinju, the tanks soon overheated when the substitute fan belts stretched and the cooling fans stopped working, and so the only three American medium tanks in Korea were lost.

More medium tanks began arriving in Korea at the end of July 1950. Although no armored divisions were sent because the initial response from battlefield commanders was "Korea isn't good tank country", six Army infantry divisions and one Marine division were deployed. Each Army infantry division should have had one divisional tank battalion of 69 tanks, and each Army infantry regiment should have had a company of 22 tanks; the Marine division had a tank battalion of 70 gun tanks and nine combination flamethrower-howitzer tanks, and each Marine infantry regiment had an antitank platoon with five tanks each. While tables of organization and equipment mandated that all tank platoon vehicles should be M26 Pershings, with howitzer tanks in company headquarters and light tanks in reconnaissance units only, some units had a shortfall that had to be filled with other tanks. The 70th Tank Battalion at Fort Knox Kentucky had pulled World War II memorial M26s off of pedestals and reconditioned them for use, but had to fill out two companies with M4A3s; the 72nd Tank Battalion at Fort Lewis Washington and the 73rd Tank Battalion at Fort Benning Georgia were fully equipped with M26s; the 89th Medium Tank Battalion was constituted in Japan with three companies of reconditioned M4A3s and one of M26s from various bases in the Pacific; due to the shortage of M26s, most regimental tank companies had M4A3 Shermans instead. Two battalions detached from the 2nd Armored Division at Fort Hood Texas, the 6th Medium and 64th Heavy Tank Battalions, were fully equipped with M46 Patton tanks. The 1st Marine Division at Camp Pendleton California had all M4A3 howitzer tanks, which were replaced with M26s just days before boarding ships for Korea. A total of 309 M26 Pershings were rushed to Korea in 1950.

A 1954 survey concluded that there were in all 119 tank vs. tank actions involving U.S. Army and Marine units during the Korean War, with 97 T-34-85 tanks knocked out and another 18 probable. The M4A3E8 was involved in 50% of the tank actions, the M26 in 32%, and the M46 in 10%. The M26/M46 proved to be an overmatch for the T-34-85 as its 90 mm HVAP round could punch all the way through the T-34 from the front glacis armor to the back, whereas the T-34-85 had difficulty penetrating the armor of the M26/46. The M4A3E8, firing 76 mm HVAP rounds which were widely available during the Korean War (unlike World War II), was a closer match to the T-34-85 as both tanks could destroy each other at normal combat ranges.

After November 1950, North Korean armor was rarely encountered. China entered the conflict in February 1951 with four regiments of tanks (a mix of mostly T-34-85 tanks, a few IS-2 tanks, and other AFVs). However, because these Chinese tanks were dispersed with the infantry, tank to tank battles with UN forces were uncommon.

With the marked decrease in tank to tank actions, the automotive deficiencies of the M26 in the mountainous Korean terrain became more of a liability, and so all M26s were withdrawn from Korea during 1951 and replaced with M4A3 Shermans and M46 Pattons. The M45 howitzer tank variant was only used by the assault gun platoon of the 6th Medium Tank Battalion, and these six vehicles were withdrawn by January 1951.

Europe


After the end of World War II, U.S. Army units on occupation duty in Germany were converted into constabulary units, a quasi-police force designed to control the flow of refugees and black marketing; combat units were converted to light motorized units and spread throughout the U.S. occupation zone. By the summer of 1947, the army required a combat reserve to back up the thinly spread constabulary; in the following year, the 1st Infantry Division was reconstituted and consolidated, containing three regimental tank companies and a divisional tank battalion. The 1948 tables of organization and equipment for an infantry division included 123 M26 Pershing tanks and 12 M45 howitzer tanks. In the summer of 1951, three more infantry divisions and the 2nd Armored Division were sent to West Germany as a part of the NATO Augmentation Program. While M26 Pershings disappeared from Korea during 1951, tank units deploying to West Germany were equipped with them, until replaced with M47 Pattons during 1952–53. The 1952–53 tables of organization and equipment for an infantry division included 135 M47 Patton tanks replacing M26s and M45s.

In 1952, the Belgian Army received 423 M26 and M26A1 Pershings, leased for free as part of a Mutual Defense Assistance Program, then the official designation of U.S. military aid to its allies. The tanks were mostly used to equip mobilizable reserve units of battalion strength: 2nd, 3rd and 4th Régiments de Guides/Regiment Gidsen (Belgian units have official names in both French and Dutch); 7th, 9th and 10th Régiments de Lanciers/Regiment Lansiers and finally the 2nd, 3rd and 5th Bataillon de Tanks Lourds/Bataljon Zware Tanks. However, in the spring of 1953, M26s for three months equipped the 1st Heavy Tank Battalion of the 1st Infantry Division, an active unit, before they were replaced by M47s.

In 1961, the number of reserve units was reduced and the reserve system reorganized, with the M26s equipping the 1st and 3rd Escadron de Tanks/Tank Escadron as a general reserve of the infantry arm. In 1969, all M26s were phased out.

As the U.S. Army units in West Germany reequipped with M47s in 1952-1953, France and Italy also received M26 Pershings; while France quickly replaced them with M47 Pattons, Italy continued to use them operationally through 1963.

Variants

 * M26 (T26E3). M3 gun with double-baffle muzzle brake. Main production model.
 * M26A1. M3A1 gun with bore evacuator and single-baffle muzzle brake.
 * T26E1-1 (T26E4-1 or M26A1E2). Version armed with a T15E1 large exterior stabilizer springs single piece ammo (used in combat).
 * T26E4. Experimental version armed with a long T15E2 gun two-part ammunition, improved mounting removed the need for springs.
 * M26E1. Longer gun, single-part ammunition T54 gun. (post war)
 * M26E2. New engine and transmission and M3A1 gun. Ended up as the M46 Patton. (post war)
 * T26E2, eventually standardized for use as the Heavy Tank M45 — a close support vehicle with a 105 mm howitzer (74 rounds).
 * T26E5. Prototype with thicker armor — a maximum of 279 mm.

Overviews on related topics

 * Armoured warfare
 * Tanks in the United States
 * Tanks of the U.S. in the World Wars
 * Tanks of the U.S. in the Cold War
 * Tank destroyer battalion (United States)

Relevant vehicles

 * 240 mm T92 Howitzer Motor Carriage
 * Centurion tank, the equivalent British tank of the same period
 * List of "M" series military vehicles
 * G-numbers
 * M1 Combat Car

Tanks of comparable role, performance and era

 * Tiger I : approximate German equivalent
 * IS-2 : approximate Soviet equivalent