British Air Forces in France

British Air Forces in France was an RAF Command set up on 15 January 1940 under the command of Air Marshal Arthur Barratt to provide unified control of all RAF units based in France. It had two immediately subordinate formations, with differing tasks. As well as the forces under its command, BAFF could also request RAF Bomber Command to provide support from UK-based medium bombers. The headquarters of BAFF were at Chauny alongside those of the French air commander, to maximise co-operation between the BAFF and the Armée de l'Air
 * 1) the "Air Component" (Royal Air Force Component of the British Expeditionary Force) underAir Vice-Marshal C H B Blount to provide reconnaissance and fighter cover for the BEF.
 * 2) the AASF (Advanced Air Striking Force) under Air Vice-Marshal P H L Playfair.  The AASF consisted of RAF light bomber squadrons based within France (around Rheims) to allow them to bomb Germany should the political decision to do so be taken.  No such decision had been taken before the German offensive in the West began on 10 May 1940, and thereafter the AASF bomber force was used against the advancing German Army and its lines of communications.

Order of battle
As of 10 May the strength of BAFF was and there was a commitment to reinforce BAFF with a further 4 Hurricane squadrons when the expected German offensive started.

Operations and reinforcement until withdrawal of the Air Component
As promised, BAFF was reinforced by 4 Hurricane squadrons in response to the German offensive. The operational instructions issued by BAFF had stated that "Bomber aircraft have proved extremely useful in support of an advancing army, especially against weak anti-aircraft resistance, but it is not clear that a bomber force used against an advancing army well supported by all forms of anti-aircraft defence and a large force of fighter aircraft, will be economically effective" and the AASF when used against German troops and key bridges rapidly suffered heavy losses in the face of the large numbers of Luftwaffe fighters and highly effective light anti-aircraft units protecting the offensive. By the end of May 12, the number of serviceable bombers with the AASF had been reduced to 72 (from 135 when the German offensive opened). The War Cabinet meeting that evening were warned by the Chief of Air Staff Cyril Newall that the bomber losses had been disproportionate to the results achieved. On May 14 the AASF made a maximum effort attack on the pontoon bridges thrown across the Meuse at Sedan by the Germans; it lost 40 out of 71 attacking aircraft.

The heavy German air superiority led to repeated reinforcement with additional Hurricane squadrons. At the request of BAFF and the BEF the equivalent of another 2 squadrons joined the Air Component on 13 May., but this was only after much discussion by the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the War Cabinet. The Chiefs of Staff Committee, meeting in the morning had advised that no further air support could be given on the Continent without unduly weakening the defence of the UK. Churchill, chairing the meeting, asked them to consider further what could be done, and raised the matter again at the War Cabinet that evening. The Secretary of State for Air Sir Archibald Sinclair warned that whereas the Air Staff had estimated that 60 fighter squadrons were needed to adequately defend Britain, there were currently only 39. Churchill then accepted that it was not possible to send large numbers of fighters to France.

On 14 May, the French Government requested another 10 squadrons. This request was discussed first at the Chief of Staffs Committee, and then at War Cabinet; both decided against taking any immediate action. The Chief of Staffs Committee of 15 May discussed the matter again; accepted Air Chief Marshal Dowding's advice that sending more fighters would not achieve decisive results in France, but would leave Fighter Command too weak to defend the UK and decided against any further reinforcement. That of 16 May had in front of it a message from General Gamelin, asking for 10 fighter squadrons at once - if they did not come the battle would be lost. It therefore reconsidered the matter and advised sending 8 'flights' (half-squadrons). This was discussed and agreed at War Cabinet; Churchill wanted to send more squadrons, but Sinclair advised that 4 squadrons was a maximum, and even this was a very serious risk, taken contrary to the advice of Dowding.

Churchill then flew to Paris for discussions with the French Government and High Command. The discussion was acrimonious, with the French pressing for the full 10 squadrons. Churchill urged the need to retain fighters to defend the UK, and doubted if 6 more fighter squadrons would make the difference. The French disagreed, Daladier asserting that air cover would give French infantry the confidence needed to fight tanks. Reynaud said the Allies had to choose between two risks - leaving English factories without fighter protection - just like the French ones - or seeing the Germans continue to advance on Paris. In the light of this discussion and the generally unsatisfactory state of affairs Churchill had found Churchill telegraphed the War Cabinet to explain that the situation was "grave in the last degree". In the light of this I personally feel that we should send squadrons of fighters demanded .. and..dominate the air above the Bulge for the next two or three days, not for any local purpose, but to give the last chance to the French Army to rally its bravery and strength

It would not be good historically if their requests were denied, and their ruin resulted. ... The War Cabinet, faced with this, agreed to the French demand. However, Newall warned that there were only 6 complete Hurricane squadrons left in the UK and/or advised that Air Component bases could only accommodate another 3 squadrons. It was therefore agreed that these squadrons were to fly to forward bases in the N of France on a daily basis; 3 in the morning, 3 in the afternoon. This brought the number of fighter squadrons in the Air Component up to 13.

The AASF's bases and the BAFF headquarters were to the south (but not very far south) of the German line of advance from Sedan to the Channel coast; the Air Component bases mostly north of it. By 17 May the landline connections between BAFF and the Air Component had been lost, and thereafter the Air Component operated as directed by Gort and the Air Ministry. The German advance up the Channel coast progressively overran Air Component bases, and the Air Component therefore rebased in Southern England over the period 19–21 May. Of the 261 fighters that had operated with the component, only 66 returned to England ; 120 of the lost planes had suffered damage which under normal circumstances would have been repairable, but prevented them being flown off.

From withdrawal of the Air Component to the Fall of France
The Air Component, renamed the Back Component, no longer controlled any combat aircraft, but its headquarters was used to coordinate RAF operations from English bases in support of the BEF and the Dunkirk evacuation. The AASF and Barratt remained in France, retreating first to the Troyes area (16 May), then to the Orléans - Le Mans area (3 June).

The provision of further reinforcements was discussed at the highest political levels, referred to by Churchill in his This was their finest hour speech of 18 June"During the great battle in France, we gave very powerful and continuous aid to the French Army both by fighters and bombers, but in spite of every kind of pressure we never would allow the entire Metropolitan strength of the Air Force, in fighters, to be consumed. This decision was painful, but it was also right, because the fortunes of the battle in France could not have been decisively affected, even if we had thrown in our entire fighter force. The battle was lost by the unfortunate strategical opening, by the extraordinary and unforeseen power of the armoured columns, and by the great preponderance of the German Army in numbers. Our fighter Air Force might easily have been exhausted as a mere accident in that great struggle, and we should have found ourselves at the present time in a very serious plight. But, as it is, I am happy to inform the House that our fighter air strength is stronger at the present time, relatively to the Germans, who have suffered terrible losses, than it has ever been, and consequently we believe ourselves to possess the capacity to continue the war in the air under better conditions than we have ever experienced before. I look forward confidently to the exploits of our fighter pilots, who will have the glory of saving their native land, their island home, and all they love, from the most deadly of all attacks." The War Cabinet discussed (3 June) what the policy should be on sending further fighter squadrons to support the French. They accepted the advice of the Chiefs of Staff Committee that no more than 6 bomber squadrons and 3 fighter squadrons should be based in France. Dowding supported this by noting the current serviceable fighter strength in the UK to be 224 Hurricanes, 280 Spitfires, and warning that this meant that if the Germans were to mount a heavy attack on the UK, he could not guarantee air superiority for more than 48 hours.  Sinclair added that the RAF was running short of fighter pilots, and this was now the limiting factor.  Churchill reopened the discussion on 4 June, noting that the Air Defence of Great Britain now had 45 fighter squadrons, and that according to Lord Beaverbrook (the Minister of Aircraft Production) there were more aircraft in Britain than before the start of the German offensive. Beaverbrook then gave more detailed figures for the period May 19-June 1: Sinclair countered that Fighter Command needed to recover its efficiency as well as its numerical strength; the squadrons were currently greatly disorganised and many of their finest leaders had been lost; Churchill did not press the matter further.

On June 5 the Germans attacked the French line on the Somme; the French repeated their request for British fighter squadrons, asking for 10 squadrons immediately, to be followed by another 10 as soon as possible In response, 2 Hurricane squadrons were sent to join the AASF (7 May); four UK-based squadrons operated each day from aerodromes near Rouen, returning to Britain every night. At the Defence Committee of 8 June Churchill argued that whereas the battle for France was important it would not be decisive one way or the other for Great Britain; maintaining adequate fighter defences for Britain would be decisive for Britain, and hence through Britain's eventual victory for France. The Committee unanimously agreed with Churchill's conclusion that it would be fatal to yield to the French demands and jeopardise the safety of the UK. No further squadrons were sent. The AASF moved one further time to bases around the mouth of the Loire, eventually returning to the UK over the period 15–18 June. Large numbers of RAF personnel were evacuated by sea from various French ports, part of Operation Ariel. An unknown number of them were lost off St Nazaire on 17 June, when the troopship HMT Lancastria was bombed and sunk by the Luftwaffe. An estimated 800 RAF men had been sent down into the ship's holds, which were penetrated by three German bombs.