Frederick M. Franks, Jr.

Frederick Melvin Franks, Jr. (born 1 November 1936) is a retired General of the United States Army. He is considered a military visionary and a distinguished combat commander, famous for having commanded the Gulf War coalition VII Corps in the highly successful "Left Hook" maneuver against fourteen Iraqi divisions, a number of whom were Iraqi Republican Guard, defeating or forcing the retreat of each with fewer than 100 American casualties lost to enemy action, a feat unmatched in modern warfare.

Early life
Born in West Lawn, Pennsylvania, Fred Franks graduated from the United States Military Academy at West Point, New York in 1959. After attending the Armor Officer Basic Course, Airborne, and Ranger training, he joined the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment in Germany. This was followed by an assignment as an instructor at West Point in the 1960s.

Vietnam War
Following his duty at West Point, Franks rejoined the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment,serving with the unit in Vietnam. In a period of intense combat, he earned the Silver Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, the Bronze Star with V Device, the Air Medal, and two Purple Hearts. While fighting in Cambodia he was severely wounded, and after a series of unsuccessful surgeries, lost his left leg, which was amputated below the knee. Franks fought to remain in a combat unit, something not normally granted amputees, and was eventually permitted to remain in combat arms.

Through the 1980s Franks served with the Army Staff in the Pentagon, commanded 1st Squadron, 3d Armored Cavalry Regiment at Fort Bliss, served in the Office of the Army Chief of Staff, spent a year at the national War College, held several high-level positions in the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command, and, finally, commanded the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, assigned to the East German frontier as the V Corps covering force.

Following his promotion to brigadier general in 1984, his flag-level assignments included Commanding General, Seventh Army Training Command, Deputy Commanding General, United States Army Command and General Staff College, and Director of Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), where he effectively integrated, for the first time, all joint staff operational planning, interoperability and warfighting functions within a single directorate of the Joint Staff, resulting in significant increases in the joint warfighting capabilities of the United States. In 1988, Franks again returned to Germany to command the 1st Armored Division, and a year later he assumed command of VII Corps.

Gulf War
In early November, 1990, Franks was ordered to deploy the VII Corps to Saudi Arabia to join the international coalition preparing to drive Iraqi forces from Kuwait; and on 24 February 1991, the Desert Storm land assault began, with VII Corps making the main attack. VII Corps consisted of 146,000 American and British soldiers in essentially 5 armored divisions (one was a mechanized infantry division and one was a cavalry division). This consisted of close to 1600 tanks, American and British, and 800 helicopters. Supporting this was its support command and vital logistics support command comprising over 26,000 soldiers and 15 hospitals. In total, VII Corps consumed over 2 million gallons of fuel a day. In 100 hours of rapid maneuver and combat, VII Corps fought several engagements with Iraqi forces. Under Franks' leadership, VII Corps units gained decisive victories at the Battle of Al Busayyah, the Battle of 73 Easting, the Battle of Norfolk and the Battle of Medina Ridge.

Unfounded controversy arose during and after the ground war over the pace at which VII Corps advanced. On the second day of the ground war General Norman Schwarzkopf publicly expressed frustration over what he characterized as VII Corps' slow pace, allowing elements of the Republican Guard to escape destruction by fleeing toward Basra. Schwarzkopf said that "The window of opportunity is rapidly slamming shut." Certain Victory, the official Army summary on the war, said, "By the 28th (of February, the third day of the ground war), with the exception of the Hammurabi Division, the majority of the remaining Guard armor had already reached or passed through the Basra sanctuary en route to positions well inside Iraq." However, the "remaining" armor were actually remnants of RGFC divisions which had been decimated by VII Corps in their 89 hour engagement of Iraqi forces. Critically, at 2100 hours on February 27, without warning, the CINC (Gen. Schwarzkopf) had indicated there would be a cease fire the next day (without consulting Gen. Franks, and in spite of Gen. Franks assertion through channels that he needed one more day to complete the job). He first ordered a 0500 hours halt to combat actions,which effectively stopped the advance of VII Corps units; but inexplicably he later extended it to 0800 hours. Had VII Corps known they had a full ten hours to execute, rather than the seven hours they had originally been given, very different objectives could have been realized. More importantly, the CINC had extended the FSCL so far north and east that air interdiction of retreating Iraqi troops was impossible. Another point that should be made is that the VII Corps was ordered to commence ground operations fifteen hours early (without warning) which created last minute maneuver and logistic problems effectively impacting and slowing the initial breach. Many of the orders issued by Gen.Schwarzkopf appeared ill-advised and were given without consulting the primary commanders on the ground. When the ceasefire was implemented, only then did Gen.Schwarzkopf personally contact Gen. Franks, and instead of congratulating him for the VII Corps incredible success (one of, if not THE largest, fastest, most successful armor maneuvers in history) he wanted to know why a particular highway hadn't been "seized" as he had ordered. In fact the "written" order came hours after the verbal order which Gen. Franks had interpreted and implemented. Gen.Schwarzkopf seemed determined to take credit for the coalition success himself, while downplaying the efforts of the Corps Commander responsible for actually leading the primary attack. But never once during the ground phase of Operation Desert Storm, did Gen. Schwarzkopf order changes to the battle plan and never once during the ground phase did he communicate directly with his primary field commander. The accomplishments of VII Corps in Desert Storm are among the all-time great accomplishments of armor warfare. Gen. Schwarzkopf made statements during press conferences that hadn't been validated on the field by his commanders and then attempted to deflect responsibility and blame them when the facts didn't quite fit the statements made to news media. Gen. Franks made it very clear from the onset of the ground phase that he needed one more day — but this window was denied. Filtered by the prism of hindsight, Gen. Schwarzkopf was the wrong man, at the wrong time for the job. (So who would have been the right man????)( Schwartzkopf was in fact the general in charge of Central Command, the man with the responsibility of leading the coalition forces in the Gulf war (multinational forces, French, British, American, Egyptian, Syrian, Canadian, Saudi, Gulf Emirates etc. In fact the stunning victory achieved by the coalition forces is not the result of any single man's expertise or skill- it was the result of a carefully crafted plan devised by the Joint Chiefs of Staff after months of planning (citation-Bob Woodward "The Commanders".  Franks is without a doubt a skilful commander of combined arms forces on a huge scale given his masterful handling of the 7th Corps, but Franks from the outset of the invasion of Iraq did not conform to the timetable established by his bosses- Generals Schwartzkopf and Yeosock- he took his own time, causing delay and confusion with other elements of the overall command- Schwartzkopf exonerates Franks from any blame in his book- words if I recall correctly are something like "Fred Franks moved a little too slow to suit my timetable, but Franks is a fine General and my confidence in him was complete. Franks tells the story in his own words in the book, written with Tom Clancy, Into the Storm - On the Ground in Iraq, which contradicts some arguments made by Schwarzkopf in his own autobiography It Doesn't Take a Hero. General Franks is credited in United States Air Force history in bringing modern day ISR capabilities to the fight. After witnessing a demonstration of JSTARS in exercise Deep Strike in Germany, Franks positive impression led to him raving about the capability to Gen Schwarzkopf. JSTARS proved indespensable in proving the JFACC with real-time intelligence and targeting information on advancing and retreating Iraqi ground Forces.

Later service and post-retirement
Following the Gulf War Franks was promoted to full General, and took over the United States Army Training and Doctrine Command. He retired in 1994 after almost 35 and a half years of active Army service. Franks now serves as chairman of the board of the VII Corps Desert Storm Veterans Association, which assists veterans and next of kin of those who served in VII Corps during Desert Storm. He has also collaborated with Tom Clancy on a book, Into the Storm - On the Ground in Iraq. He works with the U. S. Army's Battle Command Training Program for senior tactical commanders and staffs teaching battle command in seminars and simulated war games. He also works as a consultant, speaks publicly on leadership, and teaches senior level battle command at military schools in the United States and United Kingdom. He serves on the Board of Directors of Oshkosh Truck Corporation, the Customer Advisory Board for United Defense Corporation, and the Board of Trustees of the U.S. Military Academy. On March, 19th, 2011 he received the Guardian of Liberty Award presented by the West Point Society of Philadelphia at the Union League in Philadelphia.