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The battle is often erroneously noted for being the first mass use of [[tank]]s in a [[combined arms]] operation. However, the French had deployed large numbers of tanks in {{nowrap|April (130+),}} {{nowrap|May (48)}} and {{nowrap|October (92)}} 1917, and the British more than {{nowrap|200 in}} Flanders in June and July. Despite the initial success of the [[Mark IV tank]]s at Cambrai, German artillery and infantry defences exposed the frailties of their armour and the vehicles became mostly ineffective after the first day. The battle was largely an artillery-infantry engagement that achieved, surprise and technical superiority against strong fortifications but weak German infantry and artillery defences, which were quickly reinforced. The British attack demonstrated that the Hindenburg Line could be penetrated and showed the value of new artillery and infantry methods, such as sound ranging and infiltration tactics that would later play a vital part during the [[Hundred Days Offensive]].
 
The battle is often erroneously noted for being the first mass use of [[tank]]s in a [[combined arms]] operation. However, the French had deployed large numbers of tanks in {{nowrap|April (130+),}} {{nowrap|May (48)}} and {{nowrap|October (92)}} 1917, and the British more than {{nowrap|200 in}} Flanders in June and July. Despite the initial success of the [[Mark IV tank]]s at Cambrai, German artillery and infantry defences exposed the frailties of their armour and the vehicles became mostly ineffective after the first day. The battle was largely an artillery-infantry engagement that achieved, surprise and technical superiority against strong fortifications but weak German infantry and artillery defences, which were quickly reinforced. The British attack demonstrated that the Hindenburg Line could be penetrated and showed the value of new artillery and infantry methods, such as sound ranging and infiltration tactics that would later play a vital part during the [[Hundred Days Offensive]].
   
The popular perception of the battle as a tank battle was largely from writing by [[Basil Liddell Hart]] and J. F. C. Fuller, the latter erroneously claimed credit for the plan. Liddell Hart, whose position as Military Correspondent of the ''Daily Telegraph'' and ''The Times'' newspapers {{nowrap|(1925–1939)}} gave him great public influence, was a critic of [[Douglas Haig]] and attempted to use the battle to indicate a "new" form of doctrine. Several modern studies have rejected their version of events and returned to a view nearer to that of the ''[[History of the Great War|British Official History]]''.{{sfn|Hammond|2009|pp=429–430}}
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The popular perception of the battle as a tank battle was largely from writing by [[Basil Liddell Hart]] and J. F. C. Fuller, the latter erroneously claimed credit for the plan. Liddell Hart, whose position as Military Correspondent of the ''[[Daily Telegraph]]'' and ''The Times'' newspapers {{nowrap|(1925–1939)}} gave him great public influence, was a critic of [[Douglas Haig]] and attempted to use the battle to indicate a "new" form of doctrine. Several modern studies have rejected their version of events and returned to a view nearer to that of the ''[[History of the Great War|British Official History]]''.{{sfn|Hammond|2009|pp=429–430}}
   
 
==Prelude==
 
==Prelude==

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