General characteristics[edit | edit source]
Requirements for the term vary widely; the most common criteria seem to be for a malware agent which:
- Is sponsored or employed by a state or non-state actor.
- Meets an objective which would otherwise require espionage or the use of force.
- Is employed against specific targets.
Sponsor[edit | edit source]
Part of the distinction from other malware is that the agent is sponsored—that is, Is commissioned, developed, and/or actually used—not by a black-hat hacker or organized criminal group, but instead by a state or a non-state actor, the latter potentially including terrorist groups and other entities proposed in 4GW doctrines.
Objectives[edit | edit source]
A cyberweapon performs an action which would normally require a soldier or spy, and which would be considered either illegal or an act of war if performed directly by a human agent of the sponsor during peacetime. Legal issues include violating the privacy of the target and the sovereignty of its host nation. Such actions include (but are not limited to):
- Surveillance of the system or its operators, including sensitive information, such as passwords and private keys
- Theft of data or intellectual property, such as:
- Destruction of one or more of the following:
- Data or executable code (programs) on the system, or other connected systems
- Less frequently, damage to or destruction of computer hardware
- In the most extreme case, damage to an electromechanical or process control system such that a serious industrial accident results in loss of life or property beyond the system, or major economic damages.
While a cyberweapon almost certainly results in either direct or indirect financial damages to the target group, direct financial gains for the sponsor (such as the transfer of funds) are not a primary objective of this class of agent.
Target[edit | edit source]
Unlike malware used by script kiddies to organize botnets, where the ownership, physical location, and normal role of the machines attacked is largely irrelevant, cyberweapons show high selectivity in either or both of their employment and their operation. Likewise, malware employed by organized crime for the theft of personal or financial information demonstrates lower selectivity and wider distribution.
Distinctions from Viruses and Other Malware[edit | edit source]
Note that self-replication is not a requirement; as such, not all cyberweapons are viruses (and not all viruses are necessarily cyberweapons). Without this capability, however, an alternate vector is required to get the agent onto the target system(s). Likewise, compromised access alone, such as that provided by a rootkit, is not diagnostic of the employment of a cyberweapon.
While the term is frequently used by the press (examples ), some articles avoid it, instead using terms like "Internet weapon" or simply "weapon" (example, though note the URL), mainstream researchers debate the requirements of the term while still referring to the employment of the agent as a "weapon", and the software development community in particular uses the term more rarely.
Probable Cyberweapons[edit | edit source]
The following malware agents generally meet the criteria above, have been formally referred to in this manner by industry security experts, or have been described this way in government or military statements.
Weaponized malware[edit | edit source]
The following malware agents are known not to have been developed or initially deployed as cyberweapons, but have since been used to meet military or intelligence objectives.
- (section pending)
Malware mistaken for cyberweapons[edit | edit source]
The following malware agents do not meet the criteria above, or are known not to have been developed or deployed specifically as cyberweapons, but have been frequently misidentified as such in the popular press.
- (section pending)
References[edit | edit source]
- "Powerful 'Flame' Cyberweapon Torching Mideast Computers : Discovery News". News.discovery.com. 2012-05-30. http://news.discovery.com/tech/flame-cyberweapon-120530.html. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
- "Infosecurity – 2012: The Year Malware Went Nuclear". Infosecurity-magazine.com. http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/29704/-2012-the-year-malware-went-nuclear/. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
- Perlroth, Nicole (2012-05-28). "Virus Infects Computers Across Middle East - NYTimes.com". Iran: Bits.blogs.nytimes.com. http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/05/28/new-computer-virus-looks-like-a-cyberweapon/. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
- Paganini, Pierluigi (2012-04-03). "Cyber Weapons | Security Affairs". Securityaffairs.co. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/3896/intelligence/cyber-weapons.html. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
- "Infosecurity – Kaspersky looks at the wreckage of Wiper malware". Infosecurity-magazine.com. 2012-08-29. http://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/view/27869/kaspersky-looks-at-the-wreckage-of-wiper-malware. Retrieved 2012-12-07.
[edit | edit source]
- Pierluigi Paganini, Jan 9th 2014,Cyber warfare - Cost of conducting APT campaigns is dramatically dropping
- Stefano Mele, Jun 2013, Cyber-Weapons: Legal and Strategic Aspects (version 2.0)
- Stefano Mele, 30 September 2010, Cyberwarfare and its damaging effects on citizens
- Pierluigi Paganini, May 21, 2013,Zero-day market, the governments are the main buyers
- Pierluigi Paganini, Dec 6th 2013,Cyber warfare - Why we need to define a model of conflict?
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