Battle of Agordat (1941)

The Battle of Agordat was fought near Agordat in Eritrea from 26 to 31 January 1941, between Italian and Royal Corps of Colonial Troops forces against British Commonwealth forces, during the East African Campaign of the Second World War. It was the first big victory in the Allied offensive against Italian East Africa and was followed by the Battle of Keren, which led to the fall of Italian Eritrea.

Background

Capture of Kassala

Main article: Northern front, East Africa, 1940

The attack on Kassala was conducted by Italian and colonial forces comprising about 6,500 men in three columns, with support from the Regia Aeronautica and some cavalry squadrons acting as vanguards. Kassala was defended by fewer than 500 men of the SDF and local police, who remained under cover during a twelve-hour bombardment by the Regia Aeronautica, then knocked out six Italian tanks and inflicted considerable casualties on the attackers. At 1:00 p.m., Italian cavalry entered Kassala and the defenders withdrew to Butana Bridge having lost one man killed, three wounded and 26 missing, some of whom rejoined their units. Italian casualties were 43 dead and 114 men wounded. Gazzera occupied the fort of Gallabat the same day and Kurmuk in Sudan. Gallabat was placed under the command of Colonel Castagnola and fortified. At Kassala, the 12th Colonial Brigade built anti-tank defences, machine-gun posts and strongpoints.

Italian artillery firing on Kassala

During the Italian attack at Kassala a battalion of Italian colonial troops and a banda (irregulars) captured Gallabat. Karora was occupied unopposed and at Kurmuk on 7 July, another colonial battalion and a banda supported by artillery and aircraft, overcame 60 Sudanese police after a short engagement. The Italian attacks had gained a valuable entry point to Sudan at Kassala, had made it more difficult for the British to support the indigenous resistance in Gojjam by capturing Gallabat and the loss of Kurmuk prompted some of the locals to resort to banditry. Local Sudanese opinion was impressed by the Italian successes but the population of Kassala continued to support the British and supplied valuable information during the occupation. The SDF continued to operate close to Kassala and on 5 July, a company of the 2nd Warwick arrived at Gedaref; the British discovered that rumours of the arrival had reached the Italians in greatly magnified form. Platt decided to bluff the Italians into believing that there were far greater forces on the Sudan border. An Italian map captured on 25 July showed around 20,000 British and Sudanese troops in Kassala province.

British plans

In November 1940, Gazelle Force operated from the Gash river delta against Italian advanced posts around Kassala on the Ethiopian plateau, where hill ranges from 2,000–3,000 ft (610–910 m) bound wide valleys and the rainfall makes the area malarial from July to October. After a British reverse at Gallabat in November, Wavell held a review of the situation in Cairo from 1 to 2 December. With Operation Compass imminent in Egypt, the British forces in east Africa were to provide help to the Patriots in Ethiopia and continue to pressure the Italians at Gallabat. Kassala was to be recaptured early in January 1941, to prevent an Italian invasion and the 4th Indian Division was to be transferred from Egypt to Sudan from the end of December. With the success of Compass, East Africa was made second priority after Egypt and it was intended to defeat the Italian forces in Ethiopia by April.

On 11 December, Wavell ordered the transfer of the 4th Indian Division to begin. The transfer took until early January 1941 and Platt intended to begin the offensive on the northern front on 8 February, with a pincer attack on Kassala, by the 4th and 5th Indian divisions, less a brigade each. News of the Italian disaster in Egypt, the harassment by Gazelle Force and the activities of Mission 101 in Ethiopia, led to the Italians withdrawing their northern flank to Keru and Wachai and then on 18 January to retreat hurriedly from Kassala, Tessenei and the triangle of Keru, Biscia and Aicota. Wavell had ordered Platt to advance the offensive from March to 9 February and then to 19 January, when it seemed that Italian morale was crumbling. The Italian withdrawal led Wavell to order a pursuit and the troops arriving at Port Sudan (Briggs Force) to attack at Karora and advance parallel to the coast, to meet the forces coming from the west.

Italian plans

Kassala in 1940

After the conquest of British Somaliland, the Italians in the AOI adopted a more defensive posture. In late 1940, Italian forces had suffered defeats in the Mediterranean, the Western Desert, the Battle of Britain and in the Greco-Italian War. General Ugo Cavallero, the new Italian Chief of the General Staff in Rome, adopted a new strategy in East Africa. In December 1940, Cavallero ordered the Italian forces in East Africa to concentrate on the defence of the AOI by withdrawing to better defensive positions. On 31 December, Frusci ordered a retirement from the area north of Kassala along the track east of Sabdaret with outposts at Serobatib and Adaret, with a mobile force at Sabdaret as a reserve. Earlier in the month, Frusci had received orders from Rome to cancel plans to invade Sudan, withdraw from Kassala and Metemma in the lowlands along the Sudan–Eritrea border and hold the more easily defended mountain passes on the Kassala–Agordat and Metemma–Gondar roads. Frusci was reluctant to withdraw from the lowlands, because it would be a propaganda defeat after he had announced that the British were about to attack and would be defeated. Kassala was also an important railway junction; holding it prevented the British from using the railway to carry supplies from Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast to the base at Gedaref.

Prelude

Italian retirement from Sudan

The situation in late 1940 rendered the Sudanese towns of Kassala and Gallabat untenable, leading to the decision by Italian command to abandon them and withdraw the troops to Ethiopia and Eritrea. The Italian 12th Colonial Brigade (General Orlando Lorenzini) at Kassala retired on the night of 17/18 January 1941, which to the British suggested that the situation in Egypt was affecting Italian strategy in East Africa and that a bolder British policy was justified. The British offensive from Sudan due on 9 February was brought forward to 19 January and Platt was ordered to mount a vigorous pursuit. While the garrison of Gallabat was ordered to reach Gondar, the 12th Colonial Brigade methodically retired towards theKeru–Biscia–Aicota triangle in the foothills of the Eritean highlands, while opposing some resistance to Gazelle Force (Colonel Frank Walter Messervy) a motorised unit from the Sudan Defence Force, the 4th Indian Infantry Division and the 5th Indian Infantry Division. As Gazelle Force threatened to outflank and encircle the retreating Italian forces, the Amhara Cavalry (Lieutenant Amedeo Guillet), was ordered to slow down the Allied advance for at least 24 hours in the plain between Aicota and Barentu in Eritrea. The cavalry covertly circumvented the Anglo-Indian forces and at dawn on 21 January, began a surprise cavalry charge from their rear. The charge created much disarray between the Commonwealth lines but as the cavalry prepared to charge again, the Allied force re-organized and opened fire on the Amhara cavalry, while armoured units tried to encircle them. Guillet’s deputy, Lieutenant Renato Togni, charged a column of Matilda tanks with his platoon of 30 colonial soldiers who were all killed but this allowed the remainder of the cavalry to disengage. The charge cost the Amhara cavalry some 800 killed or wounded but slowed the British advance for long enough for the main Italian force to reach Agordat.

Agordat

Lieutenant Amedeo Guillet with Amhara cavalry.

Two roads from Kassala ran to Agordat, a track to the north through Keru and Biscia, where the road improved and the Via Imperiale, a tarmac road through Tessenei, Aicota and Barentu. The roads joined at Agordat and went through Keren, the only route to Asmara. Agordat was a small town on the north bank of the Baraka river, a dry strand except in the rainy season, with palm groves along the banks. To the south-west of Agordat, was the Laquetat ridge, defended by a fort at each end, wire entanglements and a concrete wall. To the south-east, the Italians had built fortifications on four rocky outcrops and beyond was Mount Cochen, with a peak about 2,000 ft (610 m) above the plain. To the north and east the foothills were closer together and the Barentu road ran south between Laquetat and Mt Cochen. The 4th Indian Division was sent 40 mi (64 km) along the road to Sabderat and Wachai, thence as far towards Keru as supplies allowed, with the Matilda Infantry tanks of B Squadron, 4th RTR to join from Egypt. The 5th Indian Division was to capture Aicota, ready to move east to Barentu or north-east to Biscia. Apart from air attacks the pursuit was not opposed until Keru Gorge, held by a rearguard of the 41st Colonial Brigade. The brigade retreated on the night of 22/23 January, leaving General Ugo Fongoli, his staff and 800 men behind as prisoners. By 27 January, most of the two Indian divisions were close to Agordat and a brigade turned south, to move across country towards Barentu.

Battle

By 25 January, the Commonwealth forces had cut the line of communication between Agordat and Barentu. On the following day, the 4th Indian Division (5th Indian Infantry Brigade and 11th Indian Infantry Brigade) bombarded the Italian defences, while the South African Air Force (SAAF) destroyed most of the Italian aircraft in Asmara and Gura, achieving air supremacy for the rest of the campaign. Between 26 and 29 January the 4th Indian Division staged a diversion against Mount Itaberrè and Mount Caianac, north of Agordat and also attacked Mount Laquatat but failed to capture it. On 28 January, Beresford-Pierse sent the 3rd Battalion, 14th Punjab Regiment to attack Mount Cochen and on the following day he sent the 1st Battalion, 6th Rajputana Rifles to join it. Mount Cochen was captured but on 30 January, a counter-attack by five Italian colonial battalions supported by mountain artillery, forced the Indian units to give way; on the morning of 31 January, the Indians attacked again and captured the mountain.

On 31 January, Beresford-Pierse launched the final assault, attacks on Mount Laquatat were renewed and the pass between Mount Laquatat and Mount Cochen (where the defenders were commanded by Colonel Luziani) was attacked, to break through the last obstacle before the Agordat plain. At first the defenders held their line but after some hours they started to lose ground. In addition to numerical superiority, artillery support and air supremacy, the Matildas proved immune to Italian artillery and Fiat M11/39 tank fire. The final assault took place from 11:00 a.m. – 2:00 p.m. with the Anglo-Indian infantry preceded by Matilda tanks which crushed the Italian defences within a few minutes, overwhelmed the Italian artillery and destroyed eleven M11/39s and Fiat L3 tankettes. Several counter-attacks by the Askari and the Amhara Cavalry in the open failed and the surviving Italian troops started a disorderly retreat towards Keren, while the Commonwealth troops pursued towards Agordat, which was captured on 1 February. The British took 1,000 prisoners along with 14 damaged tanks, 43 guns and all the heavy equipment.

Barentu

On the evening of 28 January, the 3/14th Punjab Regiment made a flanking move into the Cochen hills to the south and next day, they were joined by the 1/6th Rajputana Rifles but were unable to find a way forward. On 30 January, five Italian colonial battalions (about 8,000 men) of the 2nd Colonial Division (General Angelo Bergonzi) with 32 mountain guns in support, attacked. The Indian battalions were forced back but counter-attacked on the morning of 31 January and advanced towards the main road. The 5th Indian Brigade on the plain below attacked with the four Matilda tanks and overran the Italian defences, knocking out several Italian tanks. The road to Keren was cut and on 1 February, the 2nd Colonial Division retreated up a track further north, having lost the equivalent of two battalions of infantry taken prisoner; 28 field-guns and several medium and light tanks. The retreat was orderly but few kilometres from Arresa the road turned into a mule track and all the remaining trucks, guns and tanks had to be abandoned.

Aftermath

Italian M11/39 tanks captured after the battle of Agordat

Analysis

The Commonwealth forces had been forced to stop their pursuit on the Barka River, where the only bridge had been blown and Land mines laid in the riverbed. The Italian retreats had been orderly and though the British followed up as swiftly as possible, they lacked mobility and air support from the RAF was limited by the distance of their airfields from the front line. The airfields of the Regia Aeronautica at Sabderat and Tessenei were taken over as soon as possible and air attacks made on Italian marching columns, the railway and the remaining Italian airfields in Eritrea. From mid-January to mid-February, the Regia Aeronautica lost 61 aircraft, 50 in combat or on the ground. The Duke of Aosta had ordered Agordat and Barentu to be defended to the last man, because the terrain would nullify British superiority in tanks and wheeled vehicles. On 3 February, Wavell ordered Platt to capture Keren and Asmara. After the delaying action at Agordat, the 4th Colonial Division had time to retreat along a path to the north, sowing mines and demolitions as it went. The Italians lost about two battalions of infantry, 28 field guns and several light and medium tanks.

Casualties

During the retreat from Agordat, Barentù and the retreat to Keren, Italian and colonial forces suffered casualties of 179 officers, 130 non-commissioned officers (NCOs), 1,230 Italian and 14,686 Askari other ranks; a total of 15,916 soldiers. The Italians lost 96 guns, 231 machine guns, 329 automatic rifles, 4,331 draught animals, 387 vehicles, 36 M11/39 tanks and L3 tankettes.

References

Books

• Del Boca, Angelo (1986) (in Italian). Italiani in Africa Orientale: La caduta dell'Impero. III. Roma-Bari: Laterza. ISBN 978-88-420-2810-9. 
• Hinsley, F. H. (1994). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Its Influence on Strategy and Operations (abridged edition). History of the Second World War (2nd rev. ed.). London: HMSO. ISBN 978-0-11-630961-7. 
• Mackenzie, Compton (1951). Eastern Epic: September 1939 – March 1943 Defence. I. London: Chatto & Windus. OCLC 59637091. 
• Maioli, G.; Baudin, J. (1974). Vita e morte del soldato italiano nella guerra senza fortuna: La strana guerra dei quindici giorni. Amici della storia. I. 18 volumes, 1973–1974. Ginevra: Ed. Ferni. OCLC 716194871. 
• Petacco, Arrigo (2003). Faccetta nera: storia della conquista dell'impero. Le scie. Milano: Edizioni Mondadori. ISBN 978-8-80451-803-7. 
• Playfair, Major-General I. S. O. et al. (1954). Butler, J. R. M.. ed. The Mediterranean and Middle East: The Early Successes Against Italy (to May 1941). History of the Second World War, United Kingdom Military Series. I. HMSO. OCLC 494123451. http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Med-I/index.html. Retrieved 3 September 2015. 
• Qureshi, N. A. et al. (1963). Prasad, Bisheshwar. ed. East African Campaign, 1940–41. Official History of the Indian Armed Forces In the Second World War (1939–1945) (online ed.). Delhi: Combined Inter-Services Historical Section (India & Pakistan). OCLC 480344871. http://ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/India/EAfrica/index.html. Retrieved 23 February 2016. 
• Quirico, Domenico (2002). Squadrone bianco: storia delle truppe coloniali italiane. Le scie. Milano: Mondadori. ISBN 978-8-80450-691-1. 
• Raugh, H. E. (1993). Wavell in the Middle East, 1939–1941: A Study in Generalship. London: Brassey's UK. ISBN 978-0-08-040983-2. 
• Rovighi, Alberto (1988) (in Italian). Le Operazioni in Africa Orientale: (giugno 1940 – novembre 1941). Roma: Stato Maggiore Esercito, Ufficio storico. OCLC 848471066. 
• Stewart, A. (2016). The First Victory: The Second World War and the East Africa Campaign (1st ed.). New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-20855-9. 

Theses

• Marino, F. (2009). Military Operations in the Italian East Africa, 1935–1941: Conquest and Defeat (MMS). Quantico, VA: USMC Command and Staff College. OCLC 832080928. http://oai.dtic.mil/oai/oai?verb=getRecord&metadataPrefix=html&identifier=ADA519298. Retrieved 22 February 2016. 

External links

• The East Afrika Campaign 1940–1941 Tonazzo, L.