282,665 Pages

Operation Savannah was the name given to the South African Defence Force's 1975–1976 covert intervention in the Angolan Civil War.

Operation Savannah
Part of South African Border War
Location Angola
Operation Savannah (Angola) is located in Angola
Cassinga
Luanda
Ebo
Calueque
Benguela
Ambrizete
Lobito
Xangongo
Huambo
Operation Savannah (Angola) (Angola)
Objective
Date 1975-1976


Background[edit | edit source]

After a struggle of 14 years, aided by the so-called "Carnation Revolution" of 25 April 1974 which ended Portugal's dictatorial colonial government, Angola's three main liberation forces, FNLA, UNITA and the leftist MPLA began competing for dominance in the country. Fighting began in November 1974, starting in the capital city, Luanda, and spreading quickly across all of Angola, which was soon divided among the combatants. The FNLA occupied northern Angola and UNITA the central south, while The MPLA mostly occupied the coastline, the far south-east and, after capturing it in November 1974, Cabinda. Negotiations for independence resulted in the Treaty of Alvor being signed on 15 January 1975, naming the date of official independence as 11 November 1975. The agreement ended the war for independence but marked the escalation of the civil war. Two dissenting groups, the Front for the Liberation of the Enclave of Cabinda and the Eastern Revolt, never signed the accords, as they were excluded from negotiations. The coalition government established by the Treaty of Alvor soon ended as nationalist factions, doubting one another's intentions, tried to control the country by force. [1][2] Fighting between the three forces resumed in Luanda hardly a day after the transitional government assumed office on 15 January 1975. [3] [4] .[5] The liberation forces sought to seize strategic points, most importantly the capital, by the official day of independence. By March 1975, the FNLA was driving towards Luanda from the north, joined by units of the Zairian army which the United States had encouraged Zaire's dictator, Mobutu Sese Seko, to provide.[6] Between 28 April and early May, 1,200 Zairian troops crossed into northern Angola to assist the FNL. [7] [8] The FNLA eliminated all remaining MPLA presence in the northern provinces and assumed positions east of Kifangondo at the eastern outskirts of Luanda, from where it continued to encroach on the capital.[9][10] The situation for the MPLA in Luanda became increasingly precarious. The MPLA received supplies from the Soviet Union and repeatedly requested 100 officers for military training from Cuba. Until late August, Cuba had a few technical advisors in Angola, which the CIA noted.[11] By 9 July, the MPLA gained control of the capital, Luanda.

Starting 21 August, Cuba established four training facilities (CIR) with almost 500 men, which were to form about 4,800 FAPLA recruits in three to six months.[12][13] The mission was expected to be short-term and to endure about 6 months.[14] The CIR in Cabinda accounted for almost half of the total, 191 men, while the ones at Benguela, Saurimo (formerly Henrique de Carvalho) and at N'Dalatando (formerly Salazar) had 66 or 67 each. Some were posted in headquarters in Luanda or in other places throughout the country. The training centres were operational on 18–20 October.[15]

Military intervention[edit | edit source]

South African involvement in Angola, part of what it termed the Border War, started in 1966 when SWAPO, a liberation force of Southwest Africa, began killing South Africans in that district. At that time SWAPO had its bases in Ovamboland and Zambia.[16]

With the loss of the Portuguese as an ally and the possibility of communist pro-SWAPO governments in the two former colonies (Angola and Mozambique), the Pretoria government would lose the remaining sections of its valued "cordon sanitaire" (buffer zone) between itself and hostile pro-communist Africa.[16][17][18][19] SWAPO would have a safe haven from which to operate in Angola, and South Africa was confronted not only with the issue of another hostile government in the region but also of having to cross another border in pursuit of SWAPO.

The Angolan Civil War became a major Cold War conflict. The South Africans continued to aid UNITA, operate in and occupy parts of Southern Angola and Cubans remained stationed in the country. The USSR supplied weapons to Angola. The United States officially ended direct assistance to UNITA by the Clark Amendment but it was continued secretly and later again officially during the Reagan administration. The PRC withdrew its military advisers from Zaire, ending assistance for the FNLA.[20]

Support for UNITA and FNLA[edit | edit source]

Consequently, with the covert assistance of the United States through the CIA, it began assisting UNITA and the FNLA in a bid to ensure that a neutral or friendly government in Luanda prevailed. On 14 July 1975, South African Prime Minister Balthazar Vorster approved weapons worth US $14 million to be bought secretly for FNLA and UNITA.[21][22] of which the first shipments from South Africa arrived in August 1975.

Ruacana-Calueque occupation[edit | edit source]

On 9 August 1975 a 30-man patrol of the South African Defence Force (SADF) moved some 50 km into southern Angola and occupied the Ruacana-Calueque hydro-electric complex and other installations on the Cunene River.[23] The scheme was an important strategic asset for Ovamboland, which relied on it for its water supply. The facility had been completed earlier in the year with South African funding.[24] Several hostile incidences with UNITA and SWAPO frightening foreign workers had provided a rationale for the occupation.[25] The defence of the facility in southern Angola also was South Africa's justification for the first permanent deployment of regular SADF units inside Angola.[26][27] On 22 August 1975 the SADF initiated operation "Sausage II", a major raid against SWAPO in southern Angola and on 4 September 1975, Vorster authorized the provision of limited military training, advice and logistical assistance. In turn FNLA and UNITA would help the South Africans fight SWAPO.[16][28]

Meanwhile, the MPLA had gained against UNITA in Southern Angola and by mid-October was in control of 12 of Angola's provinces and most cities. UNITA's territory had been shrinking to parts of central Angola,[29] and it became apparent that UNITA did not have any chance of capturing Luanda by independence day, which neither the United States nor South Africa were willing to accept.[30]

The SADF established a training camp near Silva Porto (Kuito) and prepared the defences of Nova Lisboa (Huambo). They assembled the mobile attack unit "Foxbat" to stop approaching FAPLA-units with which it clashed on 5 October, thus saving Nova Lisboa for UNITA.[31]

Task Force Zulu[edit | edit source]

On 14 October, the South Africans secretly initiated Operation Savannah when Task Force Zulu, the first of several South African columns, crossed from Namibia into Cuando Cubango. The operation provided for elimination of the MPLA from the southern border area, then from south western Angola, from the central region, and finally for the capture of Luanda.[32] According to John Stockwell, a former CIA officer, "there was close liaison between the CIA and the South Africans" [30] and "’high officials’ in Pretoria claimed that their intervention in Angola had been based on an ‘understanding’ with the United States".[33]

With the liberation forces busy fighting each other, the SADF advanced very quickly. Task Force Foxbat joined the invasion in mid-October.[16][34][35] The territory the MPLA had just gained in the south was quickly lost to the South African advances. After South African advisors and antitank weapons helped to stop an MPLA advance on Nova Lisboa (Huambo) in early October, Zulu captured Rocadas (Xangongo) by 20, Sa da Bandeira (Lubango) by 24 and Mocamedes by 28 October. With the South Africans moving quickly toward Luanda, the Cubans had to terminate the CIR at Salazar only 3 days after it started operating and deployed most of the instructors and Angolan recruits in Luanda.[36] On 2–3 November, 51 Cubans from the CIR Benguela and South Africans had their first direct encounter near Catengue, where FAPLA unsuccessfully tried to stop the Zulu advance. This encounter led Zulu-Commander Breytenbach to conclude that his troops had faced the best organized FAPLA opposition to date.[37]

Cuban Intervention[edit | edit source]

After the MPLA debacle at Catengue, the Cubans became very aware of the South African intervention. On 4 November Castro decided to begin an intervention on an unprecedented scale: "Operation Carlota". The same day, a first airplane with 100 heavy weapon specialists, which the MPLA had requested in September, left for Brazzaville, arriving in Luanda on 7 November. On November 9 the first 100 men of a contingent of a 652-strong battalion of elite Special Forces were flown in.[38] The 100 specialists and 88 men of the special forces were dispatched immediately to the nearby front at Kifangondo. They assisted 850 FAPLA, 200 Katangans and one Soviet advisor.

With the help of the Cubans and the Soviet advisor, FAPLA decisively repelled an FNLA-Zairian assault in the Battle of Kifangondo on 8 November.[39] The South African contingent, 52 men commanded by General Ben de Wet Roos, that had provided for the artillery on the northern front, had to be evacuated by ship on 28 November.[40] MPLA-leader Agostinho Neto proclaimed independence and the formation of the People's Republic of Angola on 11 November and became its first President.

South African Reinforcements[edit | edit source]

On 6 and 7 November 1975 Zulu captured the harbour cities of Benguela (terminal of the Benguela railroad) and Lobito. The towns and cities captured by the SADF were given to UNITA. In central Angola, at the same time, combat unit Foxbat had moved 800 km north toward Luanda.[26] By then, the South Africans realised that Luanda could not be captured by independence day on 11 November and the South Africans considered to end the advance and retreat. But on 10 November 1975 Vorster relented to UNITA's urgent request to maintain the military pressure with the objective of capturing as much territory as possible before the impending meeting of the OAU.[41] Thus, Zulu and Foxbat continued north with two new battle groups formed further inland (X-Ray and Orange) and "there was little reason to think the FAPLA would be able to stop this expanded force from capturing Luanda within a week." [42] Through November and December 1975, the SADF presence in Angola numbered 2,900 to 3,000 personnel.[43] After Luanda was secured against the north and with enforcements from Cuba arriving, Zulu faced stronger resistance advancing on Novo Redondo (Sumbe). First Cuban reinforcements arrived in Porto Amboim, only a few km north of Novo Redondo, quickly destroying three bridges crossing the Queve river, effectively stopping the South African advance along the coast on 13 November 1975.[44] Despite concerted efforts to advance north to Novo Redondo, the SADF was unable to break through FAPLA defences.[45][46][47] In a last successful advance a South African task force and UNITA troops captured Luso on the Benguela railway on 11 December which they held until 27 December.[48]

End of South African Advance[edit | edit source]

By mid-December South Africa extended military service and brought in reserves.[49][50] "An indication of the seriousness of the situation … is that one of the most extensive military call-ups in South African history is now taking place".[51] By late December, the Cubans had deployed 3,500 to 4,000 troops in Angola, of which 1,000 were securing Cabinda,[52] and eventually the struggle began to favour of the MPLA.[53] Apart from being "bogged down" on the southern front,[54] the South African advance halted, “as all attempts by Battle-Groups Orange and X-Ray to extend the war into the interior had been forced to turn back by destroyed bridges”.[55] In addition, South Africa had to deal with two other major setbacks: the international press criticism of the operation and the associated change of US policies.

Major battles and incidents[edit | edit source]

Battle of Quifangondo[edit | edit source]

On 10 November 1975, the day before Angolan independence, the FNLA attempted against advice to capture Luanda from the MPLA. South African gunners and aircraft assisted the offensive which went horribly wrong for the attackers; they were routed by the FAPLA assisted by Cubans manning superior weaponry that had arrived recently in the country. The South African artillery, antiquated due to the UN embargo, was not any match for the longer-ranged Cuban BM-21 rocket launchers, and therefore could not influence the result of the battle.

Battle of Ebo[edit | edit source]

The Cuban military, anticipating a South African advance (under the direction of Lieutenant Christopher du Raan) towards the town of Ebo, established positions there at a river crossing to thwart any assault. The defending artillery force, equipped with a BM-21 battery, a 76mm field gun, and several anti-tank units, subsequently destroyed five to six Eland armoured cars, whilst they were bogged down with RPG-7s, on November 25, killing 5 and wounding 11 South African soldiers.[citation needed] A Cessna spotter aircraft was shot down over Ebo the following day. This was the first tangible South African defeat of Operation Savannah.

"Bridge 14"[edit | edit source]

The Battle of "Bridge 14" was fought on the 9 December at the Nhia River at 11°03′03″S 15°04′49″E / 11.050839°S 15.080325°E / -11.050839; 15.080325 (Bridge 14). An important bridge structure located there had been demolished by withdrawing Cuban forces in an ultimately futile attempt to stall the South African Defence Force as it marched on Quibala. The South African forces were known as Battle Group Foxbat under the command of Commandant George Kruys.[56]

The South Africans managed to place a handful of observers on a nearby hill dubbed "Top Hat", from which they were able to direct 5.5 inch artillery fire effectively against the enemy positions.[57] South African sappers successfully rebuilt the bridge despite heavy Cuban opposition, allowing an infantry and armoured car column to breach the river.[56] A number of Sagger missile crews had expected to ambush the advancing vehicles, but the South Africans carefully skirted the road, routing the Cuban-MPLA troops on the opposite bank.

During the fighting, Danny Roxo claimed to have single-handedly killed twelve Cuban and MPLA soldiers while conducting a reconnaissance of the bridge, an action for which he was awarded the Honoris Crux.[58] Several other South African military personnel were decorated with the medal for bravery during this battle, some posthumously. It is estimated 400 Cuban and MPLA soldiers died in the attack while the South Africans lost four SADF soldiers.[56]

In 1976, the SADF created a brief film depicting the victory, entitled Brug 14 (Afrikaans for 'Bridge 14'). This film was screened across national television when the South African Broadcasting Corporation began television broadcasts later that year.

Battle of Luso[edit | edit source]

On December 11, the South African Task Force X-Ray followed the Bengueala railway line from Silva Porto (Kuito) east to Luso, which they overran on the 11th December 1975.[59] The South African contingent included an armoured squadron, supporting infantry units, some atillery, engineers, and UNITA irregulars. Their main objective was to seize the Luso airport [1], which later went on to serve as a supply point until the South Africans finally departed Angola in early January 1976.

Battles Involving Battlegroup Zulu in the West[edit | edit source]

There were numerous unrecorded clashes fought in the southwest between Colonel Jan Breytenbach's SADF battlegroup and scattered MPLA positions during Operation Savannah. Eventually, Breytenbach's men were able to advance three thousand kilometers over Angolan soil in thirty-three days. On a related note, Battlegroup Zulu later formed the basis of South Africa's famous 32 Battalion.

Ambrizete Incident[edit | edit source]

The South African Navy was not planned to be involved in the hereunto land operation, but after the Battle of Quifangondo, nevertheless had to hastily extract a number of army personnel by sea from far behind enemy lines in Angola, as well as abandoned guns. Ambrizete north of Luanda at 7°13′25″S 12°51′24″E / 7.22361°S 12.85667°E / -7.22361; 12.85667 (Ambizete) was chosen as the pick-up point for the gunners involved in the action at Quifangondo. The frigates SAS President Kruger and SAS President Steyn went to the area, where the latter used inflatable boats and its Westland Wasp helicopter to extract 26 personnel successfully from the beach on 28 November 1975.[60] The replenishment oiler SAS Tafelberg provided logistical support to the frigates, and picked up the guns in Ambriz after they were towed to Zaire, and took them to Walvis Bay.

General Constand Viljoen, who had grave concerns at the time about the safety of both his soldiers and abandoned field guns, called it "the most difficult night ever in my operational career".[61]

The success of this operation was exceptionally fortuitous, given that the South African Navy had been penetrated by the spy Dieter Gerhardt.

Aftermath[edit | edit source]

South Africa continued to assist UNITA in order to ensure that SWAPO did not establish any bases in southern Angola.

The 49 South African casualties during the conflict were never acknowledged by the SADF, who were operating covertly in the country. These soldiers were listed simply as 'missing' rather than 'killed in action', resulting in a number of Supreme Court cases afterwards to change their status.

Further reading[edit | edit source]

References[edit | edit source]

  1. Tvedten, Inge (1997). Angola: Struggle for Peace and Reconstruction. pp. 36. 
  2. Schneidman, Witney Wright (2004). Engaging Africa: Washington and the Fall of Portugal's Colonial Empire. pp. 200. 
  3. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 50-59
  4. Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0044)
  5. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976, The University of North Carolina Press, 2002
  6. Norton, W.: In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story, New York, 1978, quoted in: Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 67, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  7. Wright, George in: The Destruction of a Nation: United States’ Policy toward Angola since 1945, Pluto Press, London, Chicago, 1997, ISBN 0-7453-1029-X, p. 60
  8. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 63
  9. Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0046)
  10. Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 68 and 70, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  11. CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4, NSA
  12. CIA, National Intelligence Daily, October 11, 1975, p. 4
  13. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 228
  14. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 65
  15. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 67
  16. 16.0 16.1 16.2 16.3 Library of Congress Country Studies: http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cstdy:@field(DOCID+ao0047)
  17. Stührenberg, Michael in: Die Zeit 17/1988, Die Schlacht am Ende der Welt, p. 11
  18. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 273-276
  19. Dr. Leopold Scholtz: The Namibian Border War (Stellenbosch University)
  20. Hanhimaki, Jussi M. (2004). The Flawed Architect: Henry Kissinger and American Foreign Policy. pp. 416. 
  21. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, p. 64-65
  22. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80
  23. Steenkamp, Willem (1989). South Africa's Border War 1966–1989. p. 39.
  24. "Agreement between the government of the Republic of South Africa and the government of Portugal in regard to the first phase of development of the water resources of the Cunene river basin". Département de l'administration et des finances (Portugal). 21 January 1969. http://www.fao.org/docrep/W7414B/w7414b11.htm. 
  25. Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the Generals. New Holland Publishers. p. 21. ISBN 978-1-86872-340-9. http://books.google.com/books?id=mYgWcHq8lE8C. Retrieved 2007-10-15. 
  26. 26.0 26.1 IPRI—Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais : The United States and the Portuguese Decolonization (1974-1976) Kenneth Maxwell, Council on Foreign Relations. Paper presented at the International Conference "Portugal, Europe and the United States", Lisbon, October, 2003
  27. Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 71, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  28. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 68
  29. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Bureau of Intelligence and Research, DOS, in: Angola: The MPLA Prepares for Independence, September 22, 1975, p 4-5, National Security Archive, Washington, quoting: Le Monde, September 13, 1975, p. 3 and quoting: Diaz Arguelles to Colomé, October 1, 1975, p. 11
  30. 30.0 30.1 Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  31. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 69
  32. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Deon Geldenhuys in: The Diplomacy of Isolation: South African Foreign Policy Making, p. 80, quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 32, 63, 86 and quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in: Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, pp. 93-101
  33. Marcum, John in: Lessons of Angola, Foreign Affairs 54, No. 3 (April 1976), quoted in: Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 62, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  34. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) p. 298
  35. Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 62, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  36. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 73-74
  37. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 76
  38. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 77-78
  39. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 82
  40. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa's Border War, 1966-1989, Gibraltar, 1989, p. 51-52; quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 140 –143; quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 121-122; quoting: de Villiers, PW, p. 259
  41. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 93
  42. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 94
  43. Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 215
  44. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 94-96
  45. Observer, December 7, 1975, p. 11
  46. Times, December 11, 1975, p. 7
  47. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 154-73; quoting: Spies, F. J. du Toit in. Operasie Savannah. Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 203–18
  48. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: du Preez, Sophia in: Avontuur in Angola. Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-1976, Pretoria, 1989, p. 186-201
  49. Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 8, December 28, 1975, E3 (quoting Botha)
  50. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Steenkamp, Willem in: South Africa's Border War 1966-1989, Gibraltar,1989, p. 55
  51. Rand Daily Mail, January 16
  52. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, (The University of North Carolina Press), p. 325
  53. Smith, Wayne: A Trap in Angola in: Foreign Policy No. 62, Spring 1986, p. 72, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
  54. Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to all American Republic Diplomatic posts, December 20, 1975, NSA
  55. George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 107
  56. 56.0 56.1 56.2 Steenkamp, Willem. South Africa's Border War 1966 - 1989. Ashanti Publishing, 1989. p. 54.
  57. Edward George (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991: From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Routledge. pp. 102–103. ISBN 0-415-35015-8. http://books.google.com/books?id=u_0yE0vcBQoC. 
  58. http://sadf.sentinelprojects.com/sasfl/roxmed.html
  59. http://home.wanadoo.nl/rhodesia/sadfhist.htm
  60. Rear Admiral Chris Bennet. Operation Savannah November 1975: Ambrizette. Just Done Productions. http://jgower.co.za/commandpost/anecdotes/24504600_1144505641.pdf. Retrieved 2007-09-26. 
  61. Hamann, Hilton (2001). Days of the Generals. New Holland Publishers. p. 38. 

External links[edit | edit source]

This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors).
Community content is available under CC-BY-SA unless otherwise noted.