|Part of World War II|
Joseph Stalin, Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill at the 1943 Tehran conference, where Operation Bodyguard was proposed
|Planned by||London Controlling Section, Ops (B), R Force & Others|
|Objective||Strategic surprise of Operation Overlord|
|Executed by||21st Army Group|
Operation Bodyguard was the code name for a high level World War II deception plan employed by the Allied nations during the build up to the 1944 invasion of northwestern Europe. The plan set out a general strategy to mislead German high command as to the exact date and location of the invasion. It was implemented as a number of independent operations, eventually culminating in tactical surprise during the Normandy landings on June 6, 1944 (also known as D-Day) and a delayed German reinforcement of the region for some time afterward.
At the time of the invasion German coastal defences were stretched thin as the Nazis prepared to defend the whole coastline of northwestern Europe. The Allies had already employed a number of deception operations against the enemy, aided by the complete compromise of German agents in the UK and decryption, with some success, of the enemies' communications. Once Normandy had been chosen as the site of the invasion it was decided that a major deception would be employed to mislead the Germans into thinking it a diversionary tactic.
Planning for Bodyguard was begun in 1943 under the auspices of an organisation called the London Controlling Section (LCS). A draft strategy, referred to as Plan Jael, was presented to Allied high command at the Tehran Conference in late November and approved on December 6. The major objective of this plan was to lead the Germans to believe that the invasion of northwestern Europe would come later than was actually planned, and to threaten attacks at other locations than the true objective, including the Pas de Calais, the Balkans, southern France, Norway, and Soviet attacks in Bulgaria and northern Norway.
Operation Bodyguard was a strategic success. The Normandy landings caught German defences unaware and subsequent deception led Hitler into delaying reinforcement from the Calais region for nearly seven weeks (the original plan had specified 14 days).
- 1 Background
- 2 Plan Jael
- 3 Early 1944: objectives and planning
- 4 Operation Fortitude
- 5 Operation Graffham
- 6 Operation Ironside
- 7 Operation Zeppelin
- 8 Normandy landings
- 9 Deception methods
- 10 Aftermath
- 11 List of operations
- 12 References
During World War II, and prior to Bodyguard, the Allies made extensive use of deception – developing many new techniques and theories. The main protagonists at this time were 'A' Force, set up in 1940 under Dudley Clarke, and the London Controlling Section, chartered in 1942 under the control of John Bevan.
At this stage of the war, Allied and German intelligence operations were heavily mismatched. Through the signals work at Bletchley Park much of the German lines of communication were compromised – intercepts, code named Ultra, gave the Allies insights into how effectively their deceptions were operating. In Europe the Allies had good intelligence from resistance movements and aerial reconnaissance. By comparison, most of the German spies sent into Britain had been caught (or handed themselves in) and turned into double agents (under the XX System). Some of the compromised agents were so trusted that, by 1944, German intelligence had stopped sending new infiltrators. Within the German command structure internal politics, suspicion and mismanagement meant intelligence gathering had only limited effectiveness.
By 1943 Hitler was defending the entire European western coast, with no clear knowledge of where an Allied invasion might land. His tactic was to defend the entire length and rely on reinforcements to quickly respond to any landings. In France the Germans deployed two Army Groups. One of these, Army Group B, was deployed to protect the coastline; the Fifteenth Army covering the Pas de Calais region and the Seventh Army in Normandy.
In 1943, after it had been decided to defer the invasion, Operation Overlord, until the following year, the Allies conducted a series of deceptions intended to threaten invasion in Norway and France. Operation Cockade was intended to confuse the German high command as to Allied intentions, and to draw them into air battles across the Channel. In this respect Cockade was not a success, with German forces barely responding even as a fake invasion force crossed the channel (turning back some distance from their "target").
Planning for Bodyguard began even before Operation Cockade was fully under way, following the decision that Normandy would be the site of the coming invasion. The departments responsible for deception, 'A' Force, COSSAC's Ops (B) and the London Controlling Section, began to address the problem of achieving tactical surprise for Overlord. They produced a paper, entitled "First Thoughts", on July 14, 1943 outlining many of the concepts that would later form the Bodyguard plan. However, as Cockade concluded, with limited success, most of the Allied high command were sceptical that any new deception would work.
In August Colonel John Henry Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section, presented a draft plan. Code named Jael (a reference to the Old Testament heroine who killed an enemy commander by deception) it would have attempted to deceive the Germans into thinking that the Allies had delayed the invasion for a further year, instead concentrating on the Balkan theatre and air bombardment of Germany through 1944. The plan had a mixed reception in the Allied High command and in October a decision on the draft was deferred until after the Tehran conference, a month later.
Meanwhile COSSAC had been working on its own deception strategy; "Appendix Y" of Operation Overlord plan. The plan, also known as Torrent, had originated in early September at COSSAC – it started life as a feint invasion of the Calais region shortly before D-Day and eventually (after the failure of a similar scheme during Cockade) transformed into a plan to divert attention from troop build up in the south-west of England. These early ideas, that later became Operation Bodyguard, recognised that the Germans would expect an invasion. Instead the core of the plan suggested misleading the enemy as to the exact time and location of the invasion and to keep them on the back foot once it had landed.
During November and December 1943 the Allied leaders met twice, firstly in Cairo (23 – 27 November) and then in Tehran (28 November – 1 December), to decide on strategy for the following year. Bevan attended the conference and received his final orders on December 6. Furnished with the final details of Overlord, Bevan returned to London to complete the draft. The deception strategy, now named Bodyguard, was approved on Christmas Day 1943. The new name had been chosen based on a comment by Winston Churchill to Joseph Stalin at the Tehran conference; "In wartime, truth is so precious that she should always be attended by a bodyguard of lies."
Early 1944: objectives and planning
The objectives of Operation Bodyguard were to deceive the enemy as to the timing, weight and direction of the Allied invasion in France. It had three main goals; to make the Pas de Calais appear to be the main invasion target, to mask the actual date and time of the assault and to keep German reinforcements in Pas de Calais (and other parts of Europe) for at least 14 days after landing.
Bodyguard set out a detailed scenario that the deceivers would attempt to sell to the Germans. This included Allied belief in air bombardment as an effective way of winning the war – with the 1944 focus on building bomber fleets. It then specified a number of invasions across the entire European coastline – in Norway, France and the Mediterranean. In January planners began to fill in the details of Bodyguard, producing the various sub-operations to cover each of the invasions and misdirection.
The task fell to two main departments. 'A' Force under Dudley Clarke, which had been successful early on, were once again given with the Mediterranean region. In Europe, however, responsibility shifted away from the LCS (who took on a co-ordination role). Prior to Eisenhower's appointment as Supreme Commander all planning for Overlord fell to the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander Allied Forces (COSSAC), Frederick E. Morgan. Under his regime the deception department, Ops (B), had received limited resources, leaving most of the planning so far at the feet of the London Controlling section. With Eisenhower's arrival Ops (B) was expanded and Dudley Clarke's deputy from 'A' Force, Noel Wild, was placed in control. With these new resources the department was able to put together the largest single segment of Bodyguard; Operation Fortitude.
Fortitude was intended to convince the Germans of a greater Allied military strength than existed, and that this would be deployed to invade both Norway and Pas de Calais. Fortitude employed similar techniques to a 1943 operation, Cockade; fictional field armies, faked operations to prepare the ground for invasion and leaked information about the Allied order of battle and war plans.
Fortitude North centred around the fictional British Fourth Army, based in Edinburgh. The Fourth Army had first been activated the previous year, as part of Cockade, to threaten Norway and tie down the German divisions stationed there. The Allies faked the existence of the army via fake radio traffic (Operation Skye) and leaks through double agents.
Political negotiations with neutral Sweden, under the name Operation Graffham, to obtain concessions that would be useful during an invasion of Norway were used to add credence to the masquerade. Sweden still maintained economic ties with Germany and it was hoped that political and economic pressure would filter through to Axis intelligence networks.
Fortitude South employed similar deception in the south of England, threatening an invasion at Pas de Calais by the fictional 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG). France was the crux of the Bodyguard plan; as the most logical choice for an invasion the Allied high command had to mislead the German defences in a very small geographical area. The Pas de Calais offered a number of advantages over the chosen invasion site, such as the shortest crossing of the English Channel and the quickest route into Germany. As a result German command, particularly Rommel, took steps to heavily fortify that area of coastline. It was decided, by the Allies, to amplify this belief of a Calais landing.
Montgomery, commanding the Allied landing forces, knew that the crucial aspect of any invasion was the ability to grow a beachhead into a full front. He also had only limited divisions at his command, 37 compared to around 60 German formations. Fortitude South's main aims were to give the impression of a much larger invasion force (the FUSAG) in the South-East of England, to achieve tactical surprise in the Normandy landings and, once the invasion had occurred, to mislead the Germans into thinking it a diversionary tactic with Calais the real objective.
Graffham was a political deception against Sweden, intended as a companion to Fortitude North. The objective was to convince German intelligence that the Allies were actively building political ties with Sweden, in preparation for an upcoming invasion of Norway. It involved meetings between several British and Swedish officials, as well as the purchase of Norwegian securities and the use of double agents to spread rumours. During the war, Sweden maintained a neutral stance and it was hoped that if the government were convinced of an imminent Allied invasion of Norway this would filter through to German intelligence.
Planning for the operation began in February 1944. Bevan was concerned that Fortitude North was not sufficient in creating a threat against Norway, and so he proposed Graffham as an additional measure. In contrast to the other aspects of Bodyguard, the operation was planned and executed by the British, with no American involvement. Graffham was envisioned as an extension of existing pressure the Allies were placing on Sweden to end their neutral stance, one example being the requests to end the export of ball bearings (an important component in military hardware) to Germany. By increasing this pressure with additional, false requests, Bevan hoped to further convince the Germans that Sweden was preparing to join the Allied nations.
The impact of Graffham was minimal. The Swedish government agreed to few of the concessions requested during the meetings, and few high level officials were convinced that the Allies would invade Norway. Overall, the influence of Graffham and Fortitude North on German strategy in Scandinavia is disputed.
Intercepted communications during January 1944 indicated German high command feared the possibility of landings near Bordeaux, in particular around the Bay of Biscay. The following month they ordered anti-invasion exercises to be carried out in the region. To play on these fears the Allies instigated Operation Ironside. The plot for Ironside was that two divisions sailing from the UK would land on the Garonne estuary ten days after D-Day. After a bridgehead had been established a further six divisions would arrive direct from the United States. The force would then capture Bordeaux before linking up with the supposed Operation Vendetta (another deception operation) forces in the south of France.
Ironside was implemented entirely via double agents, specifically Tate, Bronx and Garbo. The 'Twenty Committee', in charge of anti-espionage and deception operations of British military intelligence, were cautious about the plausibility of the story and so did not promote it too heavily through their agents. Messages sent to their German handlers included certain elements of uncertainty. This, combined with the fact that Bordeaux was an implausible target (the landing site was far outside the range of fighter cover from the UK), meant that the Germans took very little notice of the rumours and even went as far as to identify it as a probable deception. Despite this, the Abwehr continued to send their agents questions related to the landings until early June, and following D-Day the Germans maintained a state of readiness in the region.
Operation Zeppelin was the Mediterranean equivalent of Fortitude, intended to tie down German forces in the area by threatening landings in the Balkans, particularly Crete or Romania. 'A' Force employed similar tactics as before; simulating the existence of the Ninth, Tenth and Twelfth armies in Egypt via exercises and radio traffic. Although German high command believed these forces to be real in reality only three under-strength divisions were in the area.
Elements of the Bodyguard plan were in operation on June 6, 1944 in support of Operation Neptune (the amphibious assault of Normandy). Elaborate naval deceptions (Operations Glimmer, Taxable and Big Drum) were undertaken in the English Channel. Small ships and aircraft simulated invasion fleets lying off Pas de Calais, Cap d'Antifer and the western flank of the real invasion force. At the same time Operation Titanic involved the RAF dropping fake paratroopers to the east and west of the Normandy landings.
Joan Pujol Garcia, a British double agent (code named "Garbo") in high standing with the Germans, transmitted information about the Allied invasion plan with a further warning that the Normandy invasion was a diversion. This information was transmitted at the behest of the British High Command in order to increase his credibility to the Germans and was done at a time when it was too late to fortify Normandy.
The Bodyguard deceptions were implemented in a number of ways, including double agents, radio traffic and visual deception. Once planning for each stage had been completed various operational units were tasked with carrying out the deceptions. In some cases this could be specialist formations, such as R Force, but in other cases it fell to regular units.
A large part of the various Bodyguard operations involved the use of double agents. The British "Double Cross" anti-espionage operation had proven very successful from the outset of the war. The LCS was able to use double agents to send back misleading information about Allied invasion plans.
By contrast, Allied intelligence was very good. Ultra, signals intelligence from decrypted German radio transmission, confirmed to planners that the German high command believed in the Bodyguard deceptions and gave them the enemy's order of battle.
The practice of using mock tanks and other military hardware had been developed during the North Africa campaign. For Bodyguard the Allies put less reliance in these forms of deception, due to a belief that the German ability to directly reconnoitre England was limited. However, some mock hardware was created, in particular dummy landing craft that were stockpiled in the supposed FUSAG staging area.
Operation Bodyguard is regarded as a tactical success, delaying the Fifteenth Army in the Pas de Calais for seven weeks thus allowing the Allies to build a beachhead and ultimately win the Battle of Normandy. In his memoirs General Omar Bradley called Bodyguard the "single biggest hoax of the war".
In his 2004 book, The Deceivers, Thaddeus Holt attributes the success of Fortitude to the trial run of Cockade in 1943; "FORTITUDE in 1944 could not have run as smoothly as it did if the London Controlling Section and its fellows had not gone through the exercise of COCKADE in the year before."
List of operations
- Operation Fortitude (North and South)
- Operation Zeppelin
- Operation Royal Flush
- Operation Vendetta
- Operation Graffham
- Latimer (2004), pg. 148–149
- Cruickshank (2004)
- Latimer (2001), pg. 207–208
- Holt (2004)
- Latimer 2001, pg 206
- Holt 2004, pg. 478 – 480
- Holt 2004, pg. 494 – 496
- Crowdy 2008, pg. 226 – 228
- Holt 2004, pg. 502 -503
- Holt 2004, pg. 504 – 505
- Cave Brown 1975, pg. 1–10
- Hesketh 2000, pg. 12
- Crowdy 2008, pg. 229 – 230
- Holt 2004, pg. 486
- Cave Brown 1975, pg. 464 – 466
- Sexton 1983, pg. 112
- Latimer 2001, pg. 218 – 232
- Barbier (2007), p. 52
- Levine (2011), pg. 219
- Barbier (2007), p. 53
- Barbier (2007), p. 185
- Holt (2005), pp. 560–561
- Holt (2005), p. 559
- Hesketh (1999), p. 103
- Howard (1990), pg. 125
- Latimer 2001, pg. 215
- Barbier (2007), pp. 70–71
- Barbier (2007), pp. 108–109
- Masterman 1972
- Ambrose 1981, pg. 269
- Cave Brown 1975
- Lewin 2001, p. 292
- Latimer 2001, pg. 238
- Holt 2004, pg. 493
- Holt (2004), p. 821
- Ambrose, Stephen E. (1981). "Eisenhower, the Intelligence Community, and the D-Day Invasion". Wisconsin Historical Society. pp. pp. 261–277. ISSN 0043-6534.
- Barbier, Mary (30 Oct 2007). D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. Greenwood Publishing Group. p. 268. ISBN 0275994791.
- Cave Brown, Anthony (1975). Bodyguard of Lies: The Extraordinary True Story Behind D-Day.
- Crowdy, Terry (23 September 2008). Deceiving Hitler: double cross and deception in World War II. Osprey Publishing. pp. 352 pages. ISBN 1-84603-135-4.
- Cruickshank, Charles (2004). "Clarke, Dudley Wrangel (1899–1974)". Oxford Dictionary of National Biography. Oxford University Press. http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/30937. Retrieved 6 Dec 2011.
- Hesketh, Roger (2000). Fortitude: The D-Day Deception Campaign. Woodstock, NY: The Overlook Press. ISBN 1-58567-075-8.
- Holt, Thaddeus (2004). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Scribner. ISBN 0-7432-5042-7.
- Howard, Michael (1990). British Intelligence in the Second World War: Strategic deception. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-40145-6.
- Jablonsky, David (1991). Churchill, the great game and total war. Frank Cass.
- Latimer, John (2001). Deception in War. New York: Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1-58567-381-0.
- Lewin, Ronald (2001) . Ultra goes to War (Penguin Classic Military History ed.). London: Penguin Group. ISBN 978-0-14-139042-0.
- Levine, Joshua (2011). Operation Fortitude: The True Story of the Key Spy Operation of WWII That Saved D-Day. London: HarperCollins UK. ISBN 0-00-741324-6.
- Mallmann-Showell, J.P. (2003). German Naval Code Breakers. Hersham, Surrey: Ian Allan Publishing. ISBN 0-7110-2888-5. OCLC 181448256.
- Masterman, John C (1972) . The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. Australian National University Press. ISBN 978-0-7081-0459-0.
- Sexton, Donal J. (1983). "Phantoms of the North: British Deceptions in Scandinavia, 1941–1944". Society for Military History. pp. pp. 109–114. ISSN 0026-3931.
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