278,275 Pages

Winter operations 1914–1915 is a name given to military operations from 23 November 1914 – 6 February 1915, on the part of the Western Front held by the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) in French and Belgian Flanders.

Background[edit | edit source]

Race to the Sea[edit | edit source]

From 17 September – 17 October the belligerents had made reciprocal attempts to turn the northern flank of their opponent. Joffre ordered the French Second Army to move to the north of the French Sixth Army, by moving from eastern France from 2–9 September and Falkenhayn ordered the German Sixth Army to move from the German-French border to the northern flank on 17 September. By the next day French attacks north of the Aisne, led to Falkenhayn ordering the Sixth Army to repulse French forces to secure the flank.[1] When French advanced it met a German attack rather than an open flank on 24 September and by 29 September the Second Army had been reinforced to eight corps but was still opposed by German forces near Lille, rather than advancing around the German northern flank. The German Sixth Army had also found that on arrival in the north, it was forced to oppose the French attack rather than advance around the flank and that the secondary objective of protecting the northern flank of the German armies in France had become the main task. By 6 October the French needed British reinforcements to withstand German attacks around Lille. The BEF had begun to move from the Aisne to Flanders on 5 October and reinforcements from England assembled on the left flank of the Tenth Army, which had been formed from the left flank units of the Second Army on 4 October.[2]

Tactical developments[edit | edit source]

German and Allied operations, Artois and Flanders, September–November 1914

In October 1914 French and British artillery commanders met to discuss means for supporting infantry attacks, the British practice being to keep the artillery silent until targets were identified and the French firing a rafale which ceased as the infantry began the assault. A moving barrage of fire was proposed as a combination of both methods and became a standard practice as guns and ammunition were accumulated in sufficient quantity.[3] Falkenhayn issued memoranda on 7 and 25 January 1915, defining a theory of defensive warfare to be used on the Western Front, intended to enable ground to be held with the fewest possible troops. By economising on manpower in the west, a larger number of divisions could be sent to the Eastern Front. The front line was to be fortified to enable its defence with small numbers of troops indefinitely; areas captured were to be recovered by counter-attacks. A second trench was to be dug behind the front line to shelter the trench garrison and to have easy access to the front line through covered communication trenches. Should counter-attacks fail to recover the front trench, a rearward line was to be connected to the remaining parts of the front line, limiting the loss of ground to a bend (Ausbeulung) in the line, rather than a breakthrough. The building of the new defences took until the autumn of 1915 and confronted Franco-British offensives with an evolving system of field fortifications, which was able to absorb the increasing power and sophistication of attempted breakthrough attacks.[4]

During the mobile operations of 1914, armies which operated in enemy territory were forced to rely on wireless communication, to a far greater extent than anticipated, having expected to use telegraph, telephone and dispatch riders. None of the armies had established cryptographic systems adequate to protect wireless transmissions from eavesdropping and all of the attacking armies sent messages containing vital information in plain language. From September–November the British and French intercepted c. 50 German messages, which showed the disorganisation of the German command in mid-September and the gap between the 1st and 2nd armies on the eve of the Battle of the Marne. Similar plain language messages and some decodes of crudely coded German messages, gave warnings to the British of the times, places and strengths of eight attacks of four corps or more, during the Race to the Sea and the subsequent battles in Flanders.[5]

Prelude[edit | edit source]

First Battle of Flanders[edit | edit source]

BEF casualties
August–December, 1914[6]
Month Losses
August 14,409
September 15,189
October 30,192
November 24,785
December 11,079
Total 95,654

Both sides tried to advance after the "open" northern flank had disappeared, Franco-British attacks towards Lille in October, being followed by attacks between the BEF and Belgians by a new French Eighth Army. A German offensive began on 21 October but the Fourth and Sixth armies were only able to take small amounts of ground, at great cost to both sides at the Battle of the Yser (16–31 October) and further south at Ypres. Falkenhayn then attempted to achieve a limited goal of capturing Ypres and Mount Kemmel, from (19 October – 22 November).[7] By 8 November, Falkenhayn accepted that the advance along the coast had failed and that taking Ypres was impossible.[8] The French and Germans had failed to assemble forces near the nothern flank fast enough to obtain a decisive advantage. Attacks had quickly been stopped and the armies had improvised field defences, against which attacks were repulsed with many casualties. By the end of the First Battle of Ypres, both sides were exhausted, short of ammunition and suffering from collapses in morale; some infantry units refused orders.[9]

The German failure in Flanders led both sides to elaborate the improvised field fortifications of 1914, which made a return to mobile warfare even less likely. In November, Falkenhayn reconsidered German strategy, because the failures on the Yser and at Ypres showed that Germany lacked the forces in the west to obtain a decisive victory; Vernichtungsstrategie and a dictated peace were beyond German resources. Falkenhayn doubted that victory was possible on the eastern front either, although advocated by Paul von Hindenburg and Erich Ludendorff, because the Russian armies could retreat at will into the vastness of Russia, as they had done during the invasion of 1812.[10] On 18 November, Falkenhayn took the unprecedented step of asking the Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, to negotiate a separate peace with Russia. Falkenhayn intended to detach Russia or France from the Allied coalition by diplomatic as well as military action. A strategy of attrition (Ermattungsstrategie) would make the cost of the war was too great for the Allies to bear, until one enemy negotiated an end to the war on mutually acceptable terms. The remaining belligerents would have to negotiate or face the German army concentrated on the remaining front, which would be sufficient to obtain a decisive victory.[11]

Winter operations[edit | edit source]

Defence of Festubert[edit | edit source]

A reorganisation of the defence of Flanders was carried out by the Franco-British from 15–22 November, which left the BEF holding a homogeneous front from Givenchy to Wytschaete 21 miles (34 km) to the north. The Indian Corps on the right flank held a 2-mile (3.2 km) front. During three weeks of bad weather, both sides shelled sniped and raided, the British makiing several night raids late in November. On 23 November, the German Infantry Regiment 112 captured 800 yards (730 m) of trench east of Festubert, which were then recaptured by a counter-attackby the Meerut Division during the night, at a cost of 919 Indian Corps casualties.[12]

Attack on Wytschaete[edit | edit source]

Joffre arranged for a series of attacks on the Western Front, after receiving information that German divisions were moving to the Russian Front. The Eighth Army was ordered to attack in Flanders and French was asked to participate with the BEF on 14 December. Joffre wanted the British to attack along all of the BEF front and especially from Warneton to Messines, as the French attacked from Wytschaete to Hollebeke. French gave orders to attack from the Lys to Warneton and Hollebeke with II and III Corps as IV and the Indian Corps conducted local operations to fix the Germans to their front. French emphasised that the attack would begin on the left flank, next to the French and that units must not move ahead of each other. The French and the 3rd Division were to capture Wytschaete and Petit Bois, then Spanbroekmolen was to be taken by II Corps attacking from the west and III Corps from the south, only the 3rd Division making a maximum effort. On the right the 5th Division was only to pretend to attack and III Corps was to make demonstrations, as the corps was holding a 10-mile (16 km) front and could do no more.[13]

On the left, the French XVI Corps failed to reach its objectives and the 3rd Division got to within 50 yards (46 m) of the German line and found uncut wire. One battalion took 200 yards (180 m) of the German front trench and took 42 prisoners. The failure of the attack on Wytschaete resulted in the attack further south being cancelled but German artillery retaliation was much heavier than the British bombardment. Desultory attacks were made from 15–16 December which, against intact German defences and deep mud, made no impression. On 17 December, XVI and II corps did not attack, the French IX Corps sapped forward a short distance down the Menin road and small gains were made at Klein Zillebeke and Bixschoote. Joffre ended attacks in the north, except for operations at Arras and requested support from French who ordered attacks on 18 December along the British front, then restricted the attacks to support of XVI Corps by II Corps and demonstrations by II Corps and the Indian Corps. Fog impeded the Arras attack and a German counter-attack against XVI Corps led II Corps to cancel its supporting attack. Six small attacks were made by the 8th, 7th 4th and the Indian divisions, which captured little ground, all of which was untenable due to mud and waterlogged ground. Franco-British attacks in Flanders were stopped.[14]

Defence of Givenchy[edit | edit source]

Indian reinforcements who fought at Givenchy, December 1914

At dawn on 20 December, the front of the Indian Corps with the Lahore and Meerut divisions was bombarded by heavy artillery and mortars. At 9:00 a.m. ten mines of 50 kilograms (110 lb) each, were exploded under the British lines at Givenchy, which were followed up by infantry attacks on the village and north to La Quinque Rue. The trenches either side of Givenchy were captured and east of Festubert, German troops advanced for 300 yards (270 m). During the afternoon a brigade of the 1st Division of I Corps was sent forward as reinforcement, followed by another brigade at 3:17 p.m. Next day both brigades rested until noon and then attacked towards Givenchy and the break-in near Festubert. The third 1st Division brigade arrived during the afternoon and was sent forward to recapture "the Orchard" a mile to the north-east of Festubert which had been captured during the morning. Waterlogged ground and German machine-gun fire delayed the advance which only reached Givenchy after dark, just after the garrison had retired. The 1st Guards Brigade and French Territorial troops retook the village but the disruption of the counter-attack, left a small amount of ground near Festubert on the northern flank in German hands. The three brigades were isolated in the dark and the Indian Corps commander had reported that the troops were exhausted and must be relieved. It was arranged through General Headquarters that I Corps would relieve the Indian Corps on 21 December, which was completed on 22 December.[15]

First Action of Givenchy[edit | edit source]

A German soldier deserted on 25 January and disclosed that a German attack was due against Cuinchy, French positions to the south and against Givenchy to the north. About ninety minutes later, units of the German 79th Brigade of VII Corps, attacked on the north bank of the canal. Near Givenchy, German infantry reached strong-points behind the support line but could not advance further. A hasty counter-attack by the 3rd Brigade of the 1st Division, which had two companies per battalion in the line, one in local reserve and one in brigade reserve, drove the Germans back and re-captured the British trenches, taking 72 prisoners and killing 135 German soldiers.[16]

Affairs of Cuinchy[edit | edit source]

Affairs of Cuinchy, 29 January, 1 and 6 February 1915

In January 1915, rain, snow and floods added to the dangers of sniping and artillery-fire during the day and at night both sides concentrated on repairing trenches. The area from the old La Bassée battlefield, to Kemmel 20 miles (32 km) to the north, was mainly flat low-lying meadows, in the basin of the Lys (Leie) river. Clay sub-soil stopped water soaking more than 2 feet (0.61 m) down, which left trenches water-logged. The Lys rose 7 feet (2.1 m), spread out by more than 100 feet (30 m) and some trenches were abandoned. In other places trenches were blocked at both ends and continuously bailed out, the intervening ground being covered by cross-fire from the "islands". Many men stood knee-deep in water and were relieved twice a day. In January, First Army sick leave averaged 2,144 men per day.[17]

On 1 January, a German attack captured several British posts on a railway embankment at the Brickstacks, near La Bassée Canal in the vicinity of Cuinchy, held by the 2nd Brigade of the 1st Division. A battalion counter-attack at 10:00 p.m. failed and a second attempt at 4:00 a.m. on 2 January, was eventually repulsed. A bigger British attack on 10 January, recaptured the posts and defeated three German counter-attacks but then lost the posts in a German attack on 12 January. A German soldier deserted on 25 January and disclosed that a larger German attack was due against Cuinchy, French positions to the south and against Givenchy to the north. About ninety minutes later, units of the German 84th and 79th brigades attacked on either side of the canal. The German infantry reached the Allied strong-points behind the support line but could not advance further.[18]

On the south bank a counter-attack began after a delay and the trenches were not retaken, which left the British line south of the canal in a re-entrant. On 29 January, there were two more German attacks to gain more ground, which were repulsed by two 2nd Brigade battalions. Another attack on 1 February, took a post on the railway embankment, which was recovered by a counter-attack and 32 German prisoners were taken. The 2nd Division relieved the 1st Division on 4 February and on 6 February, the 4th (Guards) Brigade crossed no man's land in the dark and then attacked to push forward the line on the flanks. The attack captured the brickstacks and improved the line at the junction with the French.[Note 1] German counter-attacks including a deception failed, when a group of Germans approached the British line, calling out "Don't shoot, we are engineers!". The British Official Historian called this a legitimate ruse, since an alert defender could be expected to challenge the party and allow only one man to approach.[20]

Aftermath[edit | edit source]

Analysis[edit | edit source]

The Reichsarchiv historians wrote that the Franco-British armies conducted attacks from 17 December between Arras and Armentières. By 20 December Allied attacks had been contained but skirmishing continued around Carency, Ecurie, Neuve Chapelle and La Bassée. On 1 January 1915, the 6th Army was ordered to capture the chapel on the Lorette Spur with the XIV Corps, after which VII Corps would join the attack on either side of La Bassée Canal, from Givenchy to Cuinchy but lack of resources led to a costly stalemate by February.[21]

details to follow-->

Notes[edit | edit source]

  1. Experiments with photography from aeroplanes to map the German front line, had been conducted during the winter. 3 Squadron Royal Flying Corps (RFC), photographed the Cuinchy area and found a new German trench, which led to the plan being amended and the junction of the Anglo-French boundary being defined with precision. [19]

Footnotes[edit | edit source]

  1. Foley 2005, p. 101.
  2. Doughty 2005, pp. 98–100.
  3. Farndale 1986, p. 71.
  4. Wynne 1939, pp. 15–17.
  5. Ferris 1992, pp. 4–5.
  6. War Office 1922, p. 253.
  7. Doughty 2005, pp. 103–104.
  8. Foley 2005, pp. 102–103.
  9. Foley 2005, p. 104.
  10. Foley 2005, p. 105.
  11. Foley 2005, pp. 105–107.
  12. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, p. 4.
  13. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 16–17.
  14. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 18–20.
  15. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 20–22.
  16. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 29–30.
  17. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 27–28.
  18. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, pp. 28–29.
  19. Jones 1928, p. 89.
  20. Edmonds & Wynne 1927, p. 30.
  21. Humphries & Maker 2010, p. 27.

References[edit | edit source]

Further reading[edit | edit source]

External links[edit | edit source]


This page uses Creative Commons Licensed content from Wikipedia (view authors).
Community content is available under CC-BY-SA unless otherwise noted.