CIA activities in Kenya

Intelligence Analysis
The CIA-produced National Intelligence Estimate of October 7, 1971, stated that: "Kenya has for a decade ranked among the most stable and most prosperous countries in Africa, but tribal frictions—and the increasingly partisan performance of the national leaders—have created an atmosphere of tension and unrest...The Kikuyu establishment, with President Jomo Kenyatta's knowledge and support, is making a power play, blatant and unconcealed, to assure its pre-eminence after Kenyatta's death or incapacitation. This approach... ensures a difficult period of political adjustment after Kenyatta's death. The Kikuyu with only about 20 percent of the population would find it very difficult to govern without the acquiescence of other tribes. Opposition to Kenyatta's inner circle of southern Kikuyu politicians is found not only in the leadership of other major tribes (the Luo and Kamba) but also among clans of the northern Kikuyu, who have not gotten their share of the spoils of office.

The army is also jealous of the Kikuyu-dominated General Service Unit (GSU), a well-armed paramilitary police force. The Chief of the Defense Staff, a Kamba, was implicated with some Luo politicians and a few other Kambas in a recent coup plot and forced to resign...As long as Kenyatta is in power, however, there are many factors which militate against a military coup. The Kikuyus remain in possession of considerable assets with which to counter moves against their dominant position.

The GSU, unlike many other paramilitary outfits in Africa, is considered to be an effective force. And, even in the army, the Kikuyus are gaining strength, especially in the junior and middle grade officer ranks. But the old guard of Kikuyu politicians depends heavily on Kenyatta, who commands vast respect and power as father of his country... Though nearly 80 (no one knows for sure how old he is), Kenyatta continues to demonstrate vigor and authority. Yet, a few years ago, he had some mild strokes, and still complains of circulatory problems."

Intelligence analysis
Kenya's government was described as increasingly concerned over the possibility of war between Uganda and Somalia, as well as either country making war on Kenya. Both countries have territorial claims on land considered part of Kenya. While the United Kingdom has, in the past, been allied with Kenya, Nairobi does not expect British assistance in the event of war. Kenyan relations with Uganda, under Idi Amin, have steadily declined since he took power in 1971, but have gotten much worse recently. There have been local penetrations by Uganda into Kenya, and Kenya responded with economic sanctions. U.S. intelligence believes that Uganda, with larger forces well equipped by the Soviet Union, would have an initial advantage, but the superior discipline and training of the Kenyan military would be significant in a prolonged struggle. A possibility of long-term occupation of Kenyan terrain, however, remains of concern.

The Kenyan government believes there is a danger of war between Somalia and Ethiopia, with the casus belli being the French Territory of the Afars and Issas, from which France is withdrawing. Kenya does have a mutual defense pact with Ethiopia, who are facing a larger Somali force, again equipped by the Soviets. The analysts believed that Kenya would not want to do more than reinforce its border, although U.S. intelligence also believed Somalia would not launch a full-scale attack against Kenya unless the territorial issue with Ethiopia was resolved.

Somalia can encourage an insurgency in northwest Kenya, which Kenya can control. If, however, Kenya and Somalia go to war, Uganda would be likely to open a second Kenyan front to exploit the situation. Neither Uganda nor Somalia, however, have the logistical capability to sustain a long-term push.

Covert action
Two papers dealing with Kenya, dated October 26, 1976 and Washington, November 11, 1976, were noted in the Foreign Relations of the United States volume, but not declassified. Both were documents of the groups that approve covert action.

Counterintelligence
According to the New York Times, United States Department of State officials confirmed that they had been warned, approximately nine months before the 1998 United States embassy bombings in near-simultaneous car bomb explosions at the United States embassies in the East African capital cities of Dar es Salaam, Tanzania and Nairobi, Kenya. The attacks were linked to al Qaeda. The warning came from an Egyptian named Mustafa Mahmoud Said Ahmed, who had come into the w Nairobi embassy in November 1997, and said he knew of a plot to set off a bomb inside the embassy's underground garage. He told Kenyan intelligence officers that he had already taken photographs of the embassy. After the attacks, British officials confirmed he had visited their Dar es Salaam embassy and offered to help Tanzanian officials arrested him.

Security was increased for a time after the warning, but then relaxed. The warning contained a caveat that a cooperative third-country intelligence service considered Ahmed unreliable, but the report also said that Ahmed's claim could have been completely true, or possibly a provocation to cause the embassy security measures to be more visible to the attack planners.

There was no confirmation of Ahmed's background, who claimed to have grown up in Zaire, gone to college in Egypt, worked for Kuwait, and came to Kenya as a gem dealer for Taba Investments, a company set up by Osama bin Laden. (See CIA activities regarding terrorist financing with gems.) He was reported to have passports from Egypt, Yemen and Zaire. Ahmed said he met bin Laden in Sudan.