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The "Powell Doctrine" is a journalist-created term, named after General Colin Powell in the run-up to the 1990-1991 Gulf War. It is based in large part on the Weinberger Doctrine, devised by Caspar Weinberger, former Secretary of Defense and Powell's former boss. The doctrine emphasizes U.S. national security interests.

The Doctrine[edit | edit source]

The Powell Doctrine states that a list of questions all have to be answered affirmatively before military action is taken by the United States:

  1. Is a vital national security interest threatened?
  2. Do we have a clear attainable objective?
  3. Have the risks and costs been fully and frankly analyzed?
  4. Have all other non-violent policy means been fully exhausted?
  5. Is there a plausible exit strategy to avoid endless entanglement?
  6. Have the consequences of our action been fully considered?
  7. Is the action supported by the American people?
  8. Do we have genuine broad international support?[1]

As Powell said in an April 1, 2009 interview on The Rachel Maddow Show, the Doctrine denotes the exhausting of all "political, economic, and diplomatic means," which, only if those means prove to be futile, should a nation resort to military force. Powell has expanded upon the Doctrine, asserting that when a nation is engaging in war, every resource and tool should be used to achieve decisive force against the enemy, minimizing US casualties and ending the conflict quickly by forcing the weaker force to capitulate. This is well in line with Western military strategy dating at least from Carl von Clausewitz's On War.[citation needed]

Analysis and Commentaries[edit | edit source]

The Doctrine has been used to compare the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, and the Iraq War.[2]

Political scientist Robert Farley has criticised the Powell doctrine on the grounds that it is "an effort by the uniformed military to restrict the policymaking freedom of civilians".[3]

The Powell Doctrine has been reported as emerging legacy from Korean and Vietnam and 'Never Again vs. Limited War' policy debates (either win or don't start versus value of limited war) [4][5] and Weinberger's Six Tests described in his 1984 speech 'The Uses of Military Power'.[6] The Doctrine has been noted as not fully applicable for policy in conflicts that are humanitarian intervention, war of choice, protracted counter-insurgency or anti-terrorism, and where the criteria are subjective or open to differing interpetations.

See also[edit | edit source]

References[edit | edit source]

Further reading[edit | edit source]

  • Heiko Meiertöns: The Doctrines of US Security Policy - An Evaluation under International Law, Cambridge University Press (2010), ISBN 978-0-521-76648-7.
  • Christopher D. O'Sullivan, Colin Powell: American Power and Intervention From Vietnam to Iraq, New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, (2009)
  • U.S. FORCES: CHALLENGES AHEAD. Powell, Colin L. Foreign Affairs; Winter92, Vol. 71 Issue 5, p32-45, 14p
  • Rachel Maddow interview with Colin Powell April 1, 2009

External links[edit | edit source]

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