Lion of Babylon tank

T-72 Lion of Babylon
A fully equipped Asad Babil on display at Fort Hood
Type	Main battle tank
Place of origin	Iraq
Service history
In service	1990–present
Wars	Gulf War, 2003 invasion of Iraq
Production history
Designer	Kartsev-Venediktov, USSR
Produced	1989–1990
No. built	250–500
Specifications
Mass	41.5 tonnes (45.7 short tons; 40.8 long tons)
Length	6.9 m (22 ft 8 in)
Width	3.6 m (11 ft 10 in)
Height	2.2 m (7 ft 3 in)
Crew	3 (commander, driver and gunner)
Armor	300 mm (12 in) conventional cast (as basic T-72M model) Spaced armor reinforcement welded to front hull and turret Electro-optical interference pods
Main armament	125 mm 2A46M smoothbore
Secondary armament	PKMT 7.62 mm coaxial machine gun, NSVT or DShK 12.7 mm AA machine gun on commander's ring-mount
Engine	V-46-6 - 12-cyl. diesel 780 hp (580 kW)
Power/weight	19.8 hp/tonne
Suspension	Torsion bar Number of dampers intentionally reduced to suit desert conditions
Operational range	450 km (280 mi) 600 km (370 mi) with barrels
Maximum speed	68 km/h (42 mph) (road) 50 km/h (31 mph) (off-road)

The Lion of Babylon tank or Asad Babil (Arabic: اسد بابل) was an Iraqi-built version of the Soviet T-72 MBT (main battle tank), assembled in a factory established in the 1980s near Taji, north of Baghdad.

This project represented the most ambitious attempt by Saddam Hussein's regime to develop an indigenous tank production, triggered in part when some Western governments imposed an embargo in order to force a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war.

Production history

According to Russian sources, an informal agreement was in place between the Iraqi government and a Polish company as early as 1982. The deal comprised the assembly of 250 T-72Ms from imported hulls, in order to avoid the embargo. However, the process actually consisted of final assembly of complete knock down kits, rather than a true production line. By September 1982, the Soviet Union started to provide other T-72 components covertly via Poland, to upgrade the Iraqi tanks. The Baath regime had also bought a handful of very basic T-72B models from the USSR during president Bakr's last year in power (1979); the only T-72s imported outright by the Iraqis. About 60 T-72s were lost in the war with Iran. By the time of the beginning of the production in the Taji factory, several hundred T-72s were in active service in the Iraqi Army. Nevertheless, the tanks were upgraded to T-72M1A standards (in the case of the few of basic model) or (in the case of the assembled from Polish hulls) refurbished and modified in the Taji complex between 1989 and 1990.

The steel plant in Taji, built by a West German company in 1986, manufactured steel for several military uses and met the standards to retrofit and rebuild tanks already on duty in the Iraqi Army, such as the T-54/55 and T-62. The first locally-assembled T-72 came off the production line in early 1989, after a license agreement was achieved with a Polish contractor to provide essential parts.

The United Nations imposed an arms embargo following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, which soon limited the complex activity to the production of spare parts for the Lions and other tanks in the Iraqi arsenal.

In most aspects, the Lion of Babylon is physically identical to the basic T-72M. The Iraqi tank was upgraded to T-72M1A features with the addition of laminated armor on the front slope and rear as protection against HEAT projectiles. A few examples featured a laser rangefinder for its 125 mm smoothbore main gun. American military intelligence believed some of them also featured Belgian-made thermal sights. These same sources claim the tank was also provided with a better track protection against sand and mud than the Soviet T-72, by reducing the original number of dampers. Some of them carried a crude detachable pipe device made by the Iraqis in order to use the exhausts to blow up sand or dust to dig-in the tank. It's widely known that the tank had some kind of electro-optical interference pods of Chinese origin. As secondary armament, the tank mounted either the NSV or the DShK 12.7 mm machinegun and the coaxial 7.62 mm PKT common to all models of T-72.

Combat Performance

The Asad Babil was generally credited as being the most common tank in Iraqi service during the Gulf War (1990–91), but that honor goes, in fact, to the Type 69, produced in China but widely refitted by the Iraqis. Only Republican Guard divisions were equipped with Iraqi-modified T-72s.

The Lion of Babylon was utterly outclassed by the M1 Abrams, the Challenger and by any other contemporary Western main battle tank during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. For example, a 120 mm depleted uranium (DU) APFSDS round from an M1 could kill an Asad Babil tank well beyond 3,000 m, But even in those conditions, the M1s usually prevailed, as proven in circumstances like the Battle of Norfolk, during Desert Storm, where dozens of Iraqi MBTs were obliterated, or near Mahmoudiyah, south of Baghdad, April 3, 2003, (Iraqi Freedom) when US tanks engaged their counterparts from just 50 yards, shattering seven enemy T-72s without losses. These encounters also exposed the very poor marksmanship of the Iraqi gunners, in part due to the shortage of modern night-vision and range-finder assets.

Desert Storm (1991)

The ground war began on Feb 24, 1991, and lasted until Feb 27, when President George H. W. Bush declared a unilateral cease-fire, after the last Iraqi Army units were forced out from Kuwait. The Asad Babil saw action mostly with the Republican Guard Armored Division Tawakalna (Arabic in God we trust), on the third day of operations. The Division was decimated by the simultaneous assault of several American armored Task Forces.

Against the M1 Abrams

At first, combat assessment researchers thought that about a dozen M1s were hit and damaged in some degree in the course of tank battles with Iraqi T-72s in 1991, but further ballistics information and radiological readings showed that six Abrams were beyond any doubt hit by Helicopter-launched missiles are suspected of inflicting friendly damage in another four cases.

As already mentioned, the T-72s built in Taji were technologically fifteen or more years out of date, so they could not face the latest generation of US MBTs without sustaining heavy losses. However, some sources dispute the claim that no M1A1 Abrams took damage from this Iraqi tank. Brig. Gen. Robert Scales describes an engagement at close range between advancing M1s and dug-in Lions where at least two American tanks (B-23 and D-24) were knocked out, apparently by 125 mm sabot rounds.

The battle took place before midnight, February 26, 1991, against a brigade of Tawakalna Division. The Abrams tanks belonged to TF 1-37th Armor, US 1st Armored Division, and both were struck from behind. Two more became the targets of anti-tank missiles, depicted in the ballistics report as small shaped charge munition in one case (C-66) and one friendly DU round in the other (C-12). destroyed in the course of the battle against Tawakalna division. The kind of damage sustained matches in some way that inflicted upon Abrams B-23.]] There was speculation about incoming friendly-fire from Apache helicopters of the US 3rd Armored Division deployed to the south, p. 16. cites an M1A1 tank platoon leader from TF 1-37:"Speculation continues concerning what knocked out our four tanks. The three most probable answers are T-72 main gun, dismounted anti-tank missile, or Apache launched Hellfire missile. The fact that Apaches were operating to our rear and witnesses's reports of high round trajectory support the friendly fire theory. However, ballistics reports suggest that 125 mm HEAT rounds produced the damage on some of the tanks. Visual examination of others reveals one obvious sabot hole. Overall, the physical evidence implies that T-72 fire took out our tanks, but the friendly fire possibility cannot be excluded."</ref> An official document, shows a drawing describing the projectile path right through the tank hull, defeating the armor on both sides.

There is a summary detailing Abrams B-23's damage. This text mentions two rounds hitting the Abrams, the first of them (a shaped charge weapon) being probably an AGM-114 Hellfire missile blast through the rear grill doors, while the second 'unknown' round is almost certainly that depicted in the ballistic's sketch. The damage taken from this second hit, as is described in this report, was catastrophic. Incidentally, other sources hint that, besides C-12, at least another tank was penetrated by APFSDS shells.

A Delta company Abrams (D-24) was also hit by a HEAT round from an Asad Babil in the same skirmish, according to the tank commander, First Sergeant (1SG) Anthony Steede. Indeed, the asserts that a small shaped charge ammunition struck the NBC exhaust duct, the jet passing through the compartment (scan). The MBT lost power and hydraulic pressure, becoming a mobility kill (according to Scales, the round was a sabot). The about the incident shows the D-24 loader testifying that some kind of rocket/missile hit the US tank, which supports the friendly fire theory. However, during a TV documentary interview some 10 years later Steede was adamant about the T-72 HEAT theory. The impact threw the TC from his hatch and left the gunner seriously wounded by splinters. The presumed killer was quickly destroyed by sabot fire from another Delta company Abrams. Even if the US tank was not destroyed, the damage was enough to send it to a maintenance depot. The report about two hits in the rear turret suggests that the duffle bags in the tank's sponson boxes were presumably set on fire. Another six M1As were allegedly hit by 125 mm tank fire in the Gulf War official report, but the impacts were largely ineffectual.

More specific details exist about another Abrams storage area catching fire from a burning T-72 as a result of combat operations in the Chronology of the XVIII Airborne Corps in Gulf War.

The damage was sustained during the last engagement of the Gulf War, March 2, 1991, near the Rumeilah oil fields, southwest of Basra, when the 1st Brigade of the US 24th Infantry Division attacked by surprise a large retreating column of the Hammurabi elite Division, comprising some Asad Babil and APCs, which apparently broke the cease-fire. Most of the Brigade-size formation was demolished by the combined force of helicopters, A-10 attack aircraft and armored vehicle weapons.

Against the M2 Bradley

File:K-12.jpg

M2 Bradley K12 burning after being hit by 125 mm rounds

According to Atkinson and Scales, the Lions also accounted for at least three M2 Bradley IFVs during Desert Storm and left several damaged, all of them on February 26, 1991.

The Bradleys were often deployed as advanced scouts for the main armored forces. They explored the enemy lines, having been greeted by the Iraqi tank's main guns in many occasions. In return, if located within striking distance, they retaliated by firing their BGM-71 TOW antitank missiles with deadly effects, even taking out several MBTs. Most of the M2 losses were the result of this kind of mission.

Brigadier General Scales states that on the mentioned date, an M2 Bradley (ID number unknown), leading the TF 3-5th Cavalry scout platoon and commanded by a First Lieutenant Donald Murray, took a T-72 sabot round through the road wheels. This action led to the first officially reported killing of a Lion in the Division, by First Lieutenant Marty Lener's tank.

Atkinson cites a mostly fratricidal battle near Phase Line Bullet, a preestablished objective in the 3rd Armored Division way towards northern Kuwait, west of Al-Busayyah. The close-range skirmish involved Bradleys from the 4th Squadron of the 7th Cavalry Regiment against Iraqi dismounted infantry, APCs, and T-72s of Tawakalna Division. Visibility conditions were extremely poor (less than 400 yards), due to a sandstorm combined with the fumes of burning oil wells. The Iraqis employed small arms, RPG-7s, AT-3 Sagger missiles (completely aimless in such bad weather), and direct and indirect tank and 73 mm cannon fire from their entrenched positions.

One of the American IFVs (A-36) was hit and crippled by what ballistics suggest was a 12.7 mm bullet from an Iraqi tank (though it was described only as a small caliber penetrator by the ballistics report), and then shattered by a HEAT 125 mm shell after the crew evacuated the vehicle. Bradley A-35 also took some damage from a mix of ricocheting 12.7 mm bursts and main gun rounds near-misses, but was able to be driven out.

Another three vehicles were put out of action by M1A sabot friendly fire (A-22, A-24 and A-31). Two other ones took some damage from T-72 main and secondary armament: A-33 was hit by a ricocheting 12.7 mm bullet which disabled the radio and wounded the commander, while A-26 was struck by fragments of a 125 mm round during the process of recovery wounded personnel from A-24.

The rest of the 14 IFVs platoon, all of them damaged by shrapnel and machine gun fire, was forced to withdraw. This is the only known action in which an Iraqi armored force led by T-72s Lions beat off a US ground assault in both Iraqi wars.

There is also another US Army reference to a third Bradley (K12), belonging to 3rd squadron, 2nd ACR (2nd Armored Cavalry Regiment), hit by both kinetic energy and HEAT rounds and totally destroyed. This incident happened in the course of the scattered skirmishes that preceded the battle of 73 Easting against Tawakalna division, when a small Iraqi mechanized force attacked, during a probing action, the ressuply area of the Regiment, between Al-Bussayyah and Wadi-al-Batin, around 2:00 AM. A second Bradley and two M-113s were also damaged, all of them to friendly fire. Several MT-LBs troop carriers and one unidentified tank belonging to the retreating enemy were reported as destroyed by US forces.

A fourth Bradley from TF4-32 was destroyed by friendly fire at 19:20 from another M2A2 while engaging a lone T-72 supported by dismounted Iraqi infantry.

Invasion of Iraq (2003)

An Asad Babil abandoned after facing the final US thrust into Baghdad

During the invasion of Iraq, the Republican Guard's Lions, most of them from Medina Division, were deployed around Baghdad to attempt a last ditch defense of the Baath regime.

Since the beginning of the war, the bulk of the resistance had been conducted by regular army units, equipped with Type 69s and T-62s. In the process of the final run to the Iraqi capital, another M2 was struck by a 125 mm shell near Baghdad Airport in early April 2003, caught in the open while on a reconnaissance mission. Other sources claim the Bradley was destroyed by an Iraqi modified Type 69 fitted with an automatic 57 mm antiaircraft gun, but witnesses on the field claim that there were just two rounds fired, one against the Bradley and a previous near-miss aimed at a Fox NBC vehicle.

This action took place during a counter-attack led by Republican Guard armored forces against the Task Force 2-7 Infantry (Mechanized) Tactical Operations Center (TOC). Along with the main guns of the tanks shelling the compound, the area was hit by mortar fire and light artillery. The assault was fended off mostly by infantry armed with Javelin missiles, which destroyed a number of T-72s.

File:ApacheDown2003.jpg

Apache brought down while attacking a large formation of Asad Babils

In preparation for the final US push, the Iraqi T-72s were the preferred target for Apache helicopters and A-10s, in an attempt to diminish the combat power of Medina. However, one of these US air operations, executed by Apaches from the 11th Aviation Regiment became a fiasco near Karbala, on March 25. The Republican Guard T-72s, APCs, ZSU-23-4 antiaircraft systems, along with infantrymen armed with AK-47s, aware of the US Army plans, surprised the 34 helicopters with a barrage of PKM, NSV, 23 mm, and perhaps 125 mm tank fire. The route of the raiders was uncovered by the Republican Guard long before they could reach their intended objective.

The large aerial strike was repulsed with one Apache brought down (according to Iraqi state TV, shot at by a peasant firing an AK-47, although it was likely hit by 23 mm rounds), and all the remainder damaged, some of them taken temporary out of service and at least two being written off. Only seven were still operational after the failed raid. The two crew members of the downed aircraft were captured by the Iraqis. This left the US Regiment grounded for the rest of the invasion and, in some sense, it was the last successful battle of the T-72 Lion of Babylon.

The last operational Asad Babils were destroyed by the successive waves of American armored incursions on the Iraqi capital or abandoned by their crews after the fall of Baghdad, several of them without firing a single shot, after the collapse of the regime. The derelict tanks were later scrapped by US Army disposal teams or shipped to the USA for targeting practice. Apparently, a handful of them that were still on production in the Taji complex or hidden elsewhere were later incorporated to the new Iraqi Army for training.

But the Lions and their now dismantled factory would continue to haunt American forces in Iraq under the guise of IEDs, many of them made from 125 mm HEAT shells or even sabot rounds and other ammunitions once produced in the Taji plant, and now used, often with deadly effects, by the Iraqi Insurgency.

Conclusions

From a wide point of view, the Iraqi T-72 was affected by the same lack of maneuvering skills which pervaded the Iraqi Army commander's minds since the war with Iran. The Asad Babils, like any other tank in the Iraqi inventory, were mainly employed as artillery pillboxes, rather than high-mobility combat vehicles. Indeed, the Iraqi generals wasted numerous HEAT and even sabot tank shells in indirect fire missions from reveted positions, achieving nothing against coalition troops before being located and wiped out by helicopter or A-10 air strikes. This kind of tactic usually resulted in heavy barrel wear. The ambushes were also mostly ineffective, and those tanks met their fate at the hands of Allied MBTs or IFVs. However, the destruction of the Tawakalna Division (the bulk of it Lion of Babylon tanks) by the US 1st and 3rd Armored Divisions cost the Allied forces too much time, and consequently they were unable to destroy other Republican Guard divisions before ordered to cease-fire. Many authors maintain that the very existence of Saddam's regime for the next 12 years can be attributed to this fact, since the surviving Republican Guard units crushed the Shiite and Kurd risings right after the 1991 Iraqi defeat in Desert Storm.

Armor

An infantryman firing a FGM-148 Javelin

The Lion's primary armor was the same as the basic Soviet T-72 for export (T-72M), without any composite armor improvement, which made this tank an easy prey for any Western counterpart of latest generation. Their sides had just 60 mm protection, the turret side 300 mm standard and flat 45 mm at rear (later reinforced by the Iraqis).

Nevertheless, the reinforced armor plate present both at the turret and the front upper hull seems to have worked relatively well against some shaped-charge ordnance, like the TOWs and Hellfire missiles. Indeed, there are reports of Iraqi T-72s surviving near-misses from these weapons, although becoming a mobility kill in most of these cases. The missiles could have been deflected by the electro-optical countermeasures of the tank.

There is evidence of a direct hit in the encounter at Mahmoudiyah in 2003, when a 120 mm HEAT round from an Abrams impacted on the front of an Asad Babil turret at point blank range without producing a massive explosion. The tank was eventually destroyed by an armor piercing round.

It may be that some of these tanks featured explosive reactive armor, obtained from spare parts of the Polish T-72M1. A US Commander in the field suggested that during their last stand for Baghdad, five Iraqi T-72s seemed to be equipped with reactives.

Image showing the plate of laminated armor welded on an Asad Babil front slope. Note the edges around the rectangular section of the towing eyes and driver's hatch.

An improvised innovation that may have also work in these circumstances was introduced at the Taji complex, according to a Russian web site.

This source reports that an additional armor plate with a thickness of 30 mm was welded on the front areas of the hull and turret, leaving an air layer gap matching the size of the armor, so that the power of a HEAT jet could be dissipated in the hollow space. This technique follows the principle of spaced armor. The Iraqi engineers tested this reinforcement against 120 mm Chieftain tank rifled guns in 1989, apparently with some success. A FAS document claims that Russian designers took note of this Iraqi employment of layer armor for their T-90 MBT.

There are also at least two examples of 25 mm armor-piercing cannon fire from Bradleys IFVs ricocheting harmlessly when fired at the Iraqi tank in Desert Storm. But in the end it was no match for the 120 mm DU tank ammunition, the so-called "silver bullet".

Aftermath

Two years after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the new Iraqi Government acquired dozens of refitted T-72-M from Hungary, in order to equip an armored brigade. The headquarters of this new Iraqi Army unit is located in Taji, so there may still remain some maintenance facilities for MBTs. Some surviving Lions are used to instruct the new recruits. The training and experience of the old Iraqi Army officers and crews with the Asad Babil was also one of the reasons behind the choice of the Soviet-designed tank by the authorities.

References

• Jane's Armor & Artillery, Jane's Information Group, Surrey, 1988-89 Ed.

• Atkinson, Rick. Crusade, The untold story of the Persian Gulf War. Houghton Mifflin Company, 1993. ISBN 9780395602904
• Bin, Alberto. Hill, Richard and Jones, Archer. Desert Storm, The Forgotten War. Greenwood Pub Group, 1998. ISBN 9781573568098
• Bohannon, Second Lieutenant Richard M. "Dragon's Roar: 1-37 Armor in the Battle of 73 Easting." Armor, May–June 1992, VOL CI, #3.
• Conroy, Jason & Martz, Ron. Heavy Metal: A Tank Company's Battle To Baghdad Potomac Books, 2005. ISBN 9781574888560
• Fahey, Dan. "Collateral Damage: How U.S. Troops Were Exposed To Depleted Uranium During the Persian Gulf War", in Metal of Dishonor: Depleted Uranium: How the Pentagon Radiates Soldiers and Civilians with DU Weapons, International Action Center, 1997. ISBN 9780965691604
• Hinton, Henry L. & others: Operation Desert Storm: Bradley Fighting Vehicle, Abrams Tank, Apache Helicopter, Patriot Missile System and Foreign Government and Individual Contributions. DIANE Publishing, 2001. ISBN 0756713439
• Hofmann, George F. and Starry, Donn A. Editors. Camp Colt to Desert Storm : the history of U.S. armored forces, University Press of Kentucky, 1999. ISBN 9780813121307
• Isby, David. Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army. Salamander Books, London, 1988. ISBN 9780531037324
• Morris, David. Storm on the Horizon. Presidio Press, 2004. ISBN 9780743235570
• Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq. Penguin books, 2006. ISBN 9781594201035
• Rostker, Bernard. Environmental Exposure Report:Depleted Uranium in the Gulf, DoD Publication, 1998. OCLC 39801459
• Scales, Brigadier General Robert H. Jr. Certain Victory. Brassey's, 1994. ISBN 9780028811116
• Scarborough, Rowan. Apache Operation a lesson in defeat The Washington Times, April 22, 2003.
• West, Francis J. Bing. No true glory. A frontline account of the battle for Fallujah. Bantam, 2005. ISBN 9780553804027
• Zaloga Steven J., & Sarson, Peter. M1 Abrams Main Battle Tank 1982-1992. Osprey Military, New Vanguard. Reed International Books Ltd, 1993. ISBN 9781855322837
• Zaloga Steven J., & Sarson, Peter. T-72 Main Battle Tank 1974-1993. Osprey Military, New Vanguard. Reed International Books Ltd, 1993. ISBN 9781855323384
• Zucchino, David. Thunder Run: The armored strike to capture Baghdad. Grove Press, 2004. ISBN 080214179X

Further reading

• The Death Lobby: How the West armed Iraq by Ken Timmerman
• Yazīd Ṣāyigh, Markaz Dirāsāt al-Waḥdah al-ʻArabīyah: Arab military industry: capability, performance, and impact. Brassey's, 1992. ISBN 0080417779