|1958 Lebanon Crisis|
U.S. Marine sits in a foxhole outside Beirut, 1958
|Commanders and leaders|
Dwight D. Eisenhower
Robert Daniel Murphy
23x15px Ibrahim Kulaylat
|Casualties and losses|
The 1958 Lebanon crisis was a Lebanese political crisis caused by political and religious tensions in the country. It included a U.S. military intervention.
Background[edit | edit source]
In July 1958, Lebanon was threatened by a civil war between Maronite Christians and Muslims. Tensions with Egypt had escalated earlier in 1956 when pro-western President Camille Chamoun, a Christian, did not break diplomatic relations with the Western powers that attacked Egypt during the Suez Crisis, angering Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser. These tensions were further increased when Chamoun showed closeness to the Baghdad Pact. Nasser felt that the pro-western Baghdad Pact posed a threat to Arab nationalism. As a response, Egypt and Syria united into the United Arab Republic (UAR). Lebanese Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami supported Nasser in 1956 and 1958. Karami formed a national reconciliation government after the 1958 crisis ended.
Lebanese Muslims pushed the government to join the newly created United Arab Republic, while the Christians wanted to keep Lebanon aligned with Western powers. A Muslim rebellion that was allegedly supplied with arms by the UAR through Syria caused President Chamoun to complain to the United Nations Security Council. The United Nations sent a group of inspectors that reported that it didn't find any evidence of significant intervention from the UAR.
The toppling of a pro-Western government in Iraq's 14 July Revolution, along with the internal instability, caused President Chamoun to call for American assistance.
Operation Blue Bat[edit | edit source]
The President of the United States, Eisenhower responded by authorizing Operation Blue Bat on July 15, 1958. This was the first application of the Eisenhower Doctrine under which the U.S. announced that it would intervene to protect regimes it considered threatened by international communism. The goal of the operation was to bolster the pro-Western Lebanese government of President Camille Chamoun against internal opposition and threats from Syria and Egypt. The plan was to occupy and secure the Beirut International Airport, a few miles south of the city, then to secure the port of Beirut and approaches to the city. The chain of command for Operation Blue Bat was as follows: the Eisenhower administration at the strategic level; Specified Command, Middle East (SPECCOMME, a 'double-hat' for Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean) at the operational level; the Sixth Fleet, with aircraft carriers Saratoga, Essex, and Wasp, cruisers Des Moines and USS Boston, and two squadrons of destroyers. At the end of June Essex and Boston were anchored at Piraeus, Greece, while Des Moines, from which Vice Admiral Charles R. Brown was flying his flag, was at Villefranche. Land forces included the 2nd Provisional Marine Force (Task Force 62) and the Army Task Force 201 at the tactical level. Each of these three components influenced Operations Plan 215-58 and its execution.
The operation involved approximately 14,000 men, including 8,509 United States Army personnel, a contingent from the 1st Airborne Battle Group, 187th Infantry from the 24th Infantry Division (based in West Germany) and 5,670 officers and men of the United States Marine Corps (the 2nd Provisional Marine Force, of Battalion Landing Teams 1/8 and 2/2). They were supported by a fleet of 70 ships and 40,000 sailors. On July 16, 1958, Admiral James L. Holloway, Jr., CINCNELM and CINCSPECCOMME, flew in from London to Beirut airport and boarded USS Taconic (AGC-17), from which he commanded the remainder of the operation. The U.S. withdrew its forces on October 25, 1958. President Eisenhower also sent diplomat Robert D. Murphy to Lebanon as his personal representative. Murphy played a significant role in convincing both sides of the conflict to reach a compromise by electing moderate Christian general Fuad Chehab while President Chamoun would continue in power till the end of his term on September 22.
See also[edit | edit source]
References[edit | edit source]
- "B&J": Jacob Bercovitch and Richard Jackson, International Conflict : A Chronological Encyclopedia of Conflicts and Their Management 1945-1995 (1997)
- Eckhardt, William, in World Military and Social Expenditures 1987-88 (12th ed., 1987) by Ruth Leger Sivard.
- Singer, Joel David, The Wages of War. 1816-1965 (1972)
- Bryden, 1980, 128
- Scott Jackman, Political Success in War: A Criterion for Success, DTIC
- For more on the naval and Marine Corps forces involved, see Thomas A. Bryson, 'Tars, Turks, and Tankers: The Role of the United States Navy in the Middle East,' Scarecrow Press, Inc., Metuchen, NJ, and London, 1980, 126-140.
- "Amphibious Warfare History". GlobalSecurity.org. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/amphibious-history.htm. Retrieved 2011-03-22.
- Bryson, 1980, 131.
Books and studies[edit | edit source]
- Mohammed Shafi Agwani, The Lebanese Crisis, 1958: A Documentary Study, 1965.
- Erika G. Alin, The United States and the 1958 Lebanon Crisis, American Intervention in the Middle East, 1994.
- Pierrick el Gammal, Politique intérieure et politique extérieure au Liban de 1958 à 1961 de Camille Chamoun à Fouad Chehab, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1991. (French)
- Irene L. Gendzier, Notes from the Minefield: United States Intervention in Lebanon and the Middle East 1945–1958, 1997
- Agnes G. Korbani, U.S. Intervention in Lebanon, 1958–1982 : presidential decisionmaking, 1991.
- Nawaf Salam, L’insurrection de 1958 au Liban, Sorbonne University (Paris), 1979. (French)
- Jack Schulimson, Marines in Lebanon 1958, Historical Branch, G-3 Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps, Washington, Department of the Navy, United States Marine Corps, 1966, 60 p.
- Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism, The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East, 2003.
- The Lebanon Operation. Contingency Operations. United States Army Center of Military History. Historical Manuscript Collection 2-3.7 AC.F Tab D. Archived from the original on 12 June 2010. http://web.archive.org/web/20100612074132/http://www.history.army.mil/documents/AbnOps/TABD.htm. Retrieved 2 July 2010.
Articles[edit | edit source]
- Gerges, Fawaz A. (1993). "The Lebanese Crisis of 1958: The Risks of Inflated Self-Importance". pp. 83–113. .
- Lesch, David W. (1996). "Prelude to the 1958 American Intervention in Lebanon". pp. 87–108. .
- Little, Douglas (1996). "His Finest Hour? Eisenhower, Lebanon, and the 1958 Middle East Crisis". pp. 27–54. Digital object identifier:10.1111/j.1467-7709.1996.tb00251.x. .
- Ovendale, Ritchie (1994). "Great Britain and the Anglo-American Invasion of Jordan and Lebanon in 1958". pp. 284–304. .
- Tinguy, Edouard de (2007). "The Lebanese crisis of 1958 and the U.S military intervention". Paris: A. Pédone. (French).
[edit | edit source]
- Shulimson, Jack (1966) (PDF). Marines in Lebanon, 1958. United States Marine Corps Historical Division. Archived from the original on 17 October 2008. http://web.archive.org/web/20081017021624/http://www.marines.mil/news/publications/Documents/Marines%20in%20Lebanon%201958%20PCN%2019000318500.pdf. Retrieved 14 October 2008.
- Global Security - Operation Blue Bat
- Rapid Deployment Logistics: Lebanon, 1958
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