|Operation Polo (1948)|
The State of Hyderabad in 1909 (excluding Berar).
|Dominion of India||Hyderabad|
|Commanders and leaders|
Major General Joyanto Nath Chaudhuri|
Home Minister Sardar Patel
Lt. General E. N. Goddard
|35,000 Indian Armed Forces||
22,000 Hyderabad State Forces|
est. 200,000 Razakars (Irregular forces)
|Casualties and losses|
Hyderabad State Forces:490 killed|
1,373 killed, 1,911 captured
|27,000 - 40,000 civilians killed|
Operation Polo, the code name of the Hyderabad Police Action was a military operation in September 1948 in which the Indian Armed Forces invaded the State of Hyderabad and overthrew its Nizam, annexing the state into the Indian Union.
The conflict began after Nizam Osman Ali Khan, Asif Jah VII decided not to join the princely State of Hyderabad to either India or Pakistan after the partition of India. The Nizam's defiance was backed by Qasim Razvi's armed militias, known as Razakars and had the moral support of Pakistan. After a stalemate in negotiations between the Nizam and India, mass killing and rape of the Hindu population by Razakars, and wary of a hostile independent state in the centre of India, Deputy Prime Minister Sardar Patel decided to annex the state of Hyderabad. He sent the Indian Army and the Hyderabad State Forces were defeated within five days.
- 1 Background
- 2 Events preceding hostilities
- 3 Commencement of hostilities
- 4 Capitulation and surrender
- 5 Aftermath
- 6 References
- 7 External links
Background[edit | edit source]
|date= }} The State of Hyderabad, located over most of the Deccan Plateau in southern India, was established in 1724 by Nizam-ul-Mulk Asaf Jah after the collapse of the Mughal Indian Empire. As was the case in several Indian royal states, the Nizam was a Muslim, while a majority of the subject population was Hindu. In 1798, Hyderabad became the first Indian royal state to accede to British protection under the policy of Subsidiary Alliance instituted by Arthur Wellesley. When the British finally departed from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, they offered the various princely states in the sub-continent the option of acceding to either India or Pakistan, or staying on as an independent state.
The State of Hyderabad under the leadership of its 7th Nizam, Mir Usman Ali, was the largest and most prosperous of all princely states in India. It covered 82,698 square miles (214,190 km2) of fairly homogenous territory and comprised a population of roughly 16.34 million people (as per the 1941 census) of which a majority (85%) was Hindu. Hyderabad State had its own army, airline, telecommunication system, railway network, postal system, currency and radio broadcasting service.
Nizam decided to keep Hyderabad independent. The leaders of the new Union of India however, were wary of having an independent - and possibly hostile - state in the heart of their new country and were determined to assimilate Hyderabad into the Indian Union, even if it were by compulsion, unlike the other 565 princely states, most of which had already acceded to India or to Pakistan voluntarily.
Hyderabad state had been steadily becoming more theocratic since the beginning of the 20th century. In 1926, Mahmud Nawazkhan, a retired Hyderabad official, founded the Majlis-Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen (also known as Ittehad or MIM) in 1926. "Its objectives were to unite the Muslims in the State in support of Nizam and to reduce the Hindu majority by large-scale conversion to Islam". The MIM became a powerful communal organization, with the principal focus to marginalize the political aspirations of Hindus and moderate Muslims.
Events preceding hostilities[edit | edit source]
Political and diplomatic negotiations[edit | edit source]
|date= }} The Nizam of Hyderabad initially approached the British government with a request to take on the status of an independent constitutional monarchy under the British Commonwealth of Nations. This request was however rejected.
When Indian Home Minister Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel requested the Hyderabad Government to sign the instrument of accession, the Nizam refused and instead declared Hyderabad as an independent nation on 15 August 1947, the same day that India became independent. Alarmed at the idea of an independent Hyderabad in the heart of Indian territory, Sardar Patel approached the governor general of India, Lord Mountbatten who advised him to resolve the issue without the use of force.
Accordingly, the Indian government offered Hyderabad a 'Standstill Agreement' which made an assurance that the status quo would be maintained and no military action would be taken. Unlike in the case of other royal states, instead of an explicit guarantee of eventual accession to India, only a guarantee stating that Hyderabad would not join Pakistan was given. Negotiations were opened through K.M. Munshi, India’s envoy and agent general to Hyderabad, and the Nizam’s envoys, Laik Ali and Sir Walter Monckton. Lord Mountbatten, who presided over the negotiations, offered several possible deals to the Hyderabad government which were rejected. The Hyderabadi envoys accused India of setting up armed barricades on all land routes and of attempting to economically isolate their nation. The Indians retaliated by accusing the Hyderabad government of importing arms from Pakistan. Hyderabad had given Rupees 200 million to Pakistan, and had stationed a bomber squadron there.
In June 1948, Mountbatten prepared the 'Heads of Agreement' deal which offered Hyderabad the status of an autonomous dominion nation under India. The deal called for the restriction of the regular Hyderabadi armed forces along with a disbanding of its voluntary forces. While it allowed the Nizam to continue as the executive head of the state, it called for a plebiscite along with general democratic elections to set up a constituent assembly. The Hyderabad government would continue to administer its territory as before, leaving only foreign affairs to be handled by the Indian government.
Although the plan was approved and signed by the Indians, it was rejected by the Nizam who demanded only complete independence or the status of a dominion under the British Commonwealth.
The Nizam also made unsuccessful attempts to seek the arbitration of the President Harry S. Truman of the United States of America and intervention of the United Nations.
Civil unrest in Hyderabad and Atrocities by Razakars[edit | edit source]
The 1941 census had estimated the population of Hyderabad to be 16.34 million, over 85% of who were Hindus and with Muslims accounting for about 12%. It was also a multi-lingual state consisting of peoples speaking Telugu (48.2%), Marathi (26.4%), Kannada (12.3%) and Urdu (10.3%). In spite of the overwhelming Hindu majority, Hindus were severely under-represented in government, police and the military. Of 1765 officers in the State Army, 1268 were Muslims, 421 were Hindus, and 121 others were Christians, Parsis and Sikhs. Of the officials drawing a salary between Rs.600-1200 per month, 59 were Muslims, 5 were Hindus and 38 were of other religions. The Nizam and his nobles, who were mostly Muslims, owned 40% of the total land in the state 
Even as India and Hyderabad negotiated, most of the sub-continent had been thrown into chaos as a result of communal Hindu-Muslim riots pending the imminent partition of India. Fearing a Hindu civil uprising in his own kingdom, the Nizam allowed Qasim Razvi, a close advisor, and leader of the radical Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen (MIM) Party, to set up a voluntary militia of Muslims called the 'Razakars'. The Razakars - who numbered up to 200,000 at the height of the conflict - swore to uphold Islamic domination in Hyderabad and the Deccan plateau in the face of growing public opinion amongst the majority Hindu population favouring the accession of Hyderabad into the Indian Union.
As the manpower and arsenal of the Razakars grew, there was an escalation of violence between the Razakars and Hindu communities. In all, more than 150 villages (of which 70 were in Indian territory outside Hyderabad State) were pushed into violence. In Telangana, large groups of peasants, aided by the Communist Party of India and Andhra Mahasabha, revolted against local Hindu and Muslim landlords, and also came into direct confrontation with the Razakars, in what became known as the Telangana Rebellion. “From the beginning of 1948 the Razakars had extended their activities from Hyderabad city into the towns and rural areas, murdering hindus, abducting women, pillaging houses and fields, and looting non-muslim property in a widespread reign of terror."  Meanwhile, parties like the Hyderabad State Congress were involved in non-violent protests against the Nizam's rule.
Hyderabadi military preparations[edit | edit source]
The Nizam of Hyderabad had a large army with a tradition of hiring mercenary forces. These included Arabs, Rohillas, North Indian Muslims and Pathans. The State Army consisted of three armoured regiments, a horse cavalry regiment, 11 infantry battalions and artillery. These were supplemented by irregular units with horse cavalry, four infantry battalions (termed as the Saraf-e-khas, paigah, Arab and Refugee) and a garrison battalion - all forming a total of 22,000 men. This army was commanded by Major General El Edroos, an Arab. 55 per cent of the Hyderabadi army was composed of Muslims, with 1,268 Muslims in a total of 1,765 officers as of 1941.
In addition to these, there were about 200,000 irregular militia called the Razakars under the command of civilian leader Kasim Razvi. A quarter of these were armed with modern small firearms, while the rest were predominantly armed with muzzle-loaders and swords.
It is reported that the Nizam received arms supplies from Pakistan and from the Portuguese administration based in Goa. In addition, additional arms supplies were received via airdrops from an Australian arms trader Sidney Cotton.
Breakdown of negotiations[edit | edit source]
As the Indian government received information that Hyderabad was arming itself and was preparing to ally with Pakistan in any future war against India, Sardar Patel described the idea of an independent Hyderabad as an ulcer in the heart of India - which had to removed surgically. In response, Hyderabad's prime minister Laik Ali stated "India thinks that if Pakistan attacks her, Hyderabad will stab her in the back. I am not so sure we would not." Sardar Patel responded later by stating "If you threaten us with violence, swords will be met with swords".
In Hyderabad, militia leader Qasim Razvi told a crowd of Razakars, "Death with the sword in hand, is always preferable to extinction by a mere stroke of the pen". Razvi was later described by Indian government officials as "The Nizam’s Frankenstein Monster". In response to reports that India was planning to invade Hyderabad Razwi stated, "If India attacks us I can and will create a turmoil throughout India. We will perish but India will perish also." Time magazine magazine pointed out that if India invaded Hyderabad, the Razakars would massacre Hindus, which would lead to retaliatory massacres of Muslims across India.
Skirmish at Kodar[edit | edit source]
On 6 September an Indian police post near Chillakallu village came under heavy fire from Razakar units. The Indian Army command sent a squadron of The Poona Horse led by Abhey Singh and a company of 2/5 Gurkha Rifles to investigate who were also fired upon by the Razakars. The tanks of the Poona Horse then chased the Razakars to Kodar, in Hyderabad territory. Here they were opposed by the armoured cars of 1 Hyderabad Lancers. In a brief action the Poona Horse destroyed one armoured car and forced the surrender of the state garrison at Kodar.
Indian military preparations[edit | edit source]
On receiving directions from the government to seize and annex Hyderabad, the Indian army came up with the Goddard Plan (laid out by Lt. Gen. E. N. Goddard, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Command). The plan envisaged two main thrusts - from Vijayawada in the East and Solapur in the West - while smaller units pinned down the Hyderabadi army along the border. Overall command was placed in the hands of Lt. Gen. Rajendrasinghji, DSO.
The attack from Solapur was led by Major General J.N. Chaudhari and was composed of four task forces:
- Strike Force comprising a mix of fast moving infantry, cavalry and light artillery,
- Smash Force consisting of predominantly armoured units and artillery,
- Kill Force composed of infantry and engineering units
- Vir Force which comprised infantry, anti-tank and engineering units.
The attack from Vijayawada was led by Major General A.A. Rudra and comprised the 2/5 Gurkha Rifles, one squadron of the 17th (Poona) Horse, and a troop from the 19th Field Battery along with engineering and ancillary units. In addition, four infantry battalions were to neutralize and protect lines of communication. Two squadrons of Hawker Tempest aircraft were prepared for air support from the Pune base.
The date for the attack was fixed as 13 September, even though General Sir Roy Bucher, the Indian chief of staff, had objected on grounds that Hyderabad would be an additional front for the Indian army after Kashmir.
Commencement of hostilities[edit | edit source]
Day 1, 13 September[edit | edit source]
The first battle was fought at Naldurg Fort on the Solapur Secundarabad Highway between a defending force of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and the attacking force of the 7th Brigade. Using speed and surprise, the 7th Brigade managed to secure a vital bridge on the Bori river intact, following which an assault was made on the Hyderabadi positions at Naldurg by the 2nd Sikh Infantry. The bridge and road secured, an armoured column of the 1st Armoured Brigade - part of the Smash force - moved into the town of Jalkot, 8 km from Naldurg, at 0900 hours, paving the way for the Strike Force units under Lt. Col Ram Singh Commandant of 9 Dogra (a motorised battalion) to pass through. This armoured column reached the town of Umarge, 61 km inside Hyderabad by 1515 hours, where it quickly overpowered resistance from Razakar units defending the town. Meanwhile, another column consisting of a squadron of 3rd Cavalry, a troop from 18th King Edward's Own Cavalry, a troop from 9 Para Field Regiment, 10 Field Company Engineers, 3/2 Punjab Regiment, 2/1 Gurkha Rifles, 1 Mewar Infantry, and ancillary units attacked the town of Tuljapur, about 34 km north-west of Naldurg. They reached Tuljapur at dawn, where they encountered resistance from a unit of the 1st Hyderabad Infantry and about 200 Razakars who fought for two hours before surrendering. Further advance towards the town of Lohara was stalled as the river had swollen. The first day on the Western front ended with the Indians inflicting heavy casualties on the Hyderabadis and capturing large tracts of territory. Amongst the captured defenders was a British mercenary who had been tasked with blowing up the bridge near Naldurg.
In the East, forces led by Lt. Gen A.A. Rudra met with fierce resistance from two armoured units of Humber armoured cars and Staghound armoured cars, but managed to reach the town of Kodar by 0830 hours. Pressing on, the force reached Mungala by the afternoon.
There were further incidents in Hospet - where the 1st Mysore assaulted and secured a sugar factory from units of Razakars and Pathans - and at Tungabhadra - where the 5/5 Gurkha attacked and secured a vital bridge from the Hyderabadi army.
Day 2, 14 September[edit | edit source]
The force that had camped at Umarge proceeded to the town of Rajasur, 48 km east. As aerial reconnaissance had shown well entrenched ambush positions set up along the way, the air strikes from squadrons of Tempests were called in. These air strikes effectively cleared the route and allowed the land forces to reach and secure Rajasur by the afternoon.
The Assault force from the East was meanwhile slowed down by an anti-tank ditch and later came under heavy fire from hillside positions of the 1st Lancers and 5th Infantry 6 km from Suryapet. The positions were assaulted by the 2/5 Gurkha - veterans of the Burma Campaign - and was neutralised with the Hyderabadis taking severe casualties.
A force under the command of Maj. Gen. D.S. Brar was tasked with capturing the city of Aurangabad. The city was attacked by six columns of infantry and cavalry, resulting in the civil administration emerging in the afternoon and offering a surrender to the Indians.
There were further incidents in Jalna where 3 Sikh, a company of 2 Jodhpur infantry and some tanks from 18 Cavalry faced stubborn resistance from Hyderabadi forces.
Day 3, 15 September[edit | edit source]
Leaving a company of 3/11 Gurkhas to occupy the town of Jalna, the remainder of the force moved to Latur, and later to Mominabad where they faced action against the 3 Golconda Lancers who gave token resistance before surrendering.
At the town of Surriapet, air strikes cleared most of the Hyderabadi defences, although some Razakar units still gave resistance to the 2/5 Gurkhas who occupied the town. The retreating Hyderabadi forces destroyed the bridge at Musi to delay the Indians but failed to offer covering fire, allowing the bridge to be quickly repaired. Another incident occurred at Narkatpalli where a Razakar unit was decimated by the Indians.
Day 4, 16 September[edit | edit source]
The task force under Lt. Col. Ram Singh moved towards Zahirabad at dawn, but was slowed down by a minefield, which had to be cleared. On reaching the junction of the Bidar road with the Solapur-Hyderabad City Highway, the forces encountered gunfire from ambush positions. However, leaving some of the units to handle the ambush, the bulk of the force moved on to reach 15 kilometres beyond Zahirabad by nightfall in spite of sporadic resistance along the way. Most of the resistance was from Razakar units who ambushed the Indians as they passed through urban areas. The Razakars were able to use the terrain to their advantage until the Indians brought in their 75 mm guns.
Day 5, 17 September[edit | edit source]
In the early hours of 17 September, the Indian army entered Bidar. Meanwhile, forces led by the 1st Armoured regiment were at the town of Chityal about 60 km from the capital city, while another column took over the town of Hingoli. By the morning of the 5th day of hostilities, it had become clear that the Hyderabad army and the Razakars had been routed on all fronts and with extremely heavy casualties. At 5PM of 17 September Nizam announced ceasefire thus ending the armed action.
Capitulation and surrender[edit | edit source]
Consultations with Indian envoy[edit | edit source]
On 16 September, faced with imminent defeat, the Nizam summoned the Prime Minister Mir Laik Ali and requested his resignation by the morning of the following day. The resignation was delivered along with the resignations of the entire cabinet.
On the noon of 17 September, a messenger brought a personal note from the Nizam to India's Agent General to Hyderabad, K.M. Munshi summoning him to the Nizam's office at 1600 hours. At the meeting, the Nizam stated "The vultures have resigned. I don't know what to do". Munshi advised the Nizam to secure the safety of the citizens of Hyderabad by issuing appropriate orders to the Commander of the Hyderabad State Army, Major General El Edroos. This was immediately done.
Radio broadcast after surrender by Nizam[edit | edit source]
It was the Nizam's first visit to the radio station. The Nizam of Hyderabad, in his radio speech on 23 September 1948, said "In November last , a small group which had organized a quasi-military organization surrounded the homes of my Prime Minister, the Nawab of Chhatari, in whose wisdom I had complete confidence, and of Sir Walter Monkton, my constitutional Adviser, by duress compelled the Nawab and other trusted ministers to resign and forced the Laik Ali Ministry on me. This group headed by Kasim Razvi had no stake in the country or any record of service behind it. By methods reminiscent of Hitlerite Germany it took possession of the State, spread terror ... and rendered me completely helpless." 
The surrender ceremony[edit | edit source]
According to the records maintained by Indian Army, General Chaudhari lead an armoured column into Hyderabad at around 4 p.m. on September 18 and the Hyderabad army, led by Major General El Edroos, surrendered.
Aftermath[edit | edit source]
After having received information that widespread communal violence against Muslims in reprisal for previous atrocities against Hindus, Prime Minister Nehru sent congressman Pandit Sunderlal and a mixed-faith team to investigate. Reporting back the team estimated that between 27,000 and 40,000 civilians have died and that some members of the Indian army and police force participated in violent acts.
References[edit | edit source]
- http://indianarmy.nic.in - Official Indian army website complete Roll of Honor of Indian KIA
- Hyderabad 1948 Revisited IndiaDefence.com
- "Hyderabad 1948: India's hidden massacre". 24 September 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24159594. Retrieved 24 September 2013.
- Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724-1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p.75
- Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724-1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p.73
- "There once was a Hyderabad!". MOHAN GURUSWAMY. http://www.india-seminar.com/2008/585/585_mohan_guruswamy.htm. Retrieved 2010-08-03.
- By Frank Moraes, Jawaharlal Nehru, Mumbai: Jaico.2007, p.394
- "HYDERABAD: The Holdout". Time. 30 August 1948. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,799076-2,00.html. Retrieved 20 May 2010.
- "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. Chennai, India. 14 September 2005. http://www.hindu.com/2005/09/14/stories/2005091405050200.htm.
- Autocracy to Integration, Lucien D Benichou, Orient Longman (2000), p. 237
- "When the Indian Army liberated thousands". The Hindu. 14 Sep, 2005. http://www.hindu.com/2005/09/14/stories/2005091405050200.htm. Retrieved 2011-09-19.
- Kate, P. V., Marathwada Under the Nizams, 1724-1948, Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1987, p.84
- Thomson, Mike (September 24, 2013). "Hyderabad 1948: India's hidden massacre". BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-24159594. Retrieved September 24, 2013.
- Zubrzycki, John. (2006) The Last Nizam: An Indian Prince in the Australian Outback. Pan Macmillan, Australia. ISBN 978-0-330-42321-2.
[edit | edit source]
- A Blog by Narendra Luther on Operation Polo
- Picture of VII Nizam with Sardar Patel after his surrender
- From the Sundarlal Report, Frontline
- Of a massacre untold - A.G.Noorani
- In the Nizam's dominion
- Armchair Historian - Operation Polo (Monday, 18 September 2006) - Contributed by Sidin Sunny Vadukut - Last Updated (Monday, 18 September 2006)
- Hyderabad 1948: India's hidden massacre
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