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Provisional Irish Republican Army
(Óglaigh na hÉireann)
Participant in the Troubles
File:Mk-15-BB.jpg
Mortar and RPG displayed by IRA members (1992)
Active 1969–2005
Ideology Irish republicanism
Democratic socialism
Leaders IRA Army Council
Strength ~10,000 over 30 years[1]
Originated as Irish Republican Army
Opponents British Army, RUC[2][3][4]

The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) (Irish language: Óglaigh na hÉireann ) was an Irish republican paramilitary organisation whose aim was to remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and bring about a socialist republic within a united Ireland by force of arms and political persuasion.[5] It emerged out of the December 1969 split of the Irish Republican Army over differences of ideology and planned response to violence against the nationalist community. This violence had followed the community's demands for civil rights in 1968 and 1969, which met with resistance from some of the unionist community and from the authorities, and culminated in the 1969 Northern Ireland riots.[6]

The Provisional Irish Republican Army was also referred to as PIRA, the Provos, or by its supporters as the Army or the 'RA;[7] its constitution established it as Óglaigh na hÉireann ("Irish Volunteers") in the Irish language[8] and usually referred to its members as volunteers. The IRA is a proscribed organisation in the UK under the Terrorism Act 2000 and an unlawful organisation in the Republic of Ireland.[9][10] The United States includes them in the category of "other selected terrorist groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism".[11]

Overview of strategies[]

The IRA's initial strategy was to use force to cause the collapse of the Northern Ireland administration and to inflict enough casualties on the British forces that the British government would be forced by public opinion to withdraw from the region.[12] This policy involved recruitment of volunteers, increasing after the 1972 Bloody Sunday incident, in which the British military fired on protesters, and launching attacks against British military and economic targets.[13][14] The campaign was supported by arms and funding from Libya[15] and from some groups in the United States.[16][17]

The IRA agreed to a ceasefire in February 1975, which lasted nearly a year[18] before the IRA concluded that the British were drawing them into politics without offering any guarantees in relation to the IRA's goals, and hopes of a quick victory receded.[19] As a result, the IRA launched a new strategy known as "the Long War". This saw them conduct a war of attrition against the British and increase emphasis on political activity, via the political party Sinn Féin.[20] The process which the IRA went through to determine an offender's "guilt" or "innocence" was never open to debate or scrutiny. The IRA also engaged in attacks that broke the bones of alleged offenders, or involved shooting through the hands, or knees for persistent offenders of activities such as joyriding or drug dealing. In certain cases, for persistent offenders the IRA would serve a notice for the individual to leave the country, this was known as being "put out" of the community/country, and the clear message given to individuals served with these notices was that if they returned to the community/country they would be killed. This practice was frequently criticised by all sections of the political establishment in Northern Ireland as "summary justice".

Informers[]

In an effort to stamp out what the IRA termed "collaboration with British forces" and "informing", they killed a number of Catholic civilians, such as Joseph Fenton. Purges against these individuals, whom the IRA considered traitors to their own community and to the cause of nationalism, were most prevalent when the IRA found itself persistently vulnerable to infiltration. Investigations into informers and infiltration are suspected to have been dealt with by an IRA unit called the Internal Security Unit (ISU), known colloquially as the "Nutting Squad". This unit is said to be directly attached to IRA GHQ. Where a confession was solicited, the victim was often exiled or executed with a bullet in the back of the head. The body was either buried or, later in the IRA campaign, left in a public place, often in South Armagh.

One particular example of the killing of a person deemed by the IRA to have been an informer that is the source of continuing controversy is that of Jean McConville from Belfast, who was killed by the IRA. Ed Moloney and IRA sources continue to claim she was an informer despite the Police Ombudsman recently stating that this was not the case. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) have described the killing as a "war crime". Her family contend that she was killed as a punishment for aiding a dying British soldier in West Belfast, however this claim has been rejected in an official investigation,[21] while neither the Sutton Index or Lost Lives record the death of any British soldier near her home prior to her killing.[22]

In March 2007, Police Ombudsman Nuala O'Loan announced that there would be an inquiry into claims of collusion between IRA members and the British security forces.[23]

Attacks on other republican paramilitary groups[]

The IRA has also feuded with other republican paramilitary groups such as the Official IRA in the 1970s and the Irish People's Liberation Organisation in the 1990s.

Leading Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) member Joseph O'Connor was shot dead in Ballymurphy, west Belfast on 11 October 2000. Claims have been made by O'Connor's family and people associated with the RIRA that he was killed by the IRA as the result of a feud between the organisations.[24] but Sinn Féin denied the claims.[25] No-one has been charged with his killing.

Casualties[]

This is a summary. For a detailed breakdown of casualties caused by and inflicted on the IRA see Provisional IRA campaign 1969-1997#Casualties

File:Provo-landOmagh.jpg

An IRA signpost with the word "Provoland" underneath in Omagh, County Tyrone.

The IRA was responsible for more deaths than any other group during the Troubles.[26] Two very detailed studies of deaths in the Troubles, the CAIN project at the University of Ulster, and Lost Lives,[27] differ slightly on the numbers killed by the IRA, but a rough synthesis gives a figure of 1,800 deaths. Of these, roughly 1,100 were members of the security forces: British Army, Royal Ulster Constabulary and Ulster Defence Regiment; an estimated 510 were civilians according to Sutton,[28] while the civilian toll reaches 640 per McKittrick.[29] The remainder were either loyalist or republican paramilitaries (including over 100 IRA members accidentally killed by their own bombs or shot after being exposed as security force agents).

The IRA lost a little under 300 members killed in the Troubles.[30] In addition, roughly 50–60 members of Sinn Féin were killed.[31] However there were far more IRA volunteers imprisoned as opposed to killed. Journalists Eamonn Mallie and Patrick Bishop estimate in their book The Provisional IRA that roughly 8,000 people passed through the ranks of the IRA in the first 20 years of its existence, many of them leaving after arrest (senior officers are required to surrender their post after being arrested), retiring from the armed campaign or "disillusionment". They give 10,000 as the total number of past and present IRA members at that time.[32]

Categorisation[]

The IRA is a proscribed organisation in the United Kingdom under the Terrorism Act 2000[9] and an unlawful organisation in the Republic of Ireland under the Offences Against the State Acts.[33] Members of IRA are tried in the Republic of Ireland in the Special Criminal Court. In Northern Ireland, the IRA are referred to as terrorists by the Ulster Unionist Party, the Democratic Unionist Party, the Progressive Unionist Party, the Alliance Party of Northern Ireland,[34] and the Social Democratic and Labour Party.[35] On the island of Ireland, the largest political party to state that the IRA is not a terrorist organisation is Sinn Féin. Sinn Féin is widely regarded as the political wing of the IRA, but the party insists that the two organisations are separate.

Peter Mandelson, a former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, contrasted the post-1997 activities of the IRA with those of Al-Qaeda, describing the latter as "terrorists" and the former as "freedom fighters" (though Mandelson subsequently denied this sentiment).[36] The IRA prefer the terms freedom fighter, soldier, or volunteer.[37][38][39] The US Department of State falls short of listing the IRA as a 'Foreign Terrorist Organization', but includes them in the category 'other selected terrorist groups also deemed of relevance in the global war on terrorism.'[11] The organisation has also been described as a "private army" by a number of commentators and politicians.[40][41][42]

The IRA described its actions throughout "The Troubles" as a military campaign waged against the British Army, the RUC, other security forces, judiciary, loyalist politicians and loyalist paramilitaries in Northern Ireland, England and Europe. The IRA considers these groups to be all part of the same apparatus.[43] As noted above, the IRA seeks to draw a direct descendancy from the original IRA and those who engaged in the Irish War of Independence. The IRA sees the previous conflict as a guerrilla war which accomplished some of its aims, with some remaining "unfinished business".[44]

A process called "Criminalisation" was begun in the mid-1970s as part of a British strategy of "Criminalisation, Ulsterisation, and Normalisation". The policy was outlined in a 1975 British strategy paper titled "The Way Ahead", which was not published but was referred to by Labour's first Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Merlyn Rees, and came to be the dominant British political theme in the conflict as it raged into the 1980s.[citation needed]

Another categorisation avoids the terms "guerrilla" or "terrorist" but does view the conflict in military terms. The phrase originated with the British military strategist Frank Kitson who was active in Northern Ireland during the early 1970s. In Kitson's view, the violence of the IRA represented an "insurrection" situation, with the enveloping atmosphere of belligerence representing a "low intensity conflict" – a conflict where the forces involved in fighting operate at a greatly reduced tempo, with fewer combatants, at a reduced range of tactical equipment and limited scope to operate in a military manner.[citation needed]

Membership of the IRA remains illegal in both the UK and the Republic of Ireland, but IRA prisoners convicted of offences committed before 1998 have been granted conditional early release as part of the Good Friday Agreement.[45] In the United Kingdom a person convicted of membership of a "proscribed organisation", such as the IRA, still nominally faces imprisonment for up to 10 years.[46]

Strength and support[]

Numerical strength[]

In the early to mid-1970s, the numbers recruited by the IRA may have reached several thousand, but these were reduced when the IRA re-organised its structures from 1977 onwards. An RUC report of 1986 estimated that the IRA had 300 or so members in Active Service Units and up to 750 active members in total in Northern Ireland.[47] This does not take into consideration the IRA units in the Republic of Ireland or those in Britain, continental Europe, and throughout the world. In 2005, the then Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Michael McDowell told the Dáil that the organisation had "between 1,000 and 1,500" active members.[48]

According to the book The Provisional IRA (by Eamon Mallie and Patrick Bishop), roughly 8,000 people passed through the ranks of the IRA in the first 20 years of its existence, many of them leaving after arrest, "retirement" or disillusionment.[32] In later years, the IRA's strength has been somewhat weakened by members leaving the organisation to join hardline splinter groups such as the Continuity IRA and the Real IRA. According to former Irish Minister for Justice Michael McDowell, these organisations have little more than 150 members each.[48]

Electoral and popular support[]

The popular support for the IRA's campaign in the Troubles is hard to gauge, given that Sinn Féin, the IRA's political wing, did not stand in elections until the early 1980s. Most nationalists in Northern Ireland voted for the moderate Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) until 2001. After the 1981 hunger strike, Sinn Féin mobilised large electoral support and won 105,000 votes, or 43% of the nationalist vote in Northern Ireland, in the United Kingdom general election, 1983, only 34,000 votes behind the SDLP.[49] However, by the 1992 UK General Election, the SDLP won 184,445 votes and four seats to Sinn Féin's 78,291 votes and no seats.[50] In the 1993 Local District Council Elections in Northern Ireland, the SDLP won 136,760 votes to Sinn Féin's 77,600 votes.[51]

Few Protestant voters voted for Sinn Féin. In 1992, many of them voted for SDLP West Belfast candidate Joe Hendron rather than a unionist candidate in order to make sure Gerry Adams of Sinn Féin lost his seat in the constituency.[52]

Coalisland

An IRA wall mural in Coalisland, County Tyrone

The IRA enjoyed some popular support in the Republic of Ireland in the early 70s. However, the movement's appeal was hurt badly by bombings such as the killing of civilians attending a Remembrance Day ceremony at the cenotaph in Enniskillen in 1987 (Remembrance Day bombing), and the death of two children when a bomb exploded in Warrington, which led to tens of thousands of people demonstrating on O'Connell Street in Dublin to call for an end to the IRA's campaign. In the 1987 Irish General Election, they won only 1.7% of the votes cast.[53] They did not make significant electoral gains in the Republic until after the IRA ceasefires and the Good Friday Agreement of 1998. By the 2011 Irish general election Sinn Féin's proportion of the popular vote had reached 9.9 percent.

Sinn Féin now has 27 members of the Northern Ireland Assembly (out of 108), five Westminster MPs (out of 18 from Northern Ireland) and 14 Republic of Ireland TDs (out of 166).

Support from other countries and organisations[]

The IRA have had contacts with foreign governments and other illegal armed organisations.

The Republic of Ireland was the major source of funds, arms (mostly IEDs of Irish origin), volunteers, training camps, bomb factories, and safe houses for the Irish Republican cause more than any other group or nation on earth in the conflict.[n 1][55][56] Shannon Airport and Cork and Cobh harbours were used extensively by the IRA for arms importation overseas during the early 1970s aided by sympathetic workers on-site. The vast majority of the finances used in the IRA campaign came from criminal and legitimate activities in the Republic of Ireland rather than overseas sources. Large numbers of improvised explosive devices and firearms were manufactured by IRA members and supporters in Southern Ireland and then transported into Northern Ireland and England for use against targets in these regions. For example, one IRA bomb factory near Stannaway Road in Dublin was producing six firearms a day in 1973. An IRA bomb factory in the County Dublin village of Donabate in 1975 was described as "a centre for the manufacture of grenades, rockets and mortars." Gelignite stolen from quarries, farms and construction sites in the Republic was behind the 48,000lbs of explosives detonated in Northern Ireland in the first six months of 1973 alone. IRA training ranged from basic small arms and explosives manufacturing to heavy machine guns, overseen by Southern Irish citizens, including a former member of the Irish Defence Forces.[57][55] Thousands of Irish citizens in the Republic joined the IRA throughout the conflict; for example, the assassination of Louis Mountbatten in August 1979 was carried out by IRA member Thomas McMahon from Monaghan.[58]

Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was a supplier of arms to the IRA, donating two shipments of arms in the early 1970s,[59] and another five in the mid-1980s.[60] The final shipment in 1987 was intercepted by French authorities,[60] but the prior four shipments included 1,200 AKM assault rifles, 26 DShK heavy machine guns, 40 general-purpose machine guns, 33 RPG-7 rocket launchers, 10 SAM-7 surface-to-air missiles, 10 LPO-50 flamethrowers, and over two tonnes of plastic explosive Semtex.[61] He also gave $12 million in cash to the IRA.[62][63][64]

Irish Americans (both Irish immigrants and natives of Irish descent) also donated weapons and money.[65] The financial backbone of IRA support in the United States was the Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID), founded by Irish immigrant and IRA veteran Michael Flannery. NORAID officially raised money for the families of IRA prisoners but was strongly accused by opponents of being a front for the IRA and being involved in IRA gunrunning.[66][67] The key IRA transatlantic gunrunning network was run by Irish immigrant and IRA veteran George Harrison, who estimated to have smuggled 2,000–2,500 weapons and approximately 1 million rounds of ammunition to Ireland.[68] However, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) arrested Harrison for IRA arms smuggling in June 1981, thereby blocking the IRA's arms supply from America.[69] This forced the IRA to focus on importing weaponry from its already-established networks in Europe and the Middle East.[70][71] In addition, Irish American support for the Republican cause began to weaken in the mid-1970s and gradually diminished in the 1980s due to bad publicity surrounding IRA atrocities and NORAID.[72][73] By 1998, only $3.6 million were raised in America for the Irish Republican cause,[74][75][76][77] in which many historians and scholars agreed such an amount was too small to make an actual difference in the conflict.[78][79][75]

Irish Canadians, Irish Australians, and Irish New Zealanders were also active in supporting the Republican cause.[80][81][82] More than A$20,000 were sent per year to the Provisionals from supporters in Australia by the 1990s.[83] Canadian supporters not just fundraised or import weapons,[84][85][86][87] but also smuggled IRA and Sinn Féin members into the United States, which, unlike Canada, enacted a visa ban on such members on the basis of advocating violence since the early 1970s. Gearóid Ó Faoleán wrote that "[i]n 1972, inclement weather forced a light aeroplane to reroute to Shannon Airport from Farranfore in County Kerry, where IRA volunteers had been awaiting its arrival. The plane, piloted by a Canadian [IRA supporter], had flown from Libya with at least one cargo of arms that included RPG-7 rocket launchers" where IRA smuggled these weapons into safe houses for its armed campaign.[88] In 1974, seven Canadian residents (six who were originally from Belfast) were arrested by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) for smuggling weapons to the IRA after "raids in St. Catharines, Tavistock and Toronto and at the U.S. border at Windsor". Philip Kent, one of those arrested, was discovered in his car for having "fifteen FN rifles and a .50 calibre machine gun".[89] In January 1982, two Canadian activists were arrested by U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) agents for trying to smuggle Sinn Féin members Danny Morrison and Owen Carron into America to attend a NORAID fundraiser at a dinner dance in New York City. A month later, three Canadians and Edward "Ted" Howell (a close ally of Gerry Adams) and Dessie Ellis from Dublin were arrested for trying to enter the U.S. illegally from Canada and "with a cache of money and a shopping list" of weapons for the IRA.[90]

Former MI5 agent Willie Carlin said that one of the main reasons why the IRA Army Council did not attack Scotland during the conflict was because doing so would reduce support from Scots and have a negative impact on its fundraising and other activities there. Carlin explained that "[t]here were politicians in Scotland, a lot of whom were very sympathetic to the nationalist cause, and even the Sinn Fein cause". He also noted that while much of the money was donated by supporters in Glasgow, funds also came from all over the country, from “farmers up there who had family and relatives in Ireland”.[91]

The IRA had links with the Basque separatist group ETA.[65] Maria McGuire states the IRA received fifty revolvers from ETA in exchange for explosives training.[92][93] In 1973 the IRA was accused by the Spanish police of providing explosives for the assassination of Spanish prime minister Luis Carrero Blanco in Madrid, and the following year an ETA spokesman told German magazine Der Spiegel they had "very good relations" with the IRA.[65][92] In 1977 a representative of the Basque political party Euskal Iraultzarako Alderdia attended Sinn Féin's 1977 ard fheis, and Ó Brádaigh had a close relationship with Basque separatists, regularly visiting the Basque region between 1977 and 1983.[94] The IRA received support from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in the 1970s, with volunteers attending training camps in the Middle East.[65] In 1977 a shipment of arms from the PLO was seized in Antwerp, Belgium.[95] The shipment included twenty-nine AK-47 assault rifles, twenty-nine French submachine guns, seven RPG-7 rocket launchers and sixty rocket-propelled grenades, two Bren light machine guns, mortars, grenades and ammunition.[95] PLO leader Yasser Arafat distanced himself from the IRA following the assassination of Lord Mountbatten in 1979.[96]

In May 1996, the Federal Security Service, Russia's internal security service, accused Estonia of arms smuggling, and claimed that the IRA had bought weapons from arms dealers linked to Estonia's volunteer defence force, Kaitseliit.[97] In 2001, three Irishmen, known as the Colombia Three, were arrested and accused of training Colombian guerrillas, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).[98][99] The Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform stated the IRA was to be paid up to $35 million to train FARC in bomb-making techniques, including shaped charges, propane bombs, landmines and the construction of mortars.[99][100] In 2005 a commander in the National Army of Colombia stated IRA techniques were being used all over Colombia by FARC, and British military experts confirmed bombs used by FARC had previously been used by the IRA.[100] The Colombia Three were acquitted at trial in April 2004, before this was reversed at an appeal court in December 2004 although the men had fled the country and returned to Ireland before the appeal court verdict.[100]

Good Friday Agreement[]

The IRA ceasefire in 1997 formed part of a process that led to the 1998 Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. One aim of the Agreement is that all paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland cease their activities and disarm by May 2000.

Calls from Sinn Féin led the IRA to commence disarming in a process that was monitored by Canadian General John de Chastelain's decommissioning body in October 2001. However, following the collapse of the Stormont power-sharing government in 2002, which was partly triggered by allegations that republican spies were operating within Parliament Buildings and the Civil Service, the IRA temporarily broke off contact with General de Chastelain.[citation needed]

In December 2004, attempts to persuade the IRA to disarm entirely collapsed when the Democratic Unionist Party, under Ian Paisley, insisted on photographic evidence. Justice Minister Michael McDowell (in public, and often) insisted that there would need to be a complete end to IRA activity.[citation needed]

At the beginning of February 2005, the IRA declared that it was withdrawing from the disarmament process, but in July 2005 it declared that its campaign of violence was over, and that transparent mechanisms would be used, under the de Chastelain process, to satisfy the Northern Ireland communities that it was disarming totally.

End of the armed campaign[]

On 28 July 2005, the IRA Army Council announced an end to its armed campaign, stating that it would work to achieve its aims using "purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means",[101] and shortly afterwards completed decommissioning. In September 2008, the nineteenth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission stated that the IRA was "committed to the political path" and no longer represented "a threat to peace or to democratic politics", and that the IRA's Army Council was "no longer operational or functional".[102][103] The organisation remains classified as a proscribed terrorist group in the UK and as an illegal organisation in the Republic of Ireland.[9][104] Two small groups split from the IRA, the Continuity IRA in 1986, and the Real IRA in 1997. Both reject the Good Friday Agreement and continue to engage in paramilitary activity.

In a statement read by Séanna Breathnach, the organisation stated that it had instructed its members to dump all weapons and not to engage in "any other activities whatsoever" apart from assisting "the development of purely political and democratic programmes through exclusively peaceful means". Furthermore, the organisation authorised its representatives to engage immediately with the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) to verifiably put its arms beyond use "in a way which will further enhance public confidence and to conclude this as quickly as possible".[101]

This is not the first time that organisations styling themselves IRA have issued orders to dump arms.[105] After its defeat in the Irish Civil War in 1924 and at the end of its unsuccessful Border Campaign in 1962, the IRA Army Council issued similar orders. However, this is the first time in Irish republicanism that any organisation has voluntarily decided to dispose of its arms.[106] Some authors, like Patrick McCarthy, Peter Taylor and Brendan O'Brien concluded that, unlike previous IRA campaigns, the provisionals were not defeated.[107][108][109]

On 25 September 2005, international weapons inspectors supervised the full disarmament of the IRA, a long-sought goal of Northern Ireland's peace process. The office of IICD Chairman John de Chastelain, a retired Canadian general who oversaw the weapons' decommissioning at secret locations, released details regarding the scrapping of many tons of IRA weaponry at a news conference in Belfast on 26 September. He said the arms had been "put beyond use" and that they were "satisfied that the arms decommissioned represent the totality of the IRA's arsenal."

The IRA permitted two independent witnesses, including a Methodist minister, Rev. Harold Good, and Father Alec Reid, a Roman Catholic priest close to Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams, to view the secret disarmament work.[110] Ian Paisley, the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), complained that since the witnesses were appointed by the IRA themselves, rather than being appointed by the British or Irish governments, they therefore could not be said to be unbiased witnesses to the decommissioning. Nationalists and Catholics viewed his comments as reflecting his refusal to support devolution in Northern Ireland with Catholics in power.[111]

In 2011 Sinn Féin President Gerry Adams said: "The war is over. The IRA is gone. The IRA embraced, facilitated and supported the peace process. When a democratic and peaceful alternative to armed struggle was created the IRA left the stage."[112]

Continuing activities of IRA members[]

The 10th report published in April 2006 from the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), an organisation monitoring activity by paramilitary groups on behalf of the British and Irish governments, prefaced its remarks about IRA activity by commenting that the IRA leadership has committed itself to following a peaceful path and that in the last three months this process has involved the further dismantling of the IRA as a military structure.

The report commented that there was no paramilitary or violent activity sanctioned by the leadership; there is a substantial erosion in the IRA's capacity to return to a military campaign; and, that the IRA had no intentions of returning to violence.[113] However the IMC report also noted that following decommissioning, the IRA still retained a considerable amount of weaponry beyond what was needed for self-defence.[114]

The IMC has come in for criticism (mainly by republicans) as having been set up outside the terms of the Good Friday Agreement as a sop to Unionism. Sinn Féin MP Conor Murphy stated that the IMC was established outside and in breach of the terms of the Good Friday Agreement and that it is politically biased, and had an anti-Sinn Féin agenda.[115]

On 4 October 2006, the IMC ruled that the IRA were no longer a threat.[116]

In late 2008, the The Sunday Times quoted a senior Garda intelligence officer as saying that "the IRA had recruited in recent years, still held arms despite apparently decommissioning the lot, and was being maintained in 'shadow form.'" The Gardaí also said that the IRA was still capable of carrying out attacks.[114][117] A senior member of the PSNI, Assistant Chief Constable Peter Sheridan, said that it was unlikely that the IRA would disband in the foreseeable future.[118]

At the end of March 2010, SDLP MLA Dominic Bradley said that the IRA were still active and that they had been responsible for a number of incidents in his constituency including a punishment shooting and an armed robbery during which a shot was fired.[119]

In August 2010, the 32 County Sovereignty Movement, the Republican Network for Unity and the UPRG, claimed that the IRA were responsible for a shooting incident in the Gobnascale area of Derry. It is claimed that up to 20 masked men, some armed with handguns, attacked a group of teenagers who were engaging in anti-social behaviour at an interface area. A number of the teenagers were attacked and shots were fired into the air. The men are then reported to have removed their masks when the PSNI arrived and were subsequently identified as members of the Republican Movement. Sinn Féin denied the IRA were involved.[120][121][122]

"P. O'Neill"[]

The IRA traditionally uses a well-known signature in its public statements, which are all issued under the pseudonym of "P. O'Neill" of the "Irish Republican Publicity Bureau, Dublin".[123] According to Ruairí Ó Brádaigh, it was Seán Mac Stiofáin, as chief of staff of the IRA, who invented the name. However, under his usage, the name was written and pronounced according to Irish orthography and pronunciation as "P. Ó Néill". According to Danny Morrison, the pseudonym "S. O'Neill" was used during the 1940s.[123]

Informers[]

Throughout the Troubles, some members of the IRA passed information to the security forces. Members of the IRA suspected of being informants were usually executed after an IRA court-martial. In the 1980s, many more IRA members were imprisoned on the testimony of former IRA members known as "supergrasses" such as Raymond Gilmour. A Belfast newspaper has claimed that secret documents show that half of the IRA's top men were also British informers.[124]

In recent years, there have been some high profile allegations of senior IRA figures having been British informers. In May 2003, a number of newspapers named Freddie Scappaticci as the alleged identity of the British Force Research Unit's most senior informer within the IRA, code-named Stakeknife, who is thought to have been head of the IRA's internal security force, charged with rooting out and executing informers. Scappaticci denies that this is the case and, in 2003, failed in a legal bid to force the then NIO Minister, Jane Kennedy, to state he was not an informer.[125] She has refused to do so, and since then Scappaticci has not launched any libel actions against the media making the allegations.

On 16 December 2005, senior Sinn Féin member Denis Donaldson appeared before TV cameras in Dublin and confessed to being a British spy for twenty years.[126] He was expelled from Sinn Féin and was said to have been debriefed by the party.[127] Donaldson was a former IRA volunteer and subsequently highly placed Sinn Féin party member. Donaldson had been entrusted by Gerry Adams with the running of Sinn Féin's operations in the U.S. in the early 1990s.[128] On 4 April 2006, Donaldson was found shot dead at his retreat near Glenties in County Donegal.[129] When asked whether he felt Donaldson's role as an informer in Sinn Féin was significant, the IRA double agent using the pseudonym "Kevin Fulton" described Donaldson's role as a spy within Sinn Féin as "the tip of the iceberg".[130] The Real IRA claimed responsibility for his assassination on 12 April 2009.[131]

On 8 February 2008, Roy McShane was taken into police protection after being unmasked as an informant. McShane, a former IRA member, had been Gerry Adams' personal driver for many years. Adams said he was "too philosophical" to feel betrayed.[132]

See also[]

References[]

  1. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Moloneyxiv
  2. Murray, Gerard & Tonge, Jonathan (2005). Sinn Féin and the SDLP: From Alienation to Participation. C Hurst & Co Publishers. p. 67. ISBN 978-1-85065-649-4. 
  3. Bowyer Bell, J. (1987). The Gun in Politics: Analysis of Irish Violence, 1916–86. Transaction Publishers. p. 247. ISBN 978-1-56000-566-7. 
  4. Dillon, Martin (1996). 25 Years of Terror: The IRA's war against the British. Bantam Books. p. 125. ISBN 0-553-40773-2. 
  5. Moloney, Ed (2002). A Secret History of the IRA. Penguin Books. p. 246. ISBN 0-14-101041-X.
  6. The Provisional IRA by Patrick Bishop and Eamonn Mallie (ISBN 0-552-13337-X), p. 117.
  7. Henry McDonald (13 February 2005). "Grieving sisters square up to IRA". The Observer. London. http://observer.guardian.co.uk/focus/story/0,6903,1411801,00.html. Retrieved 20 July 2007. 
  8. Moloney, p. 707
  9. 9.0 9.1 9.2 Home Office – Proscribed Terror Groups — Home Office website. Retrieved 11 May 2007
  10. "McDowell insists IRA will remain illegal". RTÉ. 28 August 2005. http://www.rte.ie/news/2005/0828/mcdowellm.html. Retrieved 18 May 2007. 
  11. 11.0 11.1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security - Terrorist Organization Reference Guide January 2004
  12. O'Brien The Long War, p. 119.
  13. O'Brien, Long War, p. 107.
  14. The Prevention of Terrorism in British Law by Clive Walker (ISBN 978-0719022036), page 9
  15. Bowyer Bell, J. (1997). The Secret Army: The IRA. Transaction Publishers, pp. 556–571. ISBN 1-56000-901-2
  16. John O'Sullivan (15 February 2005). "The Padre Pio". National Review. http://www.nationalreview.com/jos/osullivan200502150934.asp. Retrieved 21 April 2007. 
  17. John Lloyd (28 October 2002). "Sinn Féin could win the peace". New Statesman. UK. http://www.newstatesman.com/200210280011. Retrieved 21 April 2007. [dead link]
  18. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named Taylorp156
  19. Taylor, Peter (2001). Brits. Bloomsbury Publishing. pp. 184–185. ISBN 0-7475-5806-X. 
  20. The Irish Troubles: A Generation of Violence 1967–1992 by John Bowyer Bell (ISBN 0-7171-2201-8), page 555
  21. Bowcott, Owen (15 August 2006). "Belfast police sorry for failing woman's family". The Guardian. http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2006/aug/15/northernireland.owenbowcott. 
  22. CAIN: Sutton Index of Deaths
  23. Vincent Kearney (9 March 2007). "IRA "collusion" inquiry launched". BBC News. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/6432925.stm. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  24. "Controversy over republican's murder". BBC. 17 October 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/975322.stm. Retrieved 17 March 2007. 
  25. "IRA denies murdering dissident". BBC. 18 October 2000. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/977201.stm. Retrieved 17 March 2007. 
  26. Richard English (2003), Armed Struggle – The History of the IRA, p.378
  27. Lost Lives (2004. Ed's David McKitrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, David McVea)
  28. Sutton Index of Deaths: Crosstabulations
  29. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named autogenerated7
  30. Lost Lives, p. 1531.
  31. O'Brien, Long War, p. 26.
  32. 32.0 32.1 Mallie, Bishop, p. 12.
  33. S.I. No. 162/1939 — Unlawful Organisation (Suppression) Order, 1939
  34. Significant IRA statement still leaves questions: Alliance
  35. Attwood: Libya Compensenation Claim Backs Seizure Of Ira Assets
  36. "MP denies 'IRA freedom fighters' claim". BBC. 30 December 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/1734383.stm. Retrieved 24 June 2007. 
  37. Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda by Richard Jackson, Marie Breen Smyth and Jeroen Gunning (ISBN 978-0415455077), page 142
  38. Terrorists and Freedom Fighters (People, politics and powers) by David Hayes (ISBN 978-0853406525), page 77
  39. Terrorism, Ideology, and Revolution/the Origins of Modern Political Violence by Noel O'Sullivan (ISBN 978-0813303451), page 104
  40. Seanad Éireann - Volume 135 - 29 April 1993 - International Fund for Ireland: Statements
  41. Irish Republican News
  42. DUP warns Sinn Fein over IRA Army Council - Local - Limerick Leader
  43. Recently released (3 May 2006) British Government documents show that overlapping membership between British Army units like the Ulster Defence Regiment (UDR) and loyalist paramilitary groups was a wider problem than a "few bad apples" as was often claimed. The documents include a report titled "Subversion in the UDR" which details the problem. In 1973; an estimated 5–15% of UDR soldiers were directly linked to loyalist paramilitary groups, it was believed that the "best single source of weapons, and the only significant source of modern weapons, for Protestant extremist groups was the UDR", it was feared UDR troops were loyal to "Ulster" alone rather than to "Her Majesty's Government", the British Government knew that UDR weapons were being used in the assassination and attempted assassination of Roman Catholic civilians by loyalist paramilitaries. 2 May 2006 edition of the Irish News available here.
  44. Gerry Adam's 2006 Easter Message was that "unfinished business" remains, available here [1]. "But in truth The Proclamation is also unfinished business. It is unfinished business which the vast majority of the Irish people want to see brought to completion."
  45. Transitional Justice in Northern Ireland Submitted for the 6th Annual Dalhousie University Graduate Symposium, 10 and 11 March 2011 in Halifax, Nova Scotia
  46. "House of Commons Hansard Debates for 30 October 2002 (pt 8)". House of Commons. 30 October 2002. http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmhansrd/vo021030/debtext/21030-08.htm. Retrieved 17 March 2007. 
  47. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named O'Brien, p. 161
  48. 48.0 48.1 Parliamentary Debates (Official Report – Unrevised) Dáil Éireann Thursday, 23 June 2005 – Page 1[dead link]
  49. O'Brien, p. 115.
  50. O'Brien, p. 198.
  51. Local Government Elections 1993
  52. (Coogan p284)
  53. O'Brien, p. 199.
  54. Gearóid Ó Faoleán (April 23, 2019). "A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980". https://www.goodreads.com/en/book/show/44095296. 
  55. 55.0 55.1 "Republic of Ireland played integral role in supporting IRA, says historian". News Letter. 5 April 2019. https://www.newsletter.co.uk/news/republic-ireland-played-integral-role-supporting-ira-says-historian-988519. 
  56. John Manley (6 April 2019). "Support in Republic during Troubles 'key for IRA', book claims". The Irish News. https://www.irishnews.com/news/northernirelandnews/2019/04/06/news/headline-1591367/. 
  57. Gearóid Ó Faoleán (April 23, 2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Merrion Press. p. 52. ISBN 978-1-7853-7245-2. 
  58. Gearóid Ó Faoleán (April 23, 2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Merrion Press. p. 152. ISBN 978-1-7853-7245-2. 
  59. Boyne 2006, pp. 137–138.
  60. 60.0 60.1 Boyne 2006, pp. 272–274.
  61. Boyne 2006, p. 436.
  62. Paddy Clancy (December 31, 2021). "Libyan leader Gaddafi's IRA support revealed in secret Irish State Papers". Irish Central. https://www.irishcentral.com/news/gaddafi-ira-support-irish-state-papers. 
  63. David McCullagh, Conor McMorrow and Justin McCarthy (28 December 2021). "Extent of Libyan backing for IRA 'shocked' British". RTÉ. https://www.rte.ie/news/2021/1228/1267955-state-papers-libya-ira/. 
  64. "Libya: Extent of Gaddafi's financial support for IRA stunned British intelligence". Middle East Eye. 28 December 2021. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/libya-gaddafi-financial-support-ira-stunned-british-intelligence. 
  65. Taylor 1998, pp. 84–85.
  66. Moloney 2007, pp. 421–422.
  67. Holland 1989, p. 112.
  68. Holland, Jack (February 1, 2001). The American Connection, Revised: U.S. Guns, Money, and Influence in Northern Ireland. Roberts Rinehart Publishers. p. 111. ISBN 9-7815-6833-1843. 
  69. "The Canadian Dimension to the Northern Ireland Conflict". 2020. p. 201. JSTOR 27041321. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27041321. "By the mid to late 1970s, supply routes for Republican weaponry began to shift to mainland Europe and the Middle East, in particular, Lebanon." 
  70. "Irish America and the Ulster Conflict 1968-1995". CAIN Web Service. http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/events/aia/wilson95.htm#chap9. 
  71. Andrew Mumford (2017). Counterinsurgency Wars and the Anglo-American Alliance: The Special Relationship on the Rocks. Georgetown University Press. p. 156. ISBN 9-7816-2616-4925. https://books.google.com/books?id=4r06DwAAQBAJ&pg=PA156. 
  72. Ted Smyth (Winter 2020). "Journal of American Ethnic History". https://tedsmyth.com/Journal%20of%20American%20Ethnic%20History.html. 
  73. Pamela Duncan and Simon Carswell (March 5, 2015). "Sinn Féin raised $12 million in the United States". The Irish Times. https://www.irishtimes.com/news/politics/sinn-fein-raised-12-million-in-the-united-states-1.2126033. 
  74. 75.0 75.1 Gearóid Ó Faoleán (April 23, 2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Merrion Press. p. 78. ISBN 978-1-7853-7245-2. 
  75. Nicholas Sambanis and Paul Collier. Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis · Volume 2. World Bank. p. 171. ISBN 9-7808-2136-0507. "Estimated to have sent at total of $3.6 million to Ireland from 1970 to 1991, NORAID's contributions represented a small, but not [politically] insignificant, part of the IRA's income, which is estimated to have amounted to approximately $10 million a year." 
  76. T. Wittig (July 26, 2011). Understanding Terrorist Finance. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 154-155. ISBN 9-7802-3031-6935. "From its founding in 1969 until 1991, NORAID raised approximately $3.6 million for Irish republican causes, through a combination of testimonial fundraising dinners and an extensive campaign to solicit donations through direct mail, dinner-dance benefits, and "passing the hat" in Irish American-owned businesses (such as bars) in major US cities.' This money was ostensibly to provide support for any number of causes related to Ireland and Irish republicanism, ranging from political activities to support to the families of imprisoned PIRA members" 
  77. Laura K. Donohue (2006). "Anti-Terrorist Finance in the United Kingdom and United States". Stanford University Center for International Security and Cooperation. pp. 8. https://repository.law.umich.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=&httpsredir=1&article=1187&context=mjil#page=8. 
  78. Select Committee on Northern Ireland Affairs - Part One: The continuing threat from paramilitary organisations (Report). 26 June 2002. https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200102/cmselect/cmniaf/978/97806.htm. 
  79. "The army's secret opinion". New Statesman. 13 July 1979. p. 2. https://www.duncancampbell.org/menu/journalism/newstatesman/newstatesman-1979/the%20army's%20secret%20opinion.pdf#page=2. 
  80. Andrew Sanders. Inside the IRA: Dissident Republicans and the War for Legitimacy. Edinburgh University Press. p. 105. ISBN 0-7486-8812-9. "The [British] FCO noted [in the 1970s] that 'the IRA has also looked to Irish communities elsewhere to obtain cash for its terror campaign of the past four years', also noting the presence of fundraising organisations in Canada and Australia, and an attempt to establish connections in New Zealand." 
  81. Andrew Mitrovica (October 13, 2001). "Canada let IRA members slip through, sources say". The Globe and Mail. https://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/canada-let-ira-members-slip-through-sources-say/article4154732/. 
  82. Young, Peter; Jesser, Peter (October 13, 1997). The Media and the Military. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 65. 
  83. Terrorism in Ireland (RLE: Terrorism & Insurgency). Taylor & Francis. 2015. p. 20. ISBN 9-7813-1744-8945. "The only other source of arms outside the United States that warrants inclusion here is Canada, because of several attempts in that country to supply arms and finance to both Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. The first evidence of this supportive activity was seen in August 1969 with an announcement by some 150 Toronto Irish-Canadians that they intended sending money, which could be used to buy guns if necessary, to the women and children of the (Catholic) Bogside in Derry. Thereafter the networks of the US-based Irish Northern Aid Committee (NORAID) and the Irish Republican Clubs were extended to Canada." 
  84. David A. Wilson (May 30, 2022). Canadian Spy Story: Irish Revolutionaries and the Secret Police. McGill–Queen's University Press. p. 243. ISBN 9-7802-2801-3617. "And so matters stood until the Troubles in Northern Ireland: the civil rights movement of 1967-68, the loyalist reaction, riots in the streets, the entry of the British Army, the emergence of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (ira), and thirty years of a conflict that would result in more than 3,600 deaths and fail to achieve the republican objective of a united Ireland. Under these circumstances, both Irish republicanism and Ulster loyalism would assume a renewed presence in Canadian life, largely hidden from public view but no less significant for that. As in the 1860s, recent immigrants played a dominant but by no means exclusive role in Irish Canadian revolutionary republicanism. As in the 1860s, Irish republican pubs were informal but important meeting places: some of their owners helped to provide shelter for ira men on the run. And as in the 1860s, the key activities of Irish republicans in Canada were fundraising, arms running, and publicizing the cause. Montreal, Toronto, and southern Ontario were focal points, just as they had been for the Fenians." 
  85. Dennis G. Molinaro (2021). Bridge in the Parks: The Five Eyes and Cold War Counter-Intelligence. University of Toronto Press. p. 229. ISBN 9-7814-8752-3718. "Supporters of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) smuggled detonators from Canadian mining operations for use in the indiscriminate bombings that wracked Northern Ireland for years." 
  86. Stewart Bell (February 28, 2008). Cold Terror: How Canada Nurtures and Exports Terrorism Around the World. Wiley. p. 31-32. ISBN 9-7804-7015-6223. "[T]he RCMP found that the Irish Republican Army (IRA) was also fundraising in Canada, but authorities at first did nothing because collecting cash was considered a nonviolent pursuit that was not a threat to Canada. The British government, however, put pressure on Ottawa to take action, since the money raised in Canada was financing the purchase of weapons. Canadian-made detonators were turning up inside IRA bombs." 
  87. Gearóid Ó Faoleán (April 23, 2019). A Broad Church: The Provisional IRA in the Republic of Ireland, 1969–1980. Merrion Press. p. 79. ISBN 978-1-7853-7245-2. 
  88. "The Canadian Dimension to the Northern Ireland Conflict". 2020. p. 201. JSTOR 27041321. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27041321. 
  89. "The Canadian Dimension to the Northern Ireland Conflict". 2020. p. 204. JSTOR 27041321. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27041321. 
  90. Neil Mackay (12 October 2019). "Inside story: Why the IRA never attacked Scotland". The Herald. https://www.heraldscotland.com/news/17965179.inside-story-ira-never-attacked-scotland/. 
  91. 92.0 92.1 Geraghty 1998, pp. 177–178.
  92. Mallie & Bishop 1988, p. 308.
  93. White 2006, p. 262.
  94. 95.0 95.1 Boyne 2006, pp. 168–171.
  95. Coogan 2000, p. 432.
  96. Boyne 2006, p. 396.
  97. Oppenheimer 2008, p. 109.
  98. 99.0 99.1 Moloney 2007, pp. 511–512.
  99. 100.0 100.1 100.2 Oppenheimer 2008, pp. 346–347.
  100. 101.0 101.1 Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named guardian.co.uk
  101. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named IMC12
  102. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named autogenerated2
  103. Cite error: Invalid <ref> tag; no text was provided for refs named autogenerated9
  104. Arms Dumps and the IRA, 1923-32 | History Today
  105. "IRA in arms breakthrough". BBC News. 23 October 2001. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/northern_ireland/1604301.stm. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  106. Taylor, p. 349
  107. McCarthy, Patrick (2002). Language, Politics and Writing: Stolentelling in Western Europe. Palgrave Macmillan, p. 120. ISBN 1403960240
  108. Hayden, Tom (2003). Irish on the Inside: In Search of the Soul of Irish America. Verso, p. 179. ISBN 1859844774
  109. Maintaining belief in peace aided N. Ireland transformation By Kevin Cullen, The Boston Globe, 27 September 2005.
  110. "Weapons witnesses 'IRA-nominated'". BBC. 27 September 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4286266.stm. Retrieved 17 March 2007. 
  111. "Adams condemns violent dissidents". http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/adams-condemns-violent-dissidents-15140406.html. 
  112. Tenth report of the Independent Monitoring Commission April 2006 available in PDF here [2][dead link] NOTE: the IMC report is issued every six months.
  113. 114.0 114.1 Clarke, Liam; Mooney, John (10 August 2008). "The IRA has not disbanded say intelligence experts". The Times. London. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/ireland/article4494249.ece. 
  114. "IMC should be scrapped". Sinnfein.ie. 27 February 2006. http://www.sinnfein.ie/contents/6129. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  115. Matt Weaver (4 October 2006). "Blair: Northern Ireland final settlement within reach". The Guardian. London. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Northern_Ireland/Story/0,,1887436,00.html?gusrc=rss&feed=1. Retrieved 18 May 2007. 
  116. "They haven't gone away, you know — it's the same old story up North". The Irish Examiner. 13 August 2008. http://archives.tcm.ie/irishexaminer/2008/08/13/story69665.asp. Retrieved 28 July 2009. [dead link]
  117. King, Steven (13 August 2008). "They haven't gone away, you know – it's the same old story up North". Irish Examiner. http://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/columnists/stephen-king/they-havent-gone-away-you-know-its-the-same-old-story-up-north-69665.html. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  118. "Provos 'Have Not Gone Away', 30 March 2010, Northern Ireland Newspapers". 4ni.co.uk. 30 March 2010. http://www.4ni.co.uk/northern_ireland_news.asp?id=109172. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  119. Published on Thu 30 11 September:45:22 BST 2010. "Were Provos behind shooting incident in Gobnascale? Londonderry Sentinel". Londonderrysentinel.co.uk. http://www.londonderrysentinel.co.uk/news/Were-Provos-behind-shooting-incident.6558729.jp. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  120. Published on Mon 9 August 17:04:31 BST 2010. "Mainstream Republicans blamed for Gobnascale Indident". Londonderrysentinel.co.uk. http://www.londonderrysentinel.co.uk/news/39Mainstream39-republicans-blamed-for-Gobnascale.6467389.jp. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  121. 09:03 (9 August 2010). "The Nolan Show Radio Foyle 9 August 2010". BBC. http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b00tbxvj. Retrieved 28 September 2011. 
  122. 123.0 123.1 Who is P O'Neill? — BBC News article, 22 September 2005.
  123. "Half of all top IRA men 'worked for security services'". http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/local-national/northern-ireland/half-of-all-top-ira-men-worked-for-security-services-16093721.html. 
  124. Ted Oliver (19 August 2003). "'Stakeknife' loses bid to quash spy claim". The Guardian. London. http://www.guardian.co.uk/Northern_Ireland/Story/0,,1021579,00.html. Retrieved 17 March 2007. 
  125. "Sinn Féin man admits he was agent". BBC. 16 December 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/northern_ireland/4536826.stm. Retrieved 26 March 2007. 
  126. Suzanne Breen (26 March 2006). "Denis Donaldson — squalid living after a life of lies". Sunday Tribune. http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/Sunday_Tribune/arts2006/mar26_Donaldson_squalid_life__SBreen.php. Retrieved 26 March 2007. 
  127. Suzanne Breen (9 April 2006). "No tears over Denis Donaldson". Sunday Tribune. http://www.nuzhound.com/articles/Sunday_Tribune/arts2006/apr9_no_tears_Donaldson__SBreen.php. Retrieved 26 March 2007. 
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  129. "Kevin Fulton" (not his real name) made the comments on a BBC News 24 interview 10 April 2006, RealMedia available here [3] or available on googlevideo here [4][dead link]
  130. Real IRA killed Dennis Donaldson[dead link]
  131. The Irish Times, 11 February 2008, p. 8.

Sources[]

  • Martin Dillon, 25 Years of Terror – the IRA's War against the British
  • Richard English, Armed Struggle – A History of the IRA, MacMillan, London 2003, ISBN 1-4050-0108-9
  • Peter Taylor, Provos – the IRA and Sinn Féin
  • Ed Moloney, A Secret History of the IRA, Penguin, London 2002,
  • Eamonn Mallie and Patrick Bishop, The Provisional IRA, Corgi, London 1988. ISBN 0-552-13337-X
  • Toby Harnden, Bandit Country – The IRA and South Armagh, Hodder & Stoughton, London 1999, ISBN 0-340-71736-X
  • Henry Patterson, The Politics of Illusion; A Political History of the IRA, Serif, London 1997, ISBN 978-1-897959-31-2 [5]
  • Paul Bew, Henry Patterson, Peter Gibbon, Northern Ireland, 1921 – 2001, Serif, London, 2002, ISBN 978-1-897959-38-1 [6]
  • Brendan O'Brien, The Long War – The IRA and Sinn Féin. O'Brien Press, Dublin 1995, ISBN 0-86278-359-3
  • Tim Pat Coogan, The Troubles,
  • Tim Pat Coogan, The IRA: A History (1994)
  • Tony Geraghty, The Irish War, 1998 ISBN 0-8018-6456-9
  • David McKittrick, Seamus Kelters, Brian Feeney, Chris Thornton, David McVea, Lost Lives.
  • J Bowyer Bell, The Secret Army – The IRA, 1997 3rd Edition, ISBN 1-85371-813-0
  • Christopher Andrews, The Mitrokhin Archive (also published as The Sword and the Shield)
  • Ronald John Weitzer, Policing Under Fire: Ethnic Conflict and Police-Community Relations in Northern Ireland, State University of New York Press (Jan 1995), ISBN 079142247X.

External links[]

All or a portion of this article consists of text from Wikipedia, and is therefore Creative Commons Licensed under GFDL.
The original article can be found at Provisional Irish Republican Army and the edit history here.


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